


# ANNALES



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## STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF WOMEN'S RELIGIOUS PEACE-BUILDING (IN SLOVENIA)

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### ABSTRACT

*The purpose of the paper is to analyse important phenomenon of women's religious peacebuilding within challenges of religious pluralism, growing religious illiteracy and monolithic understanding of religions. Although voice of women and their engagement in inter-religious dialogue and religious peace-building, at least at a visible, formal level, is often omitted or ignored (in Slovenia), it is precisely at informal levels, in terms of concrete actions, that women's efforts to restore peace are very much alive and present (but academically and in theory not analysed nor valued enough). While women have been marginalized from peacebuilding generally, the emerging field of religious peacebuilding has been particularly challenging for women.*

**Keywords:** women, feminist theology, religious peacebuilding, interreligious dialogue

## I PUNTI DI FORZA E DI DEBOLEZZA DEGLI SFORZI RELIGIOSI DELLE DONNE NELLA COSTRUZIONE DELLA PACE (IN SLOVENIA)

### SINTESI

*Lo scopo del saggio è di analizzare importanti fenomeni di costruzione della pace religiosa delle donne nell'ambito delle sfide del pluralismo religioso, dell'analfabetismo religioso crescente e della comprensione monolitica delle religioni. Sebbene la voce delle donne e il loro impegno nel dialogo interreligioso e nella costruzione della pace religiosa, almeno a livello visibile e formale, siano spesso omessi o ignorati (in Slovenia), è proprio a livello informale, in termini di azioni concrete, che gli sforzi delle donne per ripristinare la pace sono molto vivi e presenti (ma a livello accademico e in teoria non vengono analizzati né valutati in maniera sufficiente). Mentre le donne sono state emarginate dalla costruzione della pace in generale, il campo emergente della costruzione della pace religiosa è stato particolarmente impegnativo per le donne.*

**Parole chiave:** le donne, la teologia femminista, il costruzione della pace religiosa, il dialogo interreligioso

## INTRODUCTION

Nowdays, in the time of fast-paced globalization, religions have found themselves in a unique position because “*they all found themselves on the same stage*” (Smrke, 2000, 10). Under the headlamps of secularization<sup>1</sup> and consequent desecularization, accelerated migration and (European) refugee crisis (from 2015), religious pluralism is provoked. David Smock asserts that history of the association between religion and conflict, both civil and international, is very long, but the ending of the Cold War and the consequent upsurge in identity conflicts, waged between groups defined by factors such as ethnicity, race, gender, and religion, has given new emphasis to that association. Nothing and no one is immune from the effects of this close relationship (Smock, 2002, vii). A consequent reinvestigation of a relationship between religion and violence on one side, and booming of religious peacebuilding on the other, (re)emerged.

With the world becoming increasingly interdependent as a result of globalization, migration has led to more interaction between different cultures and faiths fuelling such theories as Samuel Huntington's “the Clash of Civilisations” and reductionist account such as Bernard Lewis's representations of Islam. Rendering religion as an ahistorical, monolithic,<sup>2</sup> and unchanging essence, consequently produces an overly simplistic, belligerent and deterministic picture of religion and conflict in the post-Cold War era. Or, as Atalia Omer has put it:

*This picture is an appealing one precisely because of its simplicity; it consequently functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy with both Islamists and xenophobic Western commentators rendering their objectives in terms of ineradicable and irreconcilable differences between civilisations* (Omer, 2015, 4).

Religious illiteracy in terms of lack of knowledge and ability to understand the complex social phenomenon of religion, and its consequent misinterpretations, could reproduce simplisms and negative (gender) religious stereotypes and prejudices that fuell conflict and violence. Religious education matters as never before as we cannot understand our own culture without religious knowledge, let alone

that of others (Davie, 2012, 279). Raising religious literacy is therefore one of the most important issue for education system and should also be implemented in inter-religious and religious peace-building. Inter-religious dialogue in post-modern society refers to dialogue at the ecumenical and interreligious level, as well as dialogue between traditional religions and new religious movements (the latter still represents a challenge of modern times), between believers and non-believers and so on. In this context, we are talking about interreligious dialogue which comprises a broader definition of relationships between different religions and spiritualities. Anja Zalta has described secular imperative of pluralistic religious coexistence:

*Because of the negative experiences of religious exclusions, particularities and extremisms, the secular imperative has become a European reality. This secular imperative allowed the emergence of new religious forms in the space, which was emptied from the narrative of just one religion and offered (at least theoretically) an equal coexistence of different religions/alternative ideologies and world views* (Zalta, 2018a, 42).

The importance of dialogic relationship between religions has been given an even stronger role in the light of the revival of the meaning of religion (desecularization), which is important in major contexts, e.g. in the context of democratic politics, in the context of political and religious extremism and terrorism, or in the context of the integration or non-integration of immigrants. Some of the ongoing debates connect the latter two, especially religious-political extremism and terrorism with the unsuccessful integration of immigrants (Drexler & Heckmann, 2005). Since a person's value system is often based on religion, religion can be an important part of the cultural capital of an individual, and if a person migrates to another country he or she will carry these elements of faith. Even if all material possesions are lost, this religious capital will remain with the migrant. Religion can become an important part of the identity of a migrant, even if he or she holds little interest in religious matters before leaving home country. When found in a new situations without family and social links and when individual migrants feel the need to

1 Anja Zalta claims that “*in the context of Europe it is clear that without the process of secularisation, (religious) pluralism would not be possible*” (Zalta, 2018a, 47).

2 Monolithic understanding of religions and the myth of uniformity of religions is one of the most common signs of religious illiteracy. And could lead to politicalisation in terms of promotion one state religion, denomination, or philosophy to the exclusion of all other religious beliefs. According to Encyclopedia Britannica from 1994 there are around 22.000 different Christian churches and denominations (Smrke, 2000, 13). According to Pew Research Centre there are more than twenty million Muslims in Europe, representing one of the largest religious minorities, which is by no means monolithic, as many would like to believe as a consequence of their religious illiteracy (Zalta, 2018a, 42).

defend their identities, religion becomes essential. Depending on what migrant will find in the host country, religion will become a positive or negative element in the personal integration process. Therefore, to establish tolerance of acceptance with (and through) the process of raising (critical) religious literacy through educational system and through the promotion of interreligious dialogue is of a great importance for integration process and the mutual coexistence and has the greatest impact when it is locally defined (Furlan Štante, 2018, 83–84). Since religions have had, and still have, a critical role in shaping the world and play a vital role in shaping world politics, as Aleš Črnič has emphasized, it is crucial to implement religion-related content in school curricula, in terms of non-confessional education about religion(s):

*In the contemporary European context, which is marred by growing Islamophobia and related growth of intolerant and radically exclusionist political (and other) extremisms, the need for a systematic critical introduction of pupils to the complex social and cultural phenomenon that religion is (with all its diversity in today's world) is particularly evident (Črnič, 2019, 5).*

From this perspective, this paper<sup>3</sup> will analyse positive and negative aspects of women's religious peace-building and its impact on religious literacy (in Slovenian context).

#### WOMEN'S RELIGIOUS PEACEBUILDING, DECONSTRUCTION OF NEGATIVE (GENDER) STEREOTYPES, RELIGIOUS LITERACY

The fundamental starting point of the article is the importance of including women's voice and gender dimension in interreligious dialogue, as well as positive contribution of women's efforts in religious peacebuilding. Inter-religious dialogue and religious peacebuilding are often seen, by both religious and secular actors, as the natural antidote to religious violence or identity conflicts with a religious dimension. Interreligious peacebuilding can also be indispensable in conflicts where religious differences are not at issue in the conflict. Religious peace building in our study is not understood in the narrower sense (in terms of war, post-war engagement) but, above all, in the broader sense; in the context of the efforts of religious peacebuilding in crisis hot spots (refugee centres) and other places that need reconciliation and healing of traumas and wounds or improved mutual understanding:

*The term peacebuilding is used increasingly to define the broad, complex, and sustained process of creating, securing, protecting, and consolidating a peaceful order – work that goes far beyond the formal negotiations that seek to end armed conflicts. Peacebuilding overlaps with development and good governance in the greater effort to build successful, prosperous, and resilient societies. It also reaches into social realms where religious institutions hold sway. It affects and is affected by the role of women in society generally and in creating peace specifically (Hayward & Marshall, 2015, 5).*

The goals of religious peacebuilding depend on the nature of the conflict and one's theory of change. They range from (1) repairing and/or deepening relationships; (2) improving mutual understanding; (3) finding common ground on beliefs and issues; (4) promoting common action; and/or (5) encouraging complementary action for peace and justice. At this point we could see peacebuilding as direct "inside" form of critical detector, evaluator and promotor of equality and justice:

*Peace-building is intricately associated with questions of justice or »positive« peace and the transformation not only of direct and obvious violence, but also of structural and cultural forms of violence (Omer, 2015, 10).*

From this perspective, the paper addresses the analysis of good religious practices and analysis of different forms of women's engagement in interreligious dialogue and interreligious peacebuilding in Slovenia (with an emphasis on Christianity and Islam), which consequently promote the implementation of human rights and peaceful coexistence in a democratic, intercultural, religiously and ethnically pluralistic, diverse society.

Although voice of women and their engagement in inter-religious dialogue and religious peacebuilding, at least at a visible, formal level, is often omitted or ignored in Slovenia as well, it is precisely at informal levels, in terms of concrete actions, that women's efforts to restore peace are very much alive and present (but academically and in theory not analysed nor valued enough).

While women have been marginalized from peacebuilding generally, the emerging field of religious peacebuilding has been particularly challenging for women. The marginalization of women in peacebuilding work, even as the definition of the

<sup>3</sup> This article was made possible by the financial support of the Slovenian Research Agency in the frames of the project *Interreligious dialogue: a basis for coexisting diversity in the light of migration and the refugee crisis* (ARRS research project J6-9393) and of the programme *Liminal spaces: areas of cultural and societal cohabitation in the age of risk and vulnerability* (ARRS research programme P6-0279).

work has broadened, reflects the larger field of international relations, which has historically been male dominated in theory and practice. United Nations Security Resolution 1325, passed in 2000, calls for the equal participation of women in peacebuilding. The resolution also encourages greater international attention to the effects of conflict and war on women (Hayward & Marshall, 2015, 5).

Similarly, lack of women's voices in interreligious dialogue, where diversity and variety are encountered, presents a considerable disadvantage in the effort of ethicalization of interhuman, intercultural and interreligious relationships. In order to empower individuals, society and religion, it is of utmost importance to think, reflect and take into consideration gender dimension. When talking about interreligious dialogue and how to integrate women's voices and gender dimension into it, we must first note two levels of epistemological definition of women's interreligious dialogue. First level presents the issue of involving women and gender dimension in the field of interreligious dialogue. Second level encompasses feminist interreligious dialogue, where individual women's experiences are confronted with a fundamental experience of oppression, neglect and marginalization within individual social and religious realities. For most effective deconstruction of prejudices and negative (gender) stereotypes, a combination of both levels is of utmost importance. However, it is precisely the latter that lacks contemporary trends and models of interreligious dialogue (both in Slovenia and beyond).

The importance of evaluating the role of women in the context of ecumenical and interreligious dialogue was also emphasized by Pope Francis when he welcomed members of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and emphasized the need for women to be engaged in interreligious dialogue:

*This means that the contribution of women should not be confined to 'female' arguments or to gatherings among women only. A dialogue is the path that women and men must take together. Today, more than ever, it is necessary for women to be present. By possessing special characteristics<sup>4</sup>, a woman can make an important contribution to dialogue through her ability to listen, accept and be generous to others (Francis, 2017).*

Pope Francis emphasised that women are often left alone in accompanying others, especially when it comes to the weakest members of the family and

society, the victims of conflict and those who have to face challenges on daily basis. In the context of the importance of (women's religious) peacebuilding and Christian-Islamic dialogue, a joint statement was signed by Pope Francis and the Grand Imam Al-Azhar Al-Tayyib on February 4, 2019, in commemoration of 80th anniversary of the meeting between Francis of Assisi and Sultan Malik al-Kamil. This document strongly condemns terrorism and violence and calls for a non-discriminatory form of coexistence. The Bishop of Rome and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar declare that, in the East and the West, believers in different religions, who look upon one another as brothers and sisters, can help each other to seek to avoid the "world war fought piecemeal" from breaking out in all its destructive power (Tornielli, 2019). While document emphasizes the importance of mutual cooperation "*in the name of God who has created all human beings equal in rights, duties and dignity, and who has called them to live together as brothers and sisters, to fill the earth and make known the values of goodness, love and peace*" (Francis, 2019), its title (*A Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living*) reveals hidden logic of gender discrimination. Despite being noted that term *human fraternity* "*embraces all human beings, unites them and renders them equal*" (Francis, 2019) the term itself implies strong normativity of male gender and consequent suppression of women and femininity.

Therefore, critical feminist inter-religious dialogue and religious peacebuilding is of utmost importance. Through the eyes of feminist theology, the (religious) other and the different are always understood in the paradigm of specific particularity and uniqueness, and of equal integrity. In this context, the very phenomenon of feminist theology can be understood as a form of interreligious dialogue (Furlan Štante, 2017, 56–57). Namely, feminist theology became a worldwide all-religious movement, in response to women's experiences of neglect and patriarchal domination, which regulated and determined their religious and secular lives. Just as individual women's experiences and the efforts of women within Christianity are different, so are different religious women's experiences within other world religions. However, we can say that all of them have in common the fact of oppression and feelings of patriarchal violence that they had to or still have to suffer. Although the experience of oppression and patriarchal violence is differently understood in different cultural and religious spheres, the desire and the need to speak about women's experiences and awakening of a woman's voice is universal. In

4 Emphasizing specific features of women is a characteristic of "Catholic feminism", which, while striving for non-discriminatory treatment of women within Catholicism and society, nevertheless remains deeply entrenched in the essentialist concept of gender, women and their gender role. The Christian anthropology of gender emphasizes the equivalence and equality of men and women in the light of human dignity, while also pointing to gender diversity (Furlan, 2006, 126–132).



**Image 1: Women against violent extremism (Source: Impakter).**

this sense, we can say that feminist theology and religious feminism have become an intercultural and interreligious phenomenon. It calls on women and at the same time it connects all women to strive for liberation from the religious dominance of patriarchal violence. This can be compared to the fight against slavery, racial discrimination or any other genocide. In different religions, women's liberation movements are formed differently. Anyhow, feminist theology is a pluralistic and diverse phenomenon rooted in women's religious experience, full of hopes, unfulfilled dreams and striving for liberation, equality and equitable evaluation of the feminine principle of action, as well as for the ethical feminization and harmonization of the world. To empower a woman as a subject.

Christian feminist theologians are increasingly striving for cooperation within individual branches of Christian feminist theology. They are aware that Christian feminist theology is an intercultural phenomenon that differs in its cultural diversity but is also an intercultural phenomenon. These different cultures are not isolated from each other, but they cooperate and interact with each other. Feminist theologians engage in interreligious dialogue, which, in turn, comprises various experiences of past and present neglect of women in the field of a particular religion and society, and the related issues and challenges. An example of continuous feminist interreligious dialogue is definitely the international, European Society of Women in Theological Research which has been operating since 1986. Within national, regional and European conferences, ESWTR members seek ecumenical and interreligious dialogue and in this context they address the current social and religious issues, such as the issue of

women's spirituality, the issue of gender and gender roles, reconstruction of the past, its influence and echo in the present, the question of religious authority and hierarchy, the issue of ecological awareness or environmental sensibility and theological ecofeminism, the question of exegesis and woman voices and characters etc. (ESWTR, 2019)

Feminist theologians critically oppose all forms of oppression, inequality and discrimination (gender, racial, class, ethnic, religious ...). Just as they refuse to distribute power along male-centred androcentrism, they also reject the superiority of a particular religion at the expense of other(s). They are committed to recognizing the equal humanity of women and the equality of all religions. In this sense, Rita Gross rejects the exclusivist and inclusivist approach of theology of religions, referring to the critical argument that they both reiterate and promote the superiority of Christianity over other religions, and calls on feminist theologians to move beyond discriminatory models and practices of exclusivism and inclusivism and adopt a pluralistic model. In her opinion, this model enables more effective recognition of common points in different traditions (Gross, 2001, 87–89). In the context of finding adequate forms and models for interreligious dialogue, they follow the critical view raised by Rita Gross and Rosemary Radford Ruether, criticizing the superiority over Christian universalism and patriarchal domination and self-evident primacy over other religious traditions (Furlan Šante, 2017, 55). The critique of self-evident Christian superiority over other religions and the issue of trans-religious identity (Katarina von Kellenbach) are important sources of feminist interreligious dialogue. From the very beginning, feminist theology was also an

*ecumenical theology* where women from different Christian churches and religions meet, so we can say that feminist theology promotes interreligious dialogue. These women have the same starting points and common goals. However, we must bear in mind that every woman comes from different social, historical and political circumstances. Therefore, there is no common model and every woman must contribute her share to liberation. Feminist theology thus becomes a very colourful whole, constantly in motion and in formation.

The active engagement of feminist theologians or women's voices in interreligious dialogue is primarily about introducing women's questions and views into interreligious dialogue and, consequently, critically recognizing and detecting the presence of negative gender and religious stereotypes and prejudices. This, in turn, makes it possible to become more aware of and recognize the otherness and specifics of the other, as well as to reveal many of the negative stereotypes and prejudices that are deeply rooted in our cultural collective awareness of not knowing the other and the different, in this case, women. With that in mind, the other, the different, becomes closer and the close one. The feminist dimension of interreligious dialogue in this respect concretizes the fields of diversity and divergence as it confronts the challenges and issues of concrete women's personal experiences and confessions that come to life through interreligious dialogue. It is this lively dialogism that is of particular importance in learning about the difference and specificity of certain religious traditions and their manifestations and women's religious experiences.

#### FRAMEWORKS OF INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE IN SLOVENIA

According to the Office for Religious Communities of the Republic of Slovenia, which operates within the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Slovenia, 54 churches and other religious communities are registered in Slovenia. This raises the topical issue of the (in)adequacy or, rather, fluid diversity of definitions of religious communities, churches, or more broadly, religions, and consequently the relationships among them and their positioning in the social space of Slovenia. The latter is a major and important challenge of modern times, both in Slovenia and beyond:

*When we talk about the administrative and legal definition of the concept of religion, we are primarily referring to determining the conditions under which a particular group can obtain the status of a religion and the associated benefits. The status of religion in most*

*legal systems provides certain legal protection, various tax benefits, access to the media* (Črnčič, 2001, 1005)

In this context, the following definition has been used by the Office for Religious Communities of the Republic of Slovenia: "A church or any other religious community is a voluntary, non-profit association of people of the same religious beliefs" (Office for Religious Communities, 2019). The basis for the entire regulation of the position of religious communities in the Republic of Slovenia is, according to constitutional case law, the human right to religious freedom or freedom of conscience referred to in Article 41 of the Constitution, and in this sense takes precedence over the constitutional principles that determine the position of religious communities in relation to the state. In this context, we refer to three important principles or milestones that frame the relationships among religious communities and between religious communities and the state: the principle of separating the state from religious communities; the principle of freedom of action for religious communities and the principle of equality of religious communities. All three principles are specified in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. The principle of separating the state from religious communities consequently imposes the principle of religious neutrality of the state, which requires equal treatment of religious communities in the field of religion and human rights (Office for Religious Communities, 2019). Therefore, this is the basis for plural equality of all religions and religious communities in the Republic of Slovenia.

In order to understand different ways and models of interreligious dialogue, it is important to be aware of the typologies of religious exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism that explains the dialogic tensions between openness and identity and to strike a balance between loyalty to one's own religion and openness. Thus, exclusivism is characterized by its aversion to other religions, as it mainly rejects interreligious dialogue and merely sees a religious other as the one who needs to be converted. The antithetical structure of an exclusivist worldview is e.g. Christian versus non-Christian or non-believers. The second model – inclusivism is more open to interreligious dialogue than the exclusivist approach. It is characterized by an eschatological connection as a reason for interreligious dialogue that seeks openness to the religious other; the focus is on connection, continuation and the search for common ground, as well as the search for harmony, emphasizing the power of integration. The inclusivism model of interreligious dialogue contains both positive, above mentioned elements, and negative elements, hierarchy being one of them (Daggers, 2012, 55–56).

Religious pluralism also builds on the phenomenology of the common, but also emphasizes the de-absolutisation of truth in the context of the de-absolutisation of symmetrical reciprocity between dialogic partners. It is characterized by a dynamic-relational understanding of religious identity that allows openness to the religious other. Its disadvantage shows in the homogenization of religious heterogeneity that pushes the specifics of individual religions into the background. The model of particularism attempts to rebuild this, aiming to transcend the soteriological firmness and rigidity of classical theology of religions and succeed where the classical soteriological approach has failed – in the search of a balance between openness and identity. The emphasis is on accepting otherness, so it is about creating space for the particularity of other religions (Prijatelj, 2012, 72–75). This opens up the possibility of interreligious conflict, when it comes down to the question of values, norms and beliefs of different religions, despite their similarities and details, not necessarily there are the same answers provided. It is therefore necessary to cultivate a hermeneutical openness that begins with the recognition of uncontrollability and un-possessiveness of *other* in other religions.

#### CRITICAL EVALUATION OF WOMEN'S VOICES AND ACTIONS IN ECUMENICAL AND INTERRELIGIOUS PEACEBUILDING IN SLOVENIA

This section will highlight some major women's initiatives and actions that promote ecumenical and interreligious dialogue and peacebuilding within the framework of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Slovenia, thus, working towards the end of "religious ignorance or illiteracy" which often serves as a springboard for many prejudices and negatives stereotypes. As Anja Zalta points out, we have recently witnessed heated debates in Slovenian social and religious fields on the topic of Muslim *hijab* of covering their face, shifting from the field of multiculturalism to the field of social cohesion, integration and, above all, security. This discourse has, as Zalta puts it,

*triggered an additional Islamophobic reaction online, especially with the massive influx of refugees to Europe in the second half of 2015 and in 2016. Vandalism and graffiti have emerged, equating refugees and asylum seekers with Islamists and "Islamic terrorists." In 2016, we also witnessed one of the first media known Islamophobic acts in Slovenia, when strangers dumped pig heads and glasses of blood at the construction site of the Islamic Religious and Cultural Centre in Ljubljana. The public Facebook pages that have been created*

*along with this (and not just for that) have begun to spread extreme forms of hate speech directed against Muslims. Certain web pages appeared, such as Radical Ljubljana, Slovenia Protect Your Borders, Slovenian Police, We Don't Want Refugees and Migrants in Slovenia, We Don't Want a Mosque in Ljubljana, to name but a few; they used the rhetoric that showed religious illiteracy that limits Islam to some stereotypes and in the extreme examples completely dehumanizes Muslims (Zalta, 2018b, 53).*

Interreligious dialogue, and especially the voices of women in it, are of utmost importance in raising awareness of both individual believers who are directly engaged and, consequently, of the broader religious communities and the society in which these religious communities coexist. As a result, negative stereotypes and prejudices are disintegrated and we are enriched with religious knowledge. Views of women are extremely valuable because they are removing the veils of prejudice and represent critical thinking even on the subtle but often overlooked and concealed questions that are one of the most effective tools of conflict and hate speech – if they remain secret and concealed.

Therefore, I would like to focus first on the initiative of Muslim women within the Zemzem Association (Zemzem Women's Association), officially active since 2007. It is a voluntary, non-profit, non-governmental and independent association operating within the Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia. The association was established for the purpose of organizing cultural and social events, humanitarian campaigns and education. With the event of *Bosnian Food Festival*, which is one of their most important projects, the female members try to bring Bosnian cuisine closer to the local and broader society, and they give the profit to humanitarian organisations. In 2009, they also organized a fashion show that featured a modern Islamic style of dress for a contemporary Muslim woman. Its purpose was to present a *hijab* or a veil to all who are unfamiliar with the concept (Zemzem, 2019). This could be an example of good practice of religious peace building in terms of raising religious literacy and mutual coexistence, but due to the lack of critical feminist perspective, it remains in the realm of perpetuation of negative gender stereotypes and prejudices. We could trace hidden captivity within realm of prejudices in the case of recent act of gender discrimination implied by representatives of the Islamic Community in Slovenia – a day before praying at a new mosque in Ljubljana – sparked a wave of outrage with their announcement. It was said a prayer would be held on Friday 7<sup>th</sup> of February 2020, but

no women were invited. Among other things, they wrote on Facebook: "Due to spatial distress, it is not intended that women will attend" (Slovenske Novice, 2020). Otherwise, it is a Friday prayer called the Jummah prayer, where, according to religious commandments, women may also attend, but Friday prayer is not obligatory for them.

The engagement of Slovenian Muslim women in their pursuit of building (religious) peace and inter-religious dialogue is completely different from many initiatives and actions of Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, bearing the mark of different socio-religious needs and frameworks. When the war started in Balkans in 1991, some feminist theologians became active in secular women's organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to help women and children survive traumas sustained during the war and after, in the war camps (Spahić-Šiljak, 2013, 177).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, women's (religious) peace-building initiatives are largely organised in the form of assistance to women who are often left to themselves after the war, as victims of war violence (as a rape<sup>5</sup>), cast off to the brink of society or even murdered.<sup>6</sup>

Post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction likewise offers the opportunity to acknowledge the contributions and sacrifices made by different groups of people during the war. It also provides opportunities for change in social relationships including gender relations. Zilka Spahić-Šiljak examines how the socio-political context of the region in Bosnia and Herzegovina influenced the emergence of peace-building and Islamic feminism, and how secular human rights and feminist organizations provided a fertile ground for female Bosnian activists to practice feminist theology even before they were exposed to the theoretical underpinnings of Islamic feminism (Spahić-Šiljak, 2017, 165).

An example of women's activities within the world's largest Christian ecumenical initiative is the *World Day of Prayer*, which places the hardships of women at the heart of common prayers and is spread in Slovenia as well. Within the framework of this international, worldwide initiative, the Slovenian Women's Initiative for the World Day of Prayer for Women has been part of the world initiative for approximately twenty years now (since 2000, for the first time in Rogaška Slatina, later in Ljubljana ...), co-ordinated by Tanja Povšnar. The mythical initiator of the *World Day of Prayer for Women* in Slovenia is German evangelical priest Corina Harbig, who founded this ecumenical movement

in Slovenia in 1999. *The World Day of Prayer for Women* is therefore a global ecumenical movement for women that cultivates prayer and connects different countries of the world. On the first Friday in March every year, the public is invited to commemorate the day of common prayer. Every year, prayer service is drawn up by women from a different country, and this country becomes the subject of prayer on that day, starting at the time of the sunrise above the Tonga Islands in the Pacific and then it continues on all continents until about 36 hours later when the last prayer is completed on the Samoa Islands. Prayer is organised every year by women in one country. Thus, on the first Friday in March, women around the world pray for 24 hours with women from a particular country, from the sunrise in the east to the sunset in the east. This is the quest for unity that Christian women have been pursuing for 130 years, a form of simple and practical ecumenism. The beginnings date back to 1887. Methodist and Presbyterian Christians first gathered in the United States to pray for missions. From this gathering, the world's largest ecumenical movement has grown. It is based on the prayer of women of different Churches and Christian communities and on solidarity support. The breakthrough was achieved in New York in 1900 at the ecumenical missionary conference, a central committee organized by women. The first World Day of Prayer was held in Europe in 1927 in Lodz, Poland. World Day of Prayer is a charismatic movement based on immersing in the Bible, prayer and solidarity. Husbands and children also join women in their prayer (World Day of Prayer for Women, 2019).

When it comes to the women's world day of prayer, it is not only prayer, but also concrete help or support that women receive in the selected country. The country selected does not choose its own theme, the theme is determined by the international executive board which informs the delegates of the national committees at an international meeting. The motto of the movement is: "*Informed Prayer – Prayerful Action*". Besides prayer, donation is also organised, intended for projects in the country that prepares the prayer. This prayer includes all the country, its characteristics, adversity and joys. It takes years to prepare for this. The Slovenian section of the World Day of Prayer for Women was chosen to prepare a prayer service in 2019 at St. Nicholas Cathedral in Ljubljana. Tanja Povšnar, the President or the Coordinator of the World Day of Prayer for Women, commented on the funds raised to support women in Slovenia:

<sup>5</sup> The impact of the pregnancies that result from rape is massively damaging. Estimates of rape pregnancies in warfare include 20-50.000 Bosnian women in 1993 (El-Bushra & Mukarubuga, 1995, 17).

<sup>6</sup> For a more detailed description of the examples, please see Popov Momčinović, 2018.

*We will support various projects with the help of donations. One of the projects aims at training leaders for groups where women gather to alleviate their problems. With the help of the Bible Society, we want to organize education for various associations, institutions, groups trying to relieve internal wounds resulting from traumas (alcoholism, abortion, separations, death, division between family and job, addictions, low self-esteem, alienation). The project will also connect Bible Societies and World Prayer Day Groups in the broader Balkan area. At the same time, we are thinking of rejuvenation and digitization of World Prayer Day Group in Slovenia, which is always a challenge. We want to reach out to as many people as we can, inform the people around us, ask God for help, and give thanks for all His gifts* (Povšnar in: Žebovec, 2019).

With World Day of Prayer for Women, women warn of ecumenism that knows no boundaries. As they pray, they learn about the lives and hardships of women in one of the countries of the world, who receive their voice through the prayers. Although it is an initiative that does not wish to be self-interpreted as feminist, it paves the way for voices of the ignored, the silent, and the vulnerable groups of women from all over the world. This, however, is one of the fundamental goals of many forms of various feminisms. At this point I would like to highlight the question of appropriateness or inappropriateness of the well-established term *feminist theology* which has a rather negative connotation, especially in the countries of Eastern Europe or in post-socialist and post-communist countries. Terms such as feminism, chauvinism, etc. are already pre-labelled with a negative sign. In the case of feminism, we think of the most radical form of feminism, which rejects all that is male.

The word *feminism* is clearly loaded with opposite meanings, laden with feelings that encourage comments, definitions, and explanations; it has many tones, it is strongly stereotyped. Many years of different, opposing, even mutually exclusive feminisms have taken its toll and burdened the word itself. Some meanings have predominated and displaced others: the stereotypical feminist has become, for example, a disgruntled, nagging woman, hysterical, incompetent, unappealing, unrealized, frustrated (because of an unhappy relationship with a man), in short, a woman who projects her bitterness on all females and thus mitigates and resolves her own problems and shortcomings. Men are fond of having fun at the expense of feminists, claiming they do not know what they are doing; or they even look down upon these flawed creatures with contempt. Perhaps this

is why many women feel they need to say aloud that they are not feminists or feminist theologians. When a woman says, "I'm not a feminist," she also wants to say, "I'm not incompetent, bitter, I'm not an unrealized woman. I succeeded because of my qualities, my knowledge and my work, without emphasising my gender, without claiming special rights, without entering in conflicts with the opposite gender." When members of a reading club in the Australian city of Victoria were asked what literature they read, most of them said that they do not like to read feminist literature and that they do not in any way regard themselves as feminists. But in fact, they did prefer to read books that were considered feminist – stories about strong women, about unhappy women, about successful women. In short, stories in which women appeared as prominent characters, as visible characters with whom they also identified. And they also lived, to say the least, in a *feminist* manner: they were independent, educated, employed (Vendramin, 1997, 50). Could this be the contradiction of women or the contradiction of *feminism*, or perhaps just a resistance to the perverted meaning of the term *feminism*? The negative dimension of the term *feminism* spills over everything related to the term. Thus, feminist theology is also negatively understood and labelled. That is why many try to use a milder and kinder term *female spirituality*, which is not exactly correct. Because something that is *feminine* is not necessarily *feminist in nature*, these are not the two sides of an equation. Namely, feminism views everything that is feminine through the prism of trapping a woman in the patriarchal bonds of society and questions the whole context. The latter could be a major contributor to various efforts of women in (religious) peacebuilding, as it would help to a more thorough dissolution and transformation of negative gender and religious prejudice and stereotyping.

## CONCLUSION

Only in complete dialogism, which does not exclude the critical view of gender dimension, can religion be understood as a factor of ethics and a catalyst for peace and the empowerment for the individuals and the society in which they are developing. When differences in religious belief and practice generate differences in convictions about how society should be structured, the potential obstacles to effective dialogue multiply. Interreligious dialogue is often considered either as idealised, i.e. affirmed as a religious-ethical imperative but lacking critical, scientific understanding, or as unfavourable for ideological reasons – e.g. because it is not based on secular (or secularistic) assumptions. Interreligious dialogue operates in three areas: practical, where interfaith partners collaborate to help

humanity; the depth or spiritual dimension, where interfaith partners attempt to experience the partner's religion or ideology "from within"; the cognitive, where interfaith partners seek understanding of the truth (Swider, 1998, 28). At the same time, it often uncritically perpetuates patterns of stereotyping and prejudicial perceptions of the religious (sexual) other. David Smock asserts that when interreligious dialogue is used to contribute international peacebuilding, it is involved in the process of overcoming prejudices and religious discrimination, and as such could be understood as religious peacebuilding in terms of helping humanity (Smock, 2002, 6). Also, the forms of women's engagement in interreligious dialogue and religious peacebuilding in Slovenia that are described in this paper are no exception. Despite the positive elements (e.g. improving mutual understanding; finding common ground on beliefs and issues; promoting common action and raising religious literacy), the lack of a critical feminist perspective, both at the initiative of Muslim women

within the Zemzem Society and at the Slovenian section of the World Day of Prayer for Women, often perpetuates, reinforces and shares negative gender stereotypes and prejudices. Despite this weakness, the presence of women's religious peacebuilding (in both presented cases) is of utmost importance "*because while women have been marginalized from peacebuilding generally, the emerging field of religious peacebuilding has been particularly challenging for women*" (Hayward, 2015, 312). While formal religious authority primarily vested in men in most religious traditions), those women seeking to work through religious institutions or to shape pro-peace religious attitudes often struggle to find spaces to lead efforts or exert influence. Despite these challenges, many women of faith pursue peace actively both within and outside of religious institutions. As such, they are creating safe space and possibility for further deconstruction and transformation of negative gender stereotypes and prejudices, and as such could be understood as potential catalyst for peace.

## PREDNOSTI IN PASTI ŽENSKE RELIGIJSKE IZGRADNJE MIRU (V SLOVENIJI)

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### *POVZETEK*

*Prispevek v prvi vrsti opozarja na pomen vključevanja žensk in njihovih glasov v medreligijski dialog ter v procesu religijske izgradnje miru. Z metodologijo hermenevtičnega ključa feministične teologije analizira primera dobre prakse religijske izgradnje miru (Zemzem in Svetovni molitveni dan žensk – slovenska sekcijsa) v slovenskem (krščansko-muslimanskem religijskem) kontekstu. Ob tem kritično analizira prednosti in slabosti teh primerov ter opozori na pomen dekonstrukcije in transformacije negativnih (spolnih) stereotipov in predsodkov, ki se prenašajo tudi po in preko sicer pomembnih opisanih ženskih religijskih iniciativ. Ob tem opozori na različne modele in poti medreligijskega dialoga (tipologije verskega ekskluzivizma, inkluzivizma in pluralizma), ki razlagajo dialoške napetosti med odprtostjo in identiteto ter vzpostavljivo ravnotežje med zvestobo lastni religiji in odprtostjo do drugih. Model feministične teologije zavrača ekskluzivističen in inkluzivističen pristop teologije religij, na podlagi kritičnega argumenta, da oba ponavljata in promovirata superiornost ene religije (krščanstva) nad drugimi religijami in poziva k pluralističnemu modelu ter preseganju diskriminatornih modelov in praks.*

**Ključne besede:** ženske, feministična teologija, religijska izgradnja miru, medreligijski dialog

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## THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AS OBSTACLES TO PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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### ABSTRACT

*The article focuses on the question of Islamophobia or "Turkophobia" in specific historical contexts and dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The article discusses the definition of Islamophobia in combination with the Eurocentric compression of racism that can be recognized in Orientalist discourses. It also emphasizes that Islamophobia and/or Muslim hatred in the south Slavic area has deep historic roots. An in-depth understanding of the special socio-cultural, historical, political and religious characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a precondition for imagining possibilities of ensuring peace and for consistent application of new models and methods for peacebuilding and peaceful coexistence.*

**Keywords:** Islamophobia, Racism, Orientalism, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Neo-Ottomanism, Muslims, Turkey, Turkophobia, Inter-religious Dialogue

## IL PROBLEMA DELL'ISLAMOFOBIA E LE SUE CONSEGUENZE COME OSTACOLO NELLA COSTRUZIONE DELLA PACE IN BOSNIA-ERZEGOVINA

### SINTESI

*L'articolo si concentra sulla questione dell'islamofobia o "turcofobia" in specifici contesti storici e nelle dinamiche in Bosnia ed Erzegovina. L'articolo discute la definizione di islamofobia in combinazione con la comprensione eurocentrica del razzismo che può e deve essere riconosciuta nei discorsi orientalistici e mostra che l'islamofobia e/o l'odio per i musulmani nell'area degli slavi meridionali ha profonde radici storiche. Una comprensione approfondita delle specifiche caratteristiche socio-culturali, storiche, politiche e religiose della Bosnia-Erzegovina presentate nell'articolo è un prerequisito per l'avviamento di nuovi modelli e metodi, sia per la costruzione della pace che per una convivenza pacifica.*

**Parole chiave:** Islamofobia, razzismo, orientalismo, Bosnia ed Erzegovina, neo-ottomanismo, musulmani, Turchia, Turkofobia, Dialogo interreligioso

## INTRODUCTION: ISLAMOPHOBIA AS RACISM – DEFINITION OF THE TERM

The paper seeks to offer an understanding of how and whether it is possible to create a fruitful interreligious and interethnic dialogue that would foster long-lasting peace in the region. There are many studies and scientific approaches that have addressed this topic based on historical, political, economic, etc., perspectives. The contribution of this article is to explicitly expose the issue of Islamophobic and Turkophobic (political) discourses in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the construction of the "Other" in the specific socio-cultural and historical context. It is on the basis of the deconstruction of the racist notion of the "Other" that (new) methods for fruitful interreligious dialogue and peaceful coexistence could be applied. Therefore, the first task is to understand the issue of Islamophobia and then relate it to the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are many definitions of Islamophobia, influenced by different theoretical approaches. Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı, the editors of the most comprehensive annual Islamophobia report in Europe since 2015, with the intention to encourage politicians and the general public to discuss Islamophobia on the basis of qualitative data, are proposing the use of the following working definition of Islamophobia:

*Islamophobia is about dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilizing and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/definition of constructed 'we'. Islamophobia operates by constructing a static 'Muslim' identity, which is attributed in negative terms and generalized for all Muslims. At the same time, Islamophobic images are fluid and vary in different contexts, because Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about Muslim/Islam (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2020, 8).*

While trying to explain the term Islamophobia, one realizes that the complexity and diversity of the Muslim identity are many times insufficiently presented even in the reports on Islamophobia, which can generate discourse used in censuses where Muslims are presented as a monolithic block, thus disregarding the diversity and complexity of Muslim communities. The diversity of these communities involves not only differences in terms of languages and ethnicity but also socio-political characteristics. All these elements together mirror the complexity of the Muslim world and are characterized by a number of cultural, political and economic factors,

which are involved in the construction of collective and individual identity. Muslims have always been divided into several branches on the basis of their different understanding of Islamic teachings and practices. The knowledge of these branches and their characteristics is a prerequisite for the establishment of both interreligious and intrareligious dialogue.

Various reports on Islamophobia may – totally unintentionally heat up discussions on "us" against "them". Maybe it would be a better strategy to pay attention to issues of the rule of law, human rights and social justice rather than focusing on what is Islamophobia and who is Islamophobic. In either way, the contextualization of the issue cannot avoid questioning and analysing the dark stains in European history, such as racism and orientalism.

According to Salman Sayyid, the Eurocentric understanding of the concept of racism is associated (only) with the Nazi regime. It sees Nazism as first and foremost an extremist ideology related exclusively to Nazis of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and neo-Nazis reviving the Nazi ideology. As a result of such conceptualization, Nazism is regarded as an "exceptional moment". As such it cannot be recognized in European colonial rules, Orientalist notions and other forms of segregation, submission, degradation, etc., carried out by colonial rulers and enabled by racial laws. It is very difficult to imagine racism when it comes to periods that have nothing to do with the Nazi regime. However, according to Sayyid it is possible to think about the Eurocentric concept of racism without recognizable racists, especially if we introduce the notion of Islamophobia and think of the affirmation that in view of Islamized practices it is justifiable to be Islamophobic (Sayyid, 2010, 12–13). For instance while dealing with the question of Islam and Muslims (in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Europe in general), one often comes across interpretations of Islam as an alternative to secular politics and a so-called "civilizational threat" posed by either activists of political Islam who would like to destroy the secular state on the one side, or the conservative and "uncivilized nature of the Muslim religion, culture and civilization" that undermines the standards of the Western civilization on the other.

Among other studies, Esra Ozyurek in her article *The politics of cultural unification, secularism, and the place of Islam in the new Europe* is analyzing two positions dominating discussions of the role of Muslims and Islam in the European Union: the right, which argues that Islam is external and even antithetical to the culture of the European Union, and the so-called the humanist-left position, discussing the role of Muslims in Europe, arguing that only secularism allows religious minorities to live safely in the nation-state system (Ozyurek, 2005). For more updated examples it is recommended to read Eu-

ropean Islamophobia reports, especially section analyzing political discourses on Islam in different European Countries (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2020).

Regarding the context of islamophobia and racism, one should not forget that the argument separating "race" from religion does not hold water. Vlasta Jalušić is referring to the so called "new racism". According to her, the new racism differs from the "old" one in that the former is no longer based on

*given biological research foundations or, in other words, on the concept of race, but above all on cultural dimensions of various groups and characteristics ascribed to their 'members': e.g. nationality, traditional customs, religion, eating habits, dress codes and culture of (everyday) life. The allegedly fixed and unalterable biological basis of racism is thus pushed into the background, and what comes to the fore is a relatively evasive and fluid set of culturally grounded 'characteristics' that can be ascribed to individuals and groups fairly randomly* (Jalušić, 2015, 30).

While biological racism implies rejection, exclusion and unequal treatment of people on the basis of their physical appearance and other physical characteristics, cultural racism also entails discourse based on cultural differences and on differences between various types of *nomos* or *sacred cosmos*, between value systems that distinguish arbitrarily between "civilized" values and "inferior barbarian, undemocratic, etc." values. Such types of racism can be recognized in Orientalist discourses, and is enough to rummage through the "treasure trove" of stereotypical "European images" of Bosnians and/or Muslims to find a number of examples. They will be presented further below. At this point, it is well-worth pointing out that Edward Said introduces the term Orientalism to designate a constructed prism through which the West gets acquainted with the East and dominates it. Orientalist discourse creates the image of the barbarian, uncivilized, primitive and irrational Other, portraying it as a passive object, which is – just like the Orient – fixed in its own Otherness; it is a passive, inactive, non-autonomous and unsovereign being (Said, 1978).

If we reintroduce Sayyid's thought at this point, his understanding of racism comes as no surprise. According to him,

*racialised bodies were never exclusively biological; they were marked at the same time as religion, culture, history, and territories were marked and used to group socially fabricated distinction between Europeaness and non-Europeaness. The idea that an individual*

*can simply choose a different cultural context ignores the fact that individuals are formed by immersion into specific cultural contexts and that it is not possible to step outside all contexts. These cultural contexts are themselves products of overlapping networks of relations, and the boundaries of one context from another are never clear-cut* (Sayyid, 2010, 13).

Racism is therefore a consequence of the construction of collective identities that are dependent on special social features and contextualization. As mentioned, Muslims cannot be reduced to only one monolithic or heterogeneous group or ethnic community. Another very problematic aspect appears when religious identification prevails over other forms of identification (e.g. ethnic, sexual, class-related, occupational, etc.). Such stereotyping and portraying of a monolithic Muslim community suits and is successfully practiced by Orientalist discourse and racism, with both being based on identity antagonism that makes a sharp distinction between "us" and "them". Islamophobia is part of such processes.

As mentioned, at the core of Islamophobia there lies the "civilizational threat" from Islam, whose alleged barbarian and undemocratic nature is thought to endanger European democracy, secularization and modernity. As a result, Islamophobia maintains a "violent hierarchy," as Sayyid puts it, between the notions of the West (and everything that it represents) and Islam (and everything that it stands for) (Sayyid, 2010, 16). Such colonial hierarchy has much in common with the hierarchy that constitutes racism itself, i.e. the distinction between "Europeanness" and "non-Europeanness," or between modernity and backwardness. Such dynamics of identity antagonism, which establishes imaginary boundaries between subjects, results from a complex mental process that involves the identification and stigmatization of the Other and wants to change or even to destroy the Other. The form of "elimination" of the Other depends on cultural specifics and, fortunately, only rarely is turned into action: action requires a combination of complex social circumstances and political measures. Nevertheless, there always exists the possibility of physical "cleansing" as we could observe in relation to Islam and Muslims during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unfortunately, the smouldering cauldron of the Bosnian tragedy has not been extinguished and is waiting for new sparks that could easily re-kindle the fire of interethnic and interreligious dimensions, which Bosnia and Herzegovina had witnessed in the bloody war of the 1990s. Therefore, it is of vital importance that one analyses the causes of atrocities and reflects on possibilities of bringing about peace and preventing further conflicts.

## HOW TO RECOGNIZE AN ORIENTALIST DISCOURSE?

In the Balkans, European Muslims were (and still are) associated with the Ottoman conquest of Europe. A very negative perception of Islam derives from the term *osmanlı*, which means Turkish or Ottoman. The racist Orientalist discourse understands it as Oriental, backward, reactionary, treacherous, inferior and as something that needs to be changed, even exterminated and annihilated. It is very important to understand where such attitude comes from in order to be able to interpret local prejudices in former Yugoslavia (as well as in the wider region) that many Christians hold against Muslims. In the first years of the war in Bosnia, many observers and commentators depicted the conflict between Muslims and Christians as the clash between the “western” and “eastern” civilizations, having been inspired by Samuel Huntington’s book *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996, 174–187), which was originally published in 1996. Huntington introduced the notion of “civilization identity” and saw it as something stable and unchanging, which holds true neither in the Islamic world nor anywhere else. Huntington has borrowed the phrase “clash of civilizations” from Bernard Lewis’s essay *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (Lewis, 1990), in which Lewis argues that Islam has never modernized itself nor separated church and state, and has been unable to understand other civilizations. Said (2003, 71) also claims that Huntington has adopted Lewis’s ideas of civilizations being monolithic, homogenous and desirous of a distinction between “us” and “them”. By employing metaphors distinguishing between “our” world, that is a normal, acceptable, domestic and logical world, and the world of Islam presented as an antipode of all this, Huntington uses Orientalist discourse, thus ignoring cultural diversity and complexity of Islamic societies and Muslim communities. In Said’s opinion, both Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington are reductive authors: their definition of the Islamic civilization is limited to the anti-western sentiment, and their rhetoric is not only based on arguments stemming from the clash; they also generate such a clash (Said, 2003, 71).

The division to the “West” and “Islam” is a manipulation enabling the reduction of religions, cultures, ethnicities, etc., to ideologies that spring up particularly in times of deep insecurity (resulting from war, imperialism, migrations or some other sudden change (Said, 2003, 75). According to Ziauddin Sardar, the western Huntingtonian fear of Islam is nothing but fear of diversity and plurality and the Western secularism is nothing more than a monolithic ideology that diminishes all diversity, all plurality, and focuses them on the singularity of the European vision. “It’s humanism is not universal,

*but stops at the borders of Europe: it is buried in mass graves of the innocent people killed in Bosnia*” (Sardar, 1995, 8).

One could presume that Sayyid agrees with Sardar:

*In the last sixty years the two communities in Europe which have been subjected to some of the most intense forms of racist genocidal violence were the German Jews and the Bosnian Muslims. In both cases being Jewish or being a Muslim was not about endorsing a set of beliefs or engaging in a set of practices. When the Nazis and Serbian ultra-nationalists called, it was not just the practice but the population that they targeted* (Sayyid, 2010, 10).

Therefore, it is of key importance to analyse the attitude that generates racist genocidal violence. This is the only way to understand how and on what basis collective memories are transmitted from one generation to another and how racist and/or Islamophobic discourses provoke conflicts in the region and beyond.

## BOSNIAN CAULDRON – EXPULSION OF THE “TURK”

If one looks deep enough into the collective historical memory in the south Slavic area, one can find a typical example of such (Serbian and Montenegrin) attitude towards Islam and Bosniacs in Petar II Petrović-Njegoš’s poem *The Mountain Wreath* published in 1847. According to Mustafa Spahić, as early as 1703 when Danilo Šćepčević, the ruler and founding father of the Petrović dynasty, convened a meeting of family leaders, a platform for genocide was formed: “*It is in the interest of the preservation of the Orthodox state that all Muslims be baptized, exiled or killed*” (Spahić, 1996, 7). Such a decision was adopted in line with the motto “*Find all poturicas!*” (i.e. all those who became “Turks” or Muslims by rejecting or, more precisely, betraying their Christian religion). Stoked by nationalism, such ideology “culminated in Serbian and Montenegrin neo-Nazism and Orthodox fundamentalism” (Spahić, 1996, 7).

The hostility towards the “Turk” or Muslim that can be recognized in the south Slavic area is not unknown to Europe, as it was of key importance in Europe’s formation as a political community. According to Tomaž Mastnak, it was the antagonism between Europe and Muslims that facilitated the shaping of European identity and encouraged the construction of the Muslim world as an antithesis of western Christianity (Mastnak, 1993 16–32). Truth be told, European history witnessed a num-



**Image 1: Battle of Kosovo by Adam Stefanović (1870) (Wikimedia Commons).**

ber of exposed “Others” who helped to shape and consolidate European identity. “Infidels” or “barbarians” were searched for and found not only beyond European borders but also among European ethnic and cultural minorities, be they Jewish or heretical. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the hostility to Muslims played a crucial role in the formation of Europe as a socio-political entity: the perception of Europe as a political idea sprang up in particular after the fall of Constantinople resulting from the Ottoman conquest in 1453 (more: Cardini, 2003, 181). The idea of war against Turks eventually ended under the common denominator “*the expulsion of the Turk from Europe*” (Mastnak, 2003, 208). The fear of or hostility to Muslims overwhelms the European political imagination even centuries later when Turkish incursions no longer pose a real threat. By analysing the Bosnian war, Tone Bringa points out anti-Muslim and above anti-Turkish prejudices held by Europe: “*The presence of Islam in Europe was understood as something that belongs to the past, as a historical remnant of the Ottoman Empire [...] They thought of Islam as a foreign body on the European soil which needs to be (or rather needed to be) eliminated by defeating the Ottomans*” (Bringa, 2002, 25). European Muslims living in the Balkans were associated with Ottoman conquests of Europe and

perceived as an anachronism. According to Bringa, the very word *Muslim* brought up such associations as “fundamentalism,” “violence,” “backwardness” and “hostility to Christians,” which was misused by the Serbian propaganda according to which Bosnian Muslims were Turkish conquerors of land that did not belong to them (Bringa, 2002, 26).

It is such ideas that are used as a source of national mythologies of south Slavic nations. In order to encapsulate them, Michael Sells (1996) has coined the term Christoslavism. Their intertwined system of myths portrays Slavic Muslims as the betrayers of Christ’s faith (even as his killers – such an idea is related to the Battle of Kosovo in which Prince Lazar takes over the role of Christ, which is discussed further below) and their own nation. The Christoslavic mythology is based on at least two closely intertwined myths formed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The first ascribes the conversion to the Muslim religion to fear and greed (introducing the character of a “poturica”), the second tries to present the total depravity of Ottoman authority (introducing the character of an evil Turk). It seems that such mythology resonates with Harry Norris, who argues that the “Serbian” attack on Islam was a result of the fact that Slavic Muslims, whom he sees as *poturicas*, had voluntarily betrayed their nation and religion (Norris, 1993, 295–297).



**Image 2: Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari (Wikimedia Commons).**

Needless to say, the Ottoman history and its rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina are not only very rich but also extremely complicated. In 1463, Bosnia became the westernmost Ottoman province, called "Bosansko Krajište." The province was granted the status of *ejalet*, a constituent part or administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman rule (1463–1878) brought about a cultural and religious transformation, which led to changes in social and cultural values and to the formation of cultural patterns that shaped a special ethnic identity. According to Ruzmir Mahmutčehajić, what makes Bosnia and Herzegovina special in terms of socio-cultural characteristics is the Bosnian Church that even before Islamization of the area formed its religious structure independently from the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christianity (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 183–190; also: Mulalić, 2014; Fine, 2002; Velikonja, 1998). Having become part of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent

gradual Islamization, which was initially only formal and entailed the acceptance of Muslim names. There are differences of opinion whether Islamization was facilitated by economic benefits in the form of lower taxation granted to farmers, merchants and others. Harry Norris (Norris, 1993) believes that the major reason of conversion to Islam was syncretism: vernacular Christianity, which had been present in the region before Islamization, was similar to new, popular Islam, with both of them being different from religious "orthodoxy" of Catholicism and/or the Orthodox Church. "*Together with Islam, the Ottomans introduced new cultural and spiritual opportunities to Bosnia,*" argues Muhidin Mulalić (2014, 56). For many centuries, Bosnia was regarded as a model of religious tolerance in Europe, mostly owing to different forms of syncretism and the fusion of or passing (i.e. converting or reconverting) between various religions. However, the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be romanticized. On the



**Image 3: Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari (Wikimedia Commons).**

basis of conversations with the local population, as well as on the basis of monitoring political rhetoric and discourses, there are differences of interpretation: while Muslims living there mostly see Ottoman period as the “golden age” of Bosnia and Herzegovina during which their religious identity was born, the local Christian population mostly perceives it as a period of Turkish occupation. In the latter case we must certainly take into consideration the influences of modern nationalist rhetoric and the intrusion of so-called religious mythology.

The negative image of the “Turk” sank deeply into the collective memory of especially Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is closely associated with the bitter memory of their defeat in the Battle of Kosovo. With the Serbian collective memory being focused on the defeat, the “Turk” became a synonym for the enemy posing a threat to the Serbian nation. The Battle of Kosovo took place on 15 June 1389 between the army led by the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the invading army

of the Ottoman Empire commanded by the Sultan Murad Hüdavendigâr. Both commanders lost their lives. In the aftermath of the defeat, Serbs became Ottoman vassals. This shared memory of the defeat in the Battle of Kosovo formed the so-called victimized identity of Serbs, who view their shared future in Bosnia and Herzegovina with fear and distrust (Sells, 1996, 2002).

Together with other social factors, the fear that the “Battle of Kosovo” could be repeated created conditions for a new search for *poturicas* – those people whom the collective memory sees as Christians who converted to Islam and betrayed the Slavic identity. And such conditions were indeed created in the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, the words of the general of Bosnian Serbs, Radko Mladić, were that “*the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region*” (The Mladic Files, 1995). In the following days, Srebrenica witnessed the genocide of 8372 Bosniaks (Nuhanović, 2007).

## TURKISH INFLUENCE AND NEO-OTTOMANISM AS (ONE OF THE) TRIGGER(S) FOR ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TODAY?

With the collective memory of historical representations of and sentiments about the "Turk" in Bosnia and Herzegovina being still alive, political moves and discourse have to be well thought-out. What adds fuel to the fire is a reference to the Ottoman past by the most visible Turkish politicians. To provide an example: following the electoral triumph of his conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the June 2011 general election, the re-elected Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, publicly declared that his victory would prove advantageous to Bosnians, too: "*Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul*" (Head, 2011). Such a public statement re-kindled discussions about neo-Ottomanism in the region, especially as regards Turkish expansionism, imperialism and Islamization; according to Mehmet Uğurekinci, some Islamic (and) conservative circles in Turkey believe that under Ottoman rule the Balkans lived in peace for centuries and view the Ottoman past as a model for bringing eternal peace and serenity to the region (Uğurekinci, 2013, 25–26).

A similar neo-Ottoman stance was taken by Turkey's new foreign policy conceived by Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became minister of foreign affairs in 2009. Davutoğlu emphasized the importance of Turkey's active cooperation in the Balkans region, which was based on what was perceived as shared cultural and historical legacy (Türbedar, 2011). In one of his improvised speeches, he said, "*Sarajevo is ours*" and "*Istanbul is yours*," adding that "*Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now we have to reinvent this*" (Somun, 2011, 38). However, as pointed out by Hajrudin Somun, his words should not be taken out of context since Davutoğlu underlined that he was not calling for the re-establishment of the Ottoman state, but mostly alluded to the shared Ottoman legacy (Somun, 2011, 38). For Davutoğlu, as analysed by Marija Mitrović, it was only in the Ottoman period that the Balkans played a central role in world politics. From such a perspective, the model of empire is seen as a positive solution to ethnic and religious conflicts (Mitrović, 2014, 46). Needless to say, the memory of the Ottoman Empire does not evoke pleasant feelings in all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As mentioned above, it is mostly Christian nations living in the Balkans that regard the Ottoman rule as a period of subjugation, and even if today the majority of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina supports the growing Turkish influence on their state, there are many other citizens who stress that Bosnia

and Herzegovina should preserve its own identity and are critical of the Turkish influence. Broadcast on 14 May 2015 by the Bosnian national television TV1, the round table entitled "*Šta je za Bosnu in Herzegovino Turčija in Rusija*" ("What Turkey and Russia Mean for Bosnia in Herzegovina"; TV1, 2015) placed special emphasis on the issue of Turkish indoctrination. The participants agreed that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the perception of Turkey was mostly "*Ottomanophile*" and that the fondness for Turkey was especially strong among those citizens who expected that Turkey would help them in case of unrest. They also pointed out the Turkish use of "*soft power*" when it came to the funding of universities, newspapers, on-line portals and cultural projects promoting Turkish culture, but turning a deaf ear to autochthonous Bosnian tradition.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish explanations about common historical and socio-cultural ties is mostly disfavored by the Serbian and Croatian population. The leader of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika srbska), Milorad Dodik, has accused Turkey of having a "*hidden agenda*" for the Balkans. He is afraid that Turkey will try to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Bosniak country and to undermine the autonomy of Republika Srbska (Strbac, 2010). His strong supporter is the leading Serbian Orientalist scholar Darko Tanasković, who was the Yugoslavian ambassador to Ankara from 1995 to 1999 and who is regarded as one of the main Islamophobes in the region. During the Bosnian war, he was an advisor to the then president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, thus exerting strong influence on the official Serbian policy. Still critical of the Turkish policy in the Balkans, Tanasković believes that Turkey would like to create the so-called "*neo-Ottoman Balkans*" (Tanasković, 2010). In his book *Neootomanizem – Povratak Turske na Balkan* ("Neo-Ottomanism: Turkey's return to the Balkans"), Tanasković argues that Turkey's current foreign policy could be called "*neo-Ottomanism*" (*Yeni Osmanlıcılık*). He defines it as an ideological amalgam of Islamism, Turkish imperialism and Ottoman nostalgia.

In the article "*Turska išće nove janjičare*" ("Turkey in Search of New Janissaries"), the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* reported that the book was published in Banja Luka, the capital city of the Bosnian Serbs, where he promoted it at the conference with the title "*Neo-Ottomanism and Republika Srpska*" and was attended by the leading politician of Bosnian Serbs, Milorad Dodik, who publicly stated that Turkey supported "*exclusively Bosniak and Muslim interests*" and that "*Turkey would like to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into an Islamic state*" (Marić, 2010). Tanasković's negative notions of Muslims as "*a foreign, inferior and dangerous element*" in the Balkans

are quoted in a study of Islamic fundamentalism by Sonja Biserko, a Serbian activist and human right defender. In her opinion, Tanasković interprets the turning of Bosnian Muslims to Turkey as a call, “as their furtive return to the old-time position of poturice [...] for the Serbs, poturice were worse than Turks” (Biserko in: Somun, 2011, 35).

Hikmet Karčić, the writer of the national reports on Islamophobia for Bosnia and Herzegovina, emphasised that although anti-Muslim hatred in Bosnia and Herzegovina has deep historic roots, “the first contemporary Islamophobic statements appeared in the late 1980s and were made by scholars, Orientalists and self-proclaimed Islam experts at the University of Belgrade” (Karčić, 2018, 173). Karčić divided the central figures in spreading Islamophobia in Bosnia and Herzegovina into three categories: the academics and semi-academics circles in Serbia and Republika Srpska; several high-ranking officials from the Serb Orthodox Church (from Patriarch Irinej to Bishops Amfilohije and Kačavenda); and politicians (such as Milorad Dodik among others) which give anti-Muslim and Islamophobic statements (Karčić, 2018, 184). One such example was Dodik’s interview for Serbian Television Happy TV in January 2018 in which he called all Serbs who work in institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Turkifiers (*poturice*) (Karčić, 2018, 179). On 6 January 2019, the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari was desecrated with the bag of pork intestines. The next day a local Orthodox priest from Srebrenica can be seen on a video leading a group of people on Orthodox Christmas Eve singing Chetnik songs (Karčić, 2020, 150). The main source of anti-Muslim propaganda in recent years are social media, especially Facebook pages, created mainly by Serbian nationalist groups. One of the most infamous example is “Remove kebab,” by which “kebab” is used as a synonym for Muslims (more: Karčić, 2020, 157).

#### CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

As we already emphasized in the introduction, the leading question to ponder upon is, how to create fruitful interreligious and interethnic (or any type of) dialogue that would foster long-lasting peace if we are not ready for ontological changes and in-depth questioning of our own epistemology? It is a social fact that a group identity affirms itself by stigmatizing the Otherness of another group, which usually happens as a collective response to a crisis, trauma or some other intense social change. The ethnopsychiatrist George Devereux (1978) argues that even if individuals possess several identities (family, group, political, professional, etc.), it is the collective identity that prevails

over others in a critical situation. Individuals lose their individuality, and the re-composition of “us” occurs, with “us” being defined in contrast to the “Other(s).” What serves as a tool in such a process is the so-called identity discourses? According to the French political anthropologist Denis-Constant Martin, they are used in situations of turmoil and rapid changes, both material and moral, as means of verbalizing and concomitantly mitigating anxiety as they give back meaning to all that seemingly lost meaning long ago, namely, by employing well-known historical, territorial, cultural and religious references (Denis-Constant, 1994, 31–32.). In order for such *imagination* to actually work, the group has to accept a discourse it finds coherent and credible if individuals are to be united in opposition to the “Other.” The aim of such rhetoric is the fixation of anxiety on the “Other,” its projection on a recognizable enemy, a constructed hostile character – in our case, the evil and dangerous “Turk” who has to be destroyed if the group is to survive.

The rhetoric of “our” survival as a result of “their” destruction can culminate in the war in self-defence, as we witnessed in the genocidal massacre of “Turks” in Srebrenica. According to the psychoanalyst Franco Fornari (1969), war is an elaboration of the paranoid process based on the notion that an individual can survive only if he destroys the enemy: “*The subject perceives the object as a threat to its existence. The threat itself is psychologically real*” (Fornari, 1966 35). Paranoid violence, which breaks out in war, results from a typical psychotic illusion that the subject conquers death by killing the “Other.” In order to be able to see another as an embodiment of absolute evil, we need imagination. Anthony Storr is convinced that in times of crisis, be it personal or collective, some kind of internal mechanism is activated in us, leading to a dualistic distinction between the absolute good and the absolute evil. When we feel seriously threatened, explains Storr, we immediately seek to find out who wishes us good or evil. Dichotomies such as good/evil, good/bad, pure/dirty constitute the imaginary space within which we deposit ideologies that seem credible and reassuring. “*These clichés – pure-impure, cleanliness-dirtiness, whiteness-blackness – seem crude to us. Their binary structures mirror however the elementary functioning of the human psyche in times of crisis*” (Storr, 1991, 122). The antagonistic process, which may lead to physical violence, therefore begins with the construction of identity based on the stigmatization of differences. Such an identification process is radicalized by perceiving the “Other” as alien, treacherous, impure, inhuman. According to Jacques Semelin, dehumanization of the enemy is an important indicator of potential violence; he provides a number of historical examples in his excellent

study of genocide (Semelin, 2007). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a typical example of such a process can be recognized in the attitude towards the “Turk” and the social dynamic related to it. What makes the situation especially dangerous is lack of awareness or reflection of the Serbian identity of the victim on the one hand and the Turkish soft-power interference in cultural sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which many recognize neo-Ottoman territorial appetites on the other. Political and religious institu-

tions, cultural organizations, civil society and other decision-makers in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to (re-)shape their common socio-cultural models. The respect for and preservation of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of vital importance for bringing about long-lasting peace in the region. Project and methods addressing this goal have to be aware of this precondition and to take it into consideration when envisaging practical work.

## ISLAMOFOBIJA IN NJENE POSLEDICE KOT PREPREKA PRI IZGRADNJI MIRU V BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI

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## POVZETEK

*Islamofobija in/ali sovraštvo do muslimanov na južnoslovanskem območju, zlasti v Bosni in Hercegovini, ima globoke zgodovinske korenine. Negativna podoba "Turka" se je globoko ukoreninila v kolektivni spomin predvsem Srbov iz Bosne in Hercegovine in je tesno povezana z grenkim spominom na njihov poraz v bitki na Kosovem polju (1389). Ker je srbski kolektivni spomin bil in ostaja osredotočen na ta poraz, je izraz "Turk" postal sinonim za sovražnika, ki ogroža srbski narod. Vendar pa sovražnost do "Turka" ali muslimana ni neznana tudi ostali Evropi. V prvem delu članek obravnava definicijo islamofobije v kombinaciji z evrocentričnim razumevanjem rasizma, ki ga je mogoče in mora biti prepoznano v orientalističnih diskurzih. Tovrstni diskurzi ustvarjajo in vzdržujejo podobe barbarskega, neciviliziranega in iracionalnega Drugega, ki ga na eni strani prikazujejo kot pasivni subjekt, po drugi strani pa kot agresivnega in nevarnega. V drugem delu se članek osredotoča na islamofobijo ali "turkofobijo" v posebnih zgodovinskih kontekstih in dinamikah v Bosni in Hercegovini. Avtorica meni, da je poglobljeno razumevanje posebnih družbeno-kulturnih, zgodovinskih, političnih in verskih značilnosti Bosne in Hercegovine predpogoj za predstavljanje možnosti zagotavljanja miru in dosledne uporabe novih modelov in metod za vzpostavljanje miru in miroljubno sobivanje.*

**Ključne besede:** Islamofobija, rasizem, orientalizem, Bosna in Hercegovina, neootomanizem, Turčuja, turkofobija, medreligijski dialog

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## LISTENING TO OTHERNESS: THE CASE OF THE TURKISH ALEVIS

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### ABSTRACT

*The article combines the theory of ethics of listening with an ethnographic case study of the Turkish Alevi religious communities to show how both, if followed as an example, can enable interreligious dialogue. Listening, that could be considered active rather than passive, allows an opening of a space of intersubjective hospitality. The Turkish Alevis, researched through the participant observation method, seem to have a strongly developed ability to listen to one another, and the other. It is deduced that this ability is present due to the entanglement of their ritual practices with music, in which they regularly engage.*

**Keywords:** Turkish Alevi, listening, Alevi music, ethics of listening, hospitality, interreligious dialogue

## ASCOLTARE L'ALTERITÀ: L'ESEMPIO DEGLI ALEVI DELLA TURCHIA

### SINTESI

*L'articolo mette in combinazione la teoria dell'etica dell'ascolto con un caso di studio etnografico delle comunità religiose degli Alevi della Turchia, per mostrare come entrambe, se prese come esempio, possono consentire un dialogo interreligioso. L'ascoltare, che dovrebbe essere considerato più attivo che passivo, permette l'apertura di uno spazio di ospitalità intersoggettiva. Gli Alevi della Turchia, studiati col metodo di osservazione partecipativa, sembrano aver sviluppato fortemente un'abilità di ascoltarsi l'un l'altro e gli altri. Si deduce che la presenza di questa capacità sia dovuta al fatto, che i loro rituali sono strettamente connessi alla musica, nella quale gli Alevi s'impegnano regolarmente.*

**Parole chiave:** Alevi Turchi, ascoltare, la musica degli Alevi, l'etica dell'ascolto, ospitalità, dialogo interreligioso

When we are exposed to or involved in the process of listening, our bodies enable us to be part of it through the ear, that is always alert, awake, always open – the ear cannot be closed as the eye. Listening, the activity of conscious perception of sonorous stimuli is traditionally (at least in cultures of the West) characterized by a sense of passivity, obedience, subordination, inferiority, powerlessness. However, it could be thought of and perceived as a very active and intentional activity of a subject who establishes a relation with their environment through this activity (Ihde, 2007). Further on, listening does not mean only *listening to* and therefore hearing/perception of sound, but also, or even mostly, an offering of attention, the possibility of deeper understanding, an allowing space for expression (Irigaray, 2008). The gesture of listening, that becomes an activity through its repetition, can reveal itself as ethical in its foundations and also crucial for establishing intersubjective spaces of mutual acceptance and affection. Therefore, listening is an active activity, an ethical gesture, directed towards the other to whom we offer attention as well as the possibility to express themselves in their proper way.

The following article<sup>1</sup> offers an insight into the possibilities of how listening could and can be the elemental gesture or activity through which individuals and communities can approach one another in order to discover and understand each other's values that are grounded in their different religious beliefs. Through listening to one another, these values can be recognised as similar, common, or if different, not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The idea of a possibility of encouraging interreligious dialogue through the gesture or activity of listening occurred to me based on personal experience, when I was engaged with field work research about hospitality with the method of participant observation amongst the Turkish Alevi<sup>2</sup> communities in Istanbul. The mutual attention and affection amongst their members, prompted by attentive listening, directed me into thinking that this culture, or even ethics of listening, that they practice spontaneously, immanently, resulted from their long time tradition of music being a very present element in their everyday lives, but also, a central element to their religious rituals. This idea will be presented in the present article, firstly, through

the in-depth insight into the *listening process as an intersubjective gesture* and also an *ethical activity*, which allows people to cohabit in a hospitable shared space. What will follow is a vast presentation of the Turkish Alevis, which will allow an understanding of the crucial role of the music performance for an establishment of a strong sense of community. Both perspectives will be correlated in an attempt to show how observing the Alevi musical tradition and practice could be a role model, a path to establish an acceptable space for attentive and effective interreligious dialogue. Finally, I offer a speculation on possible reasons that the example of Alevi religion could be a role model for enhancing the potential of interreligious dialogue, that is, by fostering an ethics of listening, and assuring mutual attentiveness, consideration and acceptance.

#### ETHICAL LISTENING: ENTERING A SPACE OF SHARING

Listening is conceived as opening to resonance, says Jean-Luc Nancy (2007, 25–27), as reverberation. This means simultaneously opening to the self and gaining or giving meaning. The listening subject is exposed to the sensual, sense, meaning, while opening in and to silence, where the ear expands: this tension of the ear is already carrying its own meaning. Listening, especially musical listening, implies an intensification of the 'auditory sense,' since with listening, the self listens to itself, too. Such an understanding offers a liberation of sense, liberation of meaning, that is way too often settled, sitting 'enthroned' to the benefit of grasping 'final truths' in the eternal philosophical and scientific realm of the Western culture, namely, its tradition of reason.<sup>3</sup> This kind of listening is not limited to musical listening, but it is connected also to speech and dialogue, which is especially important for enabling mutual understanding (Nancy, 2007, 35–37). Listening beyond meaning allows for a plurality of possible senses, meanings, and values. Listening shifts the attention(s) outside the self, as a call to open listening, to being open to the message of the speaker. This allows for differences, otherness and the unknown to emerge (Koskinen & Lindström, 2013, 146). Listening offers the possibility of approaching the unexpected,

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2 The word 'Alevi' denotes a member of the specific religious group, but also it can be used as an adjective to describe specific characteristics of this same group. The Turkish noun to name this religion is 'Alevilik', which in English publications is often translated as 'Alevism'. However, since the ending '-lik' in Turkish language is mainly used for nouns that have any, even very wide relation to the core noun, this term will be here translated as 'Aleviness', which is preferable to the former. 'Alevilik' does not denote only a religion in its narrow sense, but also, if not mainly, the cultural tradition, the ethics, worldview and way of life. The word Aleviness is not widely used, nonetheless it can be found sporadically in some publications in the field of Alevi Studies (cf. Massicard, 2016; Yocom, 2005, 584).

3 For a critique of traditional culture of reason see for example Luce Irigaray writings such as *Una nuova cultura dell'energia: Al di là di Oriente e Occidente* (Irigaray, 2011) or "Sharing Humanity: Towards Peaceful Coexistence in Difference" (Irigaray, 2013).

the unknown. It allows for an open approach to otherness and from this position it is connected to ethical gestures.

*Listening is a fundamental and complex phenomenon in the encounter with other human beings, an integral part of communication ethics and ethical caring relation* (Beard, 2009, 8–9).

Connecting listening to ethics presents an understanding of the subject as being constituted by listening itself: the listening subject is the ethical subject. (Beard, 2009, 7–8)

An emergence of the ethical from listening is explicitly recognised by communicologist Lisbeth Lipari, who positions her research among language, politics and ethics. She claims that *the ethical forms from the gesture, the act of listening*. This is tied to accepting difference, which she calls ‘listening otherwise’ (Lipari, 2009, 45). This kind of listening intentionally devotes itself to the different, unknown, ununderstood, the strange, and splits with familiarity and our knowledge of the world. In this way, the role of speech in society and in the field of ethics is diminished, since it is subordinated to listening directed towards difference and otherness, and not sameness. Also, listening always entails doubt, since it does not allow distance from the one who is being listened to, with which the listener always shares space and time (see Voegelin, 2010, xii).

With authentic listening, i.e. attentive and oriented towards silence, or the unknown, as described in the ethics of listening, it is possible to accept the foreign, the surprising, even if it is frightening, uncertain or even risky (see Beard, 2009, 19). This also stands in the case when it puts us under questioning – which is crucial in order to establish attentive intersubjective relations.

*Listening is a desire and willingness for otherness, it means to put oneself into question, to welcome and answer to the insistent supplication and invocation of the absolute Other* (Koskinen & Lindström, 2013, 151).

Learning to listen and hear ‘here and now,’ getting accustomed to this activity again, can contribute to teaching towards a more open perception, regardless of who we meet, without applying to their presence any pre-existing idea, considering only what the specific moment of the encounter is offering. Accepting the encounter as it is, welcoming it with a hospitable and affectionate ‘yes.’

However, listening to the unknown and to the foreign is quite difficult, if we do not have the means of understanding of what we hear. This is the case also in the circumstances of interreligious dialogue,

when many times we can find ourselves in situations of deepening the gap of separation due to lack of understanding, since not all participants have the ability to interpret, apprehend the symbols or religious language of another. (cf. Moyaert, 2014, 234–236). An ability to listen without the need to understand can be prominently learned by listening to music, since it is not as much coded as languages and symbols are, and moreover, it does not demand any understanding for it to be listened to. This does not imply, that the listener must like the music she hears, but only, that she can listen to it without expecting, or even needing to understand it. This is another perspective of Luce Irigaray on importance of music sharing, since

*music allows communication in an instant between people more easily. Of course, differences exist between the musical choices of diverse cultures but sharing them seems easier than going from the logic [of language] of one culture to that of another. We can listen to different music but not to different languages. To share a rhythm or a melody is easier and quicker than to share a linguistic universe. Above all music remains faithful to bodily and cosmic waves and vibrations which are universal, even if they are not equally discovered or awakened in all humans* (Irigaray, 2004, 135–136).

With listening to music one can realise through experience, that listening is not as much a ‘reasonable’ gesture, but mainly an embodied one, a shared one. Each musical piece through its specific sounds offers a particular emotional setting, an individual atmosphere. These are brought to us listeners be it through our previous experiences of these specific sounds or through our associations, or simply through their particular sound vibrations and frequencies. Whichever of these options applies, we are listening to otherness – to a sound, music, that is not ourselves, but comes from elsewhere to resonate in and to us. Listening to music can help to realise, that we do not need to like, understand, love, agree with and confirm what we hear, but this does not mean that we should not give it a chance to be listened to. If we could learn listening as an embodied experience and not as a rational one, we could use the ability to listen to make space for a more fruitful interreligious dialogue to emerge.

One of the examples for this ethical attentive listening that is brought to enactment through embodiment can be found in the communities of the Alevi religion. This tradition was kept alive for centuries in seclusion and brought to surface only during the last century mainly through its preservation and vivid presence in musical activity. The latter offers to members of the Alevi community a hospitable place for mutual listening and ethical encounters.

## WELCOMING (OF) THE ALEVIS

At the time of very first contact with the Alevi community and its members one can sense their hospitality, which they show to one another, but also, if not primarily to foreigners, to their guests. It is always possible to feel that hospitality or affection towards the other, towards a fellow human, is one of the central principles of the Alevi way of life. Eventually, one can discover that this ethical stance is being build up or prompted not by the doctrines or scriptures of their religion, but mainly through their lived experience of their inclusive community rituals, where listening is fostered especially through the musical exchange that is central to their religious worship. Before turning to this topic, the following pages include a vain attempt of a condensed description of these unorthodox religious communities, in order to sketch their tradition, history, environment and culture.

The Turkish Alevis are most frequently portrayed as a heterodox Shia religious community and the largest, otherwise unofficial, religious minority of Turkey. The word ‘Alevi’ means ‘Ali’s devotee’ (Thoraval, 1998, 16) or ‘Ali’s supporter’ (Şener, 2009, 16).<sup>4</sup> The Alevi worship Ali (Ali Ibn Abi Talib),<sup>5</sup> as well as Muhammad’s family (Ehlîbeyt) and the Twelve Imams, therefore they are commonly classified as part of the Shia branch of Islam. However, based on their diverse religious practice, which is not founded on the Quran, and is primarily seen as esoteric, they are also being connected with shamanism, religious cults of Central Asia and other pre-Islamic religions and are therefore often referred to as syncretistic. The described unorthodox characteristics (mystical rituals, disobedience to the authorities, etc.) were the main reasons that the Alevis suffered persecution, segregation and purges throughout history. Therefore, the rites of the Alevis were carried out in secrecy and they did not proclaim their creed in public. A considerable part of the Sunni majority in Turkey tended towards stigmatizing the Alevis as heretics for centuries, and sometimes this description is present even today. However, at the same time they represent an alternative to the prevailing Sunni Islam and one of the strongest political

oppositions of secular Turkey. The Alevi population estimate is approximately fifteen per cent of the total Turkish population,<sup>6</sup> and it most commonly inhabits the central and eastern parts of Anatolia. The Alevis are ethnically identified as the Turks and the Kurds, the latter being divided in terms of language use to the Kurmanji and Zaza speaking Kurds. The Alevis promote interreligious tolerance, equality, fraternity, they foster hospitality, interpersonal affection and peacefulness, which is testified through their teachings. These were over the centuries of their religious practice transmitted mostly orally, in Alevi poetry and music, that still represent the central element of their rituals. Today, they are integrated into the Turkish society as the bearers of a rich Turkish folk heritage, however, the Alevis are not identified as a religious community as they would like to, as only in this way would they achieve public equality and legitimacy of their own religious beliefs.

It is crucial to understand, that any generalised description of the Alevis is quite problematic, because the information about them differs from source to source. This is because the Alevi religious and cultural tradition is non-scriptural and also because of the actual differences among the beliefs and religious practices of specific Alevi communities themselves, that allow for different interpretations.

When considering the identity of the Alevis, the key is understanding that the latter is practically fluid and defined in various, sometimes even contradictory, modes. This happens most often also with the influence of either Western science that is applied to Turkish social environment, even by Turkish researchers themselves, or adaptations to the history and interpretations introduced in search of a compromise between the ‘old’ tradition and the demands of the modern secular state.<sup>7</sup> In any case, the objectification of their identity is prominent, which occurs in particular through any unambiguous definition of Aleviness, which distances it from its esoteric and mystical content. The codification of the Alevi practice is not congruent to their teachings, which were primarily orally transmitted. Aleviness is a non-scriptural practice, which differs from one community to another, re-

- 4 It is used as an umbrella term for religious communities from the Turkish region that honour Ali and Muhammad’s family, and their religious practice differs significantly from the Turkish Sunni majority. The name was established only in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a neutral substitute for the pejorative naming *Kızılbaş* (Shankland, 2003b, 19, 210).
- 5 Full Ali’s name in the nominative case. Hereinafter, this revered figure will be referred to with a shorter version of the name, that is, Ali, since the use of the latter is the most common among the Turkish Alevis.
- 6 Researchers do not have accurate data on the number of members of the Alevi communities, since they are difficult to identify as some still avoid to identify themselves as Alevi, and moreover the question regarding the religious affiliation is omitted from the regular population census (Shankland, 2010, 231; see also Cihat, 2014; Kurun, 2019, 9; Öktem, 2008, 5; Poyraz, 2005, 503; Şener, 2009, 189).
- 7 The fluidity of the Alevi identity is explained explicitly by David Shankland (2003a; 2003b; 2010) and Markus Dressler (2003; 2008; 2013), who have distanced themselves from and to the research subjects to provide a more critical view of the topics under discussion. I have discussed the importance of their contribution to the Alevis’ study in the article “The Turkish Alevi: In Search of an Identity” (Bjelica, 2017).

gardless of the existence of texts.<sup>8</sup> This is also because over the centuries of persecution, any textual sources were rarely used, as there was a danger that the violent and hostile representatives of the ruling Sunnis would discover them and purge them.<sup>9</sup> These factors broadly contributed to the fact, that the Alevi tradition was not established as uniform or homogeneous, but rather varied, flexible, and therefore fluid.

In Alevi belief, humankind, or rather, humanity, humanness (in Turkish language '*insanlık*') is the centre of the universe, which is primarily not so much connected with (ontological) anthropocentrism, but above all with the Alevi fundamental life-guide of the 'complete human' (in Turkish language '*insan-i kamil*'), according to which a human is becoming whole, complete, thus, approaching god, in his or her proper (Alevi) 'way' (in Turkish language '*yol*'). One should perceive a human being as a soul, 'can' (pron. *djan*), which is the reflection of god on earth. All the Alevis consider the concept of brotherhood or sisterhood (in Turkish language '*kardeşlik*') very important, as well are equality and peace among people, regardless of their ethnic identity.

For some researchers and some Alevis themselves, Aleviness is more than faith; it is a way, a path or a lifestyle (Hanoglu, 2017, 13; Issa, 2017, 1).<sup>10</sup> Therefore, Aleviness, either as a moral or as a religious path, emphasizes primarily its inner significance (*batın*) rather than its shape or form (*zahir*), which is reflected in their pervasive saying "*Yol birdir, sürekli binbir!*", which means "The path is one, routes are many!" (Hanoglu, 2017, 19). This saying is established in various areas of Alevi practices. The leaders of Alevi rituals often emphasize interreligious tolerance, since according to their belief all religions deserve respect. Among fundamental philosophies of the Alevi ethics (Kılıç, 2015b) there is also the guidance "to see seventy-two nations with the same gaze" ("*Yetmişiki millete bir gözle bakmak*"),<sup>11</sup> which testifies of Alevi aspirations for equality and non-discrimination.

Since the Alevis were throughout history perceived as 'others', as heretics, as a danger, a hindrance to homogeneity (see Issa, 2017, 3), and were therefore at the best case marginalized, and at worst case persecuted and victims of blood-thirsty violence,<sup>12</sup> they were simultaneously receiving immense pain and suffering that is part of their collective identity, even if the latter is not homogeneous (see Hanoglu, 2017, 14). Along with all this suffering, they developed or were developing a strong sense of compassion, which made them very understanding, tolerant and receptive. These characteristics are also promoted by the very concept of their community and their social structure which provides mutual support and mutual protection.

The described characteristics of Aleviness, which do not fix its practices, doctrines and religious beliefs in a homogeneous whole, enable the development and growth of interreligious tolerance, precisely because of its openness. Such openness allows space for discovering yet unknown or restarting new elements of this culture or religion, and the fluidity of the described identity allows for the movement and flexibility of these elements, which allow for ever new dynamics and combinations. Aleviness is the path of acceptance, expressing welcome and care. This is also noticeable in the contents and practices of their religious rituals, enacted communally and through mutual dialogue, emphasized with their traditional music.

Members of the Alevi community gather in the so-called *cem evi*, which is a place of assembly where they perform their rituals. The basic name of the Alevi ritual is *cem* (pron. *jam*), which in Turkish language means gathering, integration, even a group or a community, and therefore their gathering place called *cem evi* means a 'house of *cem*'. *Cem* is the fundamental religious practice of the Alevis, that is, their regular gathering in meetings in the shape of spiritual events, where members of the community, both men and women, socialize and get to know each other, thus establishing mutual relations that enable them to enjoy everyday coexistence.

<sup>8</sup> Even though this is a non-cryptographic tradition, it does not mean that there are no books on the Alevis and their tradition. Since the eighties of the previous century, when the so-called 'revival of the Alevi culture' began, a number of publications have emerged, representing the Alevi tradition from a historical point of view or in a didactic manner, in order to make it easier for people to get to know what Aleviness is (cf. Vorhoff, 2003, 28ff).

<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that despite acknowledging regular persecution of the Alevis by certain ruling powers, it is not accurate to speak of an entire Sunni majority or the state tradition condemning and prudging the Alevis in Turkey (I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this article for their sensibility to pointing this out). Throughout history there have been many clashes between the Sunni and Alevi people, some extremely violent, others acted out mainly through disagreements and discords, for example, the fact that the Alevi centres of religious worship, namely, the *cem evi*, have officially not yet been recognized as such by the Turkish state. These delicate issues unfortunately exceed the purpose of this article (cf. Kurun, 2019; Massicard, 2016; Öktem, 2008; Poyraz, 2005; Shankland, 2003b).

<sup>10</sup> Hanoglu (2017, 14) points out that this belief may have been shaped mainly by the lack of recognition of Aleviness as a religion. Hence the concept of both cultural and religious Aleviness is used interchangeably.

<sup>11</sup> As a diverse region, Anatolia is known as the land of the "seventy-two peoples" (see Hanoglu, 2017, 18); a naming that depicts and highlights its cultural diversity.

<sup>12</sup> There are very specific massacres throughout history that reinforce the victimized status of the Alevis, for which there is no space in this article. Cf. note 9 of this article (see also Dressler, 2003; Bjelica, 2017).



**Image 1: Members of the Hz. Ali Cem Evi Religious and Cultural Association at the cem, sitting on the floor in circle.**

Most of the Alevi rituals are communal because the rituals main aim is to foster unity and love within society (Hanoğlu, 2017, 21).

During these rituals, the Alevis become acquainted with their religion, with the history of their own traditions. At the same time these rituals represent a fundamental ground for the formation of Alevi ethics. Namely, this is the framework for the discourses of compassion, fraternity, tolerance and other virtues that the Alevis are supposed to develop and adopt. These rituals represent the central space for the establishment of intersubjective and community ties, and thus the fundamental and potential source of mutual hospitality. At the same time, the rituals offer an opportunity for the members of community to examine any potential resentment or to discipline any potentially harmful or violent acts; in order to be performing the ritual, all

members of the community must be reconciled (Shankland, 2003b, 121). In this way the entire community can learn through mutual listening and reciprocal dialogue and aim towards a most appropriate application of Alevi ethics.

*Cem* is a religious ritual where members of the Alevi communities venerate their saints and approach their God with a collective prayer, recitation of mystic formulae, and executing the callings to God accompanied with deep breathing. These rituals represent a place of hospitality, a place of welcome for each member of the community, and usually it turns out to be also welcoming to the visitors who are not members of the local or any other Alevi community. Because of its non-discrimination, *cem* is also often referred to as a ‘folk prayer’ (Ayışit Onatça, 2007, 31). At these religious gatherings, community members sit on the rugs and pillows on the floor, forming a kind of circle to enable

13 All the photographic material presented in this article has been created during fieldwork in March and April 2015 by the author.

the participants to look at each other face-to-face, thus making it easier to raise awareness of the community and the unity of their coexistence. This disposition also allows for a mutual attentive listening to happen more spontaneously than it would otherwise, e.g. when sat in chairs positioned in lines one after another.

Members of the community regularly gather on Thursdays<sup>14</sup> when they perform the *cems*, which especially welcome young members of the community, to whom the elderly want to introduce their traditional religious practices. In addition to these regular gatherings, the community organizes and participates in other events, especially on major holidays or special occasions that are celebrated in order to reminisce, preserve and recreate their traditions.<sup>15</sup>

The *cem* is led by the Alevi religious leader, the so called *dede*, or sometimes, *baba*.<sup>16</sup> Besides leading the ritual, the *dede* plays a key role in establishing the community's cohabitation. He often takes on the role of spiritual leader of the community and is treated with special respect. *Dede* should be among the elderly in the community, he should be selfless and able to give advice. "He translates abstract notions into everyday practice, turning them into a manner of living, world view, faith and hope" (Sipos & Csáki, 2009, 37). *Dede* or *baba* of each Alevi community is primarily a role model of behaviour and ethical conduct with a primal focus on love, tolerance, hospitality and the essential importance of spiritual and common values of the community. The results of an ethnographic study performed in Thrace (Sipos & Csáki, 2009, 37), state examples of unconditional hospitality of one of the *babas* of their Alevi community, who would

*calmly put up a prisoner released that very day for the night in his own house, then take him to the bus terminal the next morning and buy him a ticket to home. He welcomes and puts up Christians as well, gives his last blanket to orphaned Roma children, gives a large sum in advance to Gypsy musicians and is certain that however long he has to wait, the musicians will come as they promised. He is exemplary in rejecting prejudice and truly respecting people* (Sipos & Csáki, 2009, 37).

- 14 Most of the *cem* ceremonies are held on the night from Thursday to Friday, marking the night of Ali's birth. Fahriye Dinçer traced the changes in the *cem* ceremonies that took place during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and concluded that these changes also corresponded to the social structure of the Alevi community. These occurred mainly the 1950<sup>s</sup>, especially due to migration of the Alevis into urban areas of Turkey and because of their identification with their own political tendencies (Dinçer, 2000, 35). During her research in the years 1997 and 1998, she was able to determine that the *cem* ceremonies were no longer secret but open to everyone, even to non-members of the Alevi community, and that they were performed on Sundays as well (and not strictly on Thursdays as traditionally).
- 15 There are different types of *cem*, intended to meet demands of certain functions in Alevi community. Some *cems* are annual, while some are linked to an experience of an individual. Some *cems* are unlimited in number, they can last long in the night – for example, *muhabbet cem* ('affection *cem*') where socializing in kindness and fondness is crucial (Shankland, 2003b, 121; Ayışit Onatça, 2007, 35–40).
- 16 *Dede* is generally a Turkish name for any male member of the Alevi community, but it is commonly used for those members who stand out in their knowledge, importance, wisdom, and the like, or those who lead religious rites. *Baba* is another denomination for the same role, i.e. religious leader, that is used mainly in the Bektaşı Alevi communities in the region of Thrace.
- 17 The Alevis are addressed by their personal name, followed by the general title: in the case of *dede* Aşur Nergis, they call him Aşur *dede*. This form of address is typical of the Turkish language in general and will be preserved in the present text as well.

This kind of behaviour gives example to the members of the community, that are more prone to imitate the kind and attentive gestures of their *dede*, then they would be if he would not be the first one to execute them. In this way the members are more confident in facing the unknown, more willing to accept the differences and otherness, and also, to attentively listen to others' stories and wishes. The *dede* is the one to encourage contact with strangers and guests, and also to stimulate tolerance towards and acceptance of all religions. Therefore, he is also crucial for promoting proneness to interreligious dialogue.

## EXPERIENCING HOSPITALITY

The fieldwork with the Alevis of Istanbul was carried out through the methodology of participant observation for a period of three months in 2015. It revealed a genuine hospitality that was multi-layered, and evident through various types of attention and gestures, such as: listening to one another, considering each other's wishes and attempting to realize them, preparing space for the visitors, and accepting the beliefs of people who think differently.

I followed some specific activities of the *Gaziosmanpaşa Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Cem Evi İnanç ve Kültür Derneği* (Religious and Cultural Association Gaziosmanpaşa Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Cem Evi), an Alevi association in the Gaziosmanpaşa district of Istanbul, named after their sage Ahmet Yesevi. I was introduced also to another Alevi community in Istanbul from the district of Esentepe, that is *Hz. Ali Cem Evi İnanç ve Kültür Derneği* (Saint Ali Cem Evi Religious and Cultural Association), and attending their regular ritual gathering I could compare it to the one of the other association.

At the first meeting with the *dede* of Gaziosmanpaşa Alevi community Aşur Nergis, spiritual leader of the community, I was surprised to note his enthusiasm for my work. I came to the house of *cem* long before the beginning of the ceremony in order to meet with the *dede* and other members of the community. Aşur *dede*<sup>17</sup> immediately invited me to sit at his side the moment I came in. This was a little unusual, as only specific



**Image 2: Aşur Nergis, dede of the Gaziosmanpaşa Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Cem Evi Religious and Cultural Association.**

persons would be sitting beside him – it seemed that I, as a guest, had ‘special privileges,’ like the usual rules would not apply to me, the guest. I sat next to him and our conversation began. Anyone who came into the room approached *dede*, greeted him with a kiss on his hand and a little bow, so I was presented to each one of the coming members separately. When they were greeting him, he encouraged them to demonstrate some of the characteristic moves of the rite so that I could see them. One of their customary moves when greeting the members of the community and the *dede* emphasized their fondness of compassion and protection: when they greet *dede*, the believers cover the thumb of their left foot with their thumb of the right foot in a sign of compassion with Imam Hussein, who supposedly hit his left thumb and bled. This gesture is

called *dara durmak*,<sup>18</sup> and it recognizes Husein’s pain, it is a gesture of compassion. At the same time, Aşur dede emphasized another essential characteristic of the Alevi community, the so-called *rızalık*, which literally means both acceptance and decision, and it suggests mutual affection, consideration, rejoicing together and understanding each other (Nergis, 2015).

Many members of the Alevi community proved to be particularly hospitable: they greeted me from afar with smiles on their faces, sometimes even children and adolescents, especially when they were excited about their upcoming public presentation at the annual Alevi ritual, or older women who were glad that I joined them in their morning prayer time, despite the cold temperatures and the early darkness. As a guest and a researcher, I also had ‘special privileges’ regard-

<sup>18</sup> The literal translation of this phrase would read ‘stand, be close, in anxiety,’ which may indicate a position, where the legs are close together, but the term refers primarily to the anxiety experiencing the pain and difficulty of the circumstances, which Hussein suffered at the blow – a blow in the thumb and all the other painful experiences he had to go through. It is a symbolic gesture that regularly reminds us of the importance of compassion.



**Image 3: Participating at the lokma blessing by the dede.**

ing free movement during the ritual and the freedom to 'break the rules' of silence because of documentation process: Aşur dede called me to come closer during the ritual even if I preferred staying a bit further away not to intrude too much. However, he was persistent, and I had to come to the front where I could record the rituals better. Once I brought a *lokma* (cakes or any food that is shared among believers after the ceremony) Aşur dede suggested me to step in the queue with the others and greet him. It seems that their customs are non-breakable, hospitable to all the foreign, the unknown: even if I did some gestures myself as an external observer, no one in the community thought this to be disrespectful or heretical, just the opposite: they viewed my consent to greet the *dede* through the *dara durmak* position with pleasure and accepted it as a sign of respect.

While observing the activities of Gaziosmanpaşa Alevi community, it was possible to follow the revival of one of the pre-Islamic rituals that the community

carried out with the cooperation of the Movement for the Revival of Aleviness. Members gathered around the dervish lodge, alongside the tomb of a saint named Karyağdı Baba. Mustafa Cemil Kılıç (2015a), a theologian and writer, who also assumes the role of a *hoca* (pron. *hodja*), spiritual teacher in the community, connected the ritual with the daily prayers of the Alevis, which they once abandoned for the sake of assimilation to the Sunni Islam. Such a prayer is supposed to be in line with some suras of the Quran, and, above all, saluting the sun stands for saluting Ali himself. Mustafa *hoca* appealed to everyone that they should perform worshipping in their own *proper* manner and to respect differences in worshipping of Ali. He also called upon each individual to turn to the sun and salute it in the way that they *feel* most appropriate. Such freedom in the conduct of the rituals shows tolerance for individual worship in allowing them to engage in their own, singular religious practices. The believers mostly raised their



**Image 4:** Members the Gaziosmanpaşa Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Cem Religious and Cultural Association at the morning prayer to the sun, raising their hands in different ways.

hands to the sun, but in different ways, some of them rubbed their faces several times. Some members of the Sunni community also attended the ritual or its continuation: Mustafa *hoca*'s Sunni colleague, that was present at the morning prayer to the sun, after its termination invited some representatives of the Alevi community to the municipal centre for religious affairs to attend a common gathering with the Sunni community. There they read from the Quran and listened to the 'stringed Quran,' that is the *bağlama* (pron. baahlahmah), their folk string instrument. This kind of sensitivity for the individual, their own proper approach to religion and spirituality, and mutual inclusivity of different religious traditions, points to Aleviness as being a hospitable tradition, that allows for the development of different but compatible, even collaborative ethical practices. Obviously, they have space also for interreligious dialogue, fostered especially by listening to each other.

The enhanced ability to listen that members of the Alevi community embody mainly without explicitly stressing it, may be fostered by their regular engagement with musical activity. Namely, each *cem* is thoroughly entrenched with musical performance of the *zakir* (pron. zahkeer), the player of the *bağlama* (also known as the Turkish *saz*), that strongly affects the atmosphere of the ritual space. All other members engage with the music at least by listening, letting go to it, but also with singing along, scanting, humming, rocking their bodies, clapping on their knees and the like. Many scholars state (cf. Ayışit Onatça, 2007; Clarke, 1991; Duygulu, 1997; Tambar, 2010), that central to the *cem* is music itself, because it allows to the believers a connection with the divine unity. Due to the different forms of *cem* and the variety of occasions at which it is performed, and always being entangled with musical performance, it could be said that



**Image 5: Bektaş Çolak, zakir of the Gaziosmanpaşa Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Cem Evi Religious and Cultural Association.**

*the role of music can be identified as social, educational, an expression of religious beliefs and cultural concepts, a means of preserving the core of culture, and even as providing aspects of governing and judicial roles" (Clarke, 1991, 140).*

Alevi music, in the long period of persecution and repression, had the important role of preserving the Alevi cultural, religious, social tradition, while enabling a space for its sharing, spreading and developing.<sup>19</sup> The Alevi tradition, be it religiously or culturally, would not be what it is without the help of their music. It could also be argued that there would not be any Alevi community at all, if it were not for the music that enabled the Alevis to save and foster their religion and tradition in the music they performed, without having any scriptural references to turn to.

Being immersed in musical activities, the Alevi tradition, transmitted orally, is hence based also on the activity of listening. In this sense, listening is one of the main pillars of their communities, since it enabled a continuous tradition, preserved mainly in their music and poetry. Therefore, it could be argued, that the Alevi communities were (and are) constantly re-binding themselves to their beliefs and among their members through their ability and competence to listen. Moreover, through listening, they transmit and internalise their ethical principles and values, such as, as listed before, hospitality, acceptance, openness to otherness, compassion. Through one of their musical forms named *mersiye*, for example, they relive the suffering and pain of their persecuted predecessors, which enables them to develop strong feeling of empathy, compassion, not only among themselves, but also for every being

19 The Alevi unorthodox religion found its' 'safe place' in the traditional folk songs of the rural lands of Anatolia, which is the Asian part of nowadays Turkey. The Anatolian musical tradition mentioned was carried in the practices of the rural musicians that played the folk lute, *bağlama*, a kind of wandering Anatolian bards, the so called *aşık*, that eventually were also the carrier of the wisdom and knowledge of the Alevi religion.



**Image 6: Members of the Hz. Ali Cem Evi Religious and Cultural Association engaging in musical activity.**

in general. In this way they learn about the vulnerability of all the beings to which they are prone to turn with care and acceptance.

The re-binding process enabled by listening practices was not performed only inherently among the members of Alevi communities, but also extrovertly, with other communities, in the realm of sharing. The Gaziosmanpaşa Alevi community is establishing regular activities with their neighbouring Sunni communities, with which they gather together and exchange their religious tradition, through chanting sacred texts on one part and singing their traditional songs, *deyiş*, on the other. On another important example, Alevi music that was offered to be listened to, played a crucial role in the acquiring certain recognition by the public already since the 1980s. (Tambar, 2010, 654–655) For the Alevis, music represented the only way to be acknowledged, or better, the most acceptable language with which they could ‘correctly’ or properly present themselves as ‘the others’ of a certain culture to that culture itself. If it were not for the music, maybe, they would not

be having this kind of crucial role in their society, namely, an alternative in the cultural, political and especially religious sphere of their environment.

Through offering their music to the public, to members of other communities in the environment where they live, the Alevi communities invite also outsiders to listen to them, without demanding any confirmation, but solely allowing for their receiving, their acceptance, with facing the unknown and the unexpected, without fearing it. The Alevi tradition that inherently engages in practices of ethical listening, is a complex, yet simple example of the impact that the act of listening can provide also for interreligious dialogue.

#### MUSIC SHARING AND ETHICS OF LISTENING: A PATH TO AND FOR INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

*The heart of listening is to openly stand before the absolutely Other in my own vulnerability, and entails an infinite responsibility to say the words I am here in my own vulnerability, to ap-*

*proach the Other with respect and as a secret script that opens up for me if I am able to read* (Koskinen & Lindström, 2013, 154).

The activity of listening ‘in the present moment’ allows an acceptance of the perceived world and other beings without the burden or influence of knowledge of the past, nor expectations for the future. This meets Oliver Sacks’ claim that “remembering music, listening to it, or playing it, is entirely in the present” (Sacks, 2008, 226). Listening is prominent in musical activity; moreover, listening to music is more easily oriented towards the perception and acceptance of the unknown. Therefore, musical activity and creation is an adequate space to awake to active listening.

The insight of an active nature of the gesture of listening offers the possibility of another step forward in overcoming traditional dichotomies. (See e. g. Ihde, 2007; Nancy, 2007) In parallel to the overcoming of the borders and distinctions between active and passive, ‘us’ and ‘them’, the limits between new and old are also questioned. At the same time music should (again) gain the conscious function of connecting a community and establishing intersubjective relations (with)in it. With ethical listening, also deriving from it, a similar process evolves with pertinent values. Therefore, in the transmission of the values, be it common or different to other traditions, listening is an invaluable activity that can educate future and nonetheless, re-educate present generations, for a multireligious cohabitation of mutual care and respect for each other values.

The case of the Turkish Alevis, presented here, is a robust example of the possibility of establishing an attentive intersubjective space for interreligious dialogue, where everyone can be accepted and listened to.

*Dialogue, in its ideal form, involves a conversation or exchange in which participants are willing to listen and learn from one another. [...] To be sure, far from every dialogue between religions will actually yield religious fruit. But it is the very possibility that one may learn from the other which moves religious traditions from self-sufficiency to openness to the other* (Cornille, 2013, 20).

In this presentation of the Alevi tradition it is clearly noticeable that these communities have a strongly ability to listen and a developed openness to the other. Therefore, they are a suitable role model to follow in pursuing a successful interreligious dialogue. It seems that Alevi (musical) tradition fulfils all the conditions for a successful interreligious dialogue, as presented by Catherine Cornille (2013): humility, commitment, interconnection, empathy, and hospitality. Moreover, they do not give precedence to the outside forms of religious practice, but rather to the inner meaning of the gestures and beliefs. The Alevis do not expect ‘outsiders’ to perform their rituals ‘correctly’. If visitors want to participate, they are always welcome, and never perceived as intruders. Overcoming these perspectives that are usually considered to hinder the evolvement of interreligious dialogue (cf. Moyaert, 2014, 232–236), gives the Alevis more opportunities to establish contacts with members of other religions and accept them for who they are, including their beliefs. Following their example, namely, embodying ethics of listening in interreligious dialogue, would help to foster and deepen its success for mutual acceptance of difference and a discovery of possible shared beliefs.

## POSLUŠANJE DRUGOSTI: PRIMER TURŠKIH ALEVIJEV

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### *POVZETEK*

*Pričajoči članek povezuje teorijo etike poslušanja z etnografsko študio primera turških Alevijev z namenom predstavitev možnosti spodbujanja medreligijskega dialoga, ki jo kot vzorna ponujata oba vidika. Zamisel o teh možnostih se je porodila na osnovi izkustva avtorice, ko je ob terenskemu delu na osnovi metode opazovanja z udeležbo proučevala alevijske skupnosti v Istanbulu. Članice in člani teh skupnosti so se izkazali za izredno gostoljubne, medsebojno naklonjene, posebej pozorne do drugačnega in neznanega, kar je izhajalo iz njihove nagnjenosti k pozornemu poslušanju. V slednjem je bilo mogoče prepoznati geste etike poslušanja, ki je med Aleviji tako rekoč ponotranjena. V besedilu je predstavljena hipoteza, da je tovrstna spontana naravnost k poslušanju druge-/ga osnovana na okoliščinah alevijske tradicije, ki se je stoletja prenašala predvsem preko poezije in glasbe, z njunim udejanjanjem, izvajanjem. To pomeni, da je prenašanje alevijskega nazora bilo v temelju odvisno od zmožnosti (medsebojnega) poslušanja. Slednje je tudi osnova za njihov odprt odnos do drugačnosti in pripravljenost na medreligijski dialog. Prispevek nadalje prikazuje možnosti, ki jih glasbeno udejanjanje nudi za razvijanje etike poslušanja, ki bistveno pogojuje tudi možnosti odprtrega, naklonjenega, razumevajočega, sprejemajočega medreligijskega dialoga.*

**Ključne besede:** Turški aleviji, poslušanje, alevijska glasba, etika poslušanja, gostoljubje, medreligijski dialog

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## FAIR COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER AS A RATIONAL ATTITUDE: THE GRAMMARIAN ACCOUNT OF AUTHENTICITY

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### ABSTRACT

*The aim of this paper is to show how philosophical grammatical consideration can contribute to better understanding of rationality of religion, and increase respect, fair cooperation and dialogue between adherents of different religions and worldviews. I have picked three examples of such account: Wittgenstein's account of theology as grammar, Alvin Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism and Hilary Putnam's semantical externalism. In the second part of the paper, I analyse the connection between grammar, rationality, and authenticity. I show that understanding of this connection provides a rational ground for claiming the possibility of dialogue and fair cooperation with others even in case when their rationality is different from ours.*

**Keywords:** grammar, non-trivial rationality, fair cooperation, dialogue, authenticity

## EQUA COOPERAZIONE E DIALOGO CON L'ALTRO COME ATTEGGIAMENTO RAZIONALE: LA CONSIDERAZIONE GRAMMATICALE DELL'AUTENTICITÀ

### SINTESI

*Lo scopo di questo articolo è mostrare come la considerazione grammaticale filosofica può contribuire a una migliore comprensione della razionalità della religione e aumentare il rispetto, l'equa cooperazione e il dialogo tra aderenti di diverse religioni e visioni del mondo. Ho raccolto tre esempi di tali considerazioni: la concezione della teologia come grammatica di Wittgenstein, la critica al fondazionalismo classico di Alvin Plantinga, e l'esternalismo semantico di Hilary Putnam. Nella seconda parte dell'articolo, analizzo il collegamento tra grammatica, razionalità e autenticità. Mostro che la comprensione di questo collegamento fornisce una base razionale per difendere la possibilità del dialogo e di un'equa cooperazione con gli altri anche nel caso in cui la loro razionalità sia diversa dalla nostra.*

**Parole chiave:** grammatica, razionalità non triviale, cooperazione leale, dialogo, autenticità

*Some might think there is no connection between Frege and Wittgenstein, on [the] one hand, and Rawls, on the other. For me there is a very close connection, and I hope to bring it out implicitly if not explicitly today* (Dreben, 2003, 316).

## INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to show how philosophical grammatical consideration can contribute to better understanding of rationality of religion, to its respect, and help to ground and increase respect, fair cooperation<sup>1</sup> and dialogue between adherents of different religions and worldviews. I have picked three examples of such account: Wittgenstein's account of theology as grammar, Alvin Plantinga's (hereafter CF) criticism of classical foundationalism, and Hilary Putnam's semantical externalism (hereafter CF). In the second part of the paper, I will analyse the connection between grammar, rationality, and authenticity. I will show that understanding of this connection provides a rational ground for claiming the possibility of dialogue and fair cooperation with others even in case when their rationality is different from ours.

There are two basic starting points of my analysis. The first concerns dialogue, and the second fair cooperation. The first point may be formulated as the following argument: 1. There is no true dialogue without mutual respect among participants; 2. There is no true respect without mutual recognition of rationality among participants; 3. Therefore, there is no true dialogue without mutual recognition of rationality between participants. The second, Rawlsian, starting point is that fair cooperation is not possible without mutual recognition and respecting of rationality between the participants.

### GRAMMATICAL ACCOUNT OF RELIGION AND THEOLOGY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON ITS SIGNIFICANCE, FRUITFULNESS AND IMPLICATIONS

#### Wittgenstein: theology as grammar

Late Wittgenstein understood a philosopher as being a kind of grammarian. Similarly, he understood theology as grammar (Wittgenstein, 1984, 398; Arrington, 2004). In this respect, his distinction between factual and grammatical propositions is of special importance (Arrington, 2004, 171, 173).

Let's take an example of the proposition »God exists« (Arrington, 2004, 172–173, 175). According to Wittgenstein, this proposition functions in a religious language game, for instance the Catholic one, not as a factual proposition, but as a grammatical proposition. In the Catholic grammar, it doesn't express the fact that God exists (Wittgenstein, 1980, 82). Rather, we are dealing with a proper use of the word God in the Catholic grammar. The Catholic grammatical »justification« of such use of the word »God« is not by providing some proves for God's existence but by proving that such use of the word »God« is proper if one is Catholic (Arrington, 2004, 178). If one says that God doesn't exist then one is not Catholic because Catholics don't use the word "God" in such a way. The job of a Catholic theologian is not to perform a scientific or metaphysical language game (Wittgenstein, 1966, 57; Arrington, 2004, 175; Hodges, 2004, 67) – and thus to provide scientific or metaphysical proves for the claim that God exists – but rather they are grammarians of the Catholic religion. They describe the proper rules and ways of talking, thinking, and in general of living according to the Catholic religion. They are experts for the Catholic way of life, for the Catholic form of life. An appropriate discourse belongs to this form. A Catholic theologian is a »guardian« of the Catholic discourse and Catholic form of life, or, to put it in Wittgenstein's terms, of the Catholic grammar (Arrington, 2004, 173). This implies also that a Catholic theologian points out also the violations of the Catholic grammar. Following Wittgenstein, this is not true only for the Catholic religion and theology but also for other religions and theologies in general: other Christian theologies, Islamic, Buddhist theologies etc. Following Wittgenstein, we may say that the religious grammar and theology are not a matter of scientific proving or disproving that some proposition is factually true or not (Hodges, 2004, 69–70), but rather a matter of identity. If you are a Christian, you think and say that God is a Trinity »consisting« of Father, Son, and Holly Spirit. If one thinks and talks about God otherwise fine, they may do it. This doesn't mean that one may call them a bad person, or even infidel or apostate, but certainly they are not Christians. Christians simply don't think and talk that way (Arrington, 2004, 172, 174, 176).

Such understanding of religion enables Wittgenstein to account for some characteristics of religious speech and thought, for instance certainty. A specific certainty is typical for religious statements and be-

1 The formulation of the conditions of fair cooperation in an ethically heterogeneous society was one of the main aims of Rawls' philosophical endeavour. In this paper, I use the term *fair cooperation* in the Rawlsian sense, more precisely in the sense of the term as it is understood by the late Rawls (Rawls, 2001, especially pp. 5–8 (the introduction of the notion and its basic clarification)). For our purposes in this paper it is especially important Rawls' stress on reasonableness of the terms of cooperation from the point of view of all involved parties: "The idea of cooperation includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms each participant may reasonably accept" (Rawls, 2001, 6). Rawls characterizes the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation as "the central organizing idea of society" (Rawls, 2001, 26).

lieves. Such certainty is not scientific or metaphysical but rather grammatical. It originates in the certainty about the proper religious use of language, about the grammatically proper way of thinking and talking from the point of view of a particular religion.

Wittgenstein's account of religion shows that science is relevant for theology primarily as far as it can help to achieve the true interpretation or understanding of a particular religious identity and not as a means of falsifying a particular religion as a whole. Genuine religious propositions are not of the kind that can be falsified by scientific findings. Likewise, it is not possible to prove scientifically that a particular religious belief is irrational. Those who claim this confuse genuine religious propositions with factual propositions.

### **Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism**

Foundationalists distinguish between basic and non-basic beliefs. So let us introduce the definition of a basic belief of a person S (Howard-Snyder, 2012, 37):

S's belief B is basic = df B is justified and B does not owe its justification solely to

- (i) S's other beliefs,  
or
- (ii) the coherence of their belief system,  
or
- (iii) the combination of both.

CF claims that there are only three kinds of basic beliefs (Gutting, 2009, 112):

1. self-evident beliefs (for instance some truths of logic or mathematics),
2. incorrigible beliefs (like "I think"),
3. experiential beliefs (for instance that at the moment I am wearing brown trousers).

Consecutively CF claims that the only justified beliefs are either those three kinds of beliefs, or beliefs that deductively follow from those beliefs. Hence, rational and epistemically responsible person should accept only those three kinds of beliefs. Besides, if knowledge is a justified belief, any possible knowledge consists only of those three kinds of beliefs.

Plantinga has showed that CF is wrong. He proved that there are basic beliefs that don't belong to any of the three mentioned kinds of CF basic beliefs (Plantinga, 2000; Gutting, 2009, 111–120). This thesis can be demonstrated by the example of an imagined person whom we can call John (Plantinga, 2000, 100ff). John comes from totally religious environment and he is very religious. But he (surprisingly) chooses

to study philosophy at a secularized university, in a not exactly religious intellectual environment. He becomes acquainted with the criticism of religion given by Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and others but he remains quite unmoved by it. On the other hand, his faith enables him to cultivate a reach and satisfying inner spiritual and social life. So it might seem reasonable to say that John's religious beliefs are basic for they are not justified solely by some other beliefs, coherence or combination of both and it is perfectly rational for John to hold those beliefs.

Somebody can understand the intuitive power of the above example but can nevertheless object in the following way: *"I agree that the religious beliefs of John are in a sense basic. Still, these are not proper basic beliefs because they are only subjectively justified, and not objectively justified."* We can reply to this objection by introducing the distinction between only subjectively justified beliefs and warranted beliefs. The claim which I held as correct is that warranted beliefs are objectively justified, and that among warranted beliefs there are also basic beliefs that don't belong to any of the mentioned three kinds of basic beliefs recognized by CF. The sufficient conditions for a warranted belief are that it is subjectively justified, and that it is a result of a proper functioning of our cognitive faculties. This means that the one who claims that John's religious beliefs are not warranted must prove that they result from improper functioning of John's cognitive faculties. Or to put it in general terms: those who claim that a warranted religious belief is not possible must prove that a religious belief that doesn't result from improper functioning of our cognitive faculties is not possible. In particular, they must prove that it is (logically) impossible that John's religious beliefs result from proper functioning of his cognitive faculties.

Let us now turn our attention to Christian beliefs (and assume that John is a Christian). Our question is now the following: Are Christian beliefs produced by improper functioning of cognitive faculties of Christian believers or not? Plantinga has convincingly argued that only if Christian beliefs are not true then it is reasonable to claim that they are not warranted. But if, on the other hand, they are true, then it is highly probable that they are warranted. The argument is the following: If Christian beliefs are true then they are caused by God who tries to redeem us by means of them. This God is absolutely good and omnipotent but he is also the designer of our cognitive faculties. Therefore, these faculties function as their designer desires. Hence, they work properly. Ergo our Christian belief is warranted if it is true (Plantinga, 2000, 285).

The last proposition already implies that the question of the rationality of Christian belief can't be separated from the question of its being true. Critics can't claim that Christian belief is non-warranted

without at the same time claiming that it is false. If Christianity is true then it is warranted. The skeptic's objection "*I don't claim that Christian faith is true or false but just that it is non-warranted*" is therefore not reasonable. Basically, Christianity can't be questioned solely epistemologically but rather theologically. Fundamentally, we can criticize it by questioning its being true and not only by denying its warrantability or rationality. Until we prove that Christian belief can't be true we can't prove that it can't be warranted and therefore that it can't be rational. But the proposition that Christian belief can't be true has not been proved till now by anybody and it seems quite improbable that anybody will prove it. Therefore, one can't rationally claim that Christian belief can't be rational in the sense that it can't be warranted. Moreover: if we are certain that Christian belief is true then we can be sure that it is also warranted (Gutting, 2009, 114).

The moral of Plantinga's criticism of CF is similar to the one we have derived from Wittgenstein's account of religion. His account, as outlined above, can be interpreted as implying the particularity of rationality. There is no neutral intellectual framework or horizon, accessible to human beings, from which we could decide what is rational or not regarding the religious truth. Science certainly can't provide it. What is rational or not depends on a particular intellectual horizon and the "decision" – if there is any – for a particular horizon is the decision at the identity level. Rationality is contextually and horizontally marked. We can of course decide for a different identity, abandon one identity and take another ... But such decisions are not a matter of science. And they are very particularistic. Thus it is perfectly rational to say that for person A it is rational to be a Catholic, for person B to be a Muslim, and for person C to be an atheist. They can be all rational because rationality is particularistic. It is neither just subjective nor arbitrary, but it is particularistic. Such an account of rationality and religion enables genuine dialogue between people with different beliefs and worldviews because they can treat each other - despite their mutually exclusive views – as rational. Recognizing of rationality is a condition for respect and dignity. And without mutual respect and recognition of dignity, a genuine dialogue is not possible.

### Semantics of one and the same God: the religious relevance of Putnam's semantical externalism

SE is a position developed by Hilary Putnam. Putnam, through an imaginative thought argument, convincingly proved that "*meanings are not in the head*". This, to put it more precisely, means that, in

most terms, their references cannot be determined without taking into account the speaker's (social) environment (Putnam, 1975; 1991a; 1991b; 1992). Putnam differentiates between intension of the term, and its extension or reference. Extension is called meaning, intensity stereotype. This difference roughly corresponds to Frege's distinction between *sense* (German *Sinn*) and *meaning or reference* (German *Bedeutung*). Frege's sense corresponds to intension, meaning to extension. The meanings are, according to Putnam, defined by the social causal chains that lead to the original act of naming. What does that mean? Let's take the example of Christian and Muslim believers when they talk about God. Their ideas about God are different, so they have different stereotypes or intensions about God. However, the meaning or reference of their utterances about God is the same, since they are all connected with one God by the same causal social chain to the original act of naming. They speak of the same God, according to the meaning spoken of by Abraham/Ibrahim, with whom they are related via the corresponding causal social chain formed by their ancestors in their linguistic communities. In this regard, all Muslims and Christians are related to Ibrahim/Abraham, who is further related to the original act of naming God. If we accept SE, then we can say: if all the speakers about transcendence are causally related to the same "object", then they talk about the same thing, they refer to the same referent, even if they perceive it differently, from different aspects, through different intensities or stereotypes.

If it is important for (interreligious) dialogue<sup>2</sup> that the speakers speak of the same God, despite their different intensions, then SE provides an important semantic foundation for interreligious dialogue in this respect.

Putnam's SE fits nicely with Wittgensteinian account which allows particularities, even highlights them, but on the other hand refuses any subjectivism or individualism because no private grammar is possible. Likewise, according to Putnam, referents are not private, only intensions are in the head. Wittgenstein, Plantinga and Putnam all converge in understanding that we must take into account the aspects of person's environment in order to understand and explain properly their semantical, epistemological and ethical aspects. In this sense, all three accounts are externalist. Such externalism provides a suitable basis for dialogic universalism. A dialogic universalist believes that despite ethical and moral differences between people, religions, cultures etc., it is possible to reach convergence about ethically and morally important matters – if we persist in dialogue and go deep enough, beyond the surface differences. Deep

<sup>2</sup> I think that it is. One reason is that I think that dialogic universalism (see below) is the right attitude.

down, we all have something important in common and this common aspect provides the ground for fair cooperation and dialogue. The capability approach of Martha Nussbaum that we mention below provides a sound philosophical elaboration of such view.

The term *dialogic universalism* has been coined by Catholic theologian David Hollenbach. He first used it in 1979 (Hollenbach, 2003, 152, n. 23). He defined it 24 years later as follows:

*Thus the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed the pursuit of the common good in a divided world while it simultaneously urged renewal of a distinctively Christian vision of the human good. This approach can be called dialogic universalism. It is a universalist, for it presumes that human beings are sufficiently alike in that they all share certain very general characteristics in common and that the same general outlines of well-being are shared in common as well. For example, the good of all human beings requires that basic bodily needs be met, that intelligence be developed and educated, that freedom of conscience be respected, and that participation in social and political life be a real possibility* (Hollenbach, 2003, 152).

After directing us to *Gaudium et Spes* (nos. 14–17, 25), one of the central documents of the Second Vatican Council, he draws our attention to the fact of close congeniality between the Catholic teaching and work of Martha Nussbaum:

*There is a significant resemblance between what the Council says unsystematically about common human characteristics and what Martha Nussbaum develops more systematically in a number of her writings, including ‘Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings,’ in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds., *Woman, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 61–104. The resemblance stems from the influence of Aristotle on Nussbaum and of Aristotle through the mediation of Thomas Aquinas on the Council* (Hollenbach, 2003, 152–153, n. 24).

Despite my sympathies for dialogic universalism, I must at the same time stress that the aim of reaching convergence should not disturb and limit dialogue. A fully developed dialogue should be free of all aims beyond itself (Yankelovich, 2001, 40, 56–57; Žalec, 2010, 34–35). Paradoxically, we expect that an overlapping consensus can be the fruit exactly of such a free dialogue; exactly a free dialogue which doesn't primarily set itself the goal of reaching any aim be-

yond itself, is the most promising basis for reaching an adequate overlapping consensus between the particular participants in the dialogue. Such overlapping consensus can be very different – ethically, morally, culturally etc. – from some other overlapping consensus between some other ethically, morally or culturally different parties. Still, primarily important is that people reach some overlapping consensus and fairly cooperate, not on which basis they reach them. Those foundations are, can and may be very different.

#### RATIONALITY AND AUTHENTICITY ARE MATTERS OF GRAMMAR

In order to understand correctly and more completely the point of our arguments thus far, and the examples we have chosen, the term “rationality” should not be understood in the mere “trivial” sense, but more broadly, richer than the “impoverished” trivial notion of rationality: we must understand it in a particularistic way, and we could also say in the identity or existential sense. “Trivial” rationality involves adhering to formal logic, scientific methods, and the like. Whether one is rational or not in terms of respecting the laws of formal logic, mathematics, physics etc. does not depend on the identity of the person. But on the other hand, a well-founded answer to the question of whether or not it is rational for a particular person to belong to a particular religion must be very particularistic, sensitive to each particular individual, their particular context, life story etc. So for John from Plantinga’s example embracing Islam would be unreasonable, but in Ahmed’s case, on the contrary, this may be exactly the most reasonable choice. But if they deal with mathematics, both John and Ahmed are subject to the same criteria of mathematical rationality and the judgment of their mathematical rationality (rationality as mathematician) is much less, if at all, dependent on the particular features of Ahmed’s and John’s case. In addition, it should be emphasized that rationality is particular (or may be), but it is not and can never be arbitrary. The latter is by no means possible, either when it comes to trivial or non-trivial rationality. In any case, arbitrary rationality is a *contradiccio in adiecto*.

Next, despite our emphasis on the particularistic character of rationality and consciousness (as a form of practical rationality), they are not as relative as moral relativists claim. This is evidenced for instance by the evidence provided by the proponents of World Ethos idea (Küng, 1995; Grabner-Haider, 2006; Bader, 2007), or the emergence of opposition to particular harms just from the members of cultures in which those harms are in accordance with their social and moral norms (e.g. opposition of the members of traditional societies to the violence against

women where tradition permits it, for instance in India (Nussbaum, 1999, 7)). According to Nussbaum, cultural relativism is in general a bad option. As a descriptive thesis, it is wrong because there is no homogeneous reality to which cultural relativism is referring. As a normative thesis, it is burdened with hard problems: 1. It has no bite in the modern world of media; 2. It is not obvious why we should prefer some local values instead of the best one; 3. It is self-undermining: the thesis that we should prefer local cultures and their values is a universal evaluative thesis (Nussbaum, 1999, 15).

Non-trivial rationality in the just outlined sense is a part of our in depth identity. Our in depth identity is determined, shaped and actually constituted by our deepest grammar – we may say existential grammar – we belong to. This grammar can't be private, for the same reason that private language is not possible<sup>3</sup> but that doesn't mean that we can articulate it discursively. It is partly unspeakable. It is a matter of practical wisdom, of knowledge how.

We may enlighten this last point by invoking the idea of universal human religion (hereafter UHR) as understood by Jan Assmann in his book *Totale Religion* (Assmann, 2018, 130, 135). Here Assmann presents the idea of Moses Mendelssohn who finds in the Bible the same problem as Lessing: they both realised the problem that the Bible is exclusivist, given to only one people, and at the same universal, valid for all people. In this contradiction they see the origin of intolerance and violence and thus they want to relativize the notion of revelation (Assmann, 2018, 131).

Mendelssohn makes the distinction between particularistic religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, on one hand, and UHR, on the other. He understands UHR as religiosity common to all people and founded on their common participation in God's Creation. So according to Mendelssohn we can speak about *religio duplex* (Assmann, 2018, 134–135; Petkovšek, 2017, 630) because every man belongs to two religions: to particular religion, in which they are born or converted to, and to UHR. This double belonging creates – only when people are aware of it – a mutual recognition of religions and peace among them.<sup>4</sup>

UHR doesn't set itself above particularistic religions but beside them. UHR is actually the religion of

reason. The truths of UHR are truths of reason and not of revealed religion because the truths necessary for good life shouldn't be revealed. These truths are not revealed exclusively to only one religion (Assmann, 2018, 135). Mendelssohn distinguishes between dogmas and natural "revelation" on one hand, and life rules and written revelation on the other. The dogmas are eternal truths which are revealed to people in the Creation and they can know them, at least indirectly, by means of reason given to them by the Creator. They are the truths of reason, not of faith. According to Jewish understanding, they can't be and shouldn't be codified. They should be communicated through live teaching adjusted to the changes of times and circumstances. Only historical truths – like the Law communicated to Moses – may be written down but not the "eternal" truths. Only about historical truths it is proper to teach people with word and letter (Assmann, 2018, 134).<sup>5</sup> In this sense, UHR is "unspeakable". We can use spoken and written words when communicating about it, but we must be aware that those are only auxiliary and very, very insufficient means, and that UHR manifests itself primarily in good deeds. UHR is a part of the deep grammar of people. However, the fact that it is "unspeakable" doesn't mean that it can't be a matter of dialogue, because dialogue is not limited to verbal communication.<sup>6</sup> Actually, a fully developed dialogue itself is much deeper communication, much more primordial and bodily than (solely) verbal communication. It can involve verbal communication, but not necessary, and it is not reducible to it (Luckmann, 2007, 158–162).

Regarding moral relativism, UHR is another case against moral relativism because the good deeds and main goods that people usually and normally desire and want are very much similar in different cultures all around the world. This fact may be again explained by driving to Martha Nussbaum, this time to her theory of human capabilities. The main capabilities that belong to every human being are universal because of the universal aspects of any human condition: we are all mortal, we can all suffer, become ill, we all can be affected by the violation of our dignity, honour ... We all wish to realize our intellectual and emotional potential and can feel oppression to do it. And so on. On this basis, Nussbaum formulates her main capabilities and claims that discourse about universal

<sup>3</sup> Wittgenstein introduced the notion of private language in *Philosophical Investigations* in §243 (Wittgenstein, 1984, 356). He argues for its impossibility in §244–§271 (356–366). The most important are §256–§271 (360–366). In §201 and §202 (345) he showed that private rule-following is not possible what is the crucial part of his argument against the possibility of private language.

<sup>4</sup> This account of UHR and *religio duplex* fits very well with dialogic universalism. In fact, we may consider it as a version of it.

<sup>5</sup> The historical truth of the Law is valid only for Jews, but the eternal truths are valid for the whole humanity. (Assmann, 2018, 134–135)

<sup>6</sup> We may say – in Kierkegaardian way – that it is communicable only through indirect communication or even existence-communication. The most important text for understanding those Kierkegaard's notions is Kierkegaard, 2009 (see also Tietjen, 2013, especially 51–57). In it, Kierkegaard claims that Christianity is existence-communication (Kierkegaard, 2009, 312 (n. b), 318, 468, 471, 478–80, 486, 510, 512).

human rights is only the translation of the discourse about capabilities. What we are actually talking about when we talk about human rights are, according to her, capabilities. It is just that the discourse of human rights is more established, and thus it is more practical and efficiently to use it than the discourse about capabilities. But in fact human rights are reducible to capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001b, 96–100).

Nussbaum's article Non-Relative Virtues was first published in 1993 and there she already gave a list of capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001a, 218–220). Later she further developed an original capability ethics based on Aristotelian virtue ethics. In her seminal work (Nussbaum, 2001b), she provided a list of core functional capabilities, which later stabilized (Nussbaum, 2006). The following are listed: 1. life; 2. bodily health; 3. bodily integrity; 4. senses, imagination, and thought; 5. emotions; 6. practical reason; 7. affiliation; 8. other species; 9. play; 10. control over one's environment (material and political) (Nussbaum, 2001b, 78–80). Central functional capabilities set a universal minimum standard for prosperity and well-being of each person, and they enable us to evaluate the quality of life. In doing so, they form the basis of universalist ethics. The basic question for the capability approach is not whether the person is satisfied or not, or how many options and resources they have available, but whether or not they will work, allowing the person to develop and function in a fully human way. The measure of well-being is, in fact, prosperity, the flourishing of a person in the areas marked by the above ten points. As I have already mentioned, Nussbaum believes that (human) rights can also be reduced to (combined) capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001b, 98). It distinguishes three types of capabilities: basic (Nussbaum, 2001b, 78–80) (these are more or less innate or genetic), internal (Nussbaum, 2001b, 84–86) (these are advanced states of a person), and combined. The last are intrinsic capabilities combined with appropriate external conditions to perform the function (Nussbaum, 2001b, 84–85). Citizens of repressive regimes e.g., they may have an intrinsic but not combined capability to exercise their capability to speak according to their conscience. Nussbaum's list of core capabilities is a list of combined capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001b, 86). People must therefore be given at least the minimum and, where possible, the best possible conditions for exercising all three types of their capabilities.

One final note about UHR: Today we don't speak any more about universal human religion, because the idea of humanity is totally secularised. It is a principle that doesn't invoke God and revelation, but reason and knowledge. It relativizes religious and cultural differences and at the same time respects them. Today we don't focus any more on the origin,

but on the goal. We don't derive human dignity, protection of minorities etc. from (one understanding of) human nature, but from common goals and needs. (Assmann, 2018, 136) As Pope Benedict XVI (2011) observed, the human rights are not the child of the Bible, but of the Enlightenment. So the idea of *religio duplex* still lives also in the Catholic Church (Assmann, 2018, 137).

From what we have said above it is clear that trivial rationality is ethically and morally insufficient. Second, if our in depth grammar is constitutive for our in depth identity, and if non-trivial rationality is a matter of such grammar then non-trivial rationality is constitutive for our in depth identity, i.e. authenticity. Therefore not to follow rationality, not being rational, is to renounce one's own (deep) identity, what one (in depth) is, their authenticity. It means being inauthentic. In this sense, we may say that man is a rational being. What one authentically is, in their core, is their grammar, i.e. their non-trivial rationality. To betray oneself means betraying one's in depth rationality.

## CONCLUSION

Equality and respect between the participants belong to the necessary conditions and main positive factors of a true and fully developed dialogue. The understanding of the connection between grammar, rationality and authenticity that I have enlightened above provides a good basis for actual cultivation of respect and equality toward the other. There is no actual recognition of equality and respect of the other without recognition of their rationality. Our grammarian account makes possible a rational recognition of the other as rational although their rationality is different from ours and may ground truths which are incompatible with truths implied by our rationality.

Jürgen Habermas has shown that only persons who consider themselves and others as authentic can mutually recognize themselves as autonomous and equal (Habermas, 2005, 71, 84–85, 87, 97, 99; Habermas, 2007, 152–155; Žalec, 2019, 631, 634, 637–638; Strahovnik, 2018, 302–304; Ambrožy, Králik & Martín, 2017; Valčo & Štúrak, 2018). This recognition is (another) condition for a fully developed dialogue and for actual working of liberal democracy. We have shown how rational people can be authentic in incompatible ways and still mutually recognize themselves as rational and authentic. Such view fits very well with the distinction between ethics and morality which is an integral part of the modern Western moral and political grammar. According to this distinction, ethics deals with good or good life, and morality is about what is right or just. In modern times, philosophy can no longer directly judge what

a good life is. It is characterized by refraining in this respect, and it is difficult to object to this refraining posture (Habermas, 2005, 11–12; Žalec, 2019, 632–633). The ideal of authenticity is formal in nature (Junker-Kenny 2011, 124; Žalec, 2019, 633; Klun, 2019, 597). It can be applied to worldviews that are completely different in content and even incompatible, contradictory. Thus, for example, an authentic life can be achieved both by an atheist and by a theist. Therefore, the ideal of authenticity is acceptable to our age and its moral grammar, since it does not violate the division into morality and ethics that is an integral part of that grammar. Respecting of this distinction is a way to carry out liberal and democratic coexistence in modern, ethically heterogeneous societies.

A further virtue of our grammarian account is that it provides a good basis for cultivation of fair cooperation in Rawlsian sense. This is grounded on the respect of the rationality of the other. Two parties can fairly cooperate in Rawlsian sense only if they give the other reasons and proposals which respect the rationality of the other, and are acceptable by the criteria of the other's own rationality. At the same time, those reasons and proposals must be rational also by the criteria of rationality of the proponent. Only in this way, a true overlapping consensus may be achieved. The insight in the grammatical and (hence) particularistic nature of rationality shows that overlapping consensus and thus fair cooperation are possible even among people and groups with significantly different (understanding of) rationality because there is no rational reason to deny the rationality of the other just because their rationality is different from mine. Moreover, sometimes I should recognize such persons as rational if I apply the same criterion of non-trivial rationality to them as to myself. There is such a criterion but of course it is of formal nature. It is called authenticity. If the other in their different rationality is authentic, then I must admit that they are rational.

#### SOME FINAL ELUCIDATIONS

Let me finally point out a few scruples that might arise to the reader after reading this article, and answer them briefly.

The first is related to religious traditions e.g. mystical ones, which are not supposed to consider rationality important, at least not at certain levels, or even consider it harmful. How is my account in this article applicable to these traditions? Here again it is crucial to distinguish between trivial and non-trivial rationality. My answer is that these traditions do not actually belittle or reject rationality in the sense of non-trivial rationality as I defined it here. Representatives of these traditions believe that their position or attitude or approach are right, correct

and in this sense rational, at least as applied to themselves. They think they are rational even if they reject any rationality in a trivial sense as relevant, or even consider it harmful. But they think that this rejection itself is rational, that they are rational in a non-trivial sense. They also believe that their grammar or form of life in general is rational in a non-trivial sense. Of course they may use different terms than "rational" for their view. They may even strongly refuse the term "rational" as appropriate for description of their view. But as I use the term here, their own view, attitudes and way of life are properly described as being rational, at least as applied to themselves by themselves. In short, they themselves believe that their way of thinking and living is rational. A mere terminological dispute is not important here. The question however is whether they think so only for themselves, or for some people, or they believe that their position and attitudes are the only right, i.e. rational for anybody else. If their answer is yes, then their attitude – at the levels at which they claim this – is non-dialogical. If the answer is no, then they are dialogical. In the article, I do not go into the question of who in particular is or is not up to dialogue or why people are not or are up to dialogue. I limit myself to the importance of understanding rationality and of its ascribing to others for cultivation of dialog with them. Whether mystics are dialogical or not, which are and which are not, these are important questions, but I am not dealing with them in this article. I argue, however, that if one, a mystic or anybody else, does not accept rationality of others as relevantly equal, then they do not have a dialogical relation to them. The same is true of any religious tradition that considers rationality of others to be inferior. Of course, different levels of non-dialogical attitude must be taken into account. Thus, e.g. we should be aware that religious exclusivism does not imply political exclusivism (Volf, 2017, 150–160). Therefore, a believer can be dialogical at the political level, but not at the level of the highest theological truths.

Another possible second thought about my position is that it is relativistic. Regarding it I would first of all like to emphasize that in this article I am interested in the possibilities of dialogue and fair cooperation and the importance of rationality in this respect. Secondly, my focus here is on particularity, not on relativism, and it is crucial to distinguish between particularity and relativism. It is true, however, that the question of relativism as a factor of dialogue and fair cooperation arises and that some total or excessive divergence of views certainly hinders or even prevents dialogue and fair cooperation. However, I argued – with reference to Assmann, Nussbaum, capability approach and dialogical universalism (Hollenbach) – that extreme relativism is neither a well-grounded position nor a

desirable option, in terms of cultivating dialogue and fair cooperation. "Relativism" which derives from my thesis about particularity of rationality, therefore certainly has its limits, and particularity of rationality also has its limits. From the fact that rationality is particular does not follow that every position can be rational. In the article, I draw constraints of what can be rational even in a non-trivial sense. I describe these constraints in terms of capability, identity, and authenticity.

Finally, a comment on the possible designation of my position as an example of a postmodern paradigm or thesis. I prefer here to avoid the term "postmodern paradigm," even though it is true that the thesis of particularity of rationality is a part of the views of postmodern thinkers. However, the term "postmodern" has a problematic property that it can be understood as the opposite of modernity, the latter being understood – (also) in terms of rationality – as a kind of monolith. I certainly do not think that modernity is such a monolith. Historical evidence falsifies this thesis (McGrath, 2019, 44–45).<sup>7</sup> The

same conclusion follows also from my discussion in this paper. In this sense, one could say that empirical historical evidence supports my findings from the article. However, I am only pointing out this claim here. Proving it goes certainly beyond the scope of this article.

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<sup>7</sup> McGrath points out that the rootedness and contextual characterization of rationality do not imply irrationalism and radical skepticism: "*Recognizing the 'constitutive significance of place' in the production of meaning does not entail a decent into irrationalism or radical skepticism, but rather calls for a warranted attentiveness to the complex historical and cultural geography of human reason. Human rationality is rooted in, and hence shaped by, the realities of human biological and social existence*" (McGrath, 2019, 46). Relativism is harmful when it leads to complete skepticism or irrationalism. However, particularity of rationality that I myself advocate does not in any way imply these two.

## POŠTENO SODELOVANJE IN DIALOG Z DRUGIM KOT RACIONALNA DRŽA: SLOVNIČNA POJASNITEV AVTENTIČNOSTI

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### POVZETEK

Namen tega prispevka je pokazati, kako lahko filozofska slovnična obravnava prispeva k boljšemu razumevanju racionalnosti religije, njenemu spoštovanju ter pomaga pri utemeljevanju in povečanju spoštovanja, poštenega sodelovanja in dialoga med pripadniki različnih religij in svetovnih nazorov. Izbrali smo tri primere takih pojasnitev: Wittgensteinovo pojASNITEV religije kot slovnice, kritiko klasičnega fundacionalizma, ki jo je podal Alvin Plantinga, in semantični eksternalizem Hilaryja Putnama. V drugem delu prispevka analiziramo povezavo med slovnico, racionalnostjo in avtentičnostjo. Pokažemo, da razumevanje te povezave daje racionalno podlago za trditev, da sta dialog in pošteno sodelovanje z drugimi mogoča, tudi če je njihova racionalnost drugačna od naše. Naša analiza ima dve osnovni izhodišči. Prvo zadeva dialog, drugo pa pošteno sodelovanje. Prvo izhodišče lahko formuliramo v obliki naslednjega argumenta: 1. ni pravega dialoga brez medsebojnega spoštovanja udeležencev; 2. brez medsebojnega pripoznavanja racionalnosti med udeleženci ni pravega spoštovanja; 3. zato ni pravega dialoga brez medsebojnega pripoznavanja racionalnosti med udeleženci. Drugo, rawlsovsko izhodišče, je, da pošteno sodelovanje ni mogoče brez tega, da udeleženci drug drugega pripoznavajo kot racionalne in racionalnost drugega tudi dejansko spoštujejo. Vpogled v slovnično in partikularistično naravo racionalnosti razkrije, da sta prekrivajoče se soglasje in s tem pošteno sodelovanje (v Rawlsovem pomenu obeh izrazov) možna tudi med ljudmi z bistveno drugačno racionalnostjo, saj ni razumnega razloga, da bi zanikali racionalnost drugega samo zato, ker je njegova racionalnost drugačna od naše. Še več. Včasih takšne osebe moram pripoznati kot racionalne, če zanje uporabim isto merilo za netrivialno racionalnosti kot pri sebi. Takšno merilo obstaja, seveda pa je formalne narave. Imenuje se avtentičnost. Če je drugi v svoji drugačni racionalnosti avtentičen, potem moram priznati, da je racionalen.

**Ključne besede:** slovnična, netrivialna racionalnost, pošteno sodelovanje, dialog, avtentičnost

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## EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE: A CASE FOR HUMILITY

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### *ABSTRACT*

*The paper aims to highlight the role of humility as an epistemic virtue in interreligious dialogue. In particular, the paper focuses on the relationship between humility and epistemic justice and investigates it from the perspective of the religious identity (of both individuals and groups) as a possible impediment in dialogue or source of prejudice and misunderstandings. It establishes the legitimacy of humility both as a virtue as well as a form of moral and epistemic thought.*

**Keywords:** interreligious dialogue, humility, epistemic virtues, epistemic injustice, religious identity

## VIRTÙ EPISTEMICHE E DIALOGO INTERRELIGIOSO: IL CASO DELL'UMILTÀ

### *SINTESI*

*Il testo si propone di evidenziare il ruolo dell'umiltà come virtù epistemica nel dialogo interreligioso. In particolare, il lavoro si concentra sul rapporto tra umiltà e giustizia epistemica, analizzate dal punto di vista dell'identità religiosa (sia degli individui che dei gruppi) come possibile fonte di ostacolo al dialogo o fonte di pregiudizi e incomprensioni. Intende dimostrare la legittimità dell'umiltà sia come virtù, sia come forma di pensiero morale ed epistemico.*

**Parole chiave:** dialogo interreligioso, umiltà, virtù epistemiche, ingiustizia epistemica, identità religiosa

INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

One of the basic research challenges regarding the issue of interreligious dialogue is an appropriate understanding of the factors (positive and negative) of such a dialogue. Addressing selected aspects of this problem is one of the pivotal points of this paper, with specific focus being on research questions, which are at the forefront of contemporary discussions in philosophy and theology. In particular, the paper focuses on the question about the role of epistemic or intellectual virtues (virtues like for example intellectual honesty, truthfulness, persistence, open-mindedness, intellectual humility, etc.) in interreligious dialogue. The short answer to this question would be that since epistemic virtues are, by definition, something that either constitutes or contributes to our epistemic endeavours, goals, and values (e.g. truth, knowledge, justification, understanding, wisdom, insight, intellectual integrity, etc.), epistemic virtues thus also contribute to dialogue, since it is one of our important epistemic undertakings as well as goals in the sense that it can lead to increased mutual understanding. Besides to this epistemic goal, interreligious dialogue also has moral goals, the latter being often framed in terms of mutual respect, building of peace, etc. That is why dialogue must proceed from our genuine commitments (beliefs, attitudes, values, etc.), not only for the parties to be sincere but to actually enable the other side a proper understanding. As an example, one can point to Socrates and Socratic dialogue. For Socrates (and Plato), dialogue requires us to present and hear at least two different points of view, which are held sincerely. The participants in the dialogue must discuss and express what they really think or are truly convinced of (and not merely speculate on different points of view; cf. *Protagoras* 331b–331d). Socratic dialogue is therefore formed out of personal and engaged assertions or commitments that are closely related to the beliefs, stances and lives of the partakers in dialogue (Seeskin, 1987, 2). Based on this, one can appreciate how epistemic virtues such as sincerity and open-mindedness are important for dialogue as a cooperative endeavour in search of the truth.

The recent renaissance of interest in virtue epistemology has been followed by the exploration of the individual strengths of this approach, including those that enable addressing important challenges of the contemporary society like the question of so-called epistemic injustice. One form of epistemic injustice occurs where particular epistemic viewpoints are marginalized or discriminated against. Interreligious (as well as intrareligious) dialogue could be and actually is often

a venue where such phenomena arise. In the framework of the paper, an analysis of an apt understanding of epistemic virtues is put forward as well as an emphasis of their interconnection with moral virtues and their role in interreligious dialogue. Another included perspective of the analysis is how religion and religious traditions understand and can contribute to the development of these virtues, especially those that are key to tolerance, peace, and dialogue (e.g. intellectual or epistemic humility, openness, intellectual courage, etc.).

The paper particularly focuses on the virtue of humility and uses it as a paradigm to demonstrate the mentioned importance and role of epistemic virtues in interreligious dialogue. Some of the addressed research questions are going to be the following. How humility can be understood as an epistemic virtue? Does epistemic humility play an important role in identifying, abolishing, or overcoming biases in dialogue? Is epistemic humility compatible with a firm and robust or even resolute and vigorous religious beliefs and religious commitments? Preliminary one can say that intellectual or epistemic aspects of humility include the belief or experience of oneself as a limited, imperfect and fallible being (in the epistemic sense), who is part of a larger creation and thus has a limited and incomplete viewpoint and perception of reality as a whole. This belief or experience about our limitations can also be mediated and formed in the context of spiritual connection with God or the experience of a living connection with nature or cosmos as a whole. The role and importance of intellectual humility in the interreligious dialogue are also established by results of empirical research, e.g. a recent study of the relationship between intellectual humility and religious tolerance has confirmed that individuals with a high degree of intellectual humility (especially in relation to religious beliefs) exhibit a high degree of religious tolerance to different religious beliefs and believers (Hook et al., 2017). In order to understand intellectual humility fully, the paper will also point out how we can understand it not merely as an epistemic virtue but as a form of epistemic thought, which defines how we share epistemic space with others. This will then enable the argument for intellectual humility as being conducive to establishing and securing epistemic justice and the relation of all this to interreligious dialogue.

## HUMILITY AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

The section consists primarily initial thoughts on how we can understand intellectual humility. Starting from a general perspective, humility might be understood as one of fundamental moral and epistemic

<sup>1</sup> The paper is a result of research within the basic research project and research programme. The authors acknowledge the project No. J6-9393 *Interreligious Dialogue – A Basis for Coexisting Diversity in the Light of Migration and the Refugee Crisis* and research programme core funding No. P6-0269 *Ethical-Religious Grounds and Perspectives of the Society and the Religious Studies in Context of Education and Violence* as supported by the Slovenian Research Agency.

virtues. Humility is an exceedingly multi-faceted term and proves to be hard to define. Kellenberger, discussing the so-called general humility, ascertains seven elementary dimensions that we generally associate humility with (some of these are more aligned with the proposal about humility being a virtue than others). These are: (i) having a low opinion of oneself, (ii) having a low estimate of one's merit, (iii) having a modest opinion of one's importance or rank, (iv) lack of self-assertion, e.g. in cases where one has made a contribution or bears merit, (v) asserting or requesting little desert, (vi) having and/or demonstrating awareness of one's defects or proneness to mistakes, and (vii) not being (too) proud, haughty, condescending, or arrogant (Kellenberger, 2010, 321–322). The subsequent discussion of humility as a virtue will be framed predominantly within the sixth and seventh dimension. Since this aspect of humility concerns primarily how we position ourselves in relation to others it is often labelled as relational humility. Such relational humility can be defined as consisting of four elements, namely "(1) other-orientedness in one's relationships with others rather than selfishness; (2) the tendency to express positive other-oriented emotions in one's relationships (e.g., empathy, compassion, sympathy, and love); (3) the ability to regulate self-oriented emotions, such as pride or excitement about one's accomplishments, in socially acceptable ways; and (4) having an accurate view of self" (Davis et al., 2010, 248). As such, humility and humble comportment are closely associated with behaviour within relationships with others where we have an accurate perception or evaluation of ourselves and, in being humble, we are other-oriented in the sense that we consider the wellbeing others on par with our own, and this subsequently prompts trust.

Now, let us move the discussion to epistemic or intellectual aspects of humility, i.e. to intellectual humility.<sup>2</sup> Intellectual humility includes us having an apt, realistic and non-haughty view on our own intellectual capabilities and strengths. It also involves manifestation of an ability to properly assess and evaluate different ideas and views in a way that includes respect for others that e.g. do not agree with us, etc. Cole Wright and colleagues (2017) define humility as a particular psychological positioning of oneself, and in relation to its epistemic or intellectual aspects, such positioning concerns a sort of epistemic alignment. This alignment includes that we do not privilege our own viewpoints, beliefs, and values, as well as our mental capabilities and skill as "special" in a way and thus deserving acclaim, status and praise because they are ours (and not for other reasons that may e.g. mandate such appraisal). From an epistemic point of view,

this also means formed understanding and unpretentious experience of ourselves as a limited and fallible beings, who are part of a larger creation and thus have incomplete and curtailed perspective of reality.

In this sense humility can be characterized as a second-order intellectual virtue, meaning that it does not primarily concern our beliefs, but the attitude we take toward ourselves as knowers (Spiegel, 2012). Such a humble stance can be mediated by or formed within the framework of a spiritual connection with God or a profound existential connection with nature or cosmos. Humility also restricts our tendency to experience exceptionality, or superiority, as well as restricting propensity to prioritise our own beliefs. It also restricts the claims of special recognition or commendation and the establishment of inapt epistemic supremacy over others. Intellectual humility is thus both a virtue and a stance that involves having appropriate, modest, and non-haughty view of our intellectual abilities (Hook et al., 2015, 499–506; Davis et al., 2016, 215–224). Given this, we can again reaffirm its role as a positive factor in interreligious dialogue, as it is also evidenced by empirical research.

Inquiry into the relationship between intellectual humility and religious tolerance confirmed that individuals who have a high degree of intellectual humility (especially in relation to religious beliefs) also exhibit a high degree of religious tolerance regarding different religious beliefs (Hook et al., 2017). Intellectual humility is a good predictor of religious tolerance of individuals, a predictor which is fairly independent of the strength of religious commitment and conservatism of their religious beliefs; it also weakens excessively defensive posture towards others, who do not share our religious beliefs. The attributed intellectual humility is likewise a positive factor of forgiveness (Zhang et al., 2015; Hook et al., 2015), in the sense that if the "victim" perceives the "perpetrator" as humble that makes it easier to forgive wrongful behaviour (Zhang et al., 2015). Intellectual humility is important for establishing, maintaining and restoring interpersonal and social bonds in a non-selfish and solidary manner. "A high level of intellectual humility is an important virtue, especially for those individuals who are within their communities perceived as someone who has significant intellectual influence" (Hook et al., 2015, 504). In conjunction with truthfulness, humility leads to increased levels of integrity, sincerity, and loyalty, to collaborative and responsive behaviour and reduces the level of vindictiveness and manipulation. Humility is also related to (social and civic) responsibility, gratitude, compassion, benevolence

<sup>2</sup> It might well be likely that humility is a genuinely a hybrid virtue in the sense that its moral and epistemic elements cannot be split up into two completely separate virtues. Nevertheless, the paper proceeds here by focusing primarily on epistemic aspects of humility and leave the question about separability open.

and mindfulness, openness to others and hope (Cole Wright et al., 2017, 5-6). Secure attachment in the context of our relations to God is positively correlated with dispositional humility (Jankowski & Sandage, 2014, 80). Intellectual humility has a critical role in the formation of religious tolerance in a way that simple exposure of different religious beliefs and religions (religious diversity) does not. Therefore, "*if religious tolerance is a goal, it may be important to promote religious intellectual humility in religious individuals,*" (Hook et al., 2017, 6) which is especially important in the broader picture of contemporary the world where religious differences often lead to tensions, conflicts and even violence.

Humility includes both intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions. It enables us to establish an apt relationship to ourselves as epistemic agents, which *inter alia* includes an openness to new facts and insights, ability to integrate new knowledge into our existing knowledge, ability to assess the relevance of this knowledge, etc. At the same time, it puts us into an epistemic space with others (as epistemic agents) in a way that nurtures non-haughty, non-condescending, and solidary participation in the common pursuit of truth (Strahovnik, 2018).

#### HUMILITY AS A MODE OF MORAL AND EPISTEMIC THOUGHT

In this section, we will take the discussion about intellectual or epistemic humility a bit further. After putting forward a view that understands (moral) humility as a form of moral thought (and not merely a moral virtue) we will draw an analogy with intellectual humility and present a conception of intellectual humility as a form or mode of epistemic thought.

For the first part of this task, we employ the work of Raimond Gaita (2011) that develops a deepened understanding or conception of humility. Gaita begins by turning to his own experiences and autobiographical reflections and uses them to highlight how the notion of full humanity — in the sense of recognizing the other as fully human and in this regard just like ourselves, even if the circumstances of such a recognition are somewhat averse to it — is a prerequisite for any moral thought at all. This could be referred to as a sort of status justice where recognizing a moral status precedes any considerations about moral rightness or rights. Gaita similarly uses the notion of full humanity, in particular the recognition of full humanity to develop the idea of "justice beyond fairness" (pace Rawls and his justice as fairness). According to this conception of justice, distributive justice is not and cannot be primary, since we must first establish the domain of those that are even considered as beneficiaries of just distribution.

*A concern for justice in community should be, in critical part, a concern that its institutions enable and encourage us always to see, and in seeing to be responsive to the full humanity in each of our fellow human beings. That is why this kind of concern is called a concern for social justice and it is why it is so often connected with compassion* (Gaita, 2000, 84).

Such a conception of justice "involves the acknowledgement of the depth and complexity of human experience, [...] the willingness and ability to see the other as a fully human as oneself and as a genuine limit upon one's own will" (van Hooft, 2007, 313). Such a fundamental attitude of acknowledgement is marked by the absence of superiority or condescension and a full and humble recognition of the humanity of the other.

Gaita also appeals to the notion of saintly love (in relation to the sanctity of life and the dignity of a human being) and the mode of moral vision that are not to be understood at the level of virtues, but they reach beyond them. The absence of condescension is humility, and the means towards forming such humility is compassion, which enables a mode of (moral) seeing, including the actions of saintly love and the language of love.

*The nature of charity or compassion depends on the concepts under which one sees those towards whom one responds charitably or compassionately. The concepts under which my father and Hora saw Vacek [Gaita is referring here to one of his above mentioned auto-biographical examples of Gaita's father and his friend Hora recognizing and interacting with Vacek, a homeless and somewhat troubled individual, that lived on their land; note authors] were historically constituted, I believe, by the works of saintly love, by the language of love that formed and nourished those works and which was, in its turn, enriched by them* (Gaita, 2011, 6).

One level is the attitude of the individual and the other level is the background or tradition that enables such an attitude. What is at play here is compassion without condescension and with humility, with humble attention to the other. Gaita thus speaks about two fundamental views on morality. The first is framed as a system of concepts such as autonomy, integrity, courage, honour, flourishing, and heroism, including heroic virtues, while the other is focused on the good as a central concept and emphasizes the importance of our sensitivity to vulnerability and adversity, the meaning of renouncement, sacrifice, and the recognition that we are all made in the image of God. This

latter understanding also implies the concept of an ethically necessary response (in terms of moral necessity), for example, in the form of compassion that goes beyond the emotions you can choose, form, try to stop, redirect, etc. insofar as one judges that the other is not deserving compassion or moral attention (cf. Centa, 2018). This now opens up space for a deeper understanding of moral humility. In the first sense, it can be understood as our response to recognition and understanding of our flaws or mistakes as causes of our moral wrongdoing or false beliefs. A deeper understanding sees humility as one of the forms of moral thought, which establishes a special space of meaning, in which moral actions are initially made possible. Not being humble in this sense is not seen as a cause of an error but as a form of error. By analogy, we can now recognise such a double role also for intellectual humility. On the one hand, it can be seen as an epistemic virtue along the lines sketched above. On the other hand, it is something that positions us and others in a common epistemic space that enables both cultivation and practice of epistemic virtues. It facilitates mutual participation in the search for truth and other epistemic goals, and this includes such a search in dialogue.

#### THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY IN ESTABLISHING EPISTEMIC JUSTICE

One of the challenges for interreligious dialogue (as well as for contemporary world in general) is the problem of epistemic or intellectual injustice.

*Epistemic injustice refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. These issues include a wide range of topics concerning wrongful treatment and unjust structures in meaning-making and knowledge producing practices, such as the following: exclusion and silencing; invisibility and inaudibility (or distorted presence or representation); having one's meanings or contributions systematically distorted, misheard, or misrepresented; having diminished status or standing in communicative practices; unfair differentials in authority and/or epistemic agency; being unfairly distrusted; receiving no or minimal uptake; being coopted or instrumentalized; being marginalized as a result of dysfunctional dynamics; etc. (Kidd et al, 2017, 1).*

To put this in more abstract terms, epistemic injustice is a set of phenomena characterized by distinctively epistemic kind of injustice, which befalls an individual or a group in their capacity as epistemic agents, e.g. when such injustice wrongs them in their capacity as

a subject of knowledge (Fricker, 2007; 2003). One of the aims of the paper is to argue that humility is itself an important dimension of epistemic justice and to, furthermore, demonstrate how epistemic humility is thus a vital part of interreligious dialogue.

As elaborated above epistemic injustice is a uniquely epistemic kind of injustice and thus not simply a form of moral injustice (e.g. the unequal and unjust distribution of wealth leading to significantly diminished educational opportunities for those at the lower end of the distribution). It can be best considered as a specific form of wrong(ness), which is a distinctively epistemic (Fricker, 2007, 5) and can impede self-development of the individual or even prevent one of becoming who they are. Such epistemic wrongs or harms can be generalized to the level of groups, including religious communities if they face epistemic injustice. In order to appropriately comprehend epistemic injustice, we must direct our attention to epistemic practices of epistemic agents as situated within the community, on social relations, distribution of power and social identity.

Fricker distinguishes between testimonial and hermeneutical epistemic injustice. The former is a type of injustice that symptomatically arises in situations someone gives the speaker less credibility than merited, usually as a consequence of prejudice or bias. A representative example of such injustice is dismissing an otherwise credible testimony, recommendation, advice, etc. merely on the basis that it comes for a person that is of the "wrong" race, gender, religion, social class, etc. The latter, i.e. hermeneutical injustice, is a type of epistemic injustice that stems from a gap in (collective) hermeneutical resources or shared tools of social interpretation. In other words, disadvantaged members or whole groups are

*hermeneutically marginalized, that is, they participate unequally in the practices through which social meanings are generated. This sort of marginalization can mean that our collective forms of understanding are rendered structurally prejudicial in respect of content and/or style: the social experiences of members of hermeneutically marginalized groups are left inadequately conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves; and/or attempts at communication made by such groups, where they do have an adequate grip on the content of what they aim to convey, are not heard as rational owing to their expressive style being inadequately understood (Fricker 2007, 6–7).*

Victims of such epistemic injustice are prevented from making sense of (their own) experience which it is (strongly) in their interests to render intelligible. In this regard, the victim is wronged in the capacity as a sub-

ject of social understanding. The current state of the art of discussions on these topics sometimes goes beyond these two types or forms of epistemic injustice and has identified several others, but this framework suffices for our purpose of demonstrating how epistemic humility could be understood as an effective response to such injustice.

The proposed answer to the challenge of epistemic injustice is epistemic justice or, more specifically, the cultivation of epistemic justice as a virtue. The latter is conceptualized as a hybrid virtue or a set of virtues that enables us to overcome epistemic injustice on our part, e.g. as the receivers of information in the case of testimonial injustice. Testimonial justice is thus an epistemic, or better, hybrid (epistemic and ethical) virtue that enables the hearer to be in a shared epistemic space in such a way that the influence of identity prejudice on the hearer's credibility judgement is detected and corrected for. Fricker emphasises testimonial sensibility as a form of rational sensitivity. We can develop it through attention to testimonial practices, adequate or reliable attribution of credibility, careful perception and perception of cognitive status, etc.

*If we ask what is the immediate end of testimonial justice considered as an intellectual virtue, the answer is 'neutralizing prejudice in one's credibility judgements', and its ultimate end will be truth. For neutralizing prejudice is necessary for achieving the appropriate openness to truth that the subject is ultimately aiming at—if the hearer allows prejudice to influence her credibility judgement, she is liable to miss out on a truth. If we now ask what is the immediate end of testimonial justice considered as an ethical virtue, the answer is, once again, 'neutralizing prejudice in one's credibility judgements', and its ultimate end will be justice. For neutralizing prejudice is the necessary means to avoiding doing one's interlocutor a testimonial injustice* (Fricker, 2007, 122).

The individuating motivations of the epistemic and ethical aspects thus coincide, although their ultimate ends, truth and justice respectively, are different. Next, hermeneutical justice is also a hybrid virtue that enables the hearer to exercise a reflexive critical sensitivity to reduced intelligibility incurred by the speaker, owing to a gap in collective hermeneutical resources.

*The form the virtue of hermeneutical justice must take, then, is an alertness or sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one's interlocutor is having as she tries to render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its being a nonsense or her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective hermeneuti-*

*cal resources. The point is to realize that the speaker is struggling with an objective difficulty and not a subjective failing. Such a sensitivity involves, once again, a certain reflexive awareness on the part of the hearer, for a speaker whose communicative efforts are hampered by hermeneutical injustice may seem to be making no sense at all to one hearer (as when Marge expresses her suspicions to Herbert Greenleaf in an emotional or intuitive style), while to another hearer (perhaps another woman) she may seem to be making a manifestly reasonable point. The virtuous hearer, then, must be reflexively aware of how the relation between his social identity and that of the speaker is impacting on the intelligibility to him of what she is saying and how she is saying it* (Fricker 2007, 169).

After outlining dimensions of epistemic justice one can now appreciate, how epistemic humility actually is an aspect of such an overarching hybrid virtue. Humility enables us to be attentive both to our failings and limitations in the discursive sphere, as well as to be sensitive to the status that we are attributing to others in this shared epistemic space. This first of the mentioned aspects includes our sensitivity to our own prejudice and bias, while the second aspect is aiming at how we set, position and understand the other's epistemic status (testimonial justice) and how we design and structure the shared epistemic space, e.g. the space of dialogue (hermeneutical justice).

#### CONCLUSION: EPISTEMIC JUSTICE AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

In this concluding section of the paper, the relationship between epistemic justice and interreligious dialogue is laid out in a way that additionally reveals the importance of intellectual humility. The connexion between epistemic (in)justice and interreligious dialogue is multidimensional. One of the key aspects that enable us to understand it is religious identity. Such identity is necessary a part of interreligious dialogue if such dialogue is to be genuine and committed. Kidd delineates the mentioned multidimensionality of the relationship as follows.

*[R]eligious persons and groups can be perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustice. Religious persons and communities can commit, or can suffer, epistemic injustices. [...] A religious identity can invite others' prejudice and entail activities and experiences that others might find difficult to make sense of, while also shaping a person's epistemic sensibilities. The practices of testifying to and interpreting experiences take a range of distinctive forms in religious life – for*

*instance, if the testimonial practices require a special sort of religious accomplishment or if proper understanding of religious experiences is only available to those with authentic faith. But it is also clear that religious communities and traditions have been sources of epistemic injustice – for instance, by conjoining epistemic and spiritual credibility in ways disadvantageous to ‘deviant’ groups* (Kidd, 2017, 386).

Religious identity – of both, individuals and groups – can be linked with prejudices leading to both testimonial injustice and to practices of understanding that can create or maintain gaps that can lead to hermeneutical injustice. Aspects of particular identity are deeply interconnected with religious individuals and groups and cannot be simply set aside in interreligious dialogue and in dialogue with non-believers (cf. Žalec, 2019). Religious life often presupposes some special testimonial practices and hermeneutical resources embedded deeply into religious traditions, and thus religions can be sources of epistemic injustice (Kidd, 2017, 388). The religious aspect of one's identity (or its absence) is thus in no way exempt from the domain of epistemic injustice. In its most straightforward form, it can be expressed or reflected in the distinction between “true” believers or “genuine” witnesses of faith and all the others that do not qualify as such. The shift from polytheism to monotheism also, by its very nature, pushes or exhorts certain testimonial religious views and practices outside of the dominion of the “true or right” wisdom. A similar phenomenon can transpire even in the context of traditional monotheism where certain types or practices of spirituality can be excluded (for example, relegation and marginalisation of particular feminine forms of spirituality, etc.). The threat of epistemic injustice also concerns secularism (in relation to religious groups). Kidd in this regard highlights several open questions, including the questions of whether secular societies and their educational systems commit hermeneutical epistemic injustice by not providing members of these societies with resources and sensibilities needed to make sense of people's religious beliefs, attitudes, and experiences (Kidd, 2017, 394).

Intellectual humility is one way of overcoming such epistemic injustice, since it stands in opposition to pride, arrogance, self-glorification, and haughtiness.

*Honest and respectful dialogue nurtures humility and offers a corrective to the excesses of our own traditions. Dialogue can create trust and imbue a sense of security to help overcome the suspicion and fear our traditions have often instilled about the other. By forging*

*bonds of support and solidarity across religious boundaries, people of religious good will can help overcome ethnic and national xenophobia* (Lander, 2011, 150).

At the same time, religious traditions and religious thought are the ones that help us to cultivate such humble moral perception, since religious depth and authenticity allow for such moral vision and understanding. It empowers us to overcome the shallowness and superficiality, and by following the exemplars (in Christianity, for example, Jesus and the saints) some depths of religions are spaces of meaning which enable such moral vision. The key is to direct our attention to the potential of religions, religious traditions, and religious communities to foster and exhibit humility (instead of e.g. absolutism, exclusivism, or fundamentalism), both in terms of understanding as well as practice. *“There can truly be no peace among humanity until and unless there is peace among the religions of humanity. That peace cannot emerge without profound dialogue, exchange, humility, and learning from one another”* (Safi, 2011, 305). We agree with Gaita, who argues that, in connection with such a view, religion actually constitutes such a framework of meaning. *“Think of how much of our sense of religious depth and authenticity is a function of our appeal to things in which we believe that form and content cannot be separated – art of course, but also prayers, hymns, religious rituals and so on. Appeals such as these and reflection upon them occur in what I have called ‘the realm of meaning’.”* (Gaita, 2011, 12) For Gaita, the meaning of concepts such as human dignity, inalienable dignity, the inner value of persons and the unconditional respect can only be understood on the basis of a deeper background created by the aspect of common humanity and revealed by the aforementioned saintly love and the related acts of love. A humble attentiveness toward the truth as the overall epistemic aim also helps us to overcome violence (Petkovšek, 2015, 249). In this light, we can see the moral relevance of humility, which can enable us to cultivate an open, humble, tolerant and responsive dialogue. Religious communities and religions, in general, are important agents of global justice. Religions thus have a vital role in establishing justice and fostering dialogue by creating a context of sympathetic imagination, humility, and respect. Humility is a basis for stepping out of our ego and enter into the world of the other, and in this way, we can avoid the phenomenon of “invisible other(s)” (Nussbaum, 2012, 139–140). Humility, inclusive imagination, and sympathy represent only one aspect of compassion and care, but they are crucial because they are moving us in the opposite direction as fear, that is in the direction of the other. Narcissism misleads us when it persuades us that we can go through our life with

other people, not to make any efforts in the domain of imagination, sympathy, and care, and this is one of the main forms of moral error (Nussbaum, 2012, 169). Such errors could also be characterized as overlooking of the full humanity of another as the cornerstone of any justice.

*Treat me as a human being, fully as your equal, without condescension – that demand (or plea), whether it is made by women to men or blacks to whites, is a demand or a plea for justice. Not, however, as justice conceived as equal access to goods and opportunities. It is for justice as equality of respect. Only when one's humanity is fully visible will one be treated as someone who can intelligibly press*

*claims to equal access to goods and opportunities* (Gaita, 2000, xx–xxi).

Compassionate empathy and imagination are able to overcome such tunnel vision or blind spots, and do that in a way that mere arguments can-not, because the former includes experiential participation (solidarity; cf. Žalec, 2019, 419) with the other, but it also goes beyond it, since it evaluates, criticizes and explores the values that are embedded in the situation, and to dismantles hierarchies, stigmatization, and undeserved suffering. Humility, both intellectual and moral, plays an important part as a virtue here. It orients us towards the other, fosters positive other-oriented emotions, and enables us to overcome egoism, arrogance, and the feeling of superiority.

## SPOZNAVNE VRLINE IN MEDRELIGIJSKI DIALOG: PRIMER PONIŽNOSTI

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### POVZETEK

*Eden temeljnih raziskovalnih izzivov v zvezi z medverskim dialogom je ustrezeno razumevanje dejavnikov tega dialoga. Članek se osredotoča zlasti na vprašanje vloge spoznavnih ali intelektualnih vrlin (npr. intelektualne poštenosti, resnicoljubnosti, vztrajnosti, odprtosti, intelektualne ponižnosti itd.). Prispevek se posebej osredotoča na ponižnost in jo uporabi kot primer za prikaz pomena in vloge vrlin v medverskem dialogu. Intelektualna ponižnost vključuje, da imamo ustrezen, stvaren in nenadut pogled na lastne intelektualne sposobnosti ter da izkazujemo sposobnost pravilnega ocenjevanja različnih idej in pogledov na način, ki vključuje spoštovanje drugih. Omogoča nam, da vzpostavimo primeren odnos do sebe kot spoznavnih akterjev in nas postavlja v spoznavni prostor z drugimi na način, ki omogoča nesamovšečno, nevzvišeno in solidarno sodelovanje pri skupnem iskanju resnice. Intelektualna ponižnost je tudi način za premagovanje spoznavne nepravičnosti, vključno s konteksti, v katerih je verska identiteta možen vir ali tarča spoznavne nepravičnosti in krivic.*

**Ključne besede:** medreligijski dialog, ponižnost, spoznavne vrline, spoznavna nepravičnost, religijska identiteta

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## THE REALM OF ABSTRACT WORSHIP – HEGEL'S INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM

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### ABSTRACT

*The article thematises Hegel's account on Islam as found in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. The discussion primarily examines the relationship between man, God/Absolute and the world in Islam, which, as Hegel demonstrates, is marked by irreducible abstractness. Two things emerge from abstractness, both the remarkable creativity of Islam (e.g. Poetry) and its inclination to violence, including its inability to build a solid political structure. To shed light on these limitations, the discussion refers on Hegel's Science of Logic, where the condition for mutual interdependence of man, God/Absolute and the world are developed. In religious language, this interdependence articulates the concept of trinity, which makes it possible to overcome the shortcomings of the abstract approach.*

**Keywords:** Islam, philosophy of law, violence, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

## IL REGNO DELL'ADORAZIONE ASTRATTA – L'INTERPRETAZIONE DI HEGEL DELL'ISLAM

### SINTESI

*L'articolo tematizza il racconto di Hegel sull'Islam come si trova nelle sue lezioni Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. La discussione esamina principalmente il rapporto tra l'uomo, Dio / Assoluto e il mondo nell'Islam, che, come dimostra Hegel, è segnato da un'astrattezza irriducibile. Dall'astrattezza emergono due cose, sia la straordinaria creatività dell'Islam (ad esempio la poesia) come anche la sua inclinazione alla violenza, inclusa la sua incapacità di costruire una solida struttura politica. Per far luce su questi limiti, la discussione fa riferimento alla Wissenschaft der Logik di Hegel, dove si sviluppano le condizioni per la reciproca interdipendenza tra uomo, Dio / Assoluto e mondo. Nel linguaggio religioso, questa interdipendenza articola il concetto di trinità, che consente di superare le carenze dell'approccio astratto.*

**Parole chiave:** Islam, filosofia del diritto, violenza, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Understanding Islam has become one of the most important tasks of philosophy. Probably the most elusive theme within it is establishing a connection between Islam and violence. This demanding analysis is, however, often additionally burdened by the informal imperative of political correctness, that suggests either to avoid the subjects of violence completely or to remain on level of distanced generalized judgments, stating that all religions can be violent as well as peaceful, destructive as well as sublime.

The aim of this article is to shed light on the characteristics of Islam in its relation to violence and to compare this relation with the attitude towards violence of the Western tradition. As a philosophical framework for the discussion, we will take Hegel's analysis of Islam, which he develops in chapter *Mohammedanism* from the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (Hegel, 1914). We will only briefly address the issue of his positioning Islam within the context of world history, which is otherwise the basic role of the aforementioned chapter.<sup>2</sup> We have chosen this chapter since on this place Hegel explicitly thematizes the relationship between man, God/Absolute and the world in Islam. The dialectic of these three elements is crucial for the purpose of this article, as it determines the *ethos* of man within the Whole of a being and, consequently, the status of violence as a medium of relationship with the world.

Since the task of the chapter '*Mohammedanism*' is not an exhaustive analysis of those relations, we will underpin it by the reference on Hegel's work *The Science of Logic*, more precisely, by the chapter *Absolute Relation*. This chapter explains much more comprehensively the characteristics of two different constellations between substance and accidents (in our case: between God/Absolute and world). Hegel sees the shortcoming of this constellation in Islam in its abstractness. Abstractness is an indicator of the imperfection of logical relationship in general, which (in our case) results in the inclination to mere *negation* as a medium of communication with the world, and in the incapability of the immanent development of this relationship.

It must be stressed out that Hegel is an ambivalent author when it comes to criticizing the violence. It is enough to mention his programmatical rejection of pacifism not only as unrealistic, but

in the first place as unethical idea. Only the war, he argues, can bring oxygen into the sluggish water of selfishness and individualist degeneration: '*For war should not be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external contingency. [...] Whatever is by nature contingent is subject to contingencies, and this fate is therefore itself a necessity.*' (Hegel, 1991, 324). History as a 'slaughter-bench' is not a place of happiness and personal fulfillment, but rather the process of individuals' sacrifice for the interests of the world spirit. Hegel is, furthermore, famous also for his reservation to the concept of human rights, that stand in '*a fixed position – for example, as cosmopolitanism – in opposition to the concrete life*' (Hegel, 1991, 209), and are, therefore, destructive for state's organism.

Hegel is, on the other hand, from today's point of view, a valuable author, as his critique of Islam does not slip into naïve advocacy of Western superiority over Islam. He stresses out, that Islam is not merely capable of being sublime, it can achieve such richness in its creativity that the West often seeks inspiration in the Islamic tradition.<sup>3</sup> However, he sees the limits of Islam in its abstractness of the relationship between man, God/Absolute and the world, which implies inherent connection to violence, that is more tenacious than within Christianity. Thus, regarding its inclination to violence, Islam's Western pendant is not to be sought in Christianity, but in the French revolution. It is not without reason that I. Almond calls Islam '*incomplete and abstract enlightenment*' (Almond, 2010, 117).

## ABSTRACT ONE VS. CONCRETE MAN AND WORLD

Hegel's approach to the discussion on Islam is marked by certain discomfort. The impression he gives is that the emergence of Islam was an inconvenient remnant of a (generally) perfect structure in the development of the world spirit. This is clearly indicated by the fact that he included the chapter *Mohammedanism* within the section, titled *The German World*. Judaism supposedly performed its task on the global level by giving birth to Christianity and should have retreated into historic nullity. However, it did not, for it led to the emergence of Islam. Hegel tried to dispose of these unease by placing Islam onto a second level of dialectics, as an 'anti-thesis' to the first chapter (*The Elements of*

1 This article is the result of research work within the program group P6-0400 Social Contract in the 21st Century, funded by ARRS.

2 Nonetheless, these are issues that cannot be completely avoided, especially the question as to whether Islam has truly withdrawn from global history and whether its role for understanding the events on the global level has truly been eliminated, as Hegel concluded.

3 Hegel mentions Goethe's work *West–Eastern Divan* as a classic example.

*the Christian German World*), which can be found at the beginning of the section *The German World* (and is concluded by the chapter *The Empire of Charlemagne*). Thus, he placed Islam in opposition to the barbarian Europe of the time.

Hegel described this Europe as a world of the particular, contingent, and complex Many, within which the '*world of free reality*' (Hegel, 1914, 369) is being painfully constructed. However, this construction will take time, certainly more than a thousand years. In opposition to this stands a phenomenon that Hegel announced through confident rhetoric of necessity (that is otherwise characteristic for his philosophy of history): '*while the West began to shelter itself in a political edifice of chance, entanglement and particularity, the very opposite direction necessarily made its appearance in the world, to produce the balance of the totality of spiritual manifestation.*' (Hegel, 1914, 369) This '*very opposite direction*' was Islam. In the construction of Hegel's system this is of key importance: he believed Islam was capable of producing Totality at a time during which Europe was dazed by mass migrations and characterised by impenetrable dispersion. He believed Islam was capable of removing the particularity, purifying the spirit and connecting many peoples through a single principle.

Hegel called this phenomenon '*the revolution of the East*' (Hegel, 1914, 370), which is a further indicator of his difficulties at placing Islam within the horizon of world history. Such a description is unusual, because Hegel himself drew attention to the *differentia specifica* of Islam in relation to the Orient, i.e. '*East*'. The characteristic of the latter can be found in its immersion of the spirit into nature, which is nothing less than its slavery. The limit of the Orient is illustrated by the Egyptian sphinx, in which we can sense the irremediable attachment of the spirit to nature. Similar to Judaism (which Hegel places into the Orient), Islam surpasses nature clearly. Its principle is the One, still understood as pure abstraction, which, however, has been liberated of the attachment to the chosen nation. Islam differs from the Orient also in another key element: the man is understood as the subject. In opposition to India, for example, where the individual sinks into the Absolute through his disappearance, the '*subjectivity is here living and unlimited, an energy*' (370). Especially the latter justifies the notion of '*revolution*', as subjectivity starts negating the world as soon as it confronts it.

A characteristic of Islam, relevant to philosophy can be analysed by the criteria that it sets for itself: to establish the connection between man, God/Absolute and the world. Creating this connection takes place within the medium of worshiping the abstract One, as the realm of abstract worship. This One is the absolute object, totally transparent, without any inner divisions. Islam accepts the *Old Testament* command that '*thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image*' (Exodus 20: 2) with utter consistency. The subject that stands opposite to the Absolute, has the obligation to focus completely on this object, which demands the rejection of all of its particular interests. Thus '*the worship of the One remains the only bond by which the whole is capable of uniting*' (Hegel, 1914, 372). Or, if we use the words of R. Daghistani, '*The consciousness of Allah, God and his worship, remains the only bond that holds together the inner and external micro and macro cosmos and joins everything in general*' (Daghistani, 2012).

However, this connection has its limits. The relationship between One and the many, the eternal and transitory, substance and accident, cannot be reconciled within an abstract medium. A number of issues emerge from the abstractness of these relations. Firstly, subjectivity is not fulfilled, for man does not recognise himself in the One. Subjectivity is merely trapped in the fanaticism of fulfilling its purity and universality: '*In this spiritual universality, in this unlimited and indefinite purity and simplicity of conception, human personality has no other aim than the realization of this universality and simplicity*' (Hegel, 1914, 370). It thus exists merely as self-dissolution, without any affirmation.

The difficulties of abstract bond between man and One are spottable in the incapacity to consistently perform the intended '*purity*' within the religious relation. The remnant is presented by the image of Eden, marked by an explicitly hedonistic note, which enters the relation between the believer and One through the back door. Thus, the believer is trapped between the imperative of purity, in the name of which he must be willing to die if necessary, and the (promised) eternal sensual pleasure. This is a typical consequence of the so-called *first negation*, which fails to control the negated entity; on the contrary, it gives it demonic attraction and vast mobilisation power.<sup>4</sup>

4 Hegel draws attention to the paradoxical result of celibacy in a similar way. The sphere of sexuality did not disappear with it, on the contrary, it gained in power: '*It is a further abstraction if the divine and substantial is separated from its existence in such a way that feeling and the consciousness of spiritual unity are categorised as what is falsely called Platonic love; this separation is associated with the monastic attitude which defines the moment of natural life as utterly negative and, by this very separation, endows it with infinite importance in itself*' (Hegel, 1991, 163).

It is impossible for the abstract One to develop an affirmative relation towards the world. Since it is empty, it cannot pass over into its own opposite, which is why it instantly forms an excluding attitude toward the concreteness and diversity of the world: the world is understood merely as *not*-One. Because One is the supreme object, the only possible relation to the world lies in its subjugation, in non-spiritual hierarchy: '*subjectivity has this worship for the sole occupation of its activity, combined with the design to subjugate secular existence to the One*' (Hegel, 1914, 370). This is the spot where the connection of Islam and the violence can be clarified. The restlessness that can be noticed in contact of One with man and the world derives from the very structure of Islam, from its emptiness of the supreme object. This is manifested in the destructive fanaticism of subjectivity 'which enters into secular life with a purely negative purpose. And as such it exists' (Hegel, 1914, 370). Subjectivity exists, according to Hegel, merely as a negation-of-the-world.

It is obvious the parallelism with other abstract (philosophical) concepts, all of which are inclined towards violence. In § 5 of the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel analyses the moment of abstract will:

*The will contains (á) the element of pure indeterminateness, i.e., the pure doubling of the I back in thought upon itself. In this process every limit or content, present though it be directly by way of nature, as in want, appetite or impulse, or given in any specific way, is dissolved. Thus we have the limitless infinitude of absolute abstraction, or universality, the pure thought of itself* (Hegel, 1991, 5).

This description is analogous to the demand for purity of subjectivity in Islam. As soon as this concept becomes, however, active, it

*assumes both in politics and religion the form of a fanaticism, which would destroy the established social order, remove all individuals suspected of desiring any kind of order, and demolish any organisation which then sought to rise out of the ruins. Only in devastation does the negative will feel that it has reality. It intends, indeed, to bring to pass some positive social condition, such as universal equality or universal religious life. But in fact, it does not will the positive reality of any such condition, since that would carry in its train a system, and introduce a separation by way of institutions and between individuals. But classification and objective system attain self-consciousness only by destroying nega-*

*tive freedom. Negative freedom is actuated by a mere solitary idea, whose realisation is nothing but the fury of desolation* (Hegel, 1991, 5).

This Hegel's words refer specifically to the French revolution. He demonstrates that abstract concept exists, i.e. is *actual*, only as long as it is tearing the world apart. Concerning the violence in the name of abstract (religious) concepts, the parallel is summarised by the syntagma *La religion et la terreur* (Hegel, 1914, 370), which Hegel places alongside the experience of the French revolution, *La liberte et la terreur* (Hegel, 1914, 370) as philosophical concept.

### ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

In the chapter on *Mohammedanism* Hegel summarises the shortcomings of Islam in this sentence: '*This One has indeed, the quality of Spirit; yet because subjectivity suffers itself to be absorbed in the object [sich in den Gegenstand aufzugehen lässt], this One is deprived of every concrete predicate; so that neither does subjectivity become on its part spiritually free, nor on the other hand is the object of its veneration concrete.*' (Hegel, 1914, 370) These shortcomings can be best illustrated by the comparison with the ontology that lays in the fundamant of Christianity. In the first place, it is about the teaching of the trinity. Almond wrote: '*For Hegel the doctrine of the Trinity was itself a moment of progress in the development of the World Spirit. [...] It is in this sense that Islam's rejection of the divinity of Christ as the embodiment of the universal in the particular was both a denial of Christian doctrine and a refusal of this necessary step towards Absolute Knowledge*' (Almond, 2010, 124).

The dialectics of universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*) and individuality (*Einzelheit*), which are at the core of the World Spirit, is, according to Hegel, for the first time in the history risen to the level of self-consciousness in the doctrine of trinity. Consequently, in the supreme principle (i.e. in the Absolute) the believer recognises himself as *confirmed*, recognises himself as a moment of dialectics of the absolute object. The absolute is not merely One, but is always also particularity, i.e. man. Thus, the Christian does not '*suffers to be absorbed in the object*'. In relation to the absolute he is not (merely) in relation to the (supreme) object, but always also in relation to *himself* (i.e. to humanity, which is a part of the definition of the Absolute). He is confirmed in this relation. On the level of religious language this reflect the rhetoric of love (*agape, caritas*) to

man, which substitutes the relationship of abstract hierarchy, i.e. the relation of fear.

An illustrative example of the affirmative position of man in relation to the Absolute can be found in the confident, almost commanding Jesus' words, aimed at God:

*Father, the time has come. Glorify your Son, that your Son may glorify you. For you granted him authority over all people that he might give eternal life to all those you have given him. Now this is eternal life: that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent. I have glorified You on the earth. I have finished the work which You have given Me to do. And now, Father, glorify me in your presence with the glory I had with you before the world began (Jn, 17).*

The God-Man glorified God and now he demands the same of him. One cannot exist without the other.

Structure just described can be demonstrated through the ontological analysis of the sole object of religion. This is thematised, even though implicitly, in the second part of *The Science of Logic*, in the logic of essence. Hegel discusses the One – as described in the Old Testament – in the chapter *Absolute Relation*, in subsection A. *The Relation of Substantiality*, where he researches the relation between substance and the accidents. As K. Schmidt reminds, this is a chapter with a clear religious note (Schmidt, 1997, 215).

The *Relation of Substantiality* is the relation between substance and the accidents. From the aspect of logic, this is already a highly sophisticated relation, which appears at the end of the logic of essence and, as the religion in Hegel's system in general, speaks out the truth of the world as a whole.<sup>5</sup> The accidents, their movement, are the embodiment of substance, i.e. of the basis of everything that exists: '*this movement of accidentality is the actuality of substance as a tranquil coming forth of itself*' (Hegel, 2010, 156). Substance appears as a power, which thus negates the flow of the accidentals, defines their transition between the possibility, actuality and back again: '*The ceasing-to-be of the accident is its return as actuality into itself, as into its in-itself or into its possibility*' (Hegel, 2010, 156).

However, this manifestation of the absolute relation has a shortcoming, which is shared by

the One as known in Islam: the substance is not yet self-referring. It exists merely *on-itself* and not yet *for-itself*. The reason for this is that it does not perform the negation in relation to *itself*, it is negative only in relation to the accidental. Thus, it negates merely the difference in the absolute relation, but not also the identity within it. Or, to put it differently, it defines the accidents merely in the *identity* (i.e. it eliminates its being-different) with the substance, but not also in the *difference* with it. It understands this relation merely as disappearance, in our case, as the purification of the human self and the negation of the world. To summarise, it does not consider the differences (i.e. the diversities of the accidental) as *substantial*. And this is where the problem lies: because the differences are substantial. The difference between the Absolute and the world is not of secondary importance, it is the essence of the Absolute itself.

This deficiency is solved in next chapter: B. *The Relations of Causality*. In layman's terms, the causality is understood as a relation between something active and something passive. However, we will see that this is not the case. The cause needs to be active towards itself (i.e. to its identity) in a negative manner, it needs to distance itself from itself and create the effect: '*Cause is cause only in so far as it produces an effect*' (Hegel, 2010, 156). Cause and effect are mutually co-dependent, and in the further development they create the relation of total interdependency. Thus, the cause is no longer just power (towards something else), it is also something self-revealing and self-unveiling. This cognition completely changes the relation between One and the many.

Since causality becomes causality only once it produces an effect, the cause does not depend on the effect any less than the effect depends on causality. In other words, substance is actual – it exists – only in its effect: '*Substance has actuality, therefore, only as cause*' (Hegel, 2010, 156). This also implies a correspondence of contents between the cause and effect, the Absolute and the world: '*Consequently, an effect contains nothing whatever that the cause does not contain. Conversely, a cause contains nothing that is not in its effect*' (Hegel, 2010, 156). Thus, a world – understood in religious terms – as the creation is now *holy* world, since it is not snatched away from the Absolute/cause. World's multiplicity must no longer be nullified, taken away from the absolute, for '*in the effect the cause is manifested as the whole substance*' (Hegel, 2010, 156).

<sup>5</sup> Häussler summarizes the emerge of the religion in *Phenomenology of spirit* by this words: '*The acceptance of religion as an object of consciousness is confirmed in the fact that the absoluteness of the spirit has become perceptible, not in the image of the absolutized individual self, in conscience, but in the reciprocity of subjects arising from their voluntary abandonment; the object was hypostasized from representation to object – the object of religious consciousness*' (Häussler, 2008, 179-180).

Od this way in next chapter (*C. Reciprocity*) the reconciliation between the Absolute and the world is developed. This reconciliation is possible, when *'in this identity of cause and effect the form distinguishing them respectively, as that which exists in itself and that which is posited, is sublated. The cause is extinguished in its effect and the effect too is thereby extinguished, for it only is the determinateness of the cause'* (Hegel, 2010, 156).<sup>6</sup> These are the steps that lead to constellation, that is described in the religious language as trinity. At the same time the dimension of freedom enters logic, which is thematised in the third part of the *Science of Logic*. It is about ontologically understood freedom which does not contradict to necessity: '*Necessity does not come to be freedom by vanishing but in that its still only inner identity is manifested, and this manifestation is the identical movement immanent to the different sides, the immanent reflection of shine as shine'* (Hegel, 2010, 169).

According to Hegel, on the level of ontology the Christian principle is more developed<sup>7</sup> than the Islamic one. This is not an external view of Islam, as a Europocentric cliché might sound. It is about the criteria that Islam has set for itself: to connect Many into a Whole. This integration has its shortcomings and fails despite subject's willingness to its own supreme sacrifice at its realisation. Thus, Islam has problems at developing its own principle and creating and preserving differences within it. In Islam, neither man, nor world succeed in becoming a part of (what phenomenology calls) the 'holy game of the world'.

### THE CREATIVITY OF FANATICISM

Of course, this does not mean that Islam fails to produce anything. It is enough to mention its impressive and rapid expansion already during the time of the prophet Mohammed. However, Islam's creativity emerges from the structure of the abstract, which defines its dynamics as well as its reach: "*For Hegel the philosopher, Islam would forever be this monochrome, amorphous, expansive entity, a monodimensional power whose explosive growth in the Mediterranean lay precisely in the absence of complexity*" (Almond, 2010, 118). The basic shortcoming of such creativity can be found in its (lack of) duration. Even though mighty kingdoms emerge, they fail to sustain. Hegel writes that nothing lasts in the sand (sand being a metaphor for the abstract):

*'nothing is firm on abstract ground'* (Hegel, 1914, 370).

However, Islam's productivity is not fascinating merely in the quantitative sense, in the speed of its expansion, which is incomparable to the Christianity. It is also capable of noble and sublime creativity. This creativity also emerges from the purity of the abstractness. In the Western world is (was) caught within a series of relations, which in turn means that he is clamped to them. On the contrary, in Islam, '*the individual is one passion and that alone; he is superlatively cruel, cunning, bold, or generous. Where the sentiment of love exists, there is an equal abandon — love the most fervid*' (Hegel, 1914, 373). In this case the individual is completely freed of this world and has an impeccably polished interior. Such a soul rises above triviality and narcissism and is capable of astonishing feats.

Hegel believes that Islam's '*glorious poetry*' (Hegel, 1914, 373) represents its pinnacle of creativity. Here, in fantasy, the highest possible freedom is released: '*a noble soul makes itself prominent — like a billow in the surging of the sea — it manifests itself in a majesty of freedom, such that nothing more noble, more generous, more valiant, more devoted was ever witnessed*' (Hegel, 1914, 373). Hegel showed great interest in Persian poetry, especially in the poet Rumi. In his poems the total unification of the soul and God, the highest state of this unity is experienced. However, this unification remains within limits of a poetry. The reconciliation does not raise to the level of a notion and thus never enters the world.

In its abstractness Islam has even achieved traces of perfect (political) equality, that Hegel admired in the brotherly relation between the khalif and the man from the bottom of the social scale, or in the relation between the master and the slave. If he loves him, he glorifies the object of his love by laying all his power at his feet. '*On the other hand, he will sacrifice him just as recklessly*' (Hegel, 1914, 373). The creativity of Islam is marked by extremes, which fall into an uncontrollable oscillation. Everything that is created, '*is only contingent and built on sand; it is today, and tomorrow is not. With all the passionate interest he shows, the Mahometan is really indifferent to this social fabric, and rushes on in the ceaseless whirl of fortune*' (Hegel, 1914, 373). The incapability to firmly merge the Many into a Whole is the main shortcoming of Islam.

6 A similar message is laid down in Hegel's analysis of the relation between the finite and infinite, which is located in a different systemic position, the logic of Being: '*The answer to the question as to how does infinity become finite, is thus only that there is no infinity which is at first infinite and that would only then become finite, step out to finiteness, but infinity in itself is finite as well as infinite*' (Hegel, 2010, 128).

7 This judgment does not implicate the legal or political superiority of one religion over another, on contrary. As reminds Karasek, only this ontology provides the condition of equality and coexistence of all religion: '*Is precisely a state, built on the Christian-Protestant principle, that is not limited to one specific religion or even confession*' (Karasek, 2008, 77).

## THE LIMITS OF HEGEL'S ANALYSIS OF ISLAM

The task of Islam on the level of spirit is similar to that of Christianity, i.e. to articulate a relation between the Absolute and world. However, the sky refuses to descend to Earth in both cases. However, in Christianity – and this is where Hegel's analysis stands and falls – this relationship is solved on the conceptual level, while in Islam it is caught within the imperfection of the abstract and the void. As a result, it is supposedly also incapable of inner development and achieving stability.

A separated problem-field is opened by the question as to what extent does Hegel's analysis of Islam fulfil its own standard, i.e. the systematic intention. At the beginning we have mentioned the unease linked to placing Islam into world history. Hegel could not have overlooked the rise of Islam, for it determined the destiny of the Mediterranean from its very beginnings. The problem is, however, that it appeared after the spread of Christianity, which supposedly formed the horizon of the completion of the world spirit. We have seen that Hegel solves this 'the remnant' by introducing Islam as a counterpoint to (at the time) barbaric Europe. But this is only formal aspect of the systematic intention.

History is, according to Hegel the history of spirit: a progressive process of the consciousness of freedom. Nothing (relevant) that appears on one stage of history can disappear without a trace. The essence of thinking is a determinate negation (*bestimmte Negation*), in which the negated has to remain as a *moment* in the medium which performed the negation. This is the *Aufhebung*-concept, which is in textbooks explained as a triple operation: *negare*, *conservare* and *elevare*. If Islam is introduced in the world history, we are faced with the inevitable question as to where its contribution for the further development of history lies. From today's perspective, the contributions of the Greek and Roman periods to the contemporary Western world are easy to define. The orient, which has brought the rise of the spirit from nature and the gradual formation of the individual, has also undoubtedly contributed to the development of contemporary Europe. If we accept Hegel's thesis that history has needed to *negate* Islam, it should therefore have also to *conserve* it and to *elevate* it to a higher level of perfection. Thus, what would be, according to Hegel's perspective, the contribution of Islam to the world history?

Hegel spoke about the fascination with poetry, which inspired Goethe and his work *Divan*. Further, Islam handed the western (Antique) philosophy back to the West, which was for centuries showed no interest in. The West also supposedly admired

the bravery and enthusiasm of Islamic fighters. Islam could indirectly be important also as a threat to Christian Europe, as a result of which the Slavic nations obtain (a marginal) role in world history as the defenders from Islam. If we put the contents to a side and focus merely on the architecture of Hegel's system, the notion of the *Whole* appears to be the systemic contribution of Islam to global history (which stands in opposition to the dispersed particularity of Europe at the time). This Whole should be preserved as a moment in *The Empire of Charlemagne*, as the third chapter in the section is titled. There are no clear answers as regards these questions, which otherwise surpasses the frame of this contribution.

Howsoever, Hegel declared the global historical death of Islam: '*At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in one corner of Europe through the jealousy of Christian Powers, Islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into Oriental ease and repose*' (Hegel, 1914, 374). The reason for this exit can be supposedly found in the conceptual imperfection of Islam and its incapability of inner development that stems from this. The same holds true for Judaism. Both traditions are supposedly incapable of developing a stable constellation between the universality, particularity and individuality: nothing is firm on abstract ground. Similarly, I. Almond recognises '*in the emptiness of Islam a kind of socio-political vacuum in which everything was levelled*' (Almond, 2010, 122).

This conclusion is problematic to say the least. The hesitation is not justified merely from today's perspective, which is summarised by Huntington's placing of the Islamic 'civilisation' back into the heart of global history. Already in Hegel's times it was clear that Islam is capable to produce more than fleeting entities. The Ottoman Empire lasted for five hundred years before Hegel's time and another century after it. Hegel explained its firm existence as exception, referring to its heterogeneous element of Janizarism: '*The Osman race at last succeeded in establishing a firm dominion, by forming for themselves a firm centre in the Janizaries*' (Hegel, 1914, 374).

Interpretation of the role of the Ottoman Empire in world history is far from simple. On one hand it seems that it questions Hegel's assumption that nothing firm can emerge from the abstract. On the other hand, the decline of Ottoman Empire as such confirms the thesis that Islam is incapable of inner development and reforms. The end of the Ottoman Empire is marked by Atatürk, who brings a break with the centuries of Islamic tradition and accepts all of the Western standards of a modern state.

Also another problem in Hegel's analysis of Islam could be mentioned: he provided totally different descriptions of different nations that are connected by the same religion. He considered the Arabs to be barbarians and the Turks robbers, in his description of Persia, however, he introduced a totally different register, which was crowned by the admiration of noble Islamic poetry. This places the basic thesis about Islam under question. It seems that Hegel overlooked his own teachings on symbolic geography, in accordance with which the difference between the desert and the Persian hills should influence the formation of different (Islamic) spirits.

We have posed certain questions that need to remain unanswered within this discussion. The same

holds true for the analysis of the recent political organisation of Islam in the form of so-called Islamic State, which can once again serve as confirmation or rejection of the thesis that abstract principle cannot produce political entities. Let us conclude with the ascertainment that Hegel's thematization of Islam is marked by irreducible duality. On one hand, it represents unease for Hegel in the systematic (placement of the Orient – which is actually not the Orient – into the Germanic world) as well as in the conceptual sense (the thesis of volatility and the six hundred years of the Ottoman Empire). On the other hand, he offers a convincing analysis of the incapability of stabilising the relations between man, God/Absolute and the world through the abstract One. This was *fil rouge* of this article.

## KRALJESTVO ABSTRAKTNEGA BOGOSLUŽJA – HEGLOVA INTERPRETACIJA ISLAMA

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### *POVZETEK*

V članku je prikazan Heglov pogled na islam, kot ga najdemo v njegovih Predavanjih o filozofiji zgodovine. Razprava v prvi vrsti preiskuje odnos med človekom, Bogom/absolutom in svetom v islamu, ki ga, kot pokaže Hegel, zaznamuje neodpravljava abstraktnost. Iz abstraktnosti izhaja dvoje, tako izjemna ustvarjalnosti islama kot njegovo nagnjenje k nasilju. Prvo Hegel vidi v pesništvu, drugo v nezmožnosti izgradnje trdne politične strukture. Za osvetlitev teh omejitev razpravo v nadaljevanju opremo na Heglovo Znanost logike, kjer so razviti pogoji za vzajemno povezanost človeka, Boga/absoluta in sveta. V religioznem jeziku to sovpadanje artikulira koncept trinitete, ki omogoča preseganje pomanjkljivosti abstraktnega odnosa med človekom, Bogom/absolutom in svetom.

**Ključne besede:** islam, pravna filozofija, nasilje, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

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## RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND THE CHANGE OF WORLDVIEWS IN SLOVENIA (1918–1991): HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

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### ABSTRACT

*The article sheds light on religious transformations in the Slovenian territory in the first and the second Yugoslavia by placing emphasis on religious conversion and atheization as a form of deconversion. The historical analysis of the interwar period reveals the first beginnings of religious diversification, with special emphasis being placed on religious conversions. More profound changes in the religious field were provoked by the new political regime, which concomitantly promoted the spread of atheism and religion as a private matter, thus stripping the Catholic Church of its dominant role in society. Gradually, the Yugoslav state authorities developed a more liberal attitude towards religion, which resulted in the dialogue not only between Christians and Marxists but also between different religious communities. It was only the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which led to the democratization of state and social structures and to the inflow of migrants to Slovenia, that enabled the development of religiously pluralistic society in Slovenia.*

**Keywords:** religious conversion, Yugoslavia, Slovenia, atheization, interreligious relations, religious pluralism

## LE COMUNITÀ RELIGIOSE E IL CAMBIAMENTO DELLA VISIONE DEL MONDO IN SLOVENIA (1918–1991): PROSPETTIVE STORICHE E POLITICHE

### SINTESI

*L'articolo presenta la trasformazione della religione nel territorio sloveno nel periodo jugoslavo dal punto di vista del cambiamento della fede e della ateizzazione come deconversione. L'analisi storica del periodo tra le due guerre mondiali mostra gli inizi della diversificazione della religione, in particolare le conversioni religiose. I cambiamenti maggiori nel campo religioso sono stati apportati dal nuovo regime politico che ha arginato il ruolo dominante della Chiesa cattolica nella società con il supporto della diffusione dell'ateismo e con la percezione della religione come una questione privata. Il rapporto tra Stato e religione nella Jugoslavia autogestita si è nel tempo liberalizzato ed ha aperto il dialogo tra cristiani e marxisti e altre comunità cristiane. Nella Slovenia invece si può parlare della pluralizzazione delle comunità religiose solo dopo la dissoluzione della Jugoslavia con la democratizzazione delle strutture statali e sociali e con le migrazioni.*

**Parole chiave:** conversione religiosa, Jugoslavia, Slovenia, ateizzazione, relazioni interreligiose, pluralismo religioso

## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

In this article, I will present social and political challenges faced by a religiously plural society. I will place emphasis on historical analysis of religious conversion and atheization as a form of deconversion in the Slovenian territory in the interwar period and under the socialist regime. The analysis of the first period will be based on primary sources from state and private (i.e. Church) archives; the presentation of the post-war period, which was marked by “state-imposed atheism”, will take into consideration relevant references and theoretical discussions of this phenomenon.

The majority of terminology in the humanities and social sciences, in particular, studies of religions, originates from the Western Christian tradition and is, as a result, biased (cf. Kapaló, 2011, 26–27; Roudometof, 2018, 213). Consequently, the major part of the established theoretical and methodological apparatus has not appropriately addressed phenomena related to religious affiliation and individual religious practices, including conversion, particularly in everyday life and outside institutional frameworks (McGuire, 2008, 24–25).

The applicability of “mainstream” religious concepts and models, especially the rights of “other” religious groups, freedom of conscience, proselytizing by minority religious groups, and related phenomena, is easily brought into question in several countries with predominant religious groups, including those with experience of socialist regimes where specific relationships between society, the state and religious institutions have developed. For example, seeing themselves as the bearers of national identity, Christian Orthodox churches often consider religious pluralism to be a threat to national integrity and challenge the legitimacy of conversion – by both well-established groups, such as Catholics, and newcomers to the “religious marketplace”, such as evangelical Christians (Knox, 2005, 160; cf. Ramet, 2019, 2–4). Furthermore, we can observe a multitude of current controversies that pertain to the “universalization” of a Western-centric interpretation of human rights concerning religion; this challenges the dominant ethnoreligious understanding of religion in the region.

In discussions on religious conversions and atheization, the concept of secularization, which has been full of controversy since it arose, cannot be avoided (cf. Casanova, 1994; Berger, 1999). A significant relationship between the explored phenomena and the secularization thesis can be found especially in a gradual loss of influence of majority religious institutions (i.e. in Slovenian case the Catholic Church) and individualization of religious beliefs. The lat-

ter, since the beginning of the late 19th century, manifested itself also in religious conversions (cf. Verginella, 1994), in particular, due to the perception of religious belief as a choice. However, religious conversions can also be considered as the product of the so-called religious market (Stark & Iannaccone, 1994; Stark & Finke, 2000) that started to emerge in multiconfessional Yugoslavia and can be associated with the increased interest in religion (Droogers & Harskamp, 2014, 3), i.e. resurgence of religion. The trend to the latter was in Western and Central Europe, as well as in Slovenia, noticed in the late 1970s, while in most of the other world, we could hardly speak of any decline of religion. The secularization of society as a consequence of the regime policies that restrained the activities of religious institutions and actively promoted atheism has its specifics. While the increase of de-institutionalization resulted also in higher numbers of non-believers, often non-attendance of religious ceremonies had nothing to do with the loss of religious beliefs nor was the attendance necessarily an expression of profound religiosity (cf. Schnell & Keenan, 2011, 73). Henceforth, it would be most relevant for the scholarship to study secularization and resurgence of religion as interrelated occurrences (Riesebrodt, 2014, 3). For this article, phenomena will be explored within specific historical, social, and cultural settings, while also not disregarding some general social trends of de-institutionalization, individualization, and privatization of religion/religiosity.

Owing to the nature of the sources and the aforementioned drawbacks of concepts (which have to be adapted before they are used in in-depth studies related to specific historical, political and geographical frameworks), the main methodological challenge faced by a study of religious changes is how to deal with this topic without bias and how to take into account historical (archival) sources. As regards the period before the Second World War, the trouble with the analysis of sources on religious conversion is their rarity. That period typically lacks ethnographic material (oral sources) as well as biographical texts, while archival sources tend to be mostly factual, thus helping the researcher to form only a superficial picture. In addition, one has to be aware of the methodological pitfall of overgeneralizing the significance of historical events only on the basis of individual representations. What one can do is to focus on the manner in which a religious change has been depicted (Szpiech, 2019, 263), without neglecting to provide a precise historical contextualization. A different perspective offers a practice-based approach to religious phenomena which has already been adopted

<sup>1</sup> The author acknowledges that the research programme (Slovenia and the Mediterranean, P6-0272) and the research project (Inter-religious Dialogue – a Basis for Coexisting Diversity in the Light of Migration and the Refugee Crisis, J6-9393) in the scope of which this publication was published, have been financially supported by the Slovenian Research Agency.

in historical studies (Kapaló, 2011, 32; Badone, 1990, 6; Kapaló & Travagnin, 2010, 134–135).

It has to be pointed out that the field of interreligious relations – in particular at the political and interinstitutional levels, as well as between lay people and nonbelievers – tends to be pervaded with conflicts rather than cooperation. Naturally, the interactions between different religious communities and individuals cannot be limited only to these two types of relations. Probably the most common attitude is indifference; even if it involves no open conflict, such a stance preserves or even generates new prejudices against, negative stereotypes of, and divergence with the “Other”. The concept of religious pluralism, as used in this article, is understood as the ideal of peaceful co-existence of individuals and groups with different religious and secular worldviews (cf. Droogers, 2014, 24, 180), in a manner that goes beyond mere plurality and diversity. Such an ideal presupposes a world in which tolerance is surpassed through active inclusion of religious diversity (Rouméas, 2015, 15). Tolerance can be regarded as a provisional solution applied when two sides neither strive for an agreement nor a compromise between controversial beliefs, and when they also do not believe that an agreement is possible (Ndayambaje, 2013, 9). In the context of such an understanding, religious pluralism is the ideal that a community, society or state can only approach through its legal remedies.

The two basic characteristics of interreligious relations in the period in question in the Slovenian territory are the existence of a new historical and political entity – i.e. the state of Yugoslavia and its different forms or periods (kingdom, occupation during the Second World War, and the socialist regime) – and the (persistent) dominant role of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church has been determining the relations between the state and other religious communities in Slovenian and Croatian parts of the (former) country also in the socialist period. In the interwar period, it preserved its dominant position in majority Catholic regions even when the regime in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia expressed a preference for the Serbian Orthodox Church. To provide an example: the first Yugoslav state favoured the Serbian Orthodox Church over all others. At the Yugoslav and above all local level, such a preference was clearly visible in the strained relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church.

The second part of the article will focus on the role of nonbelievers in the context of increased religious diversification in Slovenia, especially during the existence of the second Yugoslavia. That time was marked by the secularization of state structures, and in particular, the atheization facilitated by the regime’s “ideological

apparatus”. This state policy propagated the individual right to either belong to religious communities or not. Religious sentiments, however, were declared a personal and private matter of individuals concerned (cf. ZKS, 1958, 479–490). The restrictions on religious communities loosened over the years, starting with the Law on the status of religious communities that was passed in 1953 (cf. Dolinar, 1995, 28–29), and mostly put a stop to nearly open hostility towards the Catholic Church endorsed by the Communist Party. The Second Vatican Council gave an impetus for the agreement between Yugoslavia and the Holy See (so-called Yugoslav protocol) to be signed in 1966 and the subsequent reinstatement of diplomatic ties with the Vatican in 1970. The situation for the religious communities was improved especially with the Law on the legal status of religious communities in Slovenia (1978), although certain questions were still left open. Lay believers in practice kept experiencing some level of discrimination, in particular teachers, professors, and clerks, whose profession was considered incompatible with religious beliefs.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, in Yugoslavia (cf. Lavrič & Friš, 2018), other socialist countries, and Western Europe (Ganiel, 2014) a considerable spread of noninstitutional forms of belief was noticed. The increase in self-proclaimed religious affiliation in the 1990s gave rise to the trend towards belonging without believing, distinctly in countries with Christian Orthodox majority (Smrke, 2017, 9; Bogomilova, 2003, 21), that is especially in the Balkans strongly interconnected with the ethnicization of religion and nationalism (Mantsinen & Tervo-Niemelä, 2019, 71). Such developments show that the implementation of atheism had different consequences, which calls for a historical analysis of the situation in individual states, and, in the case of Yugoslavia, in individual republics.

#### INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS AND RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION IN THE SLOVENIAN TERRITORY IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA

*The [Great; A/N] war with its consequences really eroded the old worldviews and changed the popular mentality, not only in the political but also in other respects. Everything was still seething and people did not trust the current situation, expecting further changes. The economic situation was so precarious that only the most economically secure people dared to set up new hearths [start new families; A/N], and so most did not marry and preferred to get along the best they could on their own (Prežihov Voranc, 2010 [1946], 85; translated by the author).*

<sup>2</sup> AS, 1589/IV 487, 4391, Report on the implementation of the Act on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, 18 October 1978.

Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic and multireligious state with various historical, cultural and political backgrounds. Its history of religions has been often addressed through the prism of multi-ethnic conflict, yet interreligious relations in Yugoslavia were always much more complex (cf. Perica, 2002, vii; Mojzes, 2011a, xiii–xiv; Ramet, 2006, 1–2) as no nation or religion had an absolute majority. As a result, Yugoslavia was the only state in Europe with large Christian Orthodox (46.6% of the entire population according to the 1921 census), Catholic (39.4%), and Islamic (11.2%) religious communities. By far the strongest influence was exerted by the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially in the political, administrative and military arenas. Even if it lost the status of the state church *de jure*, it did not lose the support of the ruling Karađorđević dynasty. The Yugoslav religious traditions had a different understanding of not only the role of religion in society and politics but also of interreligious and interethnic co-existence. In former Yugoslavia, peaceful interethnic co-existence was quite a challenge. For instance, Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks shared a series of related characteristics, especially the language, while their ethnicities as their strongest identifiers were based on religious and historical differences; i.e., the constructed ethnoreligious identity. It is representations of religious conversions – ranging from the conversion to Islam in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries to the forced conversion of Serbian Orthodox believers to the Roman Catholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia period (Škiljan, 2014, 99, 107–108; Tomasevich, 2010, 599; Aleksov, 2006, 25–26) – that can be found at the core of national myths still (re)produced by national historiographies. To quote Michael B. Petrovich: “[...] religion was not so much a matter of private conscience as of one's public identity. In some cases, the identification between religion and nationality was so great that a religious conversion automatically entailed a change of nationality in the eyes of others, if not in those of the convert himself” (Petrovich, 1967, quoted after Elzarka, 2018, 30).

During the interwar period, the question of conversion and its related phenomenon – proselytization – remained a sensitive issue in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia. For the first time in history, Slovenes and Croats succeeded in presenting themselves as two modern nations and attained partial national affirmation in the name of the state they had established together with the Serbs in the 1920s, namely, with the use of their own languages in public administration, intense development in the cultural field, etc. Nevertheless, they had to face growing Serbian centralism and Yugoslav unitarianism. The attempts to weaken national and ethnic identities became especially vigorous after

the introduction of a royal dictatorship in 1929 and they reverberated in the field of religion as King Alexander I had prohibited the operation of political parties and societies of “tribal” (i.e. ethnic) and religious nature (cf. Gašparič, 2007, 123). Such developments affected the relations between the two historical rivals: the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Each of these had strong national and political connotations.

The field of interreligious relations was neither regulated nor unified from the legal point of view, since throughout the existence of the first Yugoslavia the old legislation was still valid. That said, it is enough to look at the operation of the Catholic Church to see that these old laws were regionally specific. The constitution was the only state-wide legal instrument that regulated the field of religion. Religious equality for members of accepted and recognized creeds was stipulated by the Vidovdan Constitution (1921) and the Octroyed Constitution (1931), which did not mean, however, that religious equality was consistently respected or that the two constitutions facilitated the deconfessionalization of society and state institutions (Mithans, 2017, 81–86, 102–103; Salmič, 2015, 108–111). On the contrary, in the so-called parithetic system of religion-state relations of recognized and unrecognized religious communities, the dominant majority religious institutions could preserve their monopoly at the regional level, with their influence over politics being temporarily limited only on a few occasions. The period witnessed several (unsuccessful) attempts to adopt an interreligious act, which resulted in the immediate opposition of Catholic circles in Slovenia and Croatia, mostly because of issues about interfaith marriages and education of children born in such marriages, religious affiliation, and conversions (Mithans, 2011, 91–93). Interreligious conflicts culminated in the signing of a concordat between the Holy See and Yugoslavia. The agreement between Yugoslavia and the Holy See also addressed some issues from the sphere of interreligious relations, particularly the regulation of interfaith marriage, as well as the demand for institutions and property of the Catholic Church to remain in the possession of the church in the event of the population served by them converting to other faiths. Owing to the opposition of the Serbian Orthodox Church and oppositional political parties, it was never ratified (Mithans, 2017, 188–203, 335–337).

In the Slovenian territory, the interwar period was also marked by the attempts of re-Catholicization (Jogan, 2008, 28–33, 37; Jogan, 2016, 28–29) or, to put it differently, of the comprehensive social renewal in modern history carried out in accordance with the Catholic model. This took place from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the outbreak of the Second World War.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the period marked by the unifi-

<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, similar tendencies could be observed in the aftermath of Slovenia's independence in 1991, in particular, in right-wing political circles and within institutional structures of the Catholic Church. As the first re-Catholicization, however, could be considered Counter-Reformation.

**Table 1: Religious composition in Slovenia (Drava Banovina / Socialist Republic of Slovenia) according to the 1921, 1931, 1953, 1991 and 2002 population censuses.**

	Catholics	Lutherans and Reformed Church	Christian Orthodox	Muslims	Greek Catholics	Other religions	Unaffiliated	Non-religious, atheist	Refuse to answer	Unknown
1921	96.57%	2.59%	0.63%	0.06%	0.05%	(17 people)	/	/	/	/
1931	97%	2.2%	0.6%	0.08%	0.21%	(190)	/	0.02%	/	0%
1953	82.8%	1.5%	0.3%	0.05%		0.02%	0.13%	10.3%	/	4.9%
1991	71.6%	0.9%	2.4%	1.5%		0.04%	0.2%	4.4%	4.3%	14.6%
2002	57.8%	0.8%	2.3%	2.4%		0.2%	3.5%	10.2%	14.6%	7.1%

cation of south Slavic nations in Yugoslavia saw the very beginnings of religious diversification and the modernization of society, as well as secularization. Furthermore, Slovenia exhibits the characteristics of Latin (Catholic) religio-cultural patterns, characterized by the confrontation between two poles: political-cultural Right and political-cultural Left that especially came into the fore during the socialist period. Political Catholicism already before World War I denied the possibility that ethnic Slovenes could be anything other than Catholics. That was the notion advanced by the Bishop Anton Mahnič that with the demand for the "division of spirits", i.e. gradual elimination from public life of all ideas that were not in line with the Catholic interpretation of reality (Roter, 1996, 79; Dragoš, 1996; Pelikan, 2006), only contributed to political and social differentiation, and thus to the secularization of the "anti-clerical pole".

What has to be pointed out is an extremely high percentage of people who declared their religious affiliation in the Slovenian part of the kingdom, which goes along with the Zeitgeist, however, identifying as a member of some religious community, being religious and attending religious ceremonies diverge, especially in modern times. The 1931 census shows that almost 97% of the Slovenian population was Catholic, 2.2% Protestants and 0.6% Christian Orthodox (Šircelj, 2003, 70). However, I would like to question religious homogeneity in that period and the reliability of certain data and interpretations. The fact is that the majority of people found it socially unacceptable to be nonbelievers in a time when religious communities were (still) so embedded in state structures: in Slovenia, it was the Catholic Church that kept registers of births, deaths, and marriages, and that conducted religious education in public schools (up until 1949), etc., with one of the

few non-religious instruments for nonbelievers being civil marriage. Such a high prevalence of one religion easily led to the potential social exclusion of and discrimination against many non-Catholics: they were often regarded as aliens. The percentage and above all the visibility of non-Catholic believers and nonbelievers were higher in urban spaces (the former were most easily observed when new non-Catholic religious buildings were erected), as well as in the media and the arts (representatives of social realism were often supporters of Communism or even Communist Party members).

In the interwar period and already before the Great War, also remarkable heterogeneity of those who identify as members of the Catholic Church can be observed (Smrke & Uhan, 2012, 509), with the syncretism of religious practices and beliefs in popular religiosity (Kerševan, 1989, 12, 17–18), most often connected to folk medicine (Kotnik, 1943, 122; Kotnik, 1952, 124), and political differences, which led to the final dissent between the Catholic Right and the Catholic Left (Christian Socialists) in 1937 (Dolenc, 2005, 56). If the political Catholicism somehow managed to respond to the social crisis in the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century with the organization of loan cooperatives and saving banks, the social Corporatist model they envisioned in the interwar period was not adequate to respond to the issues of the modernity (cf. Pelikan, 2009, 313–314).

If the social differentiation with the larger number of workers and the spread of communist and socialist ideas was more obvious in the post-World War I period that by itself caused some change of beliefs and disaffiliation, the power of the Catholic Church over their believers diminished well before. The

phenomena of “localized revolts” of entire villages or several families against the Catholic Church or its representatives, which mostly did not go beyond the threats of conversion to Christian Orthodoxy and/or Greek Catholic Church can be documented in Slovenian ethnic territory already in 1889. Such are the cases of the village of Podraga in Vipava valley (Možina, 1996) and in the years between 1900 and 1910 in the village of Ricmanje near Trieste (Verginella, 1994, 189–190), followed by several others in the interwar period (Cvelfar, 2017, 116–119). The motives for the “revolts” that in some cases also evolved into conversions were mostly political and administrative, usually demanding greater autonomy (establishment of an independent parish). In the case of Ricmanje, where the whole village (temporarily) converted to the Greek Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church, and some also proclaimed themselves non-religious, people also demanded permission to introduce the Glagolitic liturgy. The latter can be understood within the context of the conflict between Slovenes and Italians, but foremost – in these villages as well as in the other, but not that obviously – people’s faith and their attachments to religious institutions have transformed. Basically, they underwent a process of desacralization (Verginella, 1994, 189–190).

Even if in terms of percentages the religious composition in the Slovenian part of the kingdom did not change much until the end of the first Yugoslavia, Slovenian towns – which were quite conservative at that time – already witnessed the very beginnings of religious diversification, which could not be inferred from mere statistical data. To provide a larger picture of the then situation: Judaism and Protestantism were present in certain Slovenian regions and large towns already before the period in question. One of the major “new” players in the Slovenian religious field after the end of the First World War was the Serbian Orthodox Church, which in the immediate aftermath of the unification of south Slavic nations in Yugoslavia established three Serbian Orthodox parishes in three large Slovenian towns: Celje, Ljubljana and Maribor. Initially, Orthodox believers were largely immigrants from other parts of Yugoslavia, while later the number of Slovenian converts started to increase. In 1938, the number of believers in the Celje Orthodox parish amounted to 683 (a figure that does not include the approximately 1,000 soldiers who were at that time in the region), of which 242 were of Slovenian origin and 3 of German (Bulovan, 2010, 76–77; Cvelfar, 2017, 317). Given the fact that prior to the First World War the region was not home to Christian Orthodox believers,<sup>4</sup> the aforementioned 245 people must have

been converts, i.e. approximately one third of permanent residents. In comparison with other religious communities, the Serbian Orthodox Church saw the largest increase in membership and was able to recruit new members through the media and public institutions. It was not uncommon that newspapers published articles promoting the Orthodox religion, and that the Sokol (“Falcon”) gymnastic society explicitly supported the “national religion” in the 1930s. Statistically speaking, one of the few religious groups that witnessed a slightly higher increase in 1931 in comparison with the situation in 1921 was Greek Catholics, which can be accounted for by the slightly re-drawn border of the Drava Banovina. The province had grown to include the area of Žumberak, which was home to the Uskoks who adhered to Greek Catholicism. Another new religion in the region was the Old Catholic Church, whose members shared the sentiments of dissatisfaction with the Catholic Church and could be to some extent regarded as a cover organization of Freemasonry. The number of Muslims in the region remained low, even if their membership slightly increased. Still, in 1931 Ljubljana saw the establishment of the first imamate in the Slovenian territory. Their number increased considerably only in the 1970s as a result of the inflow of economic immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first two mosques in the Slovenian territory were built during the First World War, one in the village of Log pod Mangrtom and one supposedly on the mountain of Rombon, in order to attend to religious needs of Muslim soldiers on the Isonzo Front. When they lost their function, the mosques were soon demolished. Religious diversity was also enhanced by the arrival of Russian immigrants, with many of them being soldiers who decided to stay in Slovenia after the end of the First World War (cf. Ratej, 2014; Mithans, 2018, 70).

If it can be generalized that contacts between various religious groups were marked by the negative image of the religious and often national Other (e.g. Slovenes were Catholics, Protestants were Germans (Lutherans) and Hungarians (Reformed Christians)), it is not surprising that responses and adjustments to religious diversification were potentially conflict-ridden. However, despite the importance of Catholic heritage in the formation of Slovenian nation, it would be false to assume that in the contemporary history religion has significantly connected or differentiated Slovenes on the national level nor differentiated them with the neighbouring nations (Kerševan, 1989, 99) like it does Croats and Serbs, for example. Most of the autochthonous non-Catholics in Slovenian territory were Germans and Hungarians, neighbouring nations

<sup>4</sup> See also: ZAC, SI ZAC-0995, no. 4, List of Orthodox Households of the Serbian Orthodox Parish in Celje – Composition as of 31 December 1936.

that are still otherwise majority Catholics. Slovene Protestants living in the north-eastern region of Prekmurje, which was in the time of Austria-Hungary in the Hungarian part of the monarchy with a more tolerant religious policy, were the only exception.

Nevertheless, in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the Slovenian territory saw the first attempts at rapprochement between Catholicism and the Orthodox creed based on the Cyril and Methodius idea of Christian connectedness, which opened the possibility of another view of the Other. Such initiatives were later complemented by those of early ecumenism, which were indeed much more receptive to dialogue, though still founded upon certain ethnic assumptions. One of the most active Slovenian theologians of the interwar period was Franc Grivec, the initiator and one of the main organizers of unionist congresses in Velehrad in Moravia (1907–1936) (Ambrožič, 2003, 69–86), and the pioneer of modern ecumenism in this part of Europe. The newly established Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana (1919) showed interest in the Orthodox religion and established a chair of Christian Orthodoxy, and, through its journal *Bogoslovni vestnik*, it also tried to build a bridge between the Western and Eastern branches of Christianity (Dolenc, 2018, 54–57; 71–72; Janežič, 2003, 186). Such a mediating role suited Slovenes, since their relations with Orthodox nations were not as burdened with political conflicts as those between Croats and Serbs were. Yet Slovenes often did not trust other Christian denominations (e.g. Evangelicals, Anglicans, Reformists) (cf. Ehrlich, 1922a, 20–29; Ehrlich, 1922b, 298–299; Juhant, 2002, 127), irrespective of the fact whether they were present in the region and irrespective of inter-Christian initiatives. The majority of the Slovenian population were reluctant to cooperate with non-Christian religious communities.

Later the modern ecumenical movement gained momentum, particularly with the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948 (the Catholic Church is not a member, but it does follow its operation) and the Conference of European Churches in 1959. In 1962, the Catholic Church, which was by far the most influential church in Slovenia, convened the Second Vatican Council and established an intense dialogue with the secular population, other Christian Churches, as well as non-Christian religions. In his encyclicals *Ecclesiam Suam* (1964) and *Lumen Gentium* (1964), Pope Paul VI launched the idea that anyone who is in honest search of god can achieve redemption irrespective of their official religious affiliation. His idea was supported by the Second Vatican Council and by progressive Slovenian theologians (Osredkar, 2016, 20–23; Turnšek, 2013, 25–27), and can be considered an important divergence from the deeply rooted Christian inter-

pretation of heresy (Zalta, 2019, 99) and the attitude to adherents of other religions.

During the Second Vatican Council in April 1965, Pope Paul VI established the Secretariat for Non-believers, the aim of which was not only to study atheism but also to organize groups of priests and lay people who would be willing to get in contact with atheists when such opportunities arose. After all, the Secretariat was named for non-believers, and not against them, stressed its first president, Cardinal Franz König. While for the Catholic Church unbelief remained unacceptable (see: Bullivant, 2012, 70), the Second Vatican Council ascribed responsibility for it partly to Christians themselves. To quote a paragraph from the encyclical *Gaudium et Spes* (1965), which reveals this remarkable aspect of the Catholic teaching on atheism:

*Undeniably, those who wilfully shut out God from their hearts and try to dodge religious questions are not following the dictates of their consciences, and hence are not free of blame; yet believers themselves frequently bear some responsibility for this situation. For, taken as a whole, atheism is not a spontaneous development but stems from a variety of causes, including a critical reaction against religious beliefs, and in some places against the Christian religion in particular. Hence believers can have more than a little to do with the birth of atheism. To the extent that they neglect their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are deficient in their religious, moral, or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the authentic face of God and religion* (Pavel VI., 1965, art. 19).

## RELIGIOUS CONVERSION IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA

According to Lewis Rambo, religious conversion means turning from and to new religious groups, ways of life, systems of belief, and modes of relating to a deity or the nature of reality (Rambo, 1993, 2–3). It is thus a process of change that takes place in a dynamic field of persons, events, ideologies, and institutions (Halama, 2014, 185–186).

Contemporary studies also support the idea that conversion does not happen in a vacuum but in relation to the social and cultural contexts in which converts are situated (Guzik, 2013, 15). In line with Gooren, I understand religious conversion as a “passage” through levels, types, and phases of religious participation (cf. Gooren, 2010, 3–4). Despite the struggle of converts to be accepted by other believers as “full” members of the new religion, they will

very likely be permanently labelled as “converts”. It is therefore salient for a better understanding of a particular religious field – although such is not the main focus of this paper – to discuss the autonomy of converts’ actions during the process of conversion – before and after the “formal acceptance”. The agency of the converts should be analysed in regard to their impact on re-evaluation, re-instatement and re-negotiation of everyday and formal/institutionalized religious practices, expressions and meanings (cf. Kapaló, 2014, 239–240; Shanneik, 2011, 505).

During the existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia and later, interreligious relations were largely determined by relations between religious communities and state authorities, by the politicization of religion (and vice versa, the introduction of religious contents into politics), and by individual chapters of the history of religious conversion: mythicizing of conversions to Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Ottoman Empire and of conversions to the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Catholic Church in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the interwar expansion of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Slovenia and Croatia; and forced conversions from the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia (Aleksov, 2006, 25–28, 49–50; Lovrenović, 2013, 103, 109, 122–125; Sancaktar, 2016, 1–2). If one takes into consideration only the 20<sup>th</sup> century, religious conversion in the Slovenian territory did not seem to play such a prominent role as it had in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. If one argues that conversion processes include not only Christianization but also Reformation, Counterreformation, and the perpetuation of the negative stereotype of non-Catholic believers as religious and ethnic Others, then their importance grows considerably.

In the interwar years, the most common type of conversion in the Slovenian territory was related to other ethnic communities, i.e. to immigrant and ethnic religions (cf. Lesjak & Črnič, 2016, 296–297) and mostly involved disaffiliation from the Catholic Church. Germans converted from Catholicism to Lutheranism for the purpose of ethnic consolidation, and Slovenes converted to the Serbian Orthodox Church (Zajšek, 2011, 99–100; Cvelfar, 2017, 113–131) because it was perceived as a “Yugoslav” religion, with conversion to the autocephalous church in practice entailing some kind of Serbian “acculturation”. A few Slovenes converted to the Old Catholic Church, and even if some converts were occasionally perceived as supporters of the former Croatian Peasant Party, ethnic affiliation did not play a major role, which, however, did not mean that the Catholic Church viewed such conversions in a more favourable light.

Taking into consideration the various push and pull factors, the following five types of religious

conversion in Slovenian and Yugoslav context can be proposed, that are not necessarily exclusive and surely not fixed:

- conversion of convenience (e.g. marriage, divorce [Serbian Orthodox Church, Islam], political opportunism [conversion to the “national religion”, i.e. the Serbian Orthodox Church], national consolidation, and protection [conversion of Jews to the Catholic Church before and during the Second World War]);
- conversion of “committed” converts (converts are active in religious rites and social activities of the religious community they were recently accepted in);
- reconversion (conversions back to the former creed; also in the form of religious renewal or vivification);
- deconversion (e.g. atheization, especially after the Second World War – further explored beneath);
- forced religious conversion in the Independent State of Croatia (if conversion processes are analysed in the Yugoslav framework).

Since non-Catholic religious communities often had an ethnic character, the religious conversions themselves and the disputes they (could have) triggered transcended the boundaries of the sphere of religiosity. These were typical cases of double minorities (cf. Durić Milovanović, 2015, 291–292) and processes of othering, not generated solely by the members of the original religion that a convert abandoned but also by members of the newly elected religious community in which the convert was for a long time (sometimes forever) perceived as an “Other”. We know of cases where even priests were not happy with certain converts. The main reason for their displeasure was, of course, the large share of converts who changed their faith with the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, “circumventing” the law by converting from Catholicism to Serbian Orthodoxy or Islam, as many of them would afterwards not even attend religious ceremonies (Cvirk, 2005, 92–95). Often we come across comments made by people from Catholic circles that the “apostasy” of these people from the Catholic Church was not a loss, as they never were good Catholics anyway and would not make good Orthodox either (and the same applies to converts to other faiths) (Cvelfar, 2017, 114, 118–119). Religious conversions for personal (secular) benefits, which, according to some estimates by the state officials and the Orthodox

Church alike, occurred in as many as 80% of cases of conversions to Orthodoxy (Bulovan, 2010, 72),<sup>5</sup> and already mentioned "revolts" of villages that converted or threatened with mass conversion to either Christian Orthodoxy or Greek Catholic Church or with disaffiliation instigated by "secular" motives, also point to the different role of religious institutions in the society. Moreover, some people were already before World War II, which shattered the trust of many in major religious institutions, inclined to abandon the idea of religion as something you were born into for life.

In another variant, the Serbian Orthodox rector in Celje asserted in his writings in 1936 that a large portion of Slovenes converting to the Serbian Orthodox Church were reluctant to adopt Orthodox customs and remained Catholics "at heart" (Bulovan, 2010, 72). We can conclude from this that a conversion to the Serbian Orthodox Church in a predominantly Catholic environment represented a cultural shock and that converts were excluded from certain segments of the society. For similar reasons, only a small number of Slovenian converts chose to convert to Protestantism, as affiliation to Evangelical religious communities (except in Prekmurje, which had been part of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy prior to the First World War) was considered as "a refuge of the Germans" (cf. Zajšek, 2011, 100).

The case of the Lutheran Church (in this territory, called the German Evangelical Church) in Maribor is specific, as it registered a high number of conversions after the First World War,<sup>6</sup> in a sort of second "Away from Rome!" movement [Ger. Los-von-Rom-Bewegung]. This, however, was no longer limited to Catholicism or Protestantism, for dissatisfaction with the Catholic Church was in a way expressed by every single case of disaffiliation from it, and most notably through the actions of the German ethnic community, which indicated the emergence of national consolidation among the remaining Germans in Slovenian regions. In fact, after disaffiliating from, mainly, the Catholic Church, they connected with fellow countrymen within the Evangelical parish. Nevertheless, membership in the German Evangelical Church decreased as a result of the expulsion and voluntary migration of the members of German nationality; in the Evangelical parish in Maribor it dropped from around 1,800 in 1918 to 900 in 1925.<sup>7</sup> The pressure on the converts was considerable, with the police

interrogating each and every one of them to establish whether the conversion was politically motivated (Zajšek, 2011, 98–100). The number of people joining the German Evangelical Church rose slightly again before the Second World War, from 1937 through 1941.<sup>8</sup> All things considered, it was not surprising that several members of German Evangelical community propagated Nazi ideas already in the 1930s.

Further, the manner in which the converts were integrated into the new religious community (if at all) and the permanence of their decision could also be in contrast with their expectations in view of the reason for their conversion. A person who at first intended to convert in order to advance professionally could later develop genuine religious feelings towards the religion to which they converted, becoming profoundly religious. Or the initial enthusiasm over the newly adopted religion could give way to disillusionment. Many Slovenes complained, for example, that the Serbian Orthodox Church spoke exclusively Serbian and used the Cyrillic alphabet, the Brotherhood of Orthodox Slovenes even demanding that the Slovenian language and the Latin alphabet be introduced into Orthodox liturgy in Slovenia and a Slovenian Orthodox Church be established (Bulovan, 2010, 72; Cvelfar, 2017, 100–101, 174–175, 220–221).

It was through such contacts and interactions that various religious groups constantly negotiated their own boundaries (cf. Barth, 1969). If to be a Serbian Orthodox believer meant that the believer had to be of Serbian nationality and had to use the Cyrillic alphabet, such principles and expectations were shaken by Slovenian converts as mentioned above. The example described above also testifies to the struggle between (fairly exclusive) elements of national and religious identities (cf. Kapaló, 2014, 230–231). In that period, such a struggle was complemented by at that time unsuccessful attempts of the state authorities to form a supranational Yugoslav identity, which in the first Yugoslavia proved to be nothing but a version of (poorly) disguised Serbian political centralism.

#### SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA AND RELIGION – BETWEEN ATHEIZATION AND RELIGION AS A PRIVATE MATTER

*When I asked her if she still believes in God, she said no, then she corrected herself that she doesn't really know. 'You know, if God exists,*

5 "The lowest number of converts are those, who enter Orthodoxy based on principles, but even those are not religious, but national" (ZAL, LJU-489, 2012, The report of the city of Ljubljana to the Bishop's office, 8. 8. 1928).

6 The fond of the Evangelical Parish of Maribor in the Maribor Regional Museum preserves 564 certifications of disaffiliation from 1918 to 1922 (PAM-1821060/2, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church 1911–1918; PAM-1821060/3, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church 1919–1945).

7 Similar trend was also in Celje (Maver, 2014, 514–515).

8 PAM-1821060/2, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church 1911–1918; PAM-1821060/3, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church 1919–1945.

*then he's not just good and he's not like they say in church. Why would he just look at such a slaughter as the war is? How they killed, tortured, and burnt people in the extermination camps? What kind of God of love is that? And I'm convinced that God didn't create humans. It was the other way around, humans created God! Otherwise, we would have only one god, and if that god would have created a human, we would be all equal and his united herd. Now we have Christ, some have Allah, others have certain Buddha in the Himalayas, and what kind of gods people in Africa have I have no idea [...] If God would have created humankind, then it would be only one god; because humans created gods, there are more of them! Different people: different gods... And different religions. Am I not right?' [...] In spite of that, we agreed that a little faith can't hurt the children, because you never know where the world will turn. So we sent the children to the communion [...] and then to the confirmation [...]. Just in case (Partljič, 2019, 28; translated by the author).*

After the end of the Second World War, the Yugoslav socialist regime considerably limited the activities of religious communities, even if with the passage of years the limitation of the rights of believers weakened and all the time there existed differences between the situation in different republics. In general, the state fostered two approaches towards religions: one was the separation of religious institutions from the state, including the declaration of faith to be a private matter, assurance of religious freedom and religious equality (which was nothing but a matter of interpretation); the other was support of "progressive" Marxism to the "liberating" process of fading away of religion, which was considered inevitable. Yugoslav communists intended to introduce equality and to attain reconciliation by building socialism on the basis of "scientific materialism" (Mojzes, 1992, 343–344).

The atheization of society in Yugoslavia (and, roughly speaking, in other countries with a socialist regime as well) should be regarded as a form of deconversion imposed by the state via its ideological apparatus (cf. Althusser, 2018) rather than a synonym for secularization as witnessed in Western Europe (Pasquale & Kosmin, 2013, 462). Despite frequent exertion of public pressure and discrimination, the decision to relinquish faith was still a private one. Many people decided to stop attending religious ceremonies yet did not lose their faith (cf. Borowik et al., 2013, 633–635). The personal reasons for such partly "state-imposed atheism" are embodied in the following five characteristics suggested by Streib:

1. loss of specific religious experiences;
2. intellectual doubt, denial or disagreement with specific beliefs;
3. moral criticism;
4. emotional suffering;
5. disaffiliation from the community (Streib et al., 2011, 22; cf. Barbour, 1994, 2).

Deconversion cannot be simply identified with disaffiliation from membership in a religious community. It also encompasses a change in the individual's religious orientation in a certain period of life, which results in the transformation of religious identity and the system of beliefs or worldviews and in the restructuring of mentality, moral judgements and attitude towards authorities (Streib et al., 2011, 22–23). In fact, formal disaffiliation is not a precondition for deconversion either.

According to a basic typology of religion-state relationships from the perspective of religious liberty formulated by Paul Mojzes, interwar Yugoslavia exhibited the characteristics of Type B: Religious Toleration. The state is benign toward religion in general but tends to give preferential treatment to one or more religious communities. Religious minorities are tolerated but are often given unequal practical treatment. Post-war Yugoslavia, however, was more inclined towards Type C: Secularistic Absolutism.

*This type consists of radical and sometimes even violent restrictions to public expressions of religiosity, driving religion into the private sphere under the guise of separation of church and state. Religious instructions are eliminated from the curriculum and atheism is vigorously promoted in education as it is in most areas of life. Communist countries implemented this model to various degrees. Former Yugoslavia initially practiced this model but gradually relaxed and modified its implementation up to the end of the 1980s (Mojzes, 2018, vii).*

In Yugoslavia, which was known as the socialist country with the most liberal stance on religion, atheization could be defined as an organized attempt (albeit "unsuccessful") to confine religion to the personal sphere through "soft" persuasion by limiting public religious ceremonies, cancelling religious holidays and not allowing religious education to be carried out at public schools. Concomitantly, the regime celebrated Yugoslav antifascism and "brotherhood" among various nationalities. Initially, though, it was openly oppressive towards religious institutions (Mirescu, 2009, 63; Alexander, 1979).

After 1945, when the whole of Eastern Europe witnessed an unprecedented limiting of religious rights (Mojzes, 1992, 345), the pre-war situation

changed completely. The determination of state authorities to promote Marxist “scientific atheism” sprang not only from the Marxist conception of the role of religion and human alienation but also from the regime’s understanding of religion: it feeds itself with nationalist feelings and can be used as a means of manipulation when conflicts, particularly between the Serbs and the Croats, arise (Mirescu, 2009, 63; Alexander, 1979). The sharpest criticism was aimed at “clericalism” in order to prevent particularly the Catholic Church from political engagement.

The Yugoslav Communist Party, especially in the first decade after coming to power after the Second World War, tried to inhibit the various nationalisms through restrictive policies towards religion. The introduction of socialist self-management was supposed to make the Communist Party loosen its direct authority; however, everyday practice of believers and control over them remained based on Leninist ideological principles. The key points of public criticism by individual Catholic intellectuals were discrimination in employment, distorted representations of religion in the media, disagreement with the status of second-class citizens, to which the religious population felt demoted in the atheist education system, and the prevention of charitable activities (Feyérdi et al., 2018, 461; cf. Radić, 2002). The authorities deemed the leading religious communities as mainly accountable for atrocities during the Second World War and the hostility between the different Yugoslav ethnicities (Mojzes 2011a; Mojzes 2011b). The officially declared atheism and the promotion of the policy of limitations of religious activities to houses of worship, while religiosity was considered as a private matter, was not only an expression of Marxist ideology but also a specific political strategy of ethnicization of religion (see: Waldenberg, 1998, 63; Mantsinen & Tervo-Niemelä, 2019, 72). However, the State Commission on Religious Affairs in Slovenia encouraged new religious organizations to undermine the importance of the Catholic Church in society (Dolinar, 1995, 30). For instance, it considered most Protestant Churches exemplary (with some exceptions, such as the Church of the Nazarene and the Seventh-Day Adventists), at least from the 1950s onwards, after a short period when the socialist regime did not allow Lutheran worship in Slovenian towns, as their members had been largely comprised of the post-war, significantly diminished German-speaking community (Mojzes, 2011a, 11; Nećak, 2013, 109–110).

The Slovenian philosopher and theologian Janez Janžekovič, a member of the state-founded Cyril-Methodius Society of Catholic Priests and a promoter of dialogue between Marxists and Christians, argued that socialism as a socioeconomic order was more acceptable to Christians than was Marxism as the

communist worldview. In his opinion, the main adversary was not communism but atheism (Režek, 2020; Juhant, 2002, 53), with atheization being one of the regime’s policies facing the strongest opposition from representatives of the Catholic Church. The only partial exception was the auxiliary bishop Vekoslav Grmič, who believed that a Christian could and even had to accept atheism as a demand of humanism as he identified the abolition of religion with the abolition of the ideology of the ruling class (Ramšak, 2014, 1025; Grmič, 1979, 170–177).

The state intruded into interior affairs of religious communities by encouraging the establishment of priestly societies within the existing Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim communities and by granting their members special privileges. It is quite probable that some members of such societies were secret agents of the state, yet during the Second World War many of them had been members of Christian Socialists – the largest group within the Slovenian Liberation Front – and had fought together with the partisans against the occupiers (Mojzes, 1992, 345; Kolar, 2008, 233). The state authorities also wanted to establish a national church that would not be dependent on the Holy See and would be modelled upon Orthodox religious communities, yet their attempts proved unsuccessful from the very beginning. By the early 1950s, the number of priests in Slovenia decreased almost by half, falling from around 2000 (in 1945) to 1,100, largely owing to emigration and some to incarceration. In the first decade of the second Yugoslavia, the administrative authorities ordered penalties in as many as 1,033 cases against priests, while 319 priests were tried before the court. In 1952 alone, as many as 735 charges against priests were filed to the misdemeanour court (Režek, 2005, 102, 104). As a result, the gap between the regime and religious exponents widened, and mutual distrust increased.

Communists actively promoted the atheistic agenda, which Roter describes as follows: activist atheism (the creation of circumstances in which society will no longer need religion) is the dominant type of atheism, occasionally combined with the enlightened subtype (the “exposing” of religion as delusion), the institutionalized subtype (communists as “missionaries” of atheism in various educational institutions), and combative political atheism (the equating of religion with clericalism) (Roter, 1976, 233–236). The programme also encompassed a rule that citizens had the right to belong to a religious community or not and that the right should be respected. However, religious feelings were considered a personal and private matter of an individual (Ramšak, 2015, 171). The regime was concerned about the side effects of the liberalization of the religious policy, and in the early 1970s it accused

the Catholic Church of selecting individuals in order to carry out a proselytical action (Ramet, 1982). Ramet describes the ambivalent policy on religious organization in very vivid terms: "*The Church was a tolerated species destined to gradual extinction when the achievements of the communist paradise on earth would have confined the state and the Church, nationalism and class inequality, hierarchy and oppression to historical oblivion*" (Ramet, 1982, 271).

On the one hand, it was mostly Catholicism (the two other major religions in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Islam, were more prone to subordination to state authorities) that was (more or less justifiably) thought to pose an ideological threat to the Communist Party / League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its policy of socialist self-management. On the other hand, the Marxist state and its policy of socializing secular values endangered religious institutions. Some authors argue that Western "secularization" and deinstitutionalization were more dangerous to religions than Marxist atheism, while others contradict them by claiming that Yugoslavia dissuaded people from religion and systematically spread atheization as the state could use all means available (Ramet, 1982, 264–265).

The attitudes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards religions and believers were based on Marxist and Leninist critique of religion as means of alienation. The communist view of religion was additionally burdened with militant "atheistic proselytism" modelled upon that of the Soviet Union. After Tito's split with Stalin in 1948, it could still be detected in Yugoslavia in its less militant form of conviction that religions were rivals to radical Marxist humanism. Together with liberalist traditions ("cultural struggle"), such views gave rise to a pronouncedly negative attitude towards religion, which marked the post-war period until 1953 (Ramšak, 2015, 171).

According to the 1953 census, "only" 10% of the Slovenian population and 12% of the entire Yugoslavian population declared themselves atheists, which so disappointed the authorities that Yugoslav censuses no longer included questions about religious affiliation (Šircelj, 2003).<sup>9</sup> A striking characteristic of the data gathered after 1953 is the fact that as many as 80% of Montenegrins, 71% of Serbs, 60% of Macedonians and 30% of Croats living in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia declared themselves atheists (Šircelj, 2003, 72–73), which was much higher than the Yugoslav average. To provide a larger picture:

only 3.5% of the population living in Slovenia was of foreign origin, and only 2.2% of the population declared themselves to belong to other Yugoslav nationalities. Perhaps this is a reason – in addition to political pragmatism and loyalty to the ideal of multinational unity promoted by the Yugoslav policy – why such high shares of (self-declared) atheists among the immigrant population in Slovenia can be interpreted as resulting from the intolerance of the majority Slovenian population. It is possible that non-Catholic immigrants simply tried to avoid standing out as members of a religious minority.

"Coordinating committees" were established with the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia in 1960 to "resolve" conflicts and tensions between religious institutions and local communities. Religious representatives, mostly sympathetic to the regime, were involved in these committees (Dolinar, 1995, 30). In the 1960s, many of the aforementioned conflicts were solved or at least lessened when the state granted religious communities greater autonomy of organization and even allowed the establishment of new religious organizations. With the new 1961 legislation on the legal status of religious communities, pressure on religious officials decreased, but discrimination of lay believers persisted. As argues Dolinar: "*Candidates for advanced state service positions and, especially, in teaching and cultural work had to possess "moral-political qualities" that is, convinced, practicing Catholics were not suited for such jobs.*" (Dolinar, 1995, 30) Moreover, members of the Communist Party (since 1952 League of Communists of Yugoslavia) remained to be banned from affiliation with any religious group. Hence openly religious people were deprived of several privileges that membership in the party came with.

These better circumstances within the Yugoslav "liberal" socialism had a positive impact on further ecumenical initiatives promoting interreligious dialogue between Christian religious communities (Perica, 2002; Mojzes, 1992, 348) and on external politics as well. However, such "religious liberalism" was much more accepted in Slovenia than in Croatia and Serbia, where ecumenism was received with considerable reservation. Even in Croat Catholicism, the Second Vatican Council was poorly received (Buchenau, 2005, 553). In the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council and the signing of the Yugoslav "protocol" (1966), Yugoslavia was the first socialist state recognized by the Vatican, and a *modus vivendi* with the Catholic Church was finally negotiated. In 1970 Yugoslavia also restored diplomatic

<sup>9</sup> In Slovenia, the question of religious affiliation has been included in annual surveys of Slovenian public opinion carried out by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (University of Ljubljana, College of Political Sciences (today: Faculty of Social Sciences) since 1968 (cf. Toš, 1997). Statistical data, based on censuses or surveys, have to be approached critically, more as an orientation point, as "*numbers are not neutral but shape and are shaped by perceptions and identities*" (Day & Lee, 2014, 345; cf. Höpner & Jurczyk, 2015).

relations with the Vatican (Ramšak, 2015, 169–170; Ramet, 1990, 192–193). The Ljubljana Faculty of Theology founded special chairs and organized several symposia on ecumenism. An active promoter of ecumenism was Archbishop Franc Perko, who attended ecumenical symposia organized since 1974 by the Faculties of Theology in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. In 1987, the Vatican appointed Slovenian Cardinal-to-be Franc Rode secretary of the Secretariat for Dialogue with Non-Believers (Osredkar, 2018, 200) after he had worked at the Secretariat for several years. In 1960, priests were permitted to travel abroad, while the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Moscow Patriarch, the Vatican's Secretary of State and other religious dignitaries were allowed to visit Yugoslavia and to hold religious ceremonies.

In the late 1960s, a reconciliatory attitude of the young liberally oriented generation of theologians towards socialism, and an open attitude of the young generation of sociologists towards religion, who analysed it from a Marxist perspective and did not simply oppose it, resulted in a short period of dialogue between Christians and Marxists in Slovenia and Croatia (Buchenau, 2005, 558; Ramšak, 2014, 1023). Moreover, prominent foreign scholars, such as Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, were allowed to deliver public lectures, and since 1977 Dubrovnik hosted an annual international seminar on the future of religion (Mojzes, 1992, 365–366).

In the 1970s, the definition of the status of religion and believers in the socialist society was one of the key political dilemmas of the League of Communists. In the late period of Yugoslav socialism, one of the most burning issues became how to convince believers, i.e. the majority of the population, to start supporting socialist self-management. The dilemma appeared when the so-called positive abolition of religion was still a valid principle of the League of Communists. In the late 1960s, the leading Yugoslav ideologist, Edvard Kardelj, had rejected dialogue between Marxists and Christians; by the early 1970s, however, he was assuring believers absolute equality at least at the formal level (Ramšak, 2014, 1029).

In this period, all religious communities were allowed to publish or distribute their press, although with some censorship. The first religious newspaper that was allowed to be published after the introduction of the socialist regime was *Družina* (The Family) in 1952, followed by *Ognjišče* (The Hearth) and periodical of the Theological Faculty *Bogoslovni vestnik* (Theological Quarterly) (both in 1965). Public religious services in the assigned places of worship were never severely hindered, although to organize religious ceremonies outside those premises (e.g.

processions) still special permissions were needed and donations collected during religious services were taxed. The Catholic religious representatives complained about the latter issue, as well as on discrimination of, especially teachers, who were religious, in the report on the new law on the status of religious communities in Slovenia of 1978.<sup>10</sup>

Although religious education was removed from public schools in 1949, according to the surveys still 45–50% of children attended it at the parish houses in the 1960s and maybe an unexpectedly high share of 80% in 1981. According to the survey performed by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, few high school students in 1981 felt discriminated in the school due to their religious convictions (only 8%) (Kerševan, 1989, 96, 98). In 1989, Christmas was reintroduced as a non-working day, after it had been cancelled with other religious holidays in 1952 and replaced with other holidays, like New Year's tree celebration (Židov, 2016, 121). The declared religiosity and religious affiliation tended to be – expectedly – also in the 1980s lower than the share of those who experience some form of either private or institutional religious upbringing (see: Kerševan, 1989, 96, 100–101). The deinstituted forms of religiosity or autonomous religiosity, that developed in socialist as well as democratic regimes, although with somehow different reasons, in Slovenia seem to be higher than institutional religiosity (24% vs. 21%), unlike in most of the other post-socialist countries (Toš, 2000, 212, 226). The "religious resurgence" in the 1980s and especially the 1990s affected institutional religiosity (i.e. attendance at religious services) less than it would be expected. Even high(er) attendance at religious services observed in some economically less developed Slovenian regions, may not exhibit "true" religious sentiments of people, but rather a mere public declaration of religious affiliation (Lavrič & Friš, 2018, 58).

Jože Rajhman, a Catholic priest and a follower of a version of Liberation Theology, subtly mentioned the changed religious practices and power relations on the religious field, also regarding the autonomous religion:

*World has changed, and according to the Latin proverb, so has a human. [...] The modern world is necessarily secularized. In this secularized world a new type of a human has been created. [...] Slovenian people feel relatively well in the current society [...] Slovenian believers who are somewhat educated know that outside the Church, but at the same time*

<sup>10</sup> AS, 1589/IV 487, 4391, Report on the implementation of the Act on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, 18 October 1978.

*because of the Church, they can find enough opportunities to connect with their inner existence and transcend themselves. So they leave church buildings and the Church, without finally and forever leaving it [...] This is the paradox of the Church and also, of course, the time in which we live (Rajhman, 1985, 410–411).*

Further progress in the field of interreligious relations was achieved with the appointment of several Yugoslav Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic theologians as members of the Yugoslav Committee for the Defence of Human Rights founded in 1988 (Mojzes, 1992), as well as with similar initiatives of the civil society at the level of the republics. Because of the outbreak of war in the major part of former Yugoslavia after the fall of socialism and the focus on interethnic conflicts among the Yugoslav nations/ethnic groups, many important aspects of religious identity, change as well as the importance of the aforementioned cooperation have been relegated to the background or ignored.

Scholarship should not be predicated on the knowledge that a war was to follow, but rather on all the nuances of cohabitation of peoples of such ethnic, historical, and religious diversity. The major religious institutions in Yugoslavia may not have succeeded in establishing a lasting cooperation (Radić 2003), but in Slovenia dialogical endeavours primarily between Christian groups did produce some short- and long-term positive results.

## CONCLUSION

It is of key importance that we understand how representations of religion and atheism are embedded in historical processes that may strengthen or weaken religious identity at the collective and individual levels. Both religious identity and religion are always subject to change even if believers often do not perceive that fact. Among major factors of change are relations between religious communities and state authorities – the latter can exert influence on religion through the politicization of religion, and marginalization or favouritism of certain religious communities – and relations between different religious communities. A special case in point is the relative openness to religious conversion presented in my article or, more precisely, openness to conversion to a certain religion rather than disaffiliation from it.

In the interwar Slovenian territory, religious conversion was often intertwined with political preferences, and non-Catholic religious affiliation was usually associated with people of foreign nationalities. Converts were under great pressure and had to face a number of obstacles when trying to adapt to life in a new religious community. As a result, in the second half of the 1930s, many of them reconverted to their original creed.<sup>11</sup> Having adopted individual agreements with most of the acknowledged religious communities (except with the Catholic Church), the Kingdom of Yugoslavia witnessed an increased need to regulate religiously mixed marriages and to restrain religious conversion whose sole purpose was divorce, and it tried to do so at the highest level by passing a state law on interreligious relations and by signing a concordat with the Holy See. The former was never passed, the latter never ratified.

Even if the number of religious conversions was low and the number of non-Catholic believers as well, large Slovenian towns had a much more multi-religious character prior to the Second World War than prior to the First World War. Religious diversification went hand in hand with a gradually more open attitude of culture, politics and the media towards religious plurality and secularism. The period also saw a few initiatives promoting ecumenism, and signalled the beginning of religious plurality in the Slovenian territory, which was followed by a change in the regime in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The Communist Party / League of Communists encouraged the atheization of society. In the first decade of its reign, it was openly oppressive towards religious institutions; later it tried to limit their public engagement in various ways. Data gathered through the 1953 census and Slovenian public opinion surveys conducted since 1968 has revealed that religion would not "fade away" (Andrews, 2016, 105–125). The largest group in Slovenia remained those who declared themselves religious.<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, at that time it was possible to establish a dialogue between Christians and Marxists. In the 1980s, it also became more or less clear that the "brotherhood-and-unity" ideology and the attempt to construct a Yugoslav identity that would prevent interethnic and interreligious frictions would not bear fruit.

The period of socialism when the political system usurped the Catholic Church's dominant role created a "space" in the religious field, and together with the democratization of state and social structures

11 NŠAL, V, 100.

12 According to the Slovenian sociologist Marko Kerševan, the downward trend stopped or even turned slightly upward in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the year 1978, however, the number of religious dropped below 50% (to 45,3%), still slightly higher than the number of non-religious. On the basis of data from the late 1980s and early 1990s, he estimated that around a third of Slovenians was religious and in contact with religious institutions, that a third was religious but had (almost) no contact with religious institutions, while a third was non-religious (Kerševan, 1994, 243; Roter, 1980, 659).

(e.g. public religiosity) and the migration of a non-Catholic population from former Yugoslav republics enabled today's religious diversity. Hence the second and third-largest religious communities (Islam and Serbian Orthodox Church) are mostly comprised of immigrants and their families. At the time being, Slovenia records 56 registered religious communities to which the constitution grants an equal status and the freedom of conscience (see: Furlan Štante, 2019, 26). Approximately a quarter of the registered religious communities were established after the changes and revisions of the Law on religious freedom (2007) were made in 2013 that diminished some privileges of the traditional religions. It is estimated that of around 140 active religious communities in total,

100 are New Religious and New Age Movements (Lesjak & Črnič, 2016, 299). Their members are mostly ethnic Slovenes, and do not present a high share of population. Such religious diversity naturally poses new social challenges of how to maintain good relations with both believers and nonbelievers. In these endeavours, the main actor is always the Catholic Church, by far the most influential religious community, now self-declared "pillar" of civil society, which also has strong indirect political power. A positive impact is to be expected by The Amendment to the Law on religious freedom that awaits parliamentary discussion since 2018; the public debate, however, will probably only politicize the topic as it had in the year 2007 (cf. Flere, 2014, 88–91).

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### POVZETEK

*V prispevku je predstavljen proces sprememb na religijskem polju na Slovenskem s poudarkom na dveh pojavih: verskih prestopih v času med svetovnima vojnoma in ateizaciji v obdobju socializma. Zgodovinska analiza obdobja prve Jugoslavije kaže na zmetke religijske diverzifikacije in individualizacije, predvsem kot posledico novega državnega okvirja, neurejenih oziroma pomajkljivo urejenih odnosov države do religijskih skupnosti in notranjih migracij. Posebnost verskih prestopov, zlasti iz Katoliške cerkve v Srbsko pravoslavno cerkev, pa tudi v islam, je bila visok delež prestopov iz koristi (zakonska razveza s ponovno poroko, napredovanje v službi ipd.), ki pa ne izključuje kasnejšega religijskega udejstvovanja v novi religijski skupnosti. Diskriminаторna politika oblasti do nemške narodnostne manjšine pa je povzročila utrditev te narodne manjšine znotraj Nemške evangeličanske cerkve s številnimi prestopi katoliških Nemcev v evangeličansko vero. Visok delež članov te religijske skupnosti, kot tudi parohij Srbske pravoslavne cerkve, predvsem če upoštevamo stalno naseljeno prebivalstvo, so bili konvertiti iz Katoliške cerkve. Verski prestopi pa so vendarle bili razmeroma redki in številčno se verska sestava religijsko izrazito homogenega območja takratne Dravske banovine ni dosti spremenila. Večje spremembe na religijskem polju pa je prinesel povojni režim, ki je s podpiranjem širjenja ateizma (kot oblike dekonverzije) in vzporedno politiko omejevanja javnega delovanja religijskih institucij zajeziel dominantno vlogo Katoliške cerkve v družbi. Odnos socialističnih oblasti do religije in njenih predstavnikov je bil v Jugoslaviji do leta 1953 izrazito negativen, sčasoma pa se je liberaliziral kar je med drugim omogočilo dialog med kristjani in marksisti ter med religijskimi skupnostmi. Migracije predvsem iz drugih jugoslovanskih republik v zadnjih petdesetih letih so prispevale k večji številčnosti pripadnikov nekatoliških verskih skupnosti. Po razpadu Jugoslavije v Sloveniji z demokratizacijo pravnih struktur opažamo porast religijskih vsebin v medijih, vrsto novih registriranih in neregistriranih religijskih skupnosti – prve nove religijske in novodobniške skupnosti se sicer pojavijo že v 1970. letih – hkrati pa tudi ponovno utrditev položaja Katoliške cerkve, ki sedaj nastopa iz pozicije civilne družbe.*

**Ključne besede:** verski prestop, Jugoslavija, Slovenija, ateizacija, medverski odnosi, religijski pluralizem

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## DRŽAVLJANSKE VOJNE V »KRŠČANSKIH ČASIH«

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### IZVLEČEK

Ker je državljanska vojna vedno veljala za eno najhujših nesreč za skupnost, je njena zelo vidna navzočnost tudi po Konstantinovi spreobrnitvi predstavljal hudo razlagalno težavo za poznoantične krščanske zgodovinarje. Ta težava še ni mučila Laktancija, saj je tudi v državljanskih vojnah videl sredstvo za izboljšanje položaja kristjanov v rimske državi. Poznejše generacije seveda niso mogle več razumeti okoliščin Laktancijevega pisanja. Vrhu tega so predvsem od začetka 5. stoletja krvave državljanske vojne iz obdobja republike služile kot temeljni dokaz »slabše« narave predkrščanskih časov. A ker je ravno »najbolj krščanski cesar« Teodozij večino svojih uspehov dosegel v državljanskih vojnah, so se Orozij in drugi krščanski zgodovinarji znašli pred nujnostjo številnih miselnih akrobacij. Slednje so med drugim slabo vplivale na ugled Orozija kot zgodovinarja od razsvetljenstva naprej.

**Ključne besede:** rimske državljanske vojne, krščanstvo in vojna, krščanska latinska historiografija v pozni antiki, Orozij, Avguštin, Teodozij Veliki, bitka pri Frigidu

## LE GUERRE CIVILI IN «TEMPI CRISTIANI»

### SINTESI

Poiché la guerra civile era sempre stata considerata come uno dei peggiori disastri per la comunità, la sua forte presenza, anche dopo la conversione di Costantino, aveva rappresentato un notevole problema interpretativo per gli storici cristiani tardo-antichi. La questione non aveva ancora tormentato Lattanzio il quale anche nelle guerre civili vedeva un mezzo per migliorare la posizione dei cristiani nello Stato romano. Le generazioni successive, ovviamente, non furono più in grado di comprendere le circostanze degli scritti di Lattanzio. Inoltre, soprattutto dall'inizio del secolo V, le sanguinose guerre civili del periodo repubblicano sono servite come prova fondamentale della «peggiore» natura del periodo precristiano. Ma poiché l'imperatore «più cristiano» Teodosio riuscì a ottenne la maggior parte dei propri successi grazie alle guerre civili, Orosio e altri storici cristiani si trovarono di fronte alla necessità di molte acrobazie mentali. Queste, tra l'altro, dall'Illuminismo in poi avevano influito negativamente sulla reputazione di Orosio come storico.

**Parole chiave:** guerre civili romane, cristianesimo e guerra, storiografia cristiana latina nella tarda antichità, Orosio, Agostino, Teodosio il Grande, battaglia di Frigido

UVOD<sup>1</sup>

Državljanska vojna praktično od vsega začetka ukvarjanja z njo velja za tisti tip vojaškega spopada, ki povzroča najhujše posledice za skupnost (prim. temeljno študijo Armitage, 2017, in s filozofskega vidika Agamben, 2016; za posamezne zgodovinske zglede skozi čas prim. Kalyvas, 2006; Payne, 2012; Roshwald, 2014; Darovec, 2017; Muir, 2019; Oman, 2019; Deželak Barič, 2016; Komel, 2018; Klabjan, 2018; Repe, 2018 in 2019; Friš, Maver & Maver Šoba, 2018; Lampe, 2017; Šterbenc, 2018). Pomembno je pristaviti, da državljanske vojne kljub svoji razširjenosti vse do leta 1977 niso imele zunanjega varovala, ker ženevske konvencije in drugo vojno pravo vanje niso posegale, saj naj bi širitev njihovih določil nanje predstavljala poseg v suverenost neke države (Lampe, 2019). Sicer pa je verjetno temeljna težava državljanskega spopada, da je porušene mostove znotraj iste družbe le stežka ali skoraj nemogoče ponovno vzpostaviti (prim. Cornwell, 2014; Armitage, 2017, 9–10; Cmrečnjak, 2017; Bajc & Lampe, 2017; Bajc & Osojnik, 2019). Medtem ko vojna z zunanjim sovražnikom velikokrat celo utrdi družbene vezi, jih državljanska vojna temeljito potrga. Še več, lahko se zgodi, da služi ohranjanje podobe nasprotnika iz takega spopada kar kot osrednje vezivo ene od strani v njem (običajno zmagovite, a morda tudi poražene), kar povoju integracijo praktično onemogoča (prim. zlasti Börn, 2016, 15–16; gl. še Osgood, 2015; Lange, 2014; Movrin, 2014; Repe, 2016; Kladnik, 2016; Oman & Darovec, 2018).

In prav na tej točki se skriva še en Janusov obraz državljanske vojne. Res je, da je bila njena

obsodba kot pojava skozi zgodovino bolj ali manj enoznačna in da opravičila zanjo tako rekoč ni bilo (Wiseman, 2010). Toda po drugi strani so se ravno izidi tovrstnih spopadov izkazali za temelj obstoječih razmerij v družbi, ki so jih hotele predvsem tiste skupine, ki so imele od njih največ koristi, zabetonirati za čim več časa (gl. zlasti študije Havener, 2014 in 2016; Haake, 2016). Tako je bil spomin na državljanske vojne po eni strani neprijeten, zaradi česar so ga poskušali na različne načine zakrivljeni. Po drugi strani je bilo treba kar naprej opozarjati, od kod izvira družbena moč enih in nemoč drugih grupacij v družbi (prim. predvsem Havener, 2016; Miladinović Zalaznik, 2018 in 2019; Čeh Steger, 2019).

Rimljani so vsekakor razvili temeljne vzorce soočanja z različnimi vidiki državljanske vojne (gl. Armitage, 2017, in zdaj Lange & Vervaet, 2019). Takšni spopadi iz njihove zgodovine so že v obdobju pozne

republike v glavnem imeli strukturne značilnosti, ki se niso bistveno spremenile niti do primerljivih evropskih v 20. stoletju, končno tudi na Slovenskem (prim. Maver, 2016, zlasti 769–771; za omejitve pri primerjavah med različnimi časovnimi obdobji Woolf, 2012, 8). Pri tem puščam ob strani znova oživljeno debato, ali so bili rimske zgodovinarji in drugi pisci sočasno tisti, ki so sploh »izumili« pojem državljanske vojne v sedanjem pomenu, kot je domneval že Avguštin (tako Armitage, 2017; bolj zadržano Lange, 2017, in Lange & Vervaet, 2019). Oboroženi konflikti med rimskimi državljanji, predvsem v 1. stoletju pr. Kr., so nedvomno ohranili svojo moč nekakšnih eksemplov vse do najnovejših časov (prim. recimo Feeney, 2010).

V nadaljevanju se bom posvetil nekoliko manj obravnavanemu in predvsem razvpitemu drugemu ali celo tretjemu valu državljanskih vojn v rimski zgodovini. Povezan je z obdobjem, ko je začelo v Rimskem cesarstvu že prevladovati krščanstvo. V novih razmerah je postal problem nadaljevanja državljanskih spopadov vedno bolj pereč, saj so kristjani svoj pogled na zgodovino v veliki meri gradili na podmeni, da bo velikih nesreč, med katere so takšni dogodki seveda sodili, v »njihovih« časih bistveno manj, če že ne bodo povsem izginile (prim. Tanz, 1983; Zecchini, 2003, 320–321).

A tudi v tem obdobju se ni bilo mogoče izogniti z obeleževanjem spomina na vojne med člani iste skupnosti povezanim dvoumnostim. Po eni strani je bilo potrebno pomen teh vojn in zlasti obseg z njimi povezanega razdejanja zmanjševati, po drugi strani pa so, kot se vidi že čisto na prehodu v nove čase ob Konstantinu Velikem, velikokrat ravno boji med rimskimi četami odločili o razdelitvi moči v družbi, ki se je zdela kristjanom zanje ugodna (prim. Haake, 2016, zlasti 275 ss.). Omenjenega klobčiča ni bilo lahko odmotati, bolj ali manj uspešni poskusi pa so ustvarili vzore za soočanje z istimi pojavi v poznejših stoletjih. Nekaj takih poskusov bo predstavljenih v nadaljevanju.

## OROZIJEVA SKUŠJAVA

Ko Orozij v sedmi knjigi svoje *Zgodovine proti pogonom* na prvi pogled zelo samozavestno vzklikajo *Ecce regibus et temporibus Christianis qualiter bella civilia, cum uitari nequeunt, transiguntur*<sup>2</sup> (Orosius, 2001, 7.35.6), se za njegovimi besedami skriva zlahka prepoznavna zadrega. Do bitke pri Frigidu, ki jo je opisal tik zatem, ko je proslavil odločilno novost državljanskih vojn v krščanskih časih (o tem njegovem prikazu prim. Rohrbacher, 2002 143), je prišlo pred

1 Prispevek je nastal v okviru raziskovalnega programa Preteklost severovzhodne Slovenije med slovenskimi zgodovinskimi deželami in v interakciji z evropskim sosedstvom št. P6-0128 in raziskovalnih projektov *Kontemporalnost razumevanjskega konteksta ter izražanje osebne in družbene svobode* št. J7-8283 ter *Kultura spominjanja gradnikov slovenske države* št. J6-9354, ki jih financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

2 »Glej, kako se končajo državljanske vojne pod krščanskimi kralji in v krščanskih časih, ko se jim ni moč izogniti.«

dobrimi dvajsetimi leti, kar je pomenilo, da je bila še globoko zasidrana v spominu nekaterih njegovih bralcev (o odmevih in opisih bitke prim. temeljno študijo Bratož, 1994, in Bratož, 2018). Teren, na katerem se je znašel duhovnik iz Brakare, je bil torej precej problematičen. Na eni strani je javni spomin vedel za neposredne, pa tudi za posredne posledice precej trdo izbojevane Teodozijeve zmage. Na drugi strani so se bitka sama in mnoge značilnosti vladavine »najbolj krščanskega vladarja« le stežka prilegale pomembni izhodiščni misli *Zgodovine proti paganom*, da se je zaradi napredovanja kristjanizacije Rimskega cesarstva ob drugih tegobah zmanjšal tudi obseg vojn in nasilja, več pa naj bi bilo miru (prim. Tanz, 1983, in Rohrbacher, 2002, zlasti 139, 143 in 148).

Iz navedenega razloga so Orozijeve težave pri razlagi v drugem desetletju 5. stoletja hkrati dobro izhodišče za razmislek, kako so se kristjani na latinskem zahodu soočali z neprijetnim pojavom državljanske vojne. Pred to nalogo so se kajpak znašli šele tedaj, ko so vladarji cesarstva izhajali iz njihovih vrst, kar se jim je morda še globoko v drugi polovici 3. stoletja zdelo povsem nemogoče (prim. Leppin, 2009, 310–313 in zlasti 319–321).

Še povsem na pragu novega časa, okrog leta 300 po Kr., je bil nenavadni apologet krščanstva Arnobij Starejši (o njem gl. zlasti temeljno študijo Simmons, 1995, in Fiedrowicz, 2000, 74–76) prepričan, da bo lahko tradicionalne rimske očitke kristjanom zavrnil s trditvijo, da je širjenje Kristusovih naukov pravzaprav prispevalo k ublažitvi splošnih razmer, kajti

*cum hominum vis tanta magisteriis eius accepimus ac legibus, malum malo rependi non oportere, iniuriam perpeti quam inrogare esse praestantius, suum potius fundere quam alieno polluere manus et conscientiam cruore, habet a Christo beneficium iamdudum orbis ingratus, per quem feritatis mollita est rabies atque hostiles manus cohibere a sanguine cognati animantis occipit* (Arnobius, 1934, 1.6.2).<sup>3</sup>

V primerjavi s takšnimi trditvami se je moral zdeti kristjanom izplen 4. stoletja precej grenak. Še huje, ravno cesarji, za katere se je vsaj na zunaj zdelo, da so z zmagovito vero najbolj povezani in so ji tudi objektivno zelo pomagali k uspehu, Konstantin Veliki, Konstancij II. in Teodozij, so bili ogromno na bojnem polju. Pri tem so morali svoje vladanje, ki je bilo z vidika Cerkve tako pomembno, večinoma braniti pred

nasprotniki v državljanski vojni. Seveda je odnos posameznih latinsko pišočih krščanskih piscev do ključnih osebnosti med krščanskimi cesarji 4. stoletja nihal od primera do primera (gl. za primere Rohrbacher, 2002), vendar so se morali ob koncu vsi soočiti z dejstvom, da je državljanska vojna ne glede na Arnobijeva zagotovila ostala stalnica političnega vsakdana. Kljub temu je potrebno ugotoviti, da je postala razlaga v Orozijevem smislu in v smislu njegove teorije o »boljši državljanski vojni« zares nujna šele v okviru napovedujočega se razpada Teodozijevega sistema na zahodu v prvih letih 5. stoletja (prim. za zgodovinski okvir zlasti Demandt, 2007, 169–191, in Kulikowski, 2019, 123–164).

Pred tem dogajanjem je moč vsekakor opazovati še druge težnje, ki lahko včasih pomenijo celo odmik od običajnih rimskega razlagalnih vzorcev, pa tudi od zgodnejših krščanskih trditev o blažilnem učinku krščanstva.

#### LAKTANCIJEV TRIUMFALISTIČNI POGLED

Omenjeni zanimivi razvoj je zelo verjetno posledica dejstva, da so številni sodobniki vsaj deloma videli v izboljšanju položaja krščanske Cerkve ravno posledico državljanskih vojn po koncu prve tetrarhije, ki jo je krščanski zgodovinski spomin seveda razumel kot temačno obdobje (prim. Winkelmann, 2003). Omenjeno posledico Arnobijev verjetni učenec Laktancij kot je znano, že na začetku svojih *Smrti preganjalcev*, proslavlja v najlepših barvah:

*Ecce, deletis omnibus adversariis, restituta per orbem tranquillitate, profligata nuper ecclesia rursum exurgit et maiore gloria templum dei, quod ab impiis fuerat eversum, misericordia domini fabricatur. Excitavit enim deus principes qui tyrannorum nefaria et cruenta imperia resciderunt <et> humano generi providerunt, ut iam quasi discusso tristissimi temporis nubilo mentes omnium pax iucunda et serena laetificet* (Lactantius, 1984, 1.1-3).<sup>4</sup>

Pisca, ki tukaj predstavi nekakšen povzetek svojega dela, očitno ne moti, da je pot do *restituta per orbem tranquillitate* in do *pax iucunda et serena* večinoma vodila preko vojaških spopadov med rimskimi četami. Zadošča mu ugotovitev, da je bil boj usmerjen proti brezbožnim in je veljal »zločinski oblasti tiranov«. Tudi pozneje, ko Laktancij denimo poroča, da je med

<sup>3</sup> »Ker smo kot precejšnja množica ljudi iz njegovih naukov in postav prejeli, da ne smemo zavračati zla z zlom, da je primerne krivico trpeti kot nalagati, da je bolje prelivati lastno kri, kakor si roke in vest mazati s tujo, ima nehvaležni svet od Kristusa milost že zdavnaj, saj se je zaradi njega ublažila divja blaznost in je začel sovražne roke odvračati od prelivanja krvi sorodnega bitja.«

<sup>4</sup> »Glej, po uničenju vseh nasprotnikov in po vnovični vzpostavitvi miru na svetu znova vstaja Cerkev, ki je bila nedavno vržena na tla, in Gospodovo usmiljenje z večjo slavo gradi Božje svetišče, ki so ga porušili brezbožni. Bog je namreč obudil vladarja, ki sta podrla hudodelske in krvavoločne vladavine in poskrbela za človeški rod, tako da duha vseh razveseluje prijeten in jasen mir, kakor da bi bil predt oblak prežalostnega časa.«

Konstantinom in Maksencijem prišlo do državljanškega spopada, se mu ne zdi vredno ali potreбno opravičevati tega stanja, ki je bilo v očeh Rimljanih že od časa rimske republike vedno problematično, kaj šele, da bi ga skušal relativirati, kakor je omenjeno ob podvigih svojega junaka Teodozija Velikega počel Orozij. Za starejšega krščanskega pisca namreč ni dvoma, da sta bila Konstantinov in pozneje Licinijev boj upravičena (prim. zlasti Christensen, 1980, in DePalma Digeser, 2000).

To Laktancij podkrepiti na dva načina. Ob Maksiminu Daji gre seveda laže. Njegova trdovratna protikrščanska drža je zelo razvidna in jo je moč vrhu tega povezati še s siceršnjimi cesarjevimi izpadi. Za nameček Laktancij nekdanjega Galerijevega cezarja označuje kot *semibarbarum in pecorum pastorem*, kar je skladno s starim rimskim izročilom, ki ga je lahko po svoji zmagi nad Magnencijem denimo s pridom izrabil še Konstancij II. Če si nasprotnika v državljanški vojni očrnili kot barbara, je to hkrati pomenilo, da je bil izvzet iz občestva Rimljani, kar je zmanjšalo ostrino državljanške vojne proti njemu (kot poudarja Haake, 2016, zlasti 241–248).

Ob Maksenciju je zgodovinarjeva naloga težavnejša, kajti osrednjega Konstantinovega tekmeца spričo njegove povezanosti z vladajočo ekipo prve tetrarhije ni mogoče preprosto odpraviti kot Nerimljana. Razen tega je bil bolj zaščitnik kot preganjalec kristjanov (prim. Girardet, 2006, 33–37). Zato se je moral retor iz Nikomedije v glavnem zadovoljiti s prikazom splošnega zavračanja Maksencija, ki naj bi bil *homo perniciosae ac malae mentis, adeo superbus et contumax, ut neque patrem neque socerum solitus sit adorare, et idcirco utrique invisis fuit*<sup>5</sup> (Lactantius, 1984, 18.9). Temu se pridruži še za Laktancija pomembna okoliščina, da je Maksencij sin enega osrednjih akterjev preganjanj. Čeprav je s tem zagotovil upravičenost državljanške vojne proti takšnim nasprotnikom, glasniku nepričakovane osvoboditve kristjanov kaj takega ne zadošča. Kajti tako odločilni Konstantin spopad z Maksenjem kot tudi tistega med Licinijem in Maksiminom Dajo opremi z Božjimi navodili za bitko. Pri navedenem se kaže verska priprava vzhodnega vladarja z monoteistično molitvijo vojakov celo kot slovesnejša, kar je Arneja Søbyja Christensa (med drugim) ne čisto neupravičeno privedlo do tega, da je v Liciniju videl Konstantinu vsaj enakovrednega junaka *Smrti preganjalcev* (gl. Christensen, 1980, zlasti 27–32).

Božja pomoč kot osrednji temelj zmage (v državljanški vojni) je kajpak močno poudarjena tudi pri Rufinu, Avguštini in Oroziju, vendar je razlika v starejšem Laktancijevem besedilu v tem, da se zdi državljanška vojna kot okvir dogajanja precej neproblematična.

<sup>5</sup> »človek pogubnega in hudobnega duha, sicer pa tako ošaben in uporen, da ni imel navade spoštovati ne očeta ne tasta, zaradi česar sta ga oba prezirala.«

To se dobro prilega osrednjim sporočilom *Smrti preganjalcev*, ki so Arnalda Momigliana napeljala do tega, da je spis opisal kot »grozno delce« (Momigliano, 1963, 57). Upoštevati je potrebno, da je skoraj popolnoma sprememba položaja kristjanov predvsem za Laktancija, ki je dogodke lahko opazoval iz neposredne Dioklecijanove bližine v Nikomediji, prišla nepričakovano (o okolju v Nikomediji gl. zlasti DePalmaDigeser, 2000). Zato je občutek brezmejnega zmagoščevanja prekosil vse morebitne drugačne podtone in ni dopuščal niti neprijetnih vprašanj v povezavi z načinom, ki je izboljšanje omogočil. Zelo pomembno je še, da je Laktancij svoj pogled na zadeve zapisal takoj po dogodkih, iz česar izvira hkrati razlika med njim in Evzebijem iz Cezareje, ki je svoje besedilo v *Cerkveni zgodovini* večkrat prilagodil spremenjenim okoliščinam (prim. Winkelmann, 2003, 5–7 in 11–12). Že nekaj desetletij ali bolje le nekaj let pozneje bi Laktancij *Smrti preganjalcev* verjetno zastavil precej drugače, vsaj, kar zadeva njegov prikaz Licinijeve vloge. Ker je obtičal v nekem specifičnem trenutku, ki ga kasneje ni bilo lahko razumeti, je ostala dokaj skromna tudi priljubljenost njegovega dela (prim. Cambi, 2005, 17–18). In iz iste okoliščine se sočasno najbrž napaja njegov precej brezskrben odnos do pojava državljanške vojne.

Vendar je ta odnos obenem skladen z vidnim popuščanjem tabujev v rimskem javnem prostoru, kar zadeva zmago v takšni vojni. Slednje je, kot je pred nekaj leti pokazal Matthias Haake (2016, 270–281), doseglo enega vrhuncev ravno po Konstantinovi zmagi nad Maksencijem. Proces sam se je seveda začel že s Cezarjem in Oktavianom v 1. stoletju pr. Kr. (prim. zlasti Havener, 2016, 268 ss.). Odločilen pospešek je dobil najpozneje v času Septimija Severa ob koncu 2. stoletja po Kr. (Osgood, 2015, 1694–1695), toda šele okoliščine njegovega uspeha so po vsem videzu prisilile Konstantina, da je z javnim razkazovanjem glave svojega nasprotnika tabu skoraj popolnoma prelomil (Haake, 2016, 272–273; Lange, 2012). Na tej točki lahko vsekakor vidimo vzporednice z Laktancijevim razmerjem do zmage v državljanški vojni.

#### V SPREMENJENIH OKOLIŠČINAH

Kot rečeno, se v okoliščine, v katerih je pisal Laktancij, pozneje ni bilo mogoče več vživeti. Razen tega je enkratni trenutek enkratne zmage zamenjala vrsta dogodkov in predvsem vladarjev, ki so bili sedaj zaznamovani s krščanstvom (o krščanskem odnosu do vprašanja vojne nasploh, ki se je s tem odprlo, gl. klasični besedili Cadoux, 1919, in Bainton, 1971). To je krščanske pisce pogosto postavljalo pred nalogu izpričati njihovo tako rekoč boljšo kakovost v primerjavi

s predkrščanskimi predhodniki. Omenjeno je posebej vidno v latinskem krščanskem zgodovinopisu, ki je v trenutku, ko je za kristjane predstavljalo sorazmerno novo zvrst, navadno še zmeraj večinoma nastajalo kot polemičen odziv na izzive, ki so prihajali iz poganske, a morda še bolj iz dvomeče krščanske okolice (prim. Winkelmann, 1990, predvsem 753 ss., in Zecchini, 2003, 317–319).

Ko se je skoraj natanko sto let po nastanku Laktancijevega »grognega delca« takšen izziv pojavil ob soočenju s propadom Teodozijevega sistema, ki je simbolični vrhunc dosegel v Alarikovi osvojitvi Rima (prim. o tem Meier & Petzold, 2010, in Bratož, 2010) je v miselnem svetu krščanskih intelektualcev novo vlogo pridobil tudi pojav državljanke vojne.

Imeli so sicer možnost, ki za poganske Rimljane v takšni obliki ni nikdar obstajala in ki bi jim morda omogočila, da bi po Laktancijevih stopnjah državljanško vojno vselej opravičevali le na podlagi njene upravičenosti. Čeprav je bilo namreč ločevanje kristjanov in s tem tudi krščanskih vladarjev na pravoverne in krivoverske do določene mere le stopnjevanje že prej priljubljenega razlikovanja med pravimi Rimljani in (pol)barbari, o čemer sem na kratko spregovoril zgoraj, bi lahko vsaj teoretično morebitni državljanški vojni med predstavniki različnih oblik krščanstva odvzelo še nekaj nesprejemljivosti. Nastavek za to slika denimo Orozij, ko se trudi, kako bi opravičil uničujoči poraz (na napačen način) krščanskega cesarja Valenta. Po njegovem mnenju naj bi Bog poznal le eno pravo Cerkev, za katero skrbi: *unus Deus unam fidem tradidit, unam ecclesiam toto orbe diffudit: hanc aspicit, hanc diligit, hanc defendit; quolibet se quisquis nomine tegat, si huic non sociatur, alienus, si hanc inpugnat, inimicus est* (Orosius, 2001, 7.33.17).<sup>6</sup>

Podobno izhodišče je bržkone omogočilo Rufinu, da je dokaj nezaskrbljeno gledal na grozeč bratski spopad med Konstancijem II. in Konstantom, ko bi morebitno vojaško posredovanje mlajšega brata razumel skoraj v Laktancijevem smislu kot pravično vojno (Rufinus, 2000, 1.20; prim. Maver, 2009, 169–170). Ista temeljna ocena pozneje vodi Orozija, ko ne poskuša samo omiliti pomena Valentove katastrofe, temveč v obeh primerih tudi povsem različno razloži neprijetno okoliščino, da so tako uspehi Konstancija II. kot Teodozija Velikega sestavljeni predvsem iz zmag v državljanških vojnah (prim. Haake, 2016, 247–248).

Do prave državljanke vojne med cesarji, ki bi pripadali različnim krščanskim smerem, v 4. stoletju sicer ni prišlo. In pošteno je potrebno dodati, da so tam, kjer se je tak spopad (razen v sporu med obema zgoraj

omenjenima Konstantinovima sinovoma) dejansko nakazoval, Rufin, Avguštin in Orozij vendarle pokazali več simpatij do (pozneje sicer spreobrnjenega) homojca Valentinijana II. (prim. zlasti Rufinus, 2000, 2.15 in 2.17). Pri tem je bila zanje po vsem videzu odločilna Teodozijeva odločitev, da kljub začetnim hudim pomislekom na koncu vendarle poseže v boj v prid precej malo cenjenemu mlademu cesarju in proti nicejcu, znancu in morda celo sorodniku Maksimu (gl. Cedilnik, 2004, 334–336). Zdi se, da tukaj pri oceni omenjenega uzurpatorja najbolj okleva Rufin, saj izrecno izpostavi razliko v verski usmeritvi med obema stranema in pravoverno Maksimovo stališče (prim. Thelamon, 1987, 45, in Thelamon, 1992, 190 s.). Ob tem pripisuje slabi vesti krivoverske cesarjeve matere Justine celo pomembno vlogo pri njenem (in Valentinjanovem) begu:

*Maximus, qui se exuere tyranni infamia et legitimum principem gestire ostendere, datis litteris impium protestatur inceptum, fidem dei impugnari et statuta catholicae ecclesiae subrui. [...] Quo Iustina comperto hoste simul atque impietatis conscientia perurgente in fugam versa cum filio exilia, quae dei sacerdotibus praeparabat, prima sortitur (Rufinus, 2000, 2.16).<sup>7</sup>*

Orozij označuje Maksima kot tirana, njegova pridostnost nicejski veroizpovedi pa je zakrito razvidna samo iz opombe, da je bil Teodozij od njega le *fide maior*. Res pa je, da duhovnik iz Brakare prej priznava, da bi bil Maksim *vir quidem probus et strenuus atque Augusto dignus nisi contra sacramenti fidem per tyrannidem emersisset* (Orosius, 2001, 7.34.9).<sup>8</sup>

## DOMA PRIDELANA TEŽAVA?

Toda za to, da je lahko prava verska usmeritev udeleženca predvsem pri Avguštinu in Oroziju le neznatno prispevala k ublažitvi težav z razlago, ki jih je povzročal pojav državljanke vojne, je bil odločilen neki drug razvoj. Ker sta bila pod pritiskom, da morata tudi po katastrofi Alarikove osvojitve Rima leta 410 krščansko sedanjost še vedno slikati kot boljšo od poganske preteklosti (prim. Goetz, 1980; Tanz, 1983; Lippold, 2001), sta tako Avguštin kot njegov učenec iz Hispanije našla dobrodošlo možnost za rešitev v veliki travmi rimske zgodovine, v državljanških vojnah, predvsem tistih iz časa pozne republike (prim. za splošni okvir Wiseman, 2010; Westall, 2014). Toda tudi omenjena pot je skrivala nekatere nevarnosti. Predkrščansko

6 »En Bog je izročil eno vero, po vsem svetu razšril eno Cerkev. Nad njo bdi, njo ljubi, njo brani. Naj se človek skriva pod katerim koli imenom, ji je tuj, če se ji ne pridruži, in je njen sovražnik, če se proti njej bori.«

7 »Maksim, ki se je želel otresti sramote tirana in se izkazati kot zakonit vladar, je s pismom nastopil proti brezbožnemu načrtu, po katerem bi napadli Božjo vero in spodkopali postave katoliške cerkve. [...] Justina je za to izvedela in ko se je, ker sta jo gnala tako sovražnik kot zavest o lastni brezbožnosti, s sinom pognala v beg, jo je prvo doletelo izgnanstvo, ki ga je pripravljala Božjim duhovnikom.«

8 »Sicer pošten in odločen mož ter vreden, da bi bil avgust, če ne bi s svojim tiranstvom nastopil zoper svojo prisego zvestobe.«

obdobje je zaradi nje sicer pridobilo krvavo obeležje, vendar je iz istega razloga precej zrasla nesprejemljivost državljanske vojne v krščanskih časih. Neveljalo ali celo pritrdilno stališče kot še pri Laktanciju je na omenjeni način povsem odpadlo. Ker pa je bila državljanska vojna tudi v drugi polovici 4. stoletja skoraj neprekiniteno navzoča resničnost, je moralo to domala neizbežno pripeljati do miselne telovadbe, ki je bila na trenutke zelo izrazita. Potrebno pa je povedati še nekaj. Običajno raziskovalci poudarjajo razlike v razumevanju zgodovine med Avguštinom in Orozijem (prim. recimo Paschoud, 1980, zlasti 114–115 in 119–125; Hamm & Meier, 2002, 537). Slednje naj bi škofa celo pripeljalo do tega, da dela duhovnika iz Brakare, ki naj bi nastalo po njegovem naročilu, nikoli izrecno ne omenja (pri čemer je njegova ocena ob anonimni omembji Orozijeve sheme desetih preganjanj izrazito negativna; Paschoud, 1980, 119 ss.). Toda prav na točki, o kateri je govor tukaj, so razlike med njima majhne. Ne nazadnje gre za posledico okoliščine, da obravnava Avguštin rimske državljanke vojne v glavnem v prvih knjigah svojega *Božjega mesta*, ko ga še zelo zaposluje neposredna polemika z nasprotniki o padcu Rima, zaradi česar se izjemno trudi kar najbolj nazorno podčrtati višjo kakovost življenja v krščanskem obdobju (O'Daly, 2004, zlasti 39 ss.).

Avguštin sicer pokaže več navdušenja nad rimsko republiko od svojega učenca, predvsem, ko znane predstavnike republikanskih vrlin predлага kristjanom za zgled, ker so bili v pričakovanju posvetnih časti pripravljeni na velike žrtve, medtem ko se kristjani pogosto niso pripravljeni podobno žrtvovati niti za nebeško plačilo (prim. D'Elia, 1980, zlasti 442–445). Škof namreč pravi:

*Proinde per illud imperium tam latum tamque diuturnum uirorumque tantorum uirtutibus praeclarum atque gloriosum et illorum intentioni merces quam quaerebant est reddita, et nobis proposita necessariae commonitionis exempla, ut, si uirtutes, quarum istae utcumque sunt similes, quas isti pro ciuitatis terrenae gloria temuerunt, pro Dei gloriosissima ciuitate non tenuerimus, pudore pungamur* (Augustinus, 1955, 5.18).<sup>9</sup>

Toda po drugi strani je ravno Avguštin tisti, ki je sestavil obsežen katalog uničujočih državljanckih

vojn iz obdobja med Romulom in Avgustom. Pri tem je v pojavu vojne med državljanji videl tako rekoč rimske izum, ki naj bi izviral iz širjenja ozemlja rimske republike. Zaradi navedenega naj bi strah pred takšnimi spopadi vladal tudi v obdobjih miru, kajti: *Tamen etiam ipsa imperii latitudo peperit peioris generis bella, socialia scilicet et ciuilia, quibus miserabilius quatitur humanum genus, siue cum belligeratur, ut aliquando conquiscent, siue cum timetur, ne rursus exsurgent* (Augustinus, 1955, 19.7).<sup>10</sup> Že prej je v skladu z rimske izročilom razglasil državljanke vojne za najhujše med vsemi vojaškimi spopadi, ko je boje iz časa Marija in Sule primerjal s keltsko in gotsko osvojitvijo Rima:

*Quae rabies exterarum gentium, quae saeuitia barbarorum huic de ciuibus uictoriae ciuum comparari potest? Quid Roma funestius taetrius amariusque uidit, utrum olim Gallorum et paulo ante Gothorum inruptionem an Marii et Sulla aliorumque in eorum partibus uirorum clarissimum tamquam suorum luminum in sua membra ferocitatem? [...]Sulla uiuo adhuc Mario ipsum Capitolium, quod a Gallis tutum fuit, ad decernendas caedes uictor insedit, et cum fuga Marius lapsus esset ferocior cruentiorque redditurus, iste in Capitolio per senatus etiam consultum multos uita rebusque priuauit* (Augustinus, 1955, 3.29).<sup>11</sup>

Za Avguština je enako kot nekaj let pozneje za Orozija seveda odločilnega pomena, da je ta najvišja oblika nasilja prevladovala pred prihodom krščanstva, ko so cveteli različni poganski obredi in kulti. Tudi na tej točki je moral nasprotnikom pojasniti, da ne more biti stopnja izgube človeških življenj in splošnega uničenja iz njegovega lastnega časa v nobenem sorazmerju s tisto iz obdobja državljanckih vojn pozne republike. V bistvu je pojav državljanke vojne sam za Avguština tipična poteza poganske preteklosti (Armistage, 2017, 85–88). Seveda se takšno stališče precej hitro razkrije kot problematično in ustvari vsaj toliko težav, kot se zdi, da jih rešuje.

Še celo hiponski škof ne more povsem zanikati nadaljnje obstoja nasilja, ki ga povzročajo državljanke vojne, v času vladavine krščanskih cesarjev. Za Orozija, ki je vendarle pisal splošno zgodovino, čeprav naj bi ta v prvi vrsti podobno kot

<sup>9</sup> »Zato je ta imperij, tako prostran, tako dolgotrajen in tako imeniten in slaven zaradi kreposti tolikih mož, po eni strani plačilo za njihovo skrb, ki so si ga že leli, po drugi strani pa je za nas zgled nujnega opomina, da bi nas, če za preslavno Božje mesto nismo ohraniali vrlin, ki so jim podobne in ki so jih oni ohraniali za slavo zemeljskega mesta, mučil občutek sramu.«

<sup>10</sup> »Vendar je tudi velikost imperija sama rodila vojne najhujše vrste, zavezniške in državljanke, ki zelo hudo pretresajo človeški rod, bodisi ko se bojuje, da bi se kdaj pomirile, bodisi ko živi v strahu, da bodo znova izbruhi.«

<sup>11</sup> »Katero besnenje tujih ljudstev, katero divjanje barbarov je moč primerjati s tistim ob zmagi nad sodržavljeni? Kaj pogubnejšega, bolj črnega in bolj grenkega je videl Rim, nekdanji galski in nedavni gotski vdor ali divjanje Marija in Sule in drugih preslavnih mož na njuni strani, ki so divjali kakor oči zoper svoje ude? [...] Ko je Marij še živel, je Sula zasedel sam Kapitol, ki je bil pred Galci varen. In ker je Marij zbežal, čeprav se je nameraval vrniti bolj divji in krvolocenejši, je Sula na Kapitolu celo z nujnim sklepom senata mnoge spravil ob življenje in premoženje.«

izbor zgodovinskega gradiva pri Avguštinu imela ilustrativen značaj, je bil položaj še kompleksnejši. Dobro se je zavedal, da bi se lahko zaradi časovne bližine predvsem seznam dosežkov njegovega vzornega cesarja Teodozija Velikega bral tako rekoč kot antiteza podmene o državljanski vojni kot pojavi, ki pripada preteklosti (Zecchini, 2003, 326–328). Zaradi izhodišča svoje zgodovinske polemike pa se po drugi strani ni smel odreči potencialu državljanških vojn iz obdobja pozne republike kot odločilnega argumenta za krvavi značaj predkrščanskega obdobja. V opisovanju teh bojev je precej natančno sledil Avguštinu, ko je recimo poudarjal uničujoče posledice čistk, ki jih je v osemdesetih letih 1. stoletja pr. Kr. izvajal Sula:

*Tantumque lectissimorum uirorum uernaculorumque militum Roma hoc ciuili bello perdidit, quantum in ea superiore tempore, cum se iam aduersum Alexandrum Magnum circumspiceret, in discretis aetatibus census inuenit; praeterea uiros consulares uiginti et quattuor, praetorios sex, aedilicios sexaginta, senatores fere ducentos, absque innumeris totius Italiae populis, qui passim sine consideratione deleti sunt* (Orosius, 2001, 5.22.3-4).<sup>12</sup>

Po drugi strani se duhovnik iz Brakare takoj nato sooči z dejstvom, da državljanske vojne še trajajo in so dobro vidne, pri čemer celo zavrača tista (očitno krščanska) mnenja, ki odklanjajo to ozako za spopade v novem, krščanskem obdobju (Armitage, 2017, 87). Raba istega pojma naj bi po njegovem omogočala pokazati na odločilne razlike med preteklostjo in sedanostjo:

*Nam quid tam apte quam bellis ciuibus bella ciuilia comparantur? an forte dicetur, etiam in his temporibus bella ciuilia non fuisse? quibus a nobis respondebitur, iustius quidem socialia uocari oportere, sed nobis proficere, si ciuilia nominentur. cum enim causis uocabulis ac studiis paria docentur omnia tum sibi in his tanto plus uindicat reuerentia Christianae religionis quanto minus praesumpserit potestas irata uictoris* (Orosius, 2001, 5.22.5-6).<sup>13</sup>

12 »In tej državljanski vojni je Rim izgubil toliko najizvrstnejših mož in domačih vojakov, kolikor jih je v tistem prejšnjem času, ko so se Rimljani že pripravljali na spopad z Aleksandrom Velikim, ugotovilo štetje. Razen tega je izgubil štiriindvajset nekdanjih konzulov, šest nekdanjih pretorjev, šestdeset nekdanjih edilov, skoraj dvesto senatorjev, če sploh ne upoštevamo neštivilnih ljudi v vsej Italiji, ki so bili uničeni kar vsevprek brez razmisleka.«

13 »Kaj je namreč primernejše od tega, da državljanske vojne primerjamo z državljanskimi vojnami? Ali naj morda rečemo, da v teh časih ni bilo niti državljanških vojn? Na to bomo odgovorili, da bi jih bilo bolj prav poimenovati vojne z zavezniki, a nam koristi, če jih imenujemo državljanške. Ker se nam namreč glede na vzroke, besede in prizadevanja vse kažejo enake, si v njih upoštevanje krščanske vere pripisuje toliko več zaslug, kolikor manj divja besna zmagovalčeva moč.«

14 »Pa vendar ni nihče zasnoval zvijače, nihče ni razpostavil vojske, naposled ni nihče, če smem tako reči, vzel niti meča iz nožnice. Najstrašnejša vojna je do zmage potekala brez prelivanja krv, ob zmagi pa se je končala s smrtjo dveh.«

15 »Slednji, ki mu je bil napovedal nekravno prvo zmago nad Maksimom, mu je obljudil tudi ta uspeh, čeprav ne brez obilnega prelivanja krv na obeh straneh.«

Te razlike naj bi bile sicer že v dejstvu, da naj bi bile državljanske vojne sedaj redkejše, toda odločilna naj bi bila precej manjša stopnja nasilja. Kako je to praktično videti v njegovih očeh, pokaže Orozij po navdušenem vzkliku o naravi »novejših« državljanških vojn v krščanskem obdobju, ki sem ga že navedel v začetku, ko opiše svoje razumevanje spopada med Teodozijem in Maksimom: *Et tamen nullus dolos struxit, nullus aciem disposuit, postremo nullus, si dici licet, gladium de uagina extulit. Formidulosissimum bellum sine sanguine usque ad uictoram et in uictoria duorum morte confectum est* (Orosius, 2001, 7.35.7; o bojih samih gl. Bratož, 2003, 484–491; Leppin, 2003, 90 s.; Cedilnik, 2004, 336–338).<sup>14</sup>

Že navedeni zgodovinarjev prikaz je sicer pretiran, vendar podmeno o precej nekravni naravi odločitve med Teodozijem in Maksimom podpirajo poročila iz drugih virov, denimo Rufinovo, čeprav je bila povsem izpuščena omemba bitk pri Sisciji in Petovioni. Položaj ob naslednji Teodozijevi državljanški vojni je bil že v izhodišču povsem drugačen. Orozijeva odločitev, da tudi spopad pri Frigidu opiše kot vojaški dogodek z neznatnimi žrtvami in s tem kot značilno državljanško vojno v krščanskih časih, je ob nekaterih njegovih kronoloških akrobacijah veliko prispevala k njegovemu slovesu neresnega zgodovinarja od razsvetljenstva naprej, občasno celo »bedaka« (Zecchini, 2003, 328–329). Zaradi dobrega poznavanja bitke med svojimi sodobniki si niti Orozij ni mogel privoščiti, da bi zamolčal visok krvni davek gotskih enot, čeprav ga je omenil zgolj obrobno in ga razglasil celo za srečo za cesarstvo. Ugledu zgodovinarja iz Hispanije je škodila zlasti izrecna omemba velike razlike med državljanškima vojnoma iz let 388 in 394 pri Rufinu, ki je o prerokbi meniha Janeza iz Likopole Teodoziju poročal naslednje (gl. o tem Thelamon, 1987, 54, in Zecchini, 1987, 47-49): *Tum ille, qui primam de Maximo ei victoram praedixerat incruentam, etiam hanc licet absque plurima utriusque sanguinis inundatione promittit.*<sup>15</sup> (Rufinus, 2000, 2.32) Opredelitev, za katero se je odločil starejši zgodovinar, bi lahko dejansko brali kot nekakšno zavrnitev Orozijevih pogledov *ante litteram*, kot je posebej izpostavil Giuseppe Zecchini (Zecchini, 1987, 50 ss.).

Isti zgodovinar je sočasno pravilno opozoril, da je Avguštin v spornih primerih dajal Rufinovi različici prednost pred Orozijevo. A kot rečeno, je bila njegova naloga lažja, saj je imel bolj proste roke pri izbiranju zgodovinskega gradiva. Pri tem niti on ni mogel mimo omembe Teodozijevih državljanskih vojn, ob čemer ni sledil izjemnemu zmanjševanju pomena posledic spopadov, kot si ga je privoščil njegov učenec (Courcelle, 1969, 114 ss.; Bratož, 1994, 14–15). Tako bitka pri Frigidu pri njem ostaja dokaj krvav dogodek, kar pa Afričanu ne preprečuje, da ne bi podčrtal blažilnega vpliva krščanskih časov. Po eni strani naj bi bil slednji razviden v izključno plemenitih motivih, ki so Teodozija spodbudili k posegu zoper Maksima; ta naj bi služil zgolj (popolni) vrnitvi Valentinijana II. na prestol. Toda pomembnejši je epilog zmage proti Evgeniju v Vipavski dolini, ki se konča s splošno pomilostivijo vojske poraženega uzurpatorja. Zadevo hiponski škof povezuje še z zamislio o spreobrnitvi, ki naj bi jo po njegovem prikazu želet Teodozij (Duval, 1966; Bratož, 1994, 14–15).

Zmagovalčeva blagost naj bi šla v krščanskih časih celo tako daleč, da je svoje nasprotnike *Christiania caritate dilexit, nec priuauit rebus et auxit honoribus*. Čeprav Avguštin glede zadeve ni pretiraval kot Orozij, ostaja temeljni poudarek enak. »Novih« državljanskih vojn naj sploh ne bi bilo mogoče primerjati s starimi iz obdobja republike, kajti Teodozij *bella ciuilia non sicut Cinna et Marius et Sulla et alii tales nec finita finire voluerunt, sed magis doluit exorta quam cuiquam nocere uoluit terminata* (Augustinus, 1955, 5.26).<sup>16</sup>

#### ZAKLJUČEK

Razlog, zaradi katerega se je Orozij odločil za tako zaostreno in pretirano omalovaževanje posledic dogodkov zlasti pri Frigidu, lahko iščemo tudi v tem, da je hotel vzeti verodostojnost vlečenju vzporednic, ki bi se sodobnikom in morda celo bralcem njegove *Zgodovine proti paganom*

utegnilo zdeti vabljivo. Šlo je za primerjavo med nicejcem Teodozijem in podpornikom arijancev Konstancijem II. Cesarjev ne povezuje samo dejstvo, da sta po daljšem obdobju deljenega vladanja nazadnje dosegla samovlado, marveč tudi tisto, kar je pomembnejše v obravnavanem kontekstu. Oba sta večino svojih zmag dosegla v okviru državljanskih vojn (prim. Barceló, 2004; Haake, 2016, 241–248; Cedilnik, 2004 in 2014). Da bi primerjavo zatrl že tako rekoč v kali, je moral Orozij še stopnjevati že znano krvavo naravo tozadevnih vojaških operacij pod Konstancijem, krvni davek podobnih Teodozijevih podvigov pa zmanjšati. Za razlagu razlike poseže Orozij po podobnem argumentu, ki ga pozneje uporabi ob Valentu (Maver, 2009, 174–176). Ker je Konstancij spodbujal duhovno državljansko vojno med kristjani, je bila njegova vladavina prestreljena s krvavimi državljanskimi spopadi: *Ille qui discissa pace et unitate fidei catholicae Christians aduersum Christians armans ciuili, ut ita dicam, bello Ecclesiae membra dilacerauerat, totum inquieti tempus imperii molestissimumque spatium uitae suaे bellis ciuilibus etiam per propinquos et consanguineos excitatis exercuit exegit expendit* (Orosius, 2001, 7.29.18).<sup>17</sup>

Čeprav je Teodozij doživel veliko podobnega, naj bi bilo njegovo delovanje po mnenju rojaka iz Hispanije popolnoma drugačnega značaja.

Če povzamem, bi bilo moč reči, da so si težave, ki so jih predvsem ob koncu 4. in v začetku 5. stoletja krščanski pisci imeli z državljanskimi vojami, slednji vsaj deloma nakopali sami. Pravilno so prepoznali vrednost krvavih in dobro znanih državljanskih spopadov iz obdobja rimske republike za obrambo zoper napade na krščanstvo po gotskih vpadih in predvsem po padcu Rima leta 410. Toda poudarjanje teh dogodkov kot poganskega pojava je nemudoma zastavilo neprijetno vprašanje, kaj storiti, če podoben dogodek ravno tako pomembno vlogo igra v krščanski sedanjosti. Kot kažejo zlasti Orozijeve akrobacije, je iskanje odgovora le stežka dalo zadovoljiv izid.

16 »Državljanskih vojn ni hotel kot Cina, Marij in Sula in drugi njim podobni zaključiti šele, ko so se že končale, marveč je namesto tega, da bi želet po njihovem koncu komu škodovati, prej obžaloval, da je do njih sploh prišlo.«

17 »Tako je Konstancij, ki je razbijal mir in edinost katoliške vere in z državljansko vojno, da se tako izrazim, mesaril ude Cerkve, ko je kristjane oboroževal zoper kristjane, ves čas svojega nemirnega vladanja in vse najbolj mučno obdobje svojega življenja prebil, preživel in trpel v državljanskih vojnah, ki so jih sprožali celo njegovi bližnji in sorodniki.«

## CIVIL WARS IN »CHRISTIAN TIMES«

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## SUMMARY

Civil war has been generally regarded as one of the greatest evils that could befall a community. So, its persistence in Roman empire after the conversion of the emperor Constantine the Great to Christianity posed a serious interpretative problems for Christian historians. This problem is almost entirely absent from Lactance's historical monograph *De mortibus persecutorum*, since the author both writes in an unique historical moment immediately after the unexpected Constantine's and Licinius' U-turn regarding Christianity and is well aware that this change was enabled by victories of both emperors in civil wars against Maxentius and Maximinus Daia, respectively. On the other hand, Constantine also broke almost all taboos connected to the commemorating of civil war victories at the virtually same time. However, later generations of Christians barely understood the setting of Lactance's writing. Continuing presence of civil wars during the »Christian times« couldn't be interpreted in his manner, even if a consequent separation of »orthodox« and »heretic« Christian rulers in Rufinus and Orosius could serve as a Christian equivalent to the earlier separation of »true Romans« and »barbarians« on the throne, making possible civil strives among them less problematic. But particularly in the beginning of the 5th century, after Gothic incursions and after the fall of Rome in 410, the idea of a generally (much) better nature of »Christian times« became a leading paradigm of Christian interpretation of history in the Latin West, especially in Augustine and Orosius. Hence, civil wars of the late Roman Republic with their devastating consequences served as a major corroboration of this thesis. But since the general public very well remembered blood baths of recent civil wars, fought (and won) by »the most Christian emperor« Theodosius, this argumentation at the same time caused unexpected problems. It was difficult to explain, how exactly can the new times be better, when civil wars remained a common occurrence. Orosius went very far in his attempts to solve the problem, claiming the civil wars in »Christian times« are of completely different quality, particularly due to allegedly minor loss of life in them. Although his exaggerations was refuted even by Rufinus' depiction of the battle of the Frigidus, Augustine basically used the same strategy in his historical parts of the City of God, underlining the much more humane epilogue of Theodosian civil wars in comparison to the earlier ones. However, such approach couldn't solve the mostly self-caused »squaring of circle« problem, particularly since Theodosius' civil war successes constituted the bulk of his legacy as emperor. Thus, Orosius also resorted to an apparently sharp contrast between him and the »heretic« Christian emperor Constantius II. All this contributed to the Orosius' reputation as a »fool« since the age of enlightenment.

**Keywords:** Roman civil wars, Christianity and war, Christian Latin historiography in late Antiquity, Orosius, Augustine, Theodosius the Great, battle of the Frigidus

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## RODBINA HOMPOŠKIH

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### IZVLEČEK

Tema pričujočega članka je bila raziskava geneze, delovanja in dosežkov rodbine, katere pripadniki so v 12. in 13. stoletju živeli in delovali na gradu Hompoš. Najprej smo obravnavali njen izvor, zatem pa še politično participacijo njenih posameznih članov. V času, ko je rodbina nastala in delovala, je bilo politično stanje na področju današnje slovenske Štajerske precej nestabilno. V nasprotju z mnogimi drugimi pripadniki spodnještajerskega lokalnega plemstva 13. stoletja, ki so svoje korenine lahko iskali na današnjem avstrijskem Štajerskem, Spodnjeavstrijskem ali celo Bavarskem, so Hompoški v prostor slovenskega Podravja zelo verjetno prišli iz današnje avstrijske Koroške.

**Ključne besede:** gospodje Hompoški, gospodje Mariborski, današnja slovenska Štajerska, 12. in 13. stoletje, grof Bernhard Spanheimski, Otokar II. Přemysl, Bela IV., štajerski deželni zbori, ministeriali

## LA STIRPE DI HOMPOŠ

### SINTESI

L'articolo è una ricerca sulla genesi, le attività e i successi della stirpe della quale i membri nel XII e XIII secolo vivevano e operavano nel castello Hompoš. All'inizio abbiamo trattato la genesi della stirpe, poi la partecipazione politica dei singoli membri. L'area dell'odierna Stiria slovena, nel periodo nel quale nacque la stirpe e nel quale agiva, era molto instabile. A differenza di molti altri nobili locali della Stiria inferiore del XIII secolo con radici famigliari nella Stiria austriaca, nella Bassa Austria o addirittura nella Baviera, la stirpe di Hompoš arrivò nell'area della Podravje molto probabilmente dall'odierna Carinzia austriaca.

**Parole chiave:** nobili di Hompoš, nobili di Maribor, Stiria slovena odierna, XII e XIII secolo, Bernardo di Spanheim, Ottocaro II di Boemia, Béla IV d'Ungheria, consiglio regionale della Stiria, ministeriali

UVOD<sup>1</sup>

Namen pričajočega članka je raziskati poreklo ter delovanje rodbine, ki je v 12. in 13. stoletju imela svoj sedež na gradu Hompoš (*Haus am Bacher*) v Hočah, v katerem od leta 2008 domuje Fakulteta za kmetijstvo in biosistemsko vede (<http://www.fkbv.um.si/index.php/o-fakulteti/zgodovina> (13. 7. 2020)). Rodbina je bila politično aktivna v času od prve polovice 12. stoletja, izumrla pa je nekje v zadnji četrtini 13. stoletja. Pri pisanju smo uporabljali tako avstrijsko kot slovensko znanstveno literaturo ter zbrane vire. Med slednjimi je kot prvo treba omeniti zbrano listinsko gradivo za zgodovino nekdanje vojvodine Štajerske, ki so ga v 19. in 20. stoletju zbrali in izdajali Joseph von Zahn (UBSt I–III), Heinrich Appelt in Gerhard Pferschy (UBSt IV), Franc in Milko Kos (Gradivo IV–V) ter France Baraga (na podlagi gradiva Boža Otorepca) (Gradivo VI). Prav tako smo uporabljali še gradivo za srednjeveško zgodovino Koroške (MDC I–VIII), ki sta ga zbiral August von Jaksch in Hermann Wiessner. Na tem mestu je treba tudi omeniti, da Hompoških ne najdemo omenjenih nikjer v vodilnem narativnem viru za zgodovino vzhodnoalpskih dežel druge polovice 13. stoletja, to je v izredno obsežni Avstrijski rimani kroniki. Prav tako jih ni najti v t. i. Deželni knjigi Avstrije in Štajerske.

V preteklosti so se medievisti in kastelologi z rodbino Hompoških že srečevali, a so jo pogosto omenjali le bolj ali manj bežno in v povezavi z neko drugo temo. Najprej (leta 1938) se je enega izmed njih s par besedami dotaknil Ljudmil Hauptmann, ki je sicer pisal o Mariborskih (Hauptmann, 1938, 81). Leta 1962 jih je v zvezi s svojo študijo o današnji slovenski Štajerski omenjal Hans Pirchegger (Pirchegger, 1962, 22, 96–97, 116–117). Na kratko jih je obravnaval tudi Jože Koropec, namreč v povezavi z zgodovino Razvanja in Hoč (Koropec, 1970, 76; Koropec, 1996, 6–7). Zastran gradu samega sta jim nekaj besed namenila Ivan Jakič in Ivan Stopar (Jakič, 1997, 133; Stopar, 1990, 55). Nekoliko podrobneje se je z rodbino v monografiji *Vitez in grad* ukvarjal Dušan Kos. Tudi v primeru Kosove monografije je šlo za enciklopedičen pregled velike večine kranjskih in štajerskih gradov pred letom 1500, grad Hompoš pa je bil le eden izmed teh (Kos, 2005, 289–290). V zadnjih letih sta dotični grad in rodbino omenjala še Peter Štih in Tone Ravnikar, a to v povezavi z nastankom gradu na mariborski Piramidi (Štih, 2006, 251; Ravnikar, 2014, 24). V sledečih vrsticah bomo skušali omenjeno rodbino, njen izvor in njene najpomembnejše člane predstavili kar se da celovito.


## SPLOŠEN POLITIČNI PREGLED

Prihod hompoške rodbine na področje današnje slovenske Štajerske je treba brez dvoma povezati z dinastijo Spanheimov. Izvor slednjih je sicer treba iskati na Frankovskem, v Porenju, od koder so se zaradi poročnih povezav preselili na Koroško. Prednik koroških Spanheimov po imenu Sigfrid se je poročil z Rikardo, hčerjo in edino dedinjo grofa Engelberta IV. iz rodu Sighardingov, ki so bili nosilci različnih grofovskih uradov in visokih cerkvenih naslovov. Sigfrid je preko žene pridobil sighardinske posesti na Koroškem in so posledično tam postali eni izmed najmočnejših velikašev. Po letu 1122 so imeli v svojih rokah tudi koroški vojvodski naslov. Z današnjim slovenskim Podravjem je bil še najbolj povezan Sigfridov in Rikardin vnuk Bernhard, med drugim ustanovitelj vetrinjskega samostana (Štih, 2003, 55–65, 73). Svoje posestne pozicije je grof Bernhard imel na Koroškem v okolici Velikovca ter v Podravju, Posavinju in celo Posavju. Velik del dotičnih posesti je pridobil na račun rodbine Askvincov, ki jih je v prvih letih 12. stoletja uničujoče vojaško porazil. Posledično je Bernhard med drugim pridobil velike dele Dravske doline med Mariborom in Dravogradom (Vita Chunradi, 1854, 67).

Leta 1147 je Bernhard na drugem križarskem poходu izgubil življenje, po njem pa je njegova posestva v Podravju dedoval štajerski mejni grof Otokar III. iz rodbine Otokarjev, ki velja za utemeljitelja kasnejše vojvodine Štajerske. Otokar III., sploh eden najpomembnejših pripadnikov svoje dinastije (†1164), je v naslednjih letih načrtno izgrajeval svojo oblast na Štajerskem. Otokarja je nasledil njegov sin Otokar IV., ki pa v življenju ni imel toliko sreče, kot njegov oče (Štih & Simoniti, 2009, 96–99; Bele, 2019, 639). Bolehal je namreč za gobavostjo in je bil brez otrok. Umrl je spomladis 1192, za njim pa je vojvodino Štajersko dedoval avstrijski vojvoda Leopold V. († 1194) iz dinastije Babenberžanov. Po njegovi smrti je tako Avstrijo kot Štajersko prevzel sin Leopold VI., slaven zaradi svojih odličnih diplomatskih sposobnosti. Leta 1230 je Leopolda v obeh vojvodinah nasledil sin Friderik II. Prepirljivec, vihav in trmast človek, ki se je kmalu začel zapletati v spore s svojimi sosedji. Posledično je cesar proti njemu sprožil sodni postopek in mu odvzel državne fevde (Lechner, 1994, 32–84).

Friderikovi sosedje so se naenkrat začeli vojskovati z njim, slednji pa je na prizorišče pripravoval tudi cesar osebno. Kljub vsemu je Babenberžanu v nekaj letih uspelo osvojiti nazaj obe vojvodini. Kmalu po umirivti situaciji pa se je vojvoda Friderik II. Prepirljivec ponovno začel zapletati v spore

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**Slika 1:** *Grad Hompoš, Topographia Ducatus Stiriae Georga Matthäusa Vischerja, 1681 (Vir: Wikimedia Commons).*

s sosedji in junija 1246 slednjič izgubil življenje v bitki z ogrskim kraljem Belo IV. (Dopsch et al., 1999, 191–193; Bele, 2018, 633). Prepirljivec ni imel potomcev, tako da se po njegovi smrti v Avstriji in na Štajerskem začel boj za oblast med raznimi zunanjimi tekmeci. Kakor se zdi, se je mno- go lokalnih plemičev začelo okoriščati na račun cerkvenih posesti. Za babenberško dediščino so se borili razni posamezniki, od katerih sta slednjič zmagala že ogrski kralj Bela IV. ter mladi češki kralj Otokar II. Přemysl. Bela IV. si je uspel priboriti Štajersko, Otokar II. Přemysl pa Avstrijo (Lechner, 1994, 307–308). V nekaj letih pa se je plemstvo na Štajerskem uprlo in od tam izgnalo nepriljubljenega slavonskega bana Štefana, ki je tam pred tem vladal v imenu kralja Bele. V nastalo situacijo se je (na strani Štajcerjev) vmešal kralj Otokar II. in Belo IV. leta 1260 premagal v bitki (pri Groißenbrunnu). S tem je sam postal gospodar na Štajerskem (Hönsch, 1989, 51–55).

Leta 1273 je bil za vladarja izvoljen grof Rudolf Habsburški. Otokar Rudolfa nikakor ni hotel priznati, zato sta se moža zapletala v vedno večje diplomatske spore. Le-ti so slednjič prerasli v še en

oborožen spopad. Pri Dürnkrutu v bližini Dunaja so se sile obeh vladarjev spopadle konec avgusta 1278, češki kralj Otokar pa je tedaj – v ne povsem jasnih okoliščinah – poleg bitke izgubil tudi življe- nje. Konec leta 1282 je kralj Rudolf svojima sino- voma podelil Avstrijo in Štajersko (poleg tega sicer tudi Kranjsko in Slovensko marko). Umrl je poleti 1291 in bil pokopan v stolnici v Speyerju (Reifenscheid, 2006, 365, 367–371). Rudolfov sin Albreht se zatem ni uspel povzpeti na vladarski prestol in je bil nekaj časa zaposlen s težavami na Štajerskem in Koroškem (MDC VI, št. 202, 205, 207, 211–212, 249, 256–257, 259; Rexroth, 2005, 90). Sredi leta 1292 je to uspelo porenskemu grofu Adolfu Nassau- skemu. Slednji se je v sledečih letih moral soočati z vedno večjimi težavami, Albreht pa je slednjič dosegel, da je bil Adolf junija 1298 odstavljen. Hkrati je uspel izsiliti svojo lastno izvolitev. Julija 1298 sta se smrtna sovražnika spopadla v bitki pri Göllheimu (v bližini Wormsa), iz katere se Adolf ni uspel vrniti živ. Albreht se je dal nato ponovno izvoliti in je bil v aachenski stolnici kronan konec avgusta (Niederstätter, 2001, 104–106; Hartmann, 2006, 379–380).

## ZAČETKI RODBINE

Na tej točki raziskave se moramo, z namenom da raziščemo izvor rodbine Hompoških, vrniti k Bernhardu Spanheimskemu. Bernhard je omenjen v šentpavelski tradicijski knjigi, ko konec marca 1124 potrjuje neko svojo daritev šentpavelskemu samostanu. Med pričami tega Bernhardovega dejanja najdemo tudi moža po imenu *Wernherus de Huzi*, ki je bil prvi znani Hompoški (UBSt I, št. 110; Gradivo IV, št. 82). Ime Verner je bilo v rodbini vodilno tudi v naslednjih generacijah, zato je v virih večkrat težko ločiti pripadnike različnih generacij. Po vsem povedanem lahko sklepamo, da so predniki kasnejših Hompoških v svojo novo domovino na spodnjem Štajerskem zelo verjetno prišli iz spanheimskih posesti na Koroškem in to kmalu po zgoraj omenjeni Bernhardovi osvojitvi askvinskih podravskih posesti. Pri tem so se razlikovali od mnogih drugih kasnejših spodnještajerskih plemičev, ki so na današnjo slovensko Štajersko (v nekem drugem kontekstu) prispeli iz Traungaua (npr. Mariborski) ali celo Bavarske (npr. Ptuiški) in sicer generacijo ali dve kasneje.

V zvezi z izvorom rodbine Hompoških je treba na tem mestu omeniti še rodbinske povezave med Hompoškimi ter Meljskimi in Mariborskimi, na katere v svojem delu o Mariboru v 13. stoletju opozarja Tone Ravnikar (Ravnikar, 2020, 15–17). Ime Verner se je na začetku 13. stoletja pojavljalo pri obeh rodbinah (UBSt II, št. 60), zato lahko sklepamo na njuno sorodstveno povezavo. Prav tako najdemo Henrika iz Melja in Vernerja iz Hompoša v isti skupini prič že v listini iz leta 1181 (GZM I, št. 10). Meljski so bili, kot kaže, fevdni šentpavelskega samostana (Mlinarič, 1980, 218). Slednjega je leta 1091 ustanovil Engelbert I., oče Bernharda Spanheimskega, Bernhard pa je po letu 1106 postal šentpavelski odvetnik (Štih, 2003, 59, 64, 73). Sklepali bi torej lahko, da je potrebno tudi izvor Meljskih iskati na Koroškem, oz. da so bili Meljski in Hompoški potomci iste rodbine. O rodbinskim povezavah med Hompoškimi in Mariborskimi bo govora v nadaljevanju.

Domači grad rodbine je verjetno nastal v prvi četrtni 12. stoletja (domnev glede njegovega nastanka je več), morda na podlagi gradbenega materiala iz antičnega grobišča med Razvanjem, Pohorskim dvorom in Hočami (Bolta & Gabrovec, 1975, 301). Beseda sama (torej Hompoš, *Haus* oz. *Domus*) je pomenila (posvetno) zidano in utrjeno stavbo, prvo svoje vrste v tedanji širši okolici (Kos, 2005, 289). Domnevamo lahko, da je bil zgoraj omenjeni Verner Hompoški eden izmed vojakov Bernharda Spanheimskega, ki so se v začetku stoletja borili proti Askvincem. Kot nagrado za vojaško službo je bil morda nagrajen s posestjo na novo osvojenem

ozemlju, kjer je nato zgradil svoj grad. Po drugi strani je pri Vernerju iz leta 1124 morda šlo že za pripadnika naslednje generacije, medtem ko se je v tem primeru proti Askvincem bojeval njegov oče. Bilo bi sicer možno, da je grad ob prihodu majhne Bernhardove vojske v začetku 12. stoletja že stal. V tem primeru je bil zgrajen morda v drugi polovici 10. stoletja, ko je na istem območju obstajala t. i. Rahvinova grofija (Gradivo II, št. 470, 487). To bi sicer pomenilo, da je (v do danes ohranjenih virih) ostal neomenjen kar stoletje in pol, ob Bernhardovi zmagi pa ga je prevzel njegov vojak Verner – v boju proslavljen z junaštvji in zato tudi nagrajen.

Po letu 1147 so Hompoški postali štajerski ministeriali oz. člani štajerske deželne zveze, kar so ostali tudi po letu 1246 oz. vse do svojega izumrtja. V šentpavelski tradicijski knjigi najdemo za čas okrog leta 1150 (po drugem datiranju med letoma 1164 in 1180) med pričami omenjenega Vernerja Hompoškega (UBSt I, št. 330; Gradivo IV, št. 476; MDC III, št. 1075). Isti Verner (tokrat že v otokarskem spremstvu) se je omenjal tudi v letih 1164 (UBSt I, št. 482) in (v listini za Šentpavel) leta 1181 (UBSt I, št. 617). Morda je šlo pri njem za sina Vernerja iz leta 1124. Sredi 12. stoletja se sicer pojavita tudi Majngot (*Meingoto*) de Hus ter Peregrin (*Pilgrim*) de Domis, vendar se zdi njuna pripadnost rodbini Hompoških vprašljiva (MDC III, št. 1180, 1377/II, ).

Kar se tiče sorodstvenih povezav med Hompoškimi in Mariborskimi (Ravnikar, 2020, 15–16), nam glede tega precej razkrije podatek iz zapisa, nastalega med letoma 1180 in 1204. Iz njega razberemo, da je Kunigunda iz Hompoša, z dovoljenjem meranskega vojvode (Bertolda IV. Andeškega) (Appelt, 1955, 151–152) ter z dovoljenjem svojega (neimenovanega) moža (predpostavljam, da Vernerja (III.)) in svojih (neimenovanih) bratov prodala šentpavelskemu samostanu pet kmetij in vinograd v okolici Maribora (Gradivo IV, št. 654; MDC III, št. 1272). Medtem, ko eksplicitno dovoljenje meranskega vojvode („*licentia ducis Merenie*“) ni jasno, je šlo pri dotični Kunigundi zelo verjetno za sorodnico zgodnjih Mariborskih, oz. je šlo za Mariborske pri njenih neimenovanih bratih (Ravnikar, 2020, 15–16).

V generaciji po Kunigundi je eden izmed sinov tako dobil ime iz njene rodbine. Šlo je za Konrada Hompoškega, medtem ko se je ime Verner kakopak tudi ohranilo. Konrada najdemo ob pregledu seznama šentpavelskih posesti. Seznam je bil sestavljen nekje med letoma 1193 in 1220. Navedene posesti so predhodniki takratnega opata Ulrika (1192–1222) dali v fevd, on pa jih zatem ni zmogel zopet pridobiti samostanu. Konrad Hompoški je s svojimi brati v fevdu imel dve vasi, Apače in Ročico ter še nekaj fevdov drugje („*et in alio loco*“) (Gradivo IV, št. 855 (VI); MDC III, št. 1426 (VI); Ginhart, 1969, 491–496).

Opat Ulrik je tudi trdil, da sam ni dal v fevd nobenih samostanskih posesti. Glede na povedano lahko sklepamo, da so Hompoški bratje omenjeno posest dobili v last še preden je Ulrik postal opat.

Imen vseh Konradovih bratov se iz virov ne da izvedeti, kot rečeno pa je bil vsaj eden izmed njih Verner (IV.). Slednjega najdemo (skupaj s Konradom) tudi leta 1202. Oba tedaj pričata v listini vojvode Leopolda VI. (katerega ministeriala sta bila) za vetrinjski samostan (Gradivo V, št. 42). Vernerja nato najdemo še v vetrinjski listini tri leta kasneje (MDC IV/1, št. 1575). Nekje v času šentpavelskega opata Ulrika je Verner (*„de castro quod vocatur Hüs“*) od samostana dobil še tri marke, da mu je ta nato odstopil neki vinograd in kmetijo (*„vineam unam cum euba“*) (MDC III, št. 1421 (V)).

Direktnih podatkov o tem, kaj se je s Hompoškimi dogajalo v naslednjih treh desetletjih nimamo. Sicer ni nobenega razloga za domnevo, da so se obnašali drugače kot drugi lokalni štajerski ministeriali. Razlogov za to je toliko manj, če imamo pred očmi dejstvo, da člani obravnavane rodbine nikoli niso bili med močnejšimi Štajerci – niti na lokalnem nivoju. Glede na to si – če so hoteli preživeti – samostojne politike niti niso mogli privočiti. Sklepamo torej, da so njihovi pripadniki v prvih treh desetletjih 13. stoletja zvesto služili vojvodi Leopoldu VI. in bili zatem – v sozvočju z ostalimi – ogorčeni nad zaletavostjo njegovega sina. V drugi polovici tridesetih let 13. stoletja so se za kratek čas najbrž pridružili cesarju in napsotnikom vojvode Friderika Prepirljivca, zatem pa s sklonjenimi glavami ponovno sprejeli njegovo nadoblast. Po Prepirljivčevi smrti (leta 1246), ko na Štajerskem ni bilo gospodarja, ki bi kaznoval nasilništva (Liechtenstein, 1888, 259–260 (kitica 1677); Liechtenstein, 2000, 580–581 (kitica 1677), 660 (Inhaltsübersicht)), so očitno zaslutili priložnost za politično in posestno okrepitev in posledično ponovno pustili več sledi v pisnih virih.

#### HOMPOŠKI PO IZUMRTJU BABENBERŽANOV


Kakor se zdi, so se razni spodnještajerski plemiči med letoma 1246 in 1254 (ko je slavonski ban Štefan na Štajerskem kot glavar prevzel oblast), kjer se je le dalo, okoriščali z nezavarovanimi cerkvenimi posestmi. Oholi ban Štefan je v naslednjih letih to očitno skušal popraviti in s tem dodata razburil štajersko plemiško javnost (Dopsch et al., 1999, 453). Med ministeriali, ki so zdaj morali zadoščevati za v preteklosti storjeno škodo, so bili tudi Hompoški, ki se jim veliki skok med pomembnejše štajersko plemstvo očitno ni posrečil.

Vernerja Hompoškega, ki ga v virih srečujemo v petdesetih, šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih 13. stoletja, najbrž ne smemo prištevati v generacijo

neposredno za Vernerjem IV. Omenjena moža bi smeli mnogo bolj gotovo smatrati za deda in vnuka, ne pa očeta in sina. Če je omenjena hipoteza pravilna, nam ostaja ime moža iz generacije med njima za vedno izgubljeno, ugibamo pa lahko, da mu je bilo ime Verner ali Konrad.

V virih prvič srečamo Vernerja VI. (?) konec leta 1254. V Mariboru zbrani (in s strani Ogrov podprt) štajerski plemiči, ki so tedaj predstavljeni politični vrh v deželi, so na Vernerja tedaj zelo pritisnili. Leta se je nato pred njimi s prisego zavezal, da bo za storjeno škodo vetrinjskemu samostanu do prihodnje Velike noči izplačal 12 mark novih denaričev (Gradivo VI, št. 252). Nekaj zelo podobnega se je zgodilo še sredi januarja naslednjega leta (1255) v Gradcu. Štajerski deželnji sodnik Gotfrid II. Marioborski, ter štajerski maršal Friderik V. Ptujski, sta tedaj zasegla posestva nekaj plemičev, jih ocenila ter jih nato izročila komendi Nemškega viteškega reda v Gradcu. Ta bi jih nato lahko uživala, dokler imenovani plemiči ne bi dali redu zadoščenja oz. popravili prizadejane krivice. Med gospodi, ki jih je doletela omenjena kazen je bil tudi Verner Hompoški, ki se mu je zaseglo posest v Bohovi (kake tri kilometre vzhodno od Hompoša samega), očitno vredno 100 mark (*„[...] bona tua Werenhere de Haüs, dicta Bochew, pro marcis C assignamus [...]“*) (Gradivo VI, št. 259; GZM I, št. 88; Koropec, 1996, 7; Kos, 2005, 290). Glede na zgoraj navedena primera lahko sklepamo, da Verner po letu 1254 ni bil pretirano navdušen nad ogrsko oblastjo v deželi. Morda je bil celo aktivno udeležen v proti-ogrskem uporu (kake neposredne informacije glede tega sicer ni), vsekakor pa je moral biti vesel, ko so konec desetletja na Štajerskem zagospodarili Čehi.

V šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih 13. stoletja srečujemo Vernerja VI. kot pričo v raznih štajerskih listinah in sicer na vsakih nekaj let. Glede na položaje, ki jih je imel v spiskih prič lahko sicer sklepamo, da je bil med zadnjimi plemiči dežele, v nekaj primerih sploh komaj še vreden omembe (UBSt III, št. 284; UBSt IV, št. 306, 309; 352, 383, 390, 410, 469, 518, 523; Koropec, 1996, 7). Po drugi strani se je skozi leta udeležil kar šestih deželnih zborov in s tem presegel mnogo mogočnejših štajerskih plemičev svojega časa. Kakor mnogi drugi Štajerci se je tedanji Hompoški v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih – kot deželnoknežji ministerial – često zadrževal v Gradcu (pa tudi Mariboru in drugih štajerskih mestih) ter bil na nek način vpletен v štajersko politično dogajanje. V tem kontekstu je bil na zborih štajerskega deželnega plemstva tudi prisoten (UBSt III, št. 155, 162, 284; UBSt IV, št. 306, 309, 328, 352, 390, 469, 518, 523). Temu navkljub lahko brez pomisleka zaključimo, da v tedanji štajerski deželnji zvezi ni imel večjega političnega vpliva, da njegovega vpliva na druge štajerske plemiče



**Slika 2: Poskus rekonstrukcije družinskega drevesa rodbine Hompoških.**

pravzaprav skoraj ni bilo, oz. da je bil pri raznih prelomnih dogodkih bolj oddaljeni opazovalec kot pa odločilni akter.

V Gössu (pri Leobnu na avstrijskem Štajerskem) se je poleti 1274 odvilo veliko zborovanje štajerskega plemstva, ki so se mu pridružili tudi nekateri plemiči iz Avstrije. Čeških plemičev ni bilo, prav tako pa se tam očitno ni odvил kak sodni postopek. Veliko bolj verjetno je, da je šlo za zborovanje brez dejelnega kneza, kjer se je dejelno plemstvo celo organiziralo proti njemu oz. razpravljalno, kako se znebiti njegove nadvlade. Med navzočimi je bil tudi Verner. Zelo možno je, da je bil na tej točki resnično tudi sam naveličan avtoritarne vlade češkega kralja, po drugi strani pa si ni mogel privoščiti močnih sovražnikov in je tako pač trolil v isti rog kot vsi ostali (UBSt IV, št. 518; Muchar, 1850, 361–362; Koropec, 1996, 7; Krones, 1865, 71–72.). Dobri dve leti kasneje, ko so se najpomembnejši štajerski in koroški plemiči zbrali v Reinu, da bi tam razglasili svojo privrženost Rudolfu Habsburškemu (UBSt IV, št. 600). Vernerja ni bilo med navzočimi (dogodek se je zapisal v zgodovino kot Reinska prizega oz. Reiner Schwur). Obstaja sicer verjetnost, da je bil tedaj že pokojni, po drugi strani pa najbrž tudi ni bil dovolj pomemben za tovrstno srečanje. V primeru omenjenega srečanja v Reinu namreč ni šlo za množično plemiško zborovanje, temveč očitno za vojni posvet le najpomembnejših.

#### GOTŠALK – ZADNJI PRIPADNIK RODBINE

Kakšna je bila Vernerjeva končna usoda ne vemo, prav tako ni čisto jasna usoda naslednje generacije Hompoških. Verner VI. je s svojim pospešenim političnim udejstvovanjem v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih morda skušal kompenzirati za svoje nesrečno družinsko življenje. Sina soimenjaka, ki bi za njim prevzel krmilo in vodil družinsko politiko v srečejšo prihodnost, kot kaže ni bilo. Ime Verner se sicer pojavi v prav vseh prej znanih generacijah rodbine. Na podlagi tega tudi sklepamo, da je tak sin obstajal tudi v generaciji neposredno po Vernerju VI., a mu morda ni uspelo preživeti otroških let.

V zapisih iz kasnejših desetletij srečamo po Hompošu imenovanega moža po imenu Gotšalk (UBSt IV, št. 410; GZM II, št. 22, 39, 74, 80; MDC VI, št. 238). Povezava med Vernerjem VI. in Gotšalkom spet ni povsem gotova. Jože Koropec je Gotšalka sicer omenjal, a se do njegove funkcije v družini žal ni opredelil (Koropec, 1996, 7). Dušan Kos domneva, da je bil Gotšalk Vernerjev sin, pri čemer se najbrž ne moti (Kos, 2005, 290). Če to drži, je bil Gotšalk morda drugi sin (z imenom iz materine rodbine) ali pa je bil ob rojstvu morebiti določen za duhovniško službo (*Godescalc*, dobesedno „Božji služabnik“). Medtem eventualni prvorjenec s starim bojevniškim imenom (po imenu Verner, torej *Warinheri*, *Wernher*

oz. dobesedno „Vojska, ki varuje“) nikoli ni dosegel polnoletnosti in tako tudi nikoli ni stopil na politično prizorišče. Posledično je njegovo mesto moral pre-vzeti Gotšalk. Vse to pa lahko le predpostavljamo, saj ne gre za z neovrgljivimi viri podprta dejstva.

Gotšalka najdemo v virih omenjenega med letoma 1271 in 1298. V listini, kjer ga srečamo prvič, je med pričami omenjen tudi Verner VI. (UBSt IV, št. 410; GZM II, št. 22). Slednji je bil nekje do sredine avgusta 1277 že pokojni. Tedaj v neki listini namreč srečamo samo še Gotšalka (GZM II, št. 39). Obe omenjeni listini sta sicer izdala Nikolaj in Hadmar, sinova Ulrika iz Lučan (na severni strani avstrijsko-slovenske meje) in medtem, ko je prvo pečatil Verner (Gotšalk pa je bil med pričami), je drugo pečatil Gotšalk, Verner pa se ni več omenjal. Studenški samostan je bil sicer še v letih 1307 in 1312 zavezan, da se ga letno spominja (RHSt I, št. 449 Koropec, 1996, 7). Zatem Gotšalka najdemo še le leta 1292 in sicer kot pričo v Šentpavelski listini, izdani v Mariboru. Šentpavelski opat je tedaj izjavil, da je nek spor med samostanom in mariborskim sodnikom končan. Med tistimi, ki so bili navzoči pri omenjeni poravnavi, je bil tudi *Gotschalch von dem Hause* (MDC VI, št. 238; GZM II, št. 74). Ko je v začetku leta 1296 Leopold Konjiški Žičam izročal štiri kmetije na Pohorju, je Gotšalk listino pečatil. Leta 1298 je Ptujskim prodal Šetarovo (vzhodno od Hrastovca) (GZM II, št. 80; Koropec, 1996, 7). Po vsem povedanem lahko zaključimo, da tudi Gotšalk ni bil pomemben na ravni celotne vojvodine, temveč se je očitno vpletal le v tekoče lokalne zadeve, dogodkov v Gradcu pa se morda sploh ni več udeleževal. V primerjavi s svojim očetom je bil torej celo politično šibkejši, čeprav je bil tudi vpliv Vernerja VI. neznaten.

#### SKLEP

V zadnjih dveh ali treh desetletjih 13. stoletja so se do hompoške posesti uspeli dokopati Mariborski (Kos, 2005, 290). Podrobnosti ponovno niso znane, a leta 1284 se je po Hompošu imenoval Henrik, leta 1305 pa Kuncel (*Chuentzel ab dem Haus oz. Konrad*) in Rajnpreht (GZM II, št. 112, 114; Jakič, 1997, 133; Koropec, 1996, 7). Vsaj pri Rajnprehtu (ki ga najdemo omenjenega še v letih 1308 in 1311) je z gotovostjo šlo za Mariborskega (GZM II, št. 114, 121–122; GZM III, št. 7). Rajnpreht (I.) se je leta

1314 odpovedal neki posesti v korist žičke kartuzije. To je storil v kapeli svojega gradu *quod dicitur Haus* (GZM III, št. 31). Rajnprehtov sin Oton (II.) se je še leta 1331 imenoval *her Ott von dem Haüs der Marchpurger* (GZM III, št. 131; Kos, 2005, 290, 330 (Genealoška preglednica 60: Maribor)).

Kaj se je v rodbini Hompoških dogajalo v zadnjih dveh ali treh desetletjih 13. stoletja ni znano. Kot smo videli, sta bili rodbini tedaj sorodstveno prepleteli že kar nekaj časa. Medtem je hompoška rodbina v Gotšalkovem času morda izgubila vse upanje na otroke in se je svojo posest pač odločila prepustiti (daljnjim) sorodnikom.

V istih letih (oz. nekje med letoma 1276 in 1281) je „posebna ekspertna skupina“ na Dunaju sestavlja- la že omenjeno Deželno knjigo Avstrije in Štajerske. V tej kratki knjigi (kjer kar mrgoli raznoterih napak) Hompoških, kot rečeno, ne najdemo. Delo sicer (med drugim) našteva posestva in rodbine, ki jih je dinastija Otokarjev (leta 1147) podedovala po grofu Bernhardu Spanheimskem. Tako se med rodbinami, ki so jih Otokarji dobili po Bernhardu omenjeni npr. Mariborski („*die von Marpurch*“), kar pa ni točen po- datek (Landbuch von Österreich und Steier, 708). Po drugi strani bi v omenjeno kategorijo spadali ravno Hompoški, a jih med naštetimi rodbinami ni najti. Deželna knjiga je sicer nastala kot eden izmed ukrepov kralja Rudolfa Habsburškega, ki se je pripravljal na prevzem nekdanjih Babenberških dežel. Njenim sestavljanjem se je torej zdelo najpomembnejše dokazati zakonit izvor babenberške posesti, ki bi jo zdaj lahko prevzel nekdo iz Rudolfove dinastije (Štih, 2006, 244–246, 252–253). Popolnoma zane- sljiv seznam prav vseh prevzetih rodbin je moral biti v tistem trenutku drugotnega pomena, predvsem v primeru Hompoških, katerih obskurna rodbina je bila v trenutku nastanka omenjenega besedila že v poslednjih vzdihljajih.

Dandanes se rodbine Hompoških spominjamo predvsem kot stanovalcev (in verjetnih graditeljev) prve utrjene in zidane stavbe v širši okolici in ne spričo kakega posebej omembe vrednega političnega uspeha. Za razliko od njih so nekateri pripadniki drugih rodbin štajerske deželne zveze v turbulentnem 13. stoletju uspeli napraviti bleščeče kariere. Hompoški so medtem stopicali na mestu in slednjič ostali brez potomstva. Kot ugotavljamo, jim torej trajnejšega pečata v zgodovini slovenskega Podravja ni uspelo pustiti.

## THE NOBLE FAMILY OF HOMPOŠ

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### SUMMARY

*The intention of the present article is to research the pedigree and activities of the noble family, that had its seat at the castle of Hompoš, above Hoče. While writing, we used Austrian and Slovenian scientific literature as well as gathered archival sources. It has to be mentioned, that we cannot find the family anywhere in the leading source of the second half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the so-called the Austrian Rhyme Chronicle. At the beginning of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, the area along the Drava river in today's Slovenia, was conquered by count Bernhard of Spanheim. At the middle of the century it passed to the Styrian margraves (dukes). The timeline of the known members of the Hompoš family begins at the onset of the 12<sup>th</sup> century – they might have been Bernhard's soldiers. The later family members from Hompoš were – legally speaking – Styrian ministerials. They testified in different less important documents and attended Styrian ducal events, but never played any important political role. During the span of the 13<sup>th</sup> century there were other local noble families in today's Slovenian Styria which managed to substantially increase their political strength. This was not the case with the family of Hompoš. Its members only ever stayed influential at a local level. During the last three decades of the 13<sup>th</sup> century they finally ran out of strength. Obviously, there were no more male members of the bloodline. Sometime at the turn of the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries their castle (the oldest in the wider region) was taken over by their relatives – the nobles of Maribor.*

**Keywords:** the nobles of Hompoš, the nobles of Maribor, today's Slovenian Styria, 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, count Bernhard of Spanheim, Ottokar II of Bohemia, Bela IV of Hungary, Styrian regional assemblies, ministerials

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## DIPLOMACIJA S (KOLEKTIVNIM) SPOMINOM: KAKO PRETEKLOST VPLIVA NA IZVAJANJE DIPLOMACIJE?

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### *IZVLEČEK*

*Članek se ukvarja z vlogo (kolektivnega) spomina pri izvajanju diplomacije države. Izhodiščna ideja članka je uokviriti razpravo o pomenu spomina kot kategorije par excellence, ki je bila do sedaj v diplomatskih študijah zapostavljena. Poleg določanja smeri in možnosti za nadaljnje teoretično osmišljjanje umeščanja spomina v diplomatske študije članek tudi implicitno ugotavlja, da ima (kolektivni) spomin določen vpliv na diplomatsko udejstvovanje. Končno: članek ne daje končnih odgovorov na to, ali je spomin pomembna ali nepomembna kategorija pri diplomatskem udejstvovanju in njegovi analizi. Daje pa napotila, ki bi jih morali preučevalci diplomatskih odnosov upoštevati pri razvijanju različnih spektrov znotraj diplomatskih študij.*

**Ključne besede:** spomin, diplomatski memoari, teorija spomina, diplomatski odnosi

## DIPLOMAZIA CON LA MEMORIA (COLLETIVA): IN CHE MODO IL PASSATO INCIDE SULL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA DIPLOMAZIA?

### *SINTESI*

*L'articolo è incentrato sul ruolo della memoria (collettiva) nell'attuazione della diplomazia di uno stato. L'idea di base dell'articolo è di inquadrare una discussione sull'importanza della memoria quale categoria per eccellenza che finora è stata trascurata negli studi diplomatici. Oltre a determinare la direzione e le possibilità di un'ulteriore concettualizzazione teorica dell'inclusione della memoria negli studi diplomatici, l'articolo mette implicitamente in evidenza che le memorie dei diplomatici potrebbero essere un contributo metodologico estremamente importante al posizionamento della memoria nel sistema degli studi diplomatici. Infine, l'articolo non fornisce quindi risposte definitive rispetto alla memoria come categoria importante o irrilevante nell'azione diplomatica e nella sua analisi. Propone invece linee guida agli studiosi delle relazioni diplomatiche, le quali dovrebbero essere prese in considerazione sviluppando vari ambiti entro gli studi diplomatici.*

**Parole chiave:** memoria, memorie diplomatiche, teoria della memoria, relazioni diplomatiche

UVOD IN ORIS RAZISKOVALNE PROBLEMATIKE<sup>1</sup>

Raziskovalci s področja mednarodnih odnosov opažajo, da se (znanstveno-raziskovalno) zanimanje za spomin in njegov vpliv na politiko, še posebej po 11. septembru 2001, izjemno povečuje (Maier, 2007, 136–138). Seveda se to zanimanje pojavlja v različnih oblikah (prim. Lampe, 2019). Na primer v državah, kjer je spomin o travmatičnih izkušnjah še vedno močno prisoten (prim. Šuligoj, 2016), ostaja spomin del aktualne politične agende in s tem njegovega utrjevanja (Langenbacher, 2010, 13). Na drugi strani pa se v državah, v katerih so ključni zgodovinski dogodki, ki so botrovali k procesu gradnje kolektivnega spomina, že zasidrani globoko v preteklosti, še vedno občasno odpirajo razprave o institucionalizaciji primernega/lastnega kulturnega spomina in lastne/kolektivne identitete. V takšnih primerih se soočamo tudi z obujanjem individualnih in kolektivnih travm, ki se, npr. zaradi sodnih procesov, obudijo in postanejo prisotne v javni zavesti (*public consciousness*).

V raziskavah in znanstveni literaturi je spomin kot političen pojav največkrat povezan z judovstvom, v katerem že sama beseda *zahkor* (spominjati) predstavlja enega najpomembnejših delov judovske tradicije in z njo povezanega kolektivnega spomina.<sup>2</sup> Pomembnost spominjanja je ključni del tudi judovskega bogočastja. Njihovi verski prazniki, *Purim*, *Pesah*, *Tiša B'Av* in *Hanuka*, obeležujejo predvsem spomin na (narodne) kolektivne katastrofe in čudeže (Soltes, 2010, 134). Podobnosti lahko vidimo tudi pri posvetnih praznikih, kot so *Yom Ha-Shoah* (Dan spomina na Holokavst), *Yom Hazikaron* (Dan spomina na padle vojake in vse tiste, ki so izgubili življenje v boju za vzpostavitev države), *Yom Ha-Hatzmut* (Dan samostojnosti) in *Yom Yerushalayim* (Dan Jeruzalema, s katerim obeležujejo osvoboditev/okupacijo le-tega v šestdnevni vojni leta 1967).

Politični izzivi, ki se navezujejo na spomin, niso povezani zgolj z judovstvom ter nastankom države Izrael, ampak jih najdemo tudi v drugih državah, ki jih *prima facie* običajno razumemo kot notranjepolitično in zunanjepolitično izjemno urejene. Kot enega takšnih primerov lahko navedemo Nemčijo. Vse od konca druge svetovne vojne se je v Nemčiji razvijal indoktrinirajoči

institut kolektivne krivde za drugo svetovno vojno.<sup>3</sup> Ta institut se je razvijal na dveh ravneh – notranjepolitični in zunanjepolitični. Leta 2000, z nastankom institucije *Zentrum gegen Vertriebungen*, pa smo bili priča obratu v zgodbi oz. spominjanju, in sicer se je začelo v javnosti tudi vse bolj govoriti o tem, kaj so Nemci pretrpeli med in po drugi svetovni vojni. Obrat, ki se je zgodil, ni bil namenjen samo notranjepolitičnemu obujanju spomina, ampak tudi (pre)vrednotenju zunanjepolitičnega razmišljanja o odnosih sveta do Nemčije in obratno. S podobno izkušnjo kot Nemci se je v času velike gospodarske krize soočila tudi Argentina. Prav v tem času so se začela odpirati vprašanja o dejstvih iz časov Videlove diktature (Kaiser, 2002, 499). Po 25 letih *omerte* in pravnoformalne sodne amnezije je Ustavno sodišče leta 2005 razglasilo zakone iz časa Videlovega režima za neustavne in s tem utrlo pot družbenemu soočenju s krvavo vojaško diktaturo z začetka 80-ih let. Odločitev Ustavnega sodišča je bila pospremljena s širšo razpravo in vzpostavljanjem različnih arhivskih centrov v Buenos Airesu, spominskega centra in parka ter Muzeja spomina, ki stoji poleg pomorske akademije, v kateri naj bi v času Videlove vladavine mučili največ posameznikov (Langenbacher, 2010, 18).

Dandanes postaja obujanje spomina neka dejavnost, ki je v velikem razmahu. Temu smo npr. priča v Franciji, kjer se vse bolj obujajo razprave v zvezi z delovanjem in nameni (!) vichyjskega režima, na Japonskem, ki se sooča s spoznavanjem lastnih vojnih zločinov med drugo svetovno vojno, v Italiji, kjer z dediščino fašizma niso nikoli zares opravili, kar občasno celo vodi do poveljevanja tega sistema ipd. Z našega vidika (kulturno)jezikovno sorodni primeri obsegajo izkušnjo postjugoslovanske tranzicije, ki je v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH), na Hrvaškem, na Kosovu in v Severni Makedoniji privredla do (dolgotrajnih) vojn ter postala temeljni gradnik novih, samostojnih republik. Kolektivni spomin travmatičnih vojn je tako postal del (skupnega) napora, ki so ga države vložile v to, da bi se soočile s preteklostjo, zgradile družbeno zaupanje, vzpostavile vladavino prava, sodno pregnale kršitelje (mednarodnega) prava ter vzpostavile različne pomiritvene komemoracijske prakse,<sup>4</sup> ki bi omogočale družbeno kohezivnost (Aguilar & Humlebaek, 2002, 121).

- 1 Avtorja se za konstruktivne predloge zahvaljujeta anonimnim recenzentom in prof. ddr. Rudiju Rizmanu. Članek je rezultat raziskovanja v okviru doktorskega študija in v okviru programske skupine P5-0177: *Slovenija in njeni akterji v mednarodnih odnosih in evropskih integracijah*.
- 2 To dokazujejo številni avtorji, mdr. Ori Soltes (2010, 133), Primo Levi (1989, 23–24) in Richard Rubenstein (1992, 13–18), ki trdijo, da je spomin konstitutiven del judovske identitete v odnosu do njihove njihove zgodovine, obveščanja o judovskih verskih praksah in sekularnih ter nacionalnih različicah judovskega obstoja.
- 3 Velja izpostaviti še primer iz leta 2007, ko je pomembna novinarka nemškega konservativnega tabora Eva Hermann izgubila službo zaradi svojega mnenja o tem, da družinske politike nacistov »niso bile tako slabe« (Spiegel, 2007). V odgovor na Hermannovo sta Harald Schmidt in Oliver Pocher na televiziji predstavila napravo, ki sta jo poimenovala Nacimeter. Ta se je vsakič oglasila, ko je prišlo do pripisovanja pozitivne konotacije besedam, ki so povezane z nacisti, kar je privedlo do manjšega škandala in pogovorov o formalni cenzuri oz. ukinitvi programa (Wittlinger, 2008, 8).
- 4 Kot primere lahko omenimo hrvaško komemoracijo za pliberškimi žrtvami, hrvaško komemoracijo pod imenom »Dan spomina na žrtve Vukovarja« ter spomin na žrtve genocida v Potočarih pri Srebrenici.

**Prikaz 1: Tipologija zgodovinske fenomenologijev (prirejeno po Assmann, 2007, 45–49 in Langenbacher, 2010, 28–29).**

Namen članka je ugotoviti, če (in če da, kako) kolektivni spomin vpliva na zunanjo politiko (Bojinović Fenko, 2010), natančneje na njeno sredstvo – diplomacijo. Razprava je zasnovana na teoretski ravni in na polju odkrivanja pomena spomina za diplomatsko udejstvovanje države. Posledično nas v raziskovalnem kontekstu spomin(janj) zanima predvsem kot predhodna spremenljivka (*antecedents*), ki na oblikovanje diplomacije običajno vpliva posredno oz. *tacite*, saj razen v primerih, ko so zahteve političnih odločevalcev takšne, da je treba stvari iz kolektivnega (in individualnega) spomina poudariti, v diplomaciji pomen spomina razumemo predvsem kot njen *implicitum*.

Ker je polje raziskovanja spomin(janj)a v diplomaciji novo polje raziskovanja, z omejeno sposobnostjo posploševanja, tudi rezultati našega raziskovanja niso ne končni in ne morejo biti posplošeni. Predstavljajo le okvir in smer za nadaljnje raziskovanje, morda tudi napotilo, česa bi se še morali raziskovalci, kljub metodološko nedodelanim izhodiščem in oviram, v polju diplomatskih študij še lotiti.

Analizo bomo izvedli s pomočjo kritične analize in sinteze sekundarnih virov, pri čemer se bomo v prvem koraku poslužili analitičnih metod, s katerimi bomo osnovne značilnosti spomina in spominjanja razdelili, jih konceptualizirali ter uokvirili znotraj naše razprave, nato pa bomo s pomočjo metode sklapljanja (*coupling*) in metode sinteze skušali oblifikovati nova spoznanja, ki bi lahko služila kot podlaga za nadaljnje raziskovanje vpliva spomina na izvajanje nacionalnih diplomacij v mednarodni skupnosti.

Članek je razdeljen na dva dela: uvodu in orisu raziskovalne problematike sledi prvi del, ki temelji na analizi spomina in spominjanja v okviru znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih (Brglez, 2008) ter v diplomatskih študijah (Brglez, 2011). Temu delu nato sledi sklapljanje in sinteza spoznanj na področju vpliva spomina na diplomatsko aktivnost ter razprava o tem

pojavu in obstoječe omejitve raziskovanja. Članek zaključimo s sklepom, v katerem povzamemo ugotovitve ter podamo napotila za raziskovanje tega področja v prihodnje.

#### **Kolektivni spomin v znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih in v diplomatskih študijah: analiza stanja**

#### **Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih in kolektivni spomin**

Če želimo razumeti, kako in zakaj države v mednarodnih odnosih uporabljajo različne interpretacije lastne preteklosti, se moramo najprej osrediniti na koncept skupne zapuščine (*shared legacy*), ki je v mednarodnih odnosih razumljena na enak način kot *spomin*. Za razliko od posameznika, pri katerem moramo spomin razumeti znotraj individualnega psihološkega polja, države ustvarjajo spomin kot družbeni konstrukt (Assmann, 2001, 34–42). Ker gre za interdisciplinaren koncept, ustvarjen na kolektivni ravni, ga običajno označujemo kot *kolektivni spomin* (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi & Levy, 2011, 41–43). Ta temelji na širše sprejetem razumevanju, ki izhaja iz preteklosti, in ne na razumevanju preteklosti *per se* (Assmann, 2000, 277–284). Iz tega izhaja, da se kolektivni spomin ne ukvarja s preteklostjo samo po sebi, temveč s preteklostjo »*kot se jo spominja(mo)*« (*remembered* in *(jo)* »*interpretiramo*« (*interpreted*). To pomeni, da raziskovalci kolektivni spomin umeščajo v sedanost in ga proučujejo tako, da skušajo identificirati točko, v kateri je prišlo do trajnega zasuka družbenega okvira (Halbwachs, 1950 in 1992).<sup>5</sup> V tem kontekstu lahko kolektivni spomin razumemo kot spomin, ki je ustvarjen s strani države in okrog katerega poteka boj različnih skupin za strateški in politični vpliv (Assmann, 2001, 43), sočasno pa ga lahko razumeemo kot enega ključnih gradnikov družbenih praks in kolektivne identitete (prim. Darovec, 2017a, 2017b;

5 Na tej točki ne smemo pozabiti na prispevek Pierra Noraja (1998), ki je poudaril, da spomin kot tak izhaja iz dveh oblik legitimnosti: zgodovinske in dejanske. Ta ločnica je – predvsem v obdobju po koncu hladne vojne – postala vse manj vidna. Slednje pomeni, da je zgodovina postala nadomestljiv imaginarij, saj je bila ta za potrebo osmišljanja »nove realnosti« pomembno rekontekstualizirana (prim. tudi Jurič Pahor 2014, 2015, 2018). Po mnenju Noraja (1998) ima spomin tudi svoj 'odsev', ki ga sam imenuje *lieu de mémoire* (mesto spomina). Gre torej za materialno ali nematerialno udejanjanje spomina določene preteklosti (prim. npr. Lampe, 2016). Ključno pri tem konceptu pa je to, da ga pomembno osmišljajo uradne oblasti (vlade) s ciljem homogenizacije različnih vernakularnih spominov. Nora (prav tam) pri tem poudarja, da »*je bilo v preteklosti veliko partikularnih spominov, ki so tvorili nacionalno zgodovino, danes pa imamo zgolj en nacionalni spomin, ki svojo enotnost gradi na deljenih spominih*«. Gre torej za idejo izmišljenih tradicij, ki so nenehno v iskanju koherence. V teh okvirih poteka sedaj razprava v Sloveniji, če naj na mesto pred Tivolskim gradom ponovno postavijo spomenik feldmaršalu Radetzkemu. Več o spominu in izzivih, ki se porajajo prav z vključevanjem spomina prim. Širok (2010 in 2012), Klabjan (2012 in 2015), Batič (2018) in Udoovič (2020).

2018a; Milharčič Hladnik, 2015; Golob, 2015 idr.).<sup>6</sup> To pa znotraj teoretskega *milieuja* odpira novo polje raziskovanja, v katerem se spomin veže na politične vede, sociologijo, kulturologijo, mednarodne odnose, pa tudi na njihove poddiscipline, kot npr. vprašanja nacionalizma in etničnosti, izobraževanja, družbene kohabitacije ipd. (Müller, 2002, 2).

Čeprav je ugotavljanje vpliva kolektivnega spomina na odnose in prerazporejanje moči znotraj družbe izjemno pomembno, pa takšno raziskovalno zanimanje predvideva zgolj uporabo notranjih (*domestic*) politik. Znanstveniki in raziskovalci na področju političnih ved ugotavljajo, da kolektivni spomin nastane kot rezultat kompleksnega prepletanja političnih interesov znotraj določene družbe. Ti interesi so bili zaradi znanstvenih del Confina (1997), Edkinsa (2003) in Bella (2010) umeščeni in proučevani znotraj širših nacionalnih in mednarodnih političnih ciljev, a kolektivni spomin *per se* še ni bil sistematično in konsistentno utemeljen znotraj znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih. Obstojeca literatura na tem področju se, namesto da bi kolektivni spomin skušala umestiti in utemeljiti znotraj discipline, ukvarja predvsem s prikazovanjem dejstva, da se raziskovalci na tem področju poslužujejo različnih raziskovalnih ciljev, empiričnih primerov, pristopov in konceptualnih okvirov (Langenbacher & Shain, 2010). Posledično različni avtorji kolektivni spomin uporabljajo takrat, ko se sklicujejo na širši niz urednih komemoracij in kolektivnih reprezentacij preteklosti z uporabo terminov kot so zauščina (*legacy*), mit, tradicija in narativ ter ga na ta način posredno razumejo kot element skupne identitete, kulture, ideologije in čustev (Olick, 1999, 336), ki vplivajo navznoter pa tudi navzven. Confino (1997, 138) ugotavlja, »da je vse primer spomina, saj je spomin povsod«, kar implicitno pomeni, da se nahaja tudi v mednarodnih odnosih; ker pa je povsod, ga je težko „ujeti“, zamejiti in preučevati. Na drugi strani Berger (1998, 56–58) trdi, da so raziskovalci na področju mednarodnih odnosov podcenjevali razsežnost vpliva spomina na proces oblikovanja politik.<sup>7</sup> Četudi bi slednje držalo, pa vseeno obstaja določen obseg znanstvene literature na področju mednarodnih odnosov, ki v ospredje postavlja koncept kolektivnega spomina (velikokrat pod imenom zgodovinska dediščina), in ga lahko delimo na dva sklopa.

Prvi sklop se ukvarja z etičnimi izzivi, ki so inherentno povezani s spominskimi študijami. V tem raziskovalnem okviru se raziskovalci osredotočajo

na vprašanja pravičnosti, sprave in prevzemanje odgovornosti za pretekla dejanja ter dolžnostjo spominjanja umrlih (Margalit, 2002; Elster, 2004; Olick, 2003). Tukaj velja še posebej izpostaviti delo Elazarja Barkana (2001), ki se ukvarja z obnašanjem držav v mednarodnih odnosih pri urednih opravičilih zaradi moralne palice (*moral yardstick*) kot posledice vzpona nove moralnosti v mednarodni skupnosti.

Za razliko od prvega sklopa literature, ki kolektivni spomin obravnava skozi normativni pristop, pa drugi sklop literature in raziskav področje kolektivnega spomina na zauščine držav analizira s pomočjo postpozitivistične metodologije, s fokusom na vplivu spomina za oblikovanje politik držav (Berger, 1998; 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Fierke, 2014). Z vidika diplomatske aktivnosti države moramo v tem okviru omeniti Yuen Foong Khong (1992), ki je v svojem teoretskem prispevku pojasnjeval, kako so zgodovinske analogije postale del procesa zunanjopolitičnega odločanja; Ernest May (1975) je pokazal, kako je mogoče zgodovino uporabiti in zlorabiti pri izvajanju ameriške zunanje politike. Zanimivi sta tudi študiji Jennifer Lind (2008) in Yinan He (2009), ki sta utemeljevali, kako se preteklost prevaja v dvostranske odnose. Če se je He osredotočala na vpliv t. i. spominske vrzeli (*memory gap*) v procesu sprave med dvema državama, je Lind razvila teorijo opravičevanja spominjanja (*apologetic remembrance*), ki določa povezavo med spominom države in percepcijo grožnje pri vstopanju v dvostranske odnose (Lind, 2008, 104–107). Četudi sta bili avtorici pionirki raziskovanja tega področja, pa sta v svojem raziskovanju trčili ob metodološke zamejitve (osredotočenje predvsem na države, ki so bile napadene; osnovni kategoriji delovanja v mednarodni skupnosti naj bi bili občutek strahu/odsotnost varnosti in nezaupanje do druge strani). Te omejitve je skušala preseči Kathrin Bachleitner (2018) s svojim modelom diplomacija s spominom (*diplomacy with memory*). Ta ima, poleg pojasnjevalne vrednosti vpliva kolektivnega spomina na diplomacijo, pomembno vlogo pri premostitvi konceptualne ločnice med kolektivnim spominom v političnih vedah in kolektivnim spominom v disciplini mednarodnih odnosov, kar posledično vodi do tega, da lahko diplomacijo s spominom preučujemo v okviru analize zunanje politike (*Foreign Policy Analysis*) in diplomatskih študij (*Diplomatic Studies*) (prim. Bachleitner, 2018, 17).

6 Darko Darovec (2017a, 2017b; 2018a, 2018b) izpostavlja različne načine reševanja konfliktov, s poudarkom na (krvnem) maščevanju. Njegova analiza pokaže, da se (različni) načini reševanja konfliktov prehajajo v družbeno prakso, prav tako pa tudi v kolektivno identiteto, kar seveda posledično vpliva na oblikovanje spomina o dejstvih in tudi o določenih družbenih praksah. Na primeru fajde v Kopru (2018b, 469–470) Darovec opozarja na pomembnost družbenih praks, ki so imele legitimnost (in legalnost) ter so kot take postajale del družbenega/kolektivnega spomina. V sorodnih primerih se je vedno iskalo družbeno rešitev, državnopravna ureditev je slednjo le potrjevala. Ta dognanja pa niso le geografsko omejena, ampak so obče družbena, zato imajo velik pomen tudi za diplomatske študije.

7 Na Slovenskem je bila leta 2019 izdana posebna številka znanstvene revije *Ars & Humanitas* na temo spominov. V njej so bili objavljeni članki, ki se navezujejo tudi na našo tematiko, in sicer naslednjih avtoric: Petek in Roter (2019), Mahnič (2019) in Ilc Klun (2019).

**Prikaz 2: Tipologija skupnih spominov (shared memories) (prijejeno po Assmann, 2007, 45–49 in Langenbacher, 2010, 28–29).**

### POMEN IN OSMIŠLJANJE KOLEKTIVNEGA SPOMINA V DIPLOMACIJI

Navedena in druga dela, ki se na ta nanašajo, potrjujejo, da obstajajo znotraj vsake države različni individualni in kolektivni spomini številnih skupin, ki v določeni točki, navkljub soobstaju in medsebojni interakciji, trčijo med seboj (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Bodnar, 1992). Zato se moramo, če želimo ta kompleksen in dinamičen mosaik individualnih in kolektivnih spominov preučevati, raziskovalno omejititi in vprašati, kateri od znotrajdržavnih kolektivnih spominov je lahko sestavni del diplomatske dejavnosti posamezne države.

V prvi vrsti je potrebno poudariti, da je potencialno število individualnih in kolektivnih spominov v tem polju praktično neomejeno, zaradi česar lahko raziskovalci v empiričnem smislu raziskujejo vpliv spomina izbrane družbene skupine na diplomatsko aktivnost posamezne države (Bachleitner, 2018, 12–14).<sup>8</sup> Seveda spominov med seboj ni mogoče razmejiti, tudi izmeriti ne, predvsem zaradi »omejenosti družbene metodologije« (Bachleitner, 2018, 17). To pomeni metodološko zamejitev in običajno osredotočenje na spomin prevladujoče družbene skupnosti/skupine v državi (Deutsch, 1970), saj predvidevamo, da bo ta skupnost imela tudi največji vpliv na notranjo in zunanjo politiko (Assmann, 1999; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Müller, 2002; Berger, 2002). Ta spomin, poznan tudi kot javni spomin (*public memory*), odraža prevladujoč narativ (skupnosti) prebivalcev, ki živijo v izbrani državi (prim. Lughofner, 2019). V mnogih primerih se ta pretvori celo v nacionalni narativ,<sup>9</sup> ki ga lahko opazimo v javnem diskurzu novinarjev ter v uradnih nastopih in besedilih predstavnikov države (Bachleitner, 2018, 21). Torej povsod tam, kjer se reprezentira simbolika države (Arbeiter & Udovič, 2017) kot tisti fenomen, ki državo in njen *populus* tudi ustvarja.

Javni in uradni spomin sta z vidika diplomacije pomembna zato, ker lahko vplivata na njeno izvajanje

(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Ne glede na to kako katerikoli od teh dveh spominov nastane (Foucault, 2011, 252; Bodnar, 1992, 17–20; Müller, 2002, 2), je pomembno, da tak spomin s svojo ritualizacijo spodbudi občutek o obstajanju skupne/nacionalne zgodovine. Ko je slednji vzpostavljen se oblikuje nov okvir delovanja političnih odločevalcev navznoter in navzven, ki poudarja predvsem skupnostne značilnosti te zamišljene skupnosti. Od tega premika se prek nacionalne ideologije oblikuje nacionalna identiteta, ki postane konstitutivni del nacionalnega interesa in državnosti (Svetličič, 2002) ter je kot takšna zastopana v vseh aktivnostih države navzven.

Iz zgornjega prikaza izhaja, da se morajo raziskovalci, če želijo ustvariti robusten teoretični okvir za razumevanje vpliva kolektivnega spomina na diplomatsko aktivnost, osredotočiti predvsem na različico kolektivnega spomina, ki odraža nacionalni narativ izbrane države in je kasneje predstavljen s strani državnega predstavnika kot nosilca doticnega spomina na mednarodni ravni (Gillis, 1994, 3–26).

### POSKUS OČRTA NOVEGA RAZISKOVALNEGA PODROČJA: AKTIVNOSTI V DIPLOMACIJI V KONTEKSTU (KOLEKTIVNEGA) SPOMINA

Ne glede na to, da nam je uspelo konceptualizirati kolektivni spomin kot nacionalni narativ, ki ga predstavniki držav prenašajo na mednarodno raven, je potrebno tovrstno različico kolektivnega spomina pojasniti skozi prizmo diplomatske aktivnosti držav. Ta je namreč del zunanjopolitične strategije in je kot taka podvržena raziskovalnemu okviru analize zunanje politike (Bachleitner, 2018, 30–32). Slednja se zaradi razpetosti med notranjepolitično in zunanjopolitično realnostjo osredotoča bodisi na proces odločanja bodisi na končni izid politike (*policy outcome*). Medtem ko Carlsnaes (2013, 298) ugotavlja, da končni izid diplomatske aktivnosti odraža kompleksnost človeškega obnašanja, pa je rezultat diplomatskega

<sup>8</sup> Kot primer lahko navedemo vernakularni (*vernacular*) in kulturni spomin ter protispomin (*counter-memory*). Vernakularni spomin nanaša na etnične, lokalne ali regionalne spomine iz preteklosti, ki determinirajo specializirane interese določene skupine (Bodnar, 1992, 14); kulturni spomin se nanaša na kolektivni spomin na podlagi zgodovinskih dogodkov, ki jih neka skupnost nikoli ni neposredno izkusila in nima pretiranega znanja o njih, a vseeno vpliva na njihovo identiteto (Assmann, 2007; Assmann, 2011; Warburg, 1999); protispomin, ki je večkrat označen kot *popularni spomin*, pa označuje alternativne oblike spominov, ki obstajajo in se umestijo znotraj uradnih in dominantnih različic preteklosti (Foucault, 2011, 252–253).

<sup>9</sup> Velja izpostaviti definicijo Bodnarja (1992, 13–16), ki je postavil jasno ločnico med vernakularnim in uradnim (*official*) spominom in trdil, da na presečišču uradnega in vernakularnega spomina nastane javni spomin (prav tam).

obnašanja s spominom potrebno razlagati v kontekstu končnega izida (*end product*), do katerega se raziskovalec opredeljuje na podlagi vsebine in ne na podlagi izbire sredstva za dosego cilja (Bachleitner, 2018, 35). Končni izid je tako »*niz ciljev, usmeritev oziroma namer, ki jih oblikujejo osebe na uradnem položaju, in so usmerjene v drugega akterja oziroma stanje v nadnacionalnem okolju z namenom vplivanja na ciljno tarčo po meri odločevalcev*« (Cohen & Harris, 1975, 49).

#### a. Diplomatske aktivnosti, ki vključujejo kolektivni spomin

Teoretski pristopi k analizi ravnanja držav v diplomatskih odnosih običajno privzamejo dve možnosti: ali države na mednarodni ravni zasledujejo lastne nacionalne interese po načelu igre z ničelno vsoto (Morgenthau, 1973) ali igre, v kateri vsi zmagujejo (Montesquieu, 1748). Kljub temu da se druga različica zdi bolj altruistična od prve, je to le videz. Konec koncev gre za dve strani istega kovanca, pri čemer v prvi inačici države želijo predvsem okrepite svojo neposredno moč, varnost in materialno premoženje; v drugi pa *mutatis mutandis* želijo isto, le postopki so drugačni. Če se v prvi različici države obnašajo lahko tudi iracionalno, pa naj bi se v drugi različici obnašale racionalno, tehtale naj bi stroške in koristi, predvsem pa naj bi korist skušale dobiti skozi prizmo ekonomskega bogastva, ki v drugi inačici velja za neomejenega (prim. Smith, 1952). Diplomacija naj bi tako služila predvsem pridobivanju koristi držav, ki se v prvi vrsti racionalno odločajo o tem, katere koristi so zanje ključne.

A realni svet je daleč od tega. To se izrazito pokaže v primeru diplomacije dveh držav, ki ju druži (skupna) tragična zgodovina. Te države v ospredje ne postavljajo logike materialnega proučevanja stroškov in koristi, ampak svojo (bolečo) izkušnjo. Posledično so pripravljene sprejeti, če je to treba, tudi dodatne stroške, ki bi nastali v interakciji z drugo državo, s katero jih druži skupna preteklost. Pripravljenost sprejeti stroške je torej tisto, česar s krovnimi teorijami in modeli v znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih ne moremo predvidevati. Dotično odstopanje v logiki materialne kalkulacije stroškov in koristi se nahaja v središču razlikovanja diplomatskih odnosov s spominom in klasičnega, odtujenega diplomatskega občevanja, četudi naš cilj ni zanikati dejstva, da interesi oblikujejo zunano politiko in diplomatsko delovanje držav, temveč poudariti da so zgodovinski konstrukti pomembni pri končnem nacionalnem interesu izbrane države (Müller, 2002, 28–30).

To zavedanje je Halla (2015, 35) privedlo do novega koncepta čustvene diplomacije (*emotional diplomacy*),<sup>10</sup> ki jo sam razume kot projekcijo specifičnega čustva, npr. jeze,<sup>11</sup> iz državne na mednarodno raven (Hall, 2015, 37). Halovo razmišljanje delno nadgrajuje Bachleitnerjeva (2018, 24), ki pravi, da država ne mednarodno raven ne projicira čustev, ampak (zgodovinsko) predstavo o državi sami (Bachleitner, 2018, 18). Četudi se morda na prvi pogled zdi, da se Hallov in Bachleitnerjin koncept izključujeta, temu ni tako. Še več: dopolnjujeta se, a sočasno predvidevata drugačno logiko obnašanja države v diplomaciji, saj Hallov (2015) konceptualni okvir predvideva racionalnost,<sup>12</sup> medtem ko Bachleitnerjeva (2018) poudarja pomen iracionalnosti in individualnega razumevanja spominjanja kot okvira za delovanje na diplomatskem področju.

#### b. Kolektivni spomin kot instrumentalna oblika diplomatskega obnašanja

Bachleitnerjeva (2018, 19–23) trdi, da bi morali na diplomacijo s spominom gledati kot na zunanjepolitično strategijo, s katero skušajo akterji doseči določen cilj na mednarodni ravni. Potrebno je poudariti, da signalizacija uradne različice preteklosti v mednarodno okolje niti ne temelji na moralni podstati, niti ni usmerjena proti zgodovinski resnici, temveč ohranja izražanje jasne namer navkljub uporabi drugačne strategije za doseganje strateških ciljev. Povedano drugače: (kolektivni) spomin ni ne cilj ne vložek, spomin je sredstvo, s katerim država na določenem področju s pomočjo diplomacije doseže tisto, kar želi oz. čemur je njena diplomatska akcija namenjena.

#### c. Diplomatsko delovanje s kolektivnim spominom kot dvonivojska igra med mednarodnim (uradnim) in domaćim (javnim) spominom

Tretji pristop k analizi odnosa med spominom in diplomacijo lahko izvedemo s pomočjo Putnamovega (1988, 460) dvonivojskega modela, ki poudarja, da je treba vse zunanjepolitične odločitve prenesti tudi v notranjepolitični sistem. V primeru diplomacije s spominom zadeva poteka na sledeč način: ko država signalizira specifično zgodovinsko podobo na mednarodno raven, je prejemnik takšnega signala vedno zunanja in mednarodna, ne nujno pa domača javnost. V takšnem primeru pride do možne destabilizacije izvajanja diplomatskih aktivnosti s spominom, saj lahko aktivnosti v diplomatskih odnosih

<sup>10</sup> Hall (2015, 42) se je pri opredeljevanju in utemeljitvi koncepta čustvene diplomacije skliceval na Jervisa (1989), ki je poudarjal, da države v mednarodnih odnosih skušajo signalizirati (*signalling*) prijateljsko podobo, pri tem pa poudaril, da države veliko tvegajo, če na mednarodni ravni skušajo signalizirati določeno zgodovinsko podobo, saj ta lahko vpliva na način in odnos, ki ga imajo druge države do nje na mednarodni ravni.

<sup>11</sup> Vlogo jeze v ruski zunanji politiki je analizirala Regina Heller (2018), pri identifikaciji omenjenega čustva pa si je pomagala s primerjalno kvalitativno analizo vsebine prek orodja MAXQDA. Gre za vodilno programsko opremo za kvalitativno raziskovanje in raziskave mešanih metod (*mixed methods*), ki omogoča raziskovanje podatkov, besedil in multimedijev (fotografije, zvočni posnetki).

<sup>12</sup> Hall uporabo čustev v mednarodnih odnosih razume kot rezultat racionalne logike posledičnosti (*consequentialism*) in primernosti (*appropriateness*), učinek čustev pa analizira skozi prizmo končnega rezultata.

prečijo dejavnosti in percepcije na notranjopolitičnem prizorišču. Zadeva gre lahko celo tako daleč, da je diplomatsko ustvarjena podoba države v diplomatskih odnosih celo v nasprotju z nacionalnim (oz. notranjopolitičnim) razumevanjem. Takšni nevarnosti se lahko ognemo na način, da pokažemo, da predstavniki držav pri uporabi kolektivnega spomina na mednarodni ravni vedno uravnotežujejo med prevladujočim javnim spominom države (t. i. notranji spomin) in percepcijo drugih diplomatskih akterjev (t. i. zunanji spomin). Kaj to pomeni za operacionalizacijo spomina v diplomatskem občevanju? Dve zadevi: prvič, (re)konstrukcija spomina s strani političnih akterjev je omejena z enako željo drugega političnega akterja (Schudson, 2011, 290), bodisi v notranjopolitični javnosti bodisi v diplomatskih odnosih; in drugič: želja po ponovnem pisanku preteklosti, s ciljem legitimacije sedanjosti na nacionalni in mednarodni ravni, akterje v diplomaciji sili v sprejemanje uradnega spomina za doseganje strateških ciljev, njihov uspeh pri ustvarjanju prepričljivega nacionalnega narativa pa terja privolitev t. i. ostalih<sup>13</sup> (Schudson, 2011, 287). Če tega ni, pride do trka konceptov, neuspešnosti udejanjanja diplomacije s spominom, predvsem pa do neuspešnosti oz. kolizije med različnimi diplomatskimi praksami nasploh. Našteto potrjuje, da gre pri diplomaciji s spominom za dvonivojsko igro, saj diplomatsko delovanje s kolektivnim spominom upošteva tako mednarodno kot domačo javnost, uporaba kolektivnega spomina na mednarodni ravni pa ni vedno nujno v skladu s takšno različico, kot je zaželena doma. Kar pomeni, da mora diplomatsko delovanje (države) s spominom upoštevati najprej uravnoteževanje (uskrajevanje) domačih in mednarodnih okvirov ter silnic, sočasno pa tudi izgrajevanje metodološkega aparata, ki omogoča ponotranjenje diplomacije s spominom z diplomatskimi odnosov v notranjo politiko in obratno. Seveda to terja ne samo usposobljeno diplomacijo, ampak tudi uskladitev percepcij o temeljnih nalogah in vidikih diplomacije. Pri tem imajo pomembno vlogo tudi t. i. interpreti tega, kaj spomin je (prim. Maček, 2018; Žigon, 2017), saj je brez njih nemogoče sploh ustvariti koherenten okvir za razmišljanje in delovanje v diplomaciji s spominom.

#### RAZPRAVA: OMEJITVE KONCEPTUALNEGA OKVIRA DIPLOMACIJE S SPOMINOM

Konceptualni model diplomacije s spominom ponudi zadosten okvir za pojasnjevanje izvajanja diplomacije (Bachleitner, 2018, 7–16). Model v prvi vrsti predlaga, da je kolektivni spomin učinkovito orodje (*tool*)<sup>14</sup> v boju za politično moč tako na mednarodni kot na nacionalni ravni, hkrati pa ima pojasnevalno vrednost pri odgovoru na vprašanje, kako politični akterji uporabljajo kolektivni spomin v diplomatskih odnosih. Model ponuja okvir za

vključevanje kompleksnih interakcij med uradnim in javnim spominom držav na način, da ponudi povezavo med uradnim spominom, ki ga država prenaša diplomatske odnose, in prevladujočim nacionalnim javnim narativom, ki v tej državi obstaja. Konceptualizacija diplomacije spominom tako ostaja vmesni koncept, ki ga lahko umestimo tudi v diplomatske študije. Njena prvenstvena značilnost je predvsem v tem, da se vzpostavlja med materialnim in nematerialnim, s čimer omogoča tudi njegovo vsestransko rabo in tudi zlorabo (*utendi et abutendi*). Ker se nahaja na polju materialnega in nematerialnega, je dovezeta tudi za številne ideoološke vplive, ne samo države in politične, ampak tudi družbene in celo individualne (t. i. diplomatski *policy entrepreneur*).

Iz navedenega izhaja, da v diplomaciji s spominom razumevanje kolektivnega spomina ni umeščeno zgolj v državni kontekst, temveč se vzporedno oblikuje na več ravneh. Najbolj izpostavljena je diplomacija s spominom na mednarodni ravni (v diplomatskih odnosih), iz katerih se nato po načelu povratne zanke prelije na domačo raven, kjer se uskladi z domačo spominsko krajino (*domestic memory landscape*), nato pa se ponovno prelije v diplomatske odnose. Ta tok se neprestano ponavlja, zato lahko utemeljimo, da se diplomacija s spominom oblikuje vzporedno po načelu *ex ante* in *ex post*. *Ex ante* se oblikuje pred začetkom umeščanja oz. upravljanja diplomatske aktivnosti, znotraj *ex post* sistema pa se potem preoblikuje. V tem kontekstu sami širimo razumevanje pomena države v diplomaciji s spominom. Ta namreč ni, kot predpostavlja tudi Bachleitnerjeva (2018), ,le' akter (*actor*), ampak ima vse lastnosti agenta (*agency*), saj ima njen nosilec (in izvajalec) aktivno vlogo v procesu konstituiranja diplomacije s spominom, prav tako pa ima znotraj svoje dejavnosti vsa opolnomočenja, celo možnost in sposobnost ustvarjanja radikalnih sprememb. V diplomaciji s spominom.

Prikazana utemeljitev obstoja modela diplomacije s spominom seveda ne pomeni, da je ta sistem popoln ter tudi jasno konceptualiziran. Prej obratno. Ostaja še veliko nedodelanih področij, ki jih je treba raziskati, da bi diplomacijo s spominom lahko smelo in koherentno konceptualizirali in operacionalizirali. Ena večjih pomanjkljivosti diplomacije s spominom je gotovo raven analize. Diplomacija se namreč skladno z *Dunajsko konvencijo o diplomatskih odnosih* vrši na ravni držav (člen 2). Diplomacija s spominom pa se nenujno oblikuje na državni ravni. Večinoma se dejansko sploh ne, ampak se oblikuje na družbeni ravni oz. ravni družbenih skupnosti (Deutsch, 1970). Pri tem seveda ni problem le raven analize, ampak tudi dejstvo, da ne obstaja enotna/ena družbena skupnost, ampak so te fragmentirane. Diplomacija s spominom tako lahko predpostavi le, da bo »njen spomin« tisti spomin, ki je prevladujoč. Posledično je diplomacija s spominom *per definitionem* izključujoča.

13 Ti so: struktura razpoložljivih različic preteklosti, struktura individualnih izbir in posamezniki ter skupine, ki so se pripravljeni spustiti v konflikt zaradi preteklosti.

14 Bachleitner (2018) o kolektivnem spominu govori kot o orodju.

Poleg te zamejitve in omejenosti koncepta diplomacije s spominom je težava predstavljenega modela tudi v tem, da spomin še vedno razume predvsem instrumentalno, kar pomeni, da preteklosti ne obravnava same po sebi, ampak jo določa kot ustvarjeno in poustvarjeno za potrebe sedanosti. Tak pristop pa koncept kolektivnega spomina umesti v sedanost in nanj gleda z vidika »kako mi vidimo preteklost«.

Končno, Schwartz (2011, 243–247) in Confino (1997, 1393–1395) konceptu diplomacije s spominom očitata še nekaj metodoloških nedoslednosti, mdr.:

- a. *da je zastavljen okvir preučevanja diplomacije s spominom preozek, saj spomin razume predvsem dihotomijo med tistimi, ki se osredotočajo na ustvarjanje in poustvarjanje spomina za sedanost, in tistimi, ki se osredotočajo na to, kako zgodovina oblikuje identiteto in po tej poti determinira dejanja v sedanosti;*
- b. *da se koncept diplomacije s spominom zares sploh ne ukvarja s kolektivnim spominom samim po sebi, ampak se usmerja v iskanje vzročnopravilne zveze ter odvisnostjo in neodvisnostjo spremenljivk v obnašanju v diplomaciji, kar je nerealno in metodološko sporno (če ne celo nevzdržno);*
- c. *da je težava pri vzročnopravilni zvezi v konceptu diplomacije s spominom zvezi še v tem, da sama vzročnopravilna zveza sama po sebi ne more obstajati, saj imamo lahko celo obratnosorazmerne učinke, ki kažejo, kako »različni spomini ohranajo enako sedanost in enak spomin ohranja različne sedanosti«.*

Na te očitke delno odgovori že Bachleitnerjeva (2018, 5–8), ki potrdi, da imajo svojo logiko, a zdržijo le, če širimo razumevanje diplomacije s spominom na vse družbene akterje. Ker pa je diplomacija (kot smo tudi že mi omenili) razumljena predvsem državocentrično, našteji očitki po njenem ne zdržijo. Sama poudarja tudi, da če bi kritiki diplomacije s spominom koncept države bolj upoštevali, bi lažje pojasnili, kako lahko enaka sedanost (temelječa na kolektivnem spominu) pripelje do različnih načinov diplomatskega udejstvovanja in sporočanja na mednarodni ravni.<sup>15</sup>

#### ZAKLJUČEK

Namen članka je bilo ugotoviti, če (in če da, kako) kolektivni spomin vpliva na diplomatsko udejstvovanje. Analiza je pokazala, da ima kolektivni spomin vpliv na izvajanje diplomacije, a se pojavi v različnih oblikah, stanjih in tudi odnosih, zato ga je skorajda nemogoče

koncepcionalizirati. Tisto, o čemer se lahko strinjam, je, da je diplomatsko udejstvovanje, ki upošteva kolektivni spomin, drugačno od tistega, ki kolektivnega spomina ne upošteva. To utemeljujemo s tem, da država v primeru travmatične preteklosti v diplomacijo s spominom projicira svoje specifične zgodovinske podobe. Te lahko vplivajo na odnose med državami, prav tako pa so države s specifičnimi podobami v diplomaciji s spominom pripravljene sprejeti višje stroške, ki morebiti nastanejo v diplomatskem občevanju zaradi njihove projekcije določenih travm v diplomatske odnose.

Pri tem velja opozoriti, da ima izvajanje diplomacije s spominom še dve metodološki težavi. Prva je, da ni jasno, če (in v kakšni meri) diplomat, tj. tisti, ki izvaja diplomatsko udejstvovanje, določen kolektivni spomin ponotranji ter če se (in v kakšni meri) zaveda, kako kolektivni spomin določa njegovo diplomatsko udejstvovanje. Drugi metodološki izziv pa je vprašanje, koliko lahko kolektivni spomin vpliva na formacijo zunanjopolitičnih dokumentov države ter na določanje prioritet države, ter ciljev in sredstev njene zunanje politike.

Seveda je omejenost raziskovanja diplomacije s spominom tudi v tem, da gre pri delovanju diplomacije za igro na dveh ravnih (mednarodni in nacionalni), kjer se od določenega akterja pričakuje, da bo notranje spremenljivke odražal na mednarodno raven, sočasno pa zunanje na notranjo raven. Kaj to pomeni za kolektivni spomin? Predvsem to, da je vseskozi pod pritiskom spremiščanja, prilagajanja in umeščanja v širše dogajanje tako v notranji politiki kot v mednarodnih odnosih.

Prikazani izzivi in omejitve potrjujejo, da raziskovalce diplomacije s spominom čaka še veliko raziskovanja, predvsem znotraj modeliranja sistema diplomatskega udejstvovanja, ki bo upošteval interpretativno naravo kolektivnega spomina ter njegov neprestani prehod med individualnim in kolektivnim. Povratna zanka tovrstne analize je ta, da diplomatske študije zaradi narave raziskovanja ostajajo na ravni razumevanja kolektivnega spomina kot nacionalnega narativa, zaradi česar prisotnost individualnih spominov ni enota analize. V prihodnosti se bo moralno raziskovanje spomina v diplomatskih študijah usmeriti tudi v vlogo diplomata kot tistega akterja in agenta, brez katerega je izvajanje diplomacije v vsej njeni obsežnosti, nemogoče. Posledično bomo morali v tem okviru raziskovanja veliko večjo mero natančnosti nameniti tudi spominom (*memoaram*) diplomatov, ki jih sedaj razumemo predvsem kot metodološko podporno gradivo, v prihodnosti pa bi lahko, če bi želeli okrepliti vidik diplomacije s spominom, postali osrednje gradivo preučevanja delovanja znotraj diplomatskih študij.

<sup>15</sup> Četudi se lahko z odgovorom Bachleitnerjeve strinjam, pa moramo na tej točki opozoriti na metodološki *faux pas* oz. omejitve, ki jih ima njen model. Sama je namreč svoj model gradila na primeru dvostranskih odnosov med Nemčijo in Izraelom ter Avstrijo in pri tem pa zanemarila dejstvo, da ni nujno, da države v dvostranske odnose vstopajo v skladu z uradnim spominom, ki obstaja v mednarodni skupnosti. Če je to morda veljalo predvsem za čas po drugi svetovni vojni, pa je po koncu hladne vojne prišlo do novih konfliktov, ki so močno otežili vzpostavitev objektivnega krivca in žrtve.

## DIPLOMACY WITH (COLLECTIVE) MEMORY: HOW THE PAST INFLUENCES THE DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE?

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### SUMMARY

*The article focuses on the role of (collective) memory in implementing a country's diplomacy. The basic idea of the article is to frame the discussion on the importance of memory as a category par excellence that has been neglected so far in diplomatic studies. In addition to determining the direction and possibilities for further theoretical conceptualization of placing memory in diplomatic studies, the article also implicitly suggests that diplomats' memoires can be an extremely important methodological contribution to the placement of memories in the diplomatic studies' system. Finally, the article does not give definitive answers to the question whether memory is an important or an irrelevant category in diplomatic activities and their analysis. It does, however, provide guidelines that diplomatic relations' scholars should consider when developing various fields within diplomatic studies.*

**Keywords:** memory, diplomatic memoires, theory of memory, diplomatic intercourse

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# THE IMPACT OF EDUCATIONAL HABITUS ON SUBJECTIVE HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE AND THE MODERATING EFFECT OF GENDER: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE STUDY OF SLOVENIAN YOUTH

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## ABSTRACT

*The main purpose of our research was to examine the relationship among various indicators of educational habitus, subjective health and substance use and the moderating role of gender. The results indicated that 1) over one third of bivariate correlation coefficients between habitus and health outcome measures were statistically significant; 2) the most consistent correlate of subjective health was satisfaction with the Slovenian educational system, while school adjustment most consistently correlated with substance use; 3) when controlling for several socioeconomic and parenting confounders in multivariate analyses, only in two out of twelve examined cases did habitus predictors remain significant (only for substance use); 4) gender moderated the impact of two indicators of educational habitus on overall substance use, but not on overall subjective health.*

**Keywords:** educational habitus, inequalities in health, school perceptions, gender, cultural capital

# L'INFLUENZA DELL'HABITUS EDUCATIVO SULLA SALUTE SOGGETTIVA E L'USO DELLE SOSTANZE ED IL RUOLO DI MODERAZIONE DEL GENERE: ANALISI DI INDAGINE RAPPRESENTATIVA DELLA GIOVENTÙ SLOVENA

## SINTESI

*Lo scopo della nostra ricerca era esaminare la relazione tra diversi indicatori di habitus educativo, salute soggettiva e uso di sostanze, esaminando anche il ruolo di moderazione del genere. I risultati hanno mostrato che un buon terzo dei coefficienti di correlazione bivariata tra indicatori di habitus e indicatori di salute era statisticamente significativo; che la soddisfazione per il sistema educativo è stata collegata in modo più coerente agli indicatori sanitari soggettivi, al consumo di droghe e all'adattabilità scolastica; che nelle analisi multivariate, comprese le variabili di controllo in due casi dell'indicatore di habitus, rimane una previsione statisticamente significativa; e che il genere ha moderato la relazione di due indicatori dell'habitat educativo con uso di sostanze.*

**Parole chiave:** habitus educativo, disuguaglianze nella salute, percezioni dell'ambiente scolastico, genere, capitale culturale

INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

School is a crucial social environment for young people (Crosnoe & Muller, 2004; Jamal et al., 2013; Lovenjak & Peklaj, 2016; OECD, 2015). School is where young people spend a large part of their days, form relationships with their schoolmates and teachers, and have their competencies publicly assessed (Hughes, 2012; Juvonen, 2018; Košir & Tement, 2014; Mikuš Kos, 1993; Ryan et al., 1994). Consequently, the school environment has a significant influence on numerous aspects of young people's health, well-being and personal development (Inchley et al., 2016; Jamal et al., 2013; Kuperminc et al., 1997; Langford et al., 2014; Pilkauskaite-Valickiene & Gabrialaviciute, 2015; Riekie et al., 2017; Ruus et al., 2007; Sweeting & Hunt, 2014). In this article, we examine the impact of young people's perceptions of the school environment and their attitudes towards education (*educational habitus*) on their subjective health and substance use. We test these effects on a subsample of school-enrolled youth from a nationally representative survey sample of young people from the Slovenian Youth 2013 Study (Flere et al., 2014).

## CULTURAL CAPITAL, EDUCATIONAL HABITUS AND HEALTH

The resources individuals have at their disposal can also be termed "capital", which French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defined as "*accumulated labor (in its materialised form or its 'incorporated' embodied form)*" (Bourdieu, 1986, 46). Bourdieu differentiated between three forms of capital: economic, social and cultural. In the present study, we focus on the latter. Cultural capital refers to the skills, habits, styles, behaviour and aesthetic preferences (tastes) one acquires through the socialization process and is related to one's position in the social structure (Bourdieu, 1984; also see Swartz, 1997). In particular, *embodied* cultural capital refers to lasting dispositions that guide one's actions and tastes (Bourdieu, 1984; 1986). Habitus has previously been operationalized in a variety of ways by Bourdieu and his contemporaries (e.g., Edgerton & Roberts, 2014; Lahire, 2003; Reay, 2004). Bourdieu sees the habitus as durable "*schemata or structures of perception, conception and action*" (Bourdieu, 2005, 43), and Edgerton and Roberts (2014, 195) conceptualize habitus as a "*learned set of preferences or dispositions by which a person orients to the social world*" (also see Swartz, 1997). As Dumais (2002, 45) succinctly puts it, habitus is "*one's*

*view of the world and one's place in it*". Habitus not only refers to mental attitudes and perceptions but is also expressed through permanent ways "*of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking*" (Bourdieu, 1990, 70).

Numerous studies have shown that habitus impacts educational outcomes (e.g., Dumais, 2002; Edgerton & Roberts, 2014; Flere et al., 2010; Nash, 2002). Less is known, however, about whether habitus impacts non-school related outcomes, including young people's subjective health. In recent years, more and more studies have indicated that perceptions of and attitudes towards the school environment and education may act as important resources young people possess that impact their health outcomes (Lazzeri et al., 2014; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009; Shek & Li, 2016; Sonmark & Modin, 2017; Suldo et al., 2006). It remains less clear which school and education-related perceptions and behaviours have the most substantial impact on young people's health, relative to one another. Most studies examine only a small number of school-related perceptions simultaneously, e.g., perceived school climate (including social support from classmates and teachers), satisfaction with school, perceptions of school stress, academic grade, or some combination of these. In our study, we examine the impact of six indicators of habitus on health.

Within the cultural capital framework, we argue it may be fruitful to examine the health-related impact of a specific type of habitus: "*educational habitus*". The term has recently been used when referring to internal dispositions and schemes of perceptions which orient young people in the educational process and guide their behaviours, as well as to behaviours in the educational process. Building on Nash (2002) and his use of the term "*educated habitus*", Edgerton and colleagues (2014, 190) use the term "*school-related habitus*" to refer to "**positive response to the purposes, priorities, and processes of school, including positive perceptions of teachers**" (my emphasis). In their research, Edgerton and colleagues (2013; 2014) operationalize habitus as students' expected level of educational attainment, perceptions of teachers, perceptions of the desirability of post-secondary education and self-assessment of their potential as post-secondary students. Educated habitus is positively linked to "*academic practices*", i.e. practices which are particularly conducive to educational achievement (e.g. assignment completion and task perseverance). Edgerton and colleagues (2013; 2014) also found that educational habitus had a positive impact on academic achievement. Positive school achievement, in

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turn, may lead to better health. Ravens-Sieberer and colleagues (2009), for example, found that perceived school climate and demands have a positive impact on positive school adjustment, which then favourably affects life satisfaction and health.

Other studies have also found that positive perceptions of the school environment – such as perceived low school demands and stressfulness, a perceived high-quality school climate (e.g., peer and teacher support), perceived enjoyment of school, satisfaction with school and academic achievement – are related to better self-reported health, higher levels of life satisfaction and fewer health complaints (Lazzeri et al., 2014; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2004; 2009; Shek & Li, 2016; Suldo & Huebner, 2006; Suldo et al., 2006). A study of Croatian adolescents even found that the school environment was a “*more consistent and stronger predictor*” of health outcomes than family affluence and peer groups (Simetin et al., 2011, 122).

Among perceived school environment indicators, in particular, stress related to schoolwork and school demands was found to be associated with lower subjective health and more health complaints, more so for girls than boys (Aanesen et al. 2017; Eriksson & Sellström, 2010; Låftman & Modin, 2012; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009; Wiklund et al., 2012). For example, students with higher rates of school-related stress report having more headaches, backaches, and psychosomatic problems, such as tiredness and sadness (Torsheim & Wold, 2001; Wiklund et al., 2012). In addition, students’ perceptions of their school performance were also found to be associated with health outcomes, including with higher life satisfaction (Suldo et al., 2006), better self-rated health and fewer health complaints (Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2004). Some studies also found positive associations between students’ actual school performance (school grades) and their health perceptions (Piko, 2007) and health outcomes (Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2004). In addition, in a longitudinal study, Herd (2010) found that school performance was linked to health outcomes in later life, as well.

Perceptions of the school environment were previously found to be related not only to young people’s general health outcomes but also to their mental health. In a study of early adolescents, perceptions of school belonging and within-school relationships were associated with fewer mental health problems (Gaete et al., 2016). Similarly, school functioning (fewer school problems) was found associated with fewer symptoms of anxiety and depression, more so for boys than girls (Derdikman-Eiron et al., 2011). Some research also found negative correlations between students’ perceived or actual school performance and depression (Cole et al., 2001; Fröjd et al., 2008; Huang, 2015; Rodelović et al., 2015; Undheim & Sund, 2005).

The evidence, therefore, shows that students’ school perceptions and their links with health outcomes are dependent on gender. In several studies, stress related to school was particularly associated with various symptoms of mental health problems, such as depression, aggression, and anxiety. Substantial variability was found regarding the strength of these links between genders (see, for example, Little & Garber, 2004; Moksnes et al., 2013). While in some cases stronger associations between school-related stress and depression (Sund et al., 2003) and aggression (Little & Garber, 2004) were found among boys, in other studies stronger associations were found among girls for depression (Khanehkeshi & Basavarajappa, 2011; Little & Garber, 2004), aggression (Khanehkeshi & Basavarajappa, 2011) and anxiety (Wiklund et al., 2012). As argued by Moksnes and colleagues (2013), the gender-dependent impact of school stress might be related to the type of stress members of each gender are experiencing at school. The authors found positive associations between general school stress and depression among girls, while stress related to school performance was positively associated with depression and anxiety among boys (Moksnes et al., 2013).

In Slovenia, a few previous studies on perceptions of the school environment have given mixed results. On the one hand, the school was found to be the most important stressor for young people (Koštal, 2000; Lovenjak & Peklaj, 2016). On the other hand, more recent cross-national studies have indicated that Slovenian students spend a relatively small amount of their time occupied with school activities. For example, analysing Slovenian Youth 2013 data, Tavčar Krajnc and colleagues (2014) found that Slovenian youth spend the least amount of their time studying, as compared to other youth in the region. The most substantial proportion of Slovenian youth (38%) reported studying up to one hour per day, while in Kosovo, the largest proportion (31%) of youth reported studying 2-3 hours daily. In addition, 19% of Slovenian youth said that everyday life in their school/university was “(very) difficult and stressful”, compared to 28% in Croatia and 30% in Kosovo.

Several mechanisms that might play a role in the positive impact of habitus on health deserve mentioning. Ravens-Sieberer and colleagues (2009), for example, found that school climate, demands and adjustment impact satisfaction with life, which then improves health. Educational habitus, including academic achievement, might play a role in the formation of positive self-concepts such as self-esteem and internal locus of control (Bodovski, 2015), which may in turn increase general wellbeing (Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009). An unfavourable school environment, on the other hand, may have a detrimental impact on health behaviours, increasing the odds of smoking,

alcohol use and other unhealthy behaviours (Lazzeri et al., 2014; McLellan et al., 1999). For example, Jamal and colleagues (2013, 5) emphasize that “*where young people feel educationally marginalised and/or unsafe [...] the process of identity construction based on aggression and substance use appears to be an important source of bonding, social support and security*”. Higher perceived social support in school, on the other hand, might be positively related to health and wellbeing (Sonmark & Modin, 2017), for example, via better coping with school-related and other stressors (Rosvall, 2019), which could also be efficiently promoted through school-based mental health promotion programmes (Fenwick-Smith et al., 2018).

### STUDY AIM

Despite previous studies on the importance of the school environment for European and Slovenian youth, there has not yet been a comprehensive analysis of the health impact of young people’s perceptions of the school and educational environment (educational habitus) using various measures of health and health behaviours, as well as different measures of educational habitus. The present research aimed to fill this gap and to examine whether educational habitus is related to subjective health outcomes and health behaviours among Slovenian youth, and to investigate differences in the associations according to respondents’ gender. We frame our analysis within Bourdieu’s perspective on the importance of cultural capital for one’s success in life and youth outcomes, and on the importance of (educational) habitus. We examine the relationship among various indicators of adolescent educational habitus and subjective health and substance use, using a subsample of school-enrolled youth from a nationally representative survey sample of young people from the Slovenian Youth 2013 Study (Flere et al., 2014).

### METHODOLOGY

#### Sample

The Cepyus-FES Slovenian Youth 2013 Study consisted of a stratified quota sample. The target population surveyed were Slovenian youth residing in the Republic of Slovenia and who were on May 28th, 2013, aged between 16 and 27 years. The sample consisted of 907 respondents ( $N = 907$ ;  $M_{\text{age}} = 21.90$ ;  $SD = 3.25$ ; 48.3% women). The survey was conducted between May 29th and July 20th in the form of a face-to-face interview within respondents’ households (for details on sampling and data collection, see Flere & Divjak, 2014). We carried out our analysis on a subsample of school-enrolled young people ( $n = 608$ ;  $M_{\text{age}} = 20.9$  years).

### Measures

#### Health outcomes

We examined four single-item indicators of subjective health and four measures of substance use. Single item measures have become “*the norm for measuring overall health in population studies published in the international literature*” (Rohrer et al., 2005, 438). First, we employed the most frequently used indicator of *self-rated health*: “In general, how would you rate your health? Would you say it is?” (1 = poor; 5 = excellent). *Self-perceived stress* was measured with the following question: “How often would you say you experience stress? ‘Stress’ refers to a situation in which a person feels tense, restless, nervous or anxious and is out focus.” The responses in our questionnaire were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = “Never or a few times per year”; 5 = “Most days per week”. *Self-reported depression* was measured with the following question: “How much did the following statement apply to you over the past week? In the past week, I felt sad and depressed” (1 = did not apply to me at all; 4 = applied to me very much). We also used a single-item measure of *self-rated mental health*: “In general, would you say your mental health is...?” (1 = poor; 5 = excellent). Finally, we also measured satisfaction with life (1 = completely unsatisfied; 10 = completely satisfied). We analysed five items separately, and we also carried out exploratory factor analysis, where one factor emerged. We standardized all five measures and created a summation scale of a five-item overall subjective health (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.67$ ), which was also analysed as the outcome variable in bivariate and multivariate analyses. To carry out ordinal regression analysis, we ranked respondents into quartiles (1 = lowest subjective health; 4 = highest subjective health).

We measured substance use with four items. *Alcohol use* was measured with a question: “Do you drink alcohol?” (1 = yes, regularly (every day); 2 = yes, several time a week; 3 = on weekends; 4 = rarely; 5 = never), while *tobacco use* was tapped with the question “Do you smoke tobacco/cigarettes” (1 = yes, regularly (every day); 2 = occasionally; 3 = non-smoker). In addition, illegal substance use was tapped with questions about the *frequency of soft drugs* (marijuana, hashish) and *hard drugs* use (cocaine, heroin, ‘speed’, LSD, ecstasy) (1 = never; 2 = once; 3 = 2-5 times; 4 = more than five times). As with subjective health variables, we standardized all four measures and created a summation scale of a four-item substance use scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.63$ ), which was also analysed as the outcome variable in bivariate and multivariate analyses. When performing ordinal regression analyses, we ranked respondents into quartiles. For ease of interpretation, those

respondents who reported the worst health behaviour were ranked in the lowest quartile (1 = highest substance use; 4 = lowest substance use).

### **Educational habitus**

The concept of habitus has previously been operationalized in a variety of ways. We aimed to examine young people's habitus in the educational (school) field, i.e. educational habitus. We included six indicators of habitus, which refer to one's (educational) dispositions, behaviours and outcomes. First, *perceived school stressfulness* was measured with the following question: "What is your opinion about studying at the school/faculty you are enrolled in?" (1 = Very difficult and very stressful; 5 = Very easy and without stress).

Second, *satisfaction with the educational system* in Slovenia was tapped with the question: "In general, how satisfied are you with the quality of education in Slovenia?" (1 = Very dissatisfied; 5 = Very satisfied). Third, satisfaction with attending one's school (*school adjustment*) was measured with the question: "Would you say that you go to the school/faculty you are enrolled in ...?" (1 = Very reluctantly; 5 = Very eagerly).

We also measured young people's expectations of getting a job. We asked whether respondents believed they would get a job after finishing school. While not all jobs are alike, in a social climate with increasing youth unemployment, caused by structural and labour market changes in recent decades, expectations regarding acquiring a job may reveal one's habitus. The question for measuring *job prospects* was: "Do you think that after finishing undergraduate/postgraduate study, it will be possible for you to find a job?" (1 = No, I do not believe that I will find a job quickly; 2 = Yes, I will find a job after some time; 3 = Yes, I will find a job immediately after).

Finally, we also tapped *average school grade* in the previous year with a 4-point scale (1 = Between 1-2 /unsatisfactory-satisfactory (students: between 5-6); 4 = Between 4-5/very good-excellent (students: between 8-10) and the *average amount of studying daily* (in hours). Both were included not only as important indicators relating to school outcomes but also since these were examined in previous studies on the link between school perceptions and youth wellbeing.

### **Control variables**

Several control variables were included in our regression models. Age (from 16 to 27 years), gender (1 = male; 2 = female), *paternal and maternal education* (1 = primary school or less; 2 = completed high school; 3 = higher education), *self-assessed family economic/material status* (1 = highly below average;

10 = highly above average) and *size of the residential settlement* (1 = less than 2,000 inhabitants; 4 = more than 100,000 inhabitants) were included as standard sociodemographic controls.

To eliminate the confounding effect of parenting on the habitus-health link, we included *parenting styles* as controls, since parenting has previously been found as a consistent link to both youth educational and health outcomes. We measured *parenting style* with nine items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "very uncharacteristic of me"; 5 = "very characteristic of me"), which were adapted from a study on parenting by Robinson and colleagues (1995). Respondents were asked how they were treated by their parents when they were elementary school pupils. The three *authoritative parenting style* items measured were: "My parents were aware of my problems or concerns about school."; "My parents gave me reasons why rules should be obeyed." and "My parents allowed me to give input into family rules." A summation scale of authoritative parenting was created, with Cronbach's alpha reaching 0.67. The three *permissive parenting style* items were: "If I caused a commotion about something, my parents usually gave in to my wish", "I was given rewards (toys, candies etc.) in order to behave well", "My parents threatened punishments that were never implemented in practice" (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.65$ ). Finally, *authoritarian parenting* items were "My parents yelled or shouted at me if I misbehaved", "If I did not meet my parents' expectations, I was scolded and criticized" and "I was slapped if I misbehaved" (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.72$ ).

### **Plan of analysis**

In the Results section, we first examine bivariate associations (Spearman's rho) between educational habitus indicators and subjective health and substance use and control variables at the total sample level. We then perform ordinal regression analyses with habitus indicators as predictors variables due to the ordinal health and substance use indicators. We also include interaction variables in our models to examine whether gender moderates the associations between perceived habitus and overall subjective health and substance use. Habitual indicators were dichotomized in multivariate analyses.

### **RESULTS**

Table 1 shows the determinants of educational habitus as indicated by bivariate analysis. We investigated 66 associations between subjective health outcomes and substance use and educational habitus indicators. Twenty-five (38%) of these coefficients were statistically significant, indicating the impor-

**Table 1: Determinants of educational habitus (bivariate analysis) (Flere et al., 2014).****Tabela 1: Dejavniki izobraževalnega habitusa (bivariatna analiza) (Flere et al., 2014).**

	Perceived school stressfulness	Average academic grade	Hours of studying daily	Satisfaction with the educational system in Slovenia	School adjustment	Job expectations
SRH				0.15**		0.12*
STRESS	0.18***		-0.12**	0.16***		
DEP.						
SRMH				0.14***		
LS		0.10*		0.22***	0.18***	0.16**
Subjective health				0.22**	0.12*	0.13*
Alcohol use	-0.13**		0.09*			
Tobacco use	-0.10*	0.15***	0.11**	0.09*		
Soft drugs					0.09*	
Hard drugs					0.11**	
Total substance use	-0.10*	0.10*	0.13**		0.13**	
Gender (male)	-0.10*	0.18***	0.22***		0.19***	-0.14*
Age		0.13**	0.13**	-0.09*	0.09*	-0.11*
Father's education						
Mother's education						
Family economic status				0.14***		0.13*
Size of residential settlement						
Authoritative parenting		0.15***	0.14***		0.17***	
Permissive parenting			-0.09*		-0.08*	
Authoritarian parenting		-0.09*	-0.11*			

Note: \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Only significant correlations are shown ( $p < 0.05$ ). Higher scores on health variables indicate more favourable health outcomes. Higher scores on school variables indicate higher values on educational habitus.

tance of educational habitus for the health outcomes and health-risk behaviours of Slovenian youth. Satisfaction with the educational system in Slovenia was the most consistent habitus correlate of subjective health outcomes, as it proved associated with four out of five subjective health measures and with the overall subjective health scale. More satisfied youngsters reported higher satisfaction with life ( $\rho = 0.22$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ), lower stress levels ( $\rho = 0.16$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ), better self-rated health ( $\rho = 0.15$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) and mental health ( $\rho = 0.14$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ), and better overall subjective health ( $\rho = 0.22$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ). There were also several other significant habitus correlates of subjective health (see Table 1). School adjustment and job expectation were also significant correlates of overall subjective health.

= 0.22;  $p < 0.001$ ), lower stress levels ( $\rho = 0.16$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ), better self-rated health ( $\rho = 0.15$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) and mental health ( $\rho = 0.14$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ), and better overall subjective health ( $\rho = 0.22$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ). There were also several other significant habitus correlates of subjective health (see Table 1). School adjustment and job expectation were also significant correlates of overall subjective health.

**Table 2: The impact of control variables on subjective health and substance use (bivariate analysis) (Flere et al., 2014).**  
**Tabela 2: Odnos med kontrolnimi spremenljivkami in subjektivnim zdravjem ter uporabo substanc (bivariatna analiza) (Flere et al., 2014).**

	SRH	STRESS	DEP.	SRMH	LS	Subjective health	Alcohol use	Tobacco use	Soft drugs	Hard drugs	Total substance use
Gender (female)	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.22***	-0.14***	-0.08***	-0.25***	0.18***		0.09*		0.10*
Age							-0.09*	-0.10*	-0.18***	-0.15***	-0.19***
Father's education	0.13**					0.10*	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.16***		-0.17***
Mother's education							-0.12**		-0.18***		-0.16***
Family economic status	0.16*	0.14***	0.11**	0.19***	0.39***	0.29***	-0.09*				
Size of residential settlement											
Authoritative parenting				0.16***	0.27***	.018***		0.11**	0.09*	0.10*	0.13***
Permissive parenting	0.08*								-0.13***	-0.17***	-0.15***
Authoritarian parenting			-0.15***		-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.10*		-0.10**	-0.18***	-0.16***

Notes: \* < 0.05; \*\* < 0.01; \*\*\* < 0.001. Only significant correlations ( $p < 0.05$ ) are shown. Higher scores on health variables indicate more favourable health outcomes. Higher scores on school variables indicate higher values on educational habitus.

Habitus measures were found to be even more consistently linked with substance use than with subjective health. School adjustment was the most consistent habitus correlate of substance use, with four out of five coefficients being significant. Total substance use correlated with four out of six habitus measures, three of them being positive, indicating a favourable impact of habitus on lowering the frequency of substance use. Table 1 also shows that out of 25 significant coefficients, only four were negative, while 21 were positive, indicating an overall favourable impact of educational habitus on better subjective health and lower substance use. Finally, Table 1 also shows that several control variables were linked with habitus, mostly in the anticipated direction, with few exceptions (e.g., residential settlement proved non-significant). Authoritative parenting had

a significant positive impact on habitus, while both permissive and authoritarian parenting had a negative impact, confirming the need for these to be controlled for in our multivariate models.

Before turning to the multivariate analyses, Table 2 shows that control and confounding variables also impact subjective health and substance use: gender, age, parental education, family economic status and parenting styles have an impact on subjective health and substance use. Since size of residential settlement again proved to be non-significant, we did not include it in our multivariate analyses. As with the results of habitus correlates in Table 1, Table 2 indicates that authoritative parenting has a favourable impact on better subjective health and lower substance use, while both permissive and authoritarian parenting styles show a deleterious effect on youth. This again confirms the

**Table 3: Ordinal regression analysis (parameter estimates) for predicting overall subjective health among Slovenian youth (Fleure et al., 2014).****Tabela 3: Ordinalna regresijska analiza (ocena parametrov) napovedovanja subjektivnega zdravja slovenske mladine (Fleure et al., 2014).**

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Gender (female)	-2.5	1.74	2.14	1	0.144	-5.96	0.87
Age	0.07	0.06	1.41	1	0.235	-0.04	0.18
Father's education (low group)	-0.53	0.50	1.12	1	0.290	-1.52	0.46
Father's education (middle group)1	-0.37	0.29	1.58	1	0.208	-0.93	0.20
Mother's education (low group)	0.36	0.46	0.61	1	0.435	-0.54	1.26
Mother's education (middle group)2	0.17	0.29	0.34	1	0.558	-0.40	0.74
Family economic status	0.34	0.09	14.56	1	0.010	0.16	0.51
Authoritative parenting	0.45	0.14	10.46	1	0.001	0.18	0.73
Permissive parenting	1.12	0.15	0.66	1	0.417	-0.17	0.41
Authoritarian parenting	-0.45	0.15	8.58	1	0.003	-0.748	-0.15
Average grade	0.18	0.83	0.05	1	0.824	-1.44	1.81
Hours studying	0.30	0.83	0.13	1	0.722	-1.33	1.92
Satisfaction with educational system	0.36	0.79	0.21	1	0.646	-1.19	1.91
School adjustment	0.72	0.83	0.74	1	0.388	-0.91	2.34
Perceived school stressfulness	-1.35	0.86	2.38	1	0.123	-3.06	0.37
Job expectations	-1.24	0.85	2.11	1	0.146	-2.91	0.43
Average grade x Gender	-0.02	0.51	0.01	1	0.973	-1.01	0.97
Hours studying x Gender	-0.34	0.52	0.44	1	0.507	-1.36	0.67
Satisfaction with educational system x Gender	0.11	0.48	0.05	1	0.819	-0.84	1.06
School adjustment x Gender	-0.39	0.50	0.63	1	0.427	-1.37	0.58
Perceived school stressfulness x Gender	0.66	0.51	1.63	1	0.201	-0.35	1.67
Job expectations x Gender	0.92	0.51	3.26	1	0.071	-0.08	1.93

Note: 1 = reference group is father's high-education group. 2 = reference group is the mother's high-education group.

**Table 4: Ordinal regression analysis (parameter estimates) for predicting overall substance use among Slovenian youth (Fleure et al., 2014).****Tabela 4: Ordinalna regresijska analiza (ocena parametrov) napovedovanja uporabe substanc slovenske mladine (Fleure et al., 2014).**

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Gender (female)	-2.36	1.75	1.83	1	0.176	-5.79	1.06
Age	-0.04	0.06	0.52	1	0.470	-0.15	0.07
Father's education (low group)	1.09	0.52	4.30	1	0.038	0.06	2.11
Father's education (middle group)1	0.04	0.29	0.02	1	0.880	-0.52	0.61
Mother's education (low group)	0.65	0.46	1.94	1	0.163	-0.26	1.56
Mother's education (middle group)2	0.53	0.29	3.42	1	0.064	-0.03	1.10
Family economic status	-0.06	0.09	0.48	1	0.487	-0.23	0.11
Authoritative parenting	0.06	0.14	0.21	1	0.647	-0.21	0.33
Permissive parenting	-0.38	0.15	6.72	1	0.010	-0.70	-0.09
Authoritarian parenting	-0.25	0.15	2.75	1	0.097	-0.54	0.05
Average grade	-0.35	0.83	0.18	1	0.673	-1.98	1.28
Hours studying	-1.69	0.83	4.16	1	0.041	-3.32	-0.07
Satisfaction with educational system	-0.55	0.79	0.49	1	0.484	-2.10	0.10
School adjustment	2.20	0.84	6.86	1	0.009	0.56	3.85
Perceived school stressfulness	-0.53	0.87	0.37	1	0.541	-2.23	1.17
Job expectations	-0.25	0.85	0.09	1	0.766	-1.91	1.41
Average grade x Gender	0.30	0.51	0.36	1	0.548	-0.69	1.30
Hours studying x Gender	1.19	0.52	5.29	1	0.022	0.18	2.21
Satisfaction with educational system x Gender	0.48	0.49	0.98	1	0.321	-0.47	1.43
School adjustment x Gender	-0.10	0.50	3.97	1	0.046	-1.98	-0.02
Perceived school stressfulness x Gender	0.15	0.51	0.09	1	0.768	-0.85	1.15
Job expectations x Gender	0.18	0.51	0.13	1	0.724	-0.82	1.18

Note: 1 = reference group is father's high-education group. 2 = reference group is mother's high-education group.

need for parenting styles to be controlled for in multivariate analysis, to provide a more thorough test of the health-impact of educational habitus.

In Table 3 and Table 4 we present the results of two ordinal regression analyses as a more stringent test of the impact of educational habitus on subjective health and substance use, with sociodemographic, socioeconomic and parenting control variables included in regression models. In addition, we included six interaction terms between gender and habitus indicators in each regression model to test whether gender moderates the impact of habitus on overall subjective health and substance use.

Table 3 shows the regression model predicting overall subjective health. The full model was significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) and explained 24.9% of the variance (Nagelkerke) in overall subjective health. Among demographic and socioeconomic control variables, only family economic status proved a significant predictor of better subjective health (see estimated coefficients in Table 3). Two additional controls proved significant: authoritative parenting improved subjective health, while authoritarian parenting decreased it. Taking into account the control variables, neither the six habitus indicators nor the interaction terms proved significant predictors of subjective health.

Table 4 shows the ordinal regression model predicting youth substance use. The full model was significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) and explained 17.1% of the variance (Nagelkerke) in overall substance use. Among control variables, lower paternal education proved a predictor of *lower* substance use. Additionally, among parenting controls, permissive parenting proved to have a deleterious impact on substance use, i.e. increasing substance use frequency. Taking into account the control variables, two of the six habitus indicators proved significant predictors of substance use at the total sample level. A lower number of hours studying and better school adjustment decreased substance use frequency, while the other four habitus predictors proved non-significant.

In addition, both significant habitus predictors of substance use also interacted with gender. Among men, fewer hours studying was linked with more frequent substance use, while among women, more hours studying was linked with lower substance use. The second significant interaction term was between school adjustment and gender. While better school adjustment was linked with less frequent substance use in both genders, the health beneficial effect of school adjustment was significantly higher among men than among women. Our results thus indicate that habitus indicators have no impact on overall subjective health and that gender plays no moderating role. On the other hand, the hours spent studying

for school obligations and school adjustment predict substance use over and above several control variables. In addition, gender moderates their impact on substance use: hours studying is protective for women (but a risk for substance use among men), and school adjustment is more protective for men's substance use than women's.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

School contexts have a significant impact on the health and wellbeing of school-enrolled youth (Langford et al., 2014; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009; Suldo et al., 2006). In our study, several significant bivariate associations were found between educational habitus and health outcomes. On the other hand, multivariate analyses indicated that when controls and confounders were included in the model, habitus did not play as significant a role in Slovenian youth's subjective health. However, it did play a role in the young people's health behaviours.

Among the habitus indicators we analysed in the bivariate analysis, satisfaction with the educational system in Slovenia was positively associated with the largest number of subjective health indicators. At the total sample level, students who were more satisfied with the educational system also reported better self-rated health and mental health, less perceived stress, higher life satisfaction and better overall subjective health. It needs to be emphasized that satisfaction with the educational system might be a reflection (i.e. a consequence) of one's experiences with school and could then determine one's actions within the school field. In this sense, satisfaction with the educational system might function as habitus typically does: as a system of "*durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures*" (Bourdieu, 1990, 53). As Edgerton and Roberts (2014, 198) put it, "*As the circumstances of one's social origins – and associated life chances – tend to influence one's perceptual and behavioral dispositions, so too do one's consequent actions (practices) tend to contribute to the perpetuation or reinforcement of like circumstances and life chances.*" Satisfaction with the educational system thus is reflected by it, while at the same time, it guides one's action within the educational field. More importantly, our multivariate models indicate that the educational satisfaction indicator might only be a proxy for some other determinant of health and substance use, e.g., family socioeconomic status or parenting styles, which shows the importance of including relevant controls when examining the health impact of habitus.

Contrary to some previous studies (e.g., Piko, 2007; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2004), in our study, the academic grade was not a significant correlate of overall subjective health, nor substance use when

controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables and parenting confounders. Our results indicate that future studies of academic outcomes should increase the focus on outcomes other than academic achievement, since other educational and school variables might play as important a role as the academic grade, including on health-related outcomes and behaviours.

We also found that gender moderated the association between educational habitus and substance use, but not subjective health. This is not in line with some previous studies, where stronger associations of the perceived school environment with subjective health outcomes were detected among women (Aanesen et al., 2017; Eriksson & Sellström, 2010; Låftman & Modin, 2012; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009; Wiklund et al., 2012). Compared to Slovenia, in other countries school perceptions seem to play a more critical role in the health outcomes of women, which may partly be due to the higher expectations of parents and teachers regarding the importance of educational achievement for girls. In our study, gender did moderate the habitus' health impact on substance use. The results indicate that a higher number of hours studying is protective against women's substance use, but a risk factor for men. It may be that a higher number of hours spent studying among men is an indicator of having difficulties with school subjects or assignments, or a potential indicator of male students also having other types of school problems (e.g., school deviance), which could partly explain the association of the number of hours studying with more frequent substance use among men. Among women, on the other hand, the number of hours studying may be more a proxy for their diligence and higher school motivation (e.g., putting in additional studying time to get a maximum grade). Future studies should examine these gender differences in more detail.

Previous studies of the health of Slovenian youth have detected relatively low levels of socioeconomic inequality, with family and parental socioeconomic status proving to be a weak or insignificant predictor of young people's health (e.g. Kirbiš & Tavčar Krajnc, 2014; Kirbiš & Tement, 2014). In our study, we found that one's educational habitus also does not play a significant role in youngsters' subjective health but does play a role in their substance use. Future studies should investigate what determinants impact the health of Slovenian youth, including other indicators of habitus, e.g. cultural participation. In future studies on the health-impact of habitus, researchers should investigate the potential moderating role of age and type of schooling, since, at higher levels of education, specific school environment characteristics may become more pronounced concerning health (e.g., Klinger, 2015; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009).

Although our study results point to some interesting results, the study implications are limited, owing to the use of several general educational indicators. For example, is satisfaction with the educational system perhaps a proxy for some more immediate determinant, such as teacher-student relationship (see, for example, Košir & Tement, 2014)? To investigate the role of the type of schooling, and in particular gender and parental education in these associations, future studies should include additional measures of subjective health, for example, specific mental health indicators (e.g., anxiety, aggression) and other health-behaviours, including fruit and vegetable consumption, junk food and meat consumption and frequency of physical activity. Moreover, since sources of school stress might vary at different stages of education and between genders (e.g., Klinger, 2015; Moksnes et al., 2013; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2009), measuring different types of school stressfulness might also contribute to a more detailed analysis. Finally, the direction of the causality between the variables in our study remains unclear, owing to the cross-sectional nature of the Slovenian Youth 2013 Study data. It may be, for example, that substance use decreases students' wellbeing in school, their positive perceptions of the school environment, satisfaction with the educational system and their school adjustment. These are all possibilities that need to be examined in future research, preferably with panel data. Broadening the scope of examined health measures in future studies to include various dimensions of health – such as physical health, mental health, subjective wellbeing, but also health-behaviours such as substance use – is critical for successful future interventions for improving youth health outcomes. Substance use, in particular, is becoming more widespread and problematic among Slovenian youth and thus needs to be focused on; a recent cross-national HBSC study of 45 countries, for example, indicated that in 2018 Slovenian adolescents rank third in the frequency of marijuana use (Inchley et al., 2020).

Despite limitations, our study indicates that several examined indicators of educational habitus may have an impact on health-related outcomes of Slovenian youth. Improving the experience of attending a school (school adjustment), increasing satisfaction with the Slovenian educational system and decreasing the time needed to study (among men) might have a particularly positive impact on young people's health behaviours and outcomes. Of course, this should not be done by increasing specific non-productive and potentially deleterious socialization patterns in school. An example is the negative impact of permissive parenting detected in our study, which suggests that authoritative socialization – by parents and teachers – should be more widely implemented, i.e. by adults setting firm rules, but also providing support to students. Our

results also suggest that decision-makers and education professionals (e.g., school counsellors, teachers) should focus on policies and intervention health programmes that are tailored to specific subgroups of students. They should consider gender, as well as target specific dimensions of the school environment and experiences. This is crucial, since school and educational processes may impact not only students'

educational and professional outcomes but also their health-related outcomes (e.g., Lazzari et al., 2014; McLellan et al., 1999; Ravens-Sieberer et al., 2004; Shek & Li, 2016; Suldo & Huebner, 2006), although the impact seems less pronounced in Slovenia. Future studies should further investigate which cultural, social or economic resources play the most significant role in youth's wellbeing.

## VPLIV IZOBRAŽEVALNEGA HABITUSA NA SUBJEKTIVNO ZDRAVJE IN UPORABO SUBSTANC TER MODERATORSKA VLOGA SPOLA: ANALIZA REPREZENTATIVNE RAZISKAVE SLOVENSKE MLADINE

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### POVZETEK

Namen naše raziskave je bil preučiti odnos med različnimi kazalniki izobraževalnega habitusa, subjektivnega zdravja ter uporabe substanc, ob tem pa smo preučili tudi moderatorsko vlogo spola. Izvedli smo analizo podvzorca šolajočih se mladih, zajetih v anketnih podatkih nacionalnega reprezentativnega vzorca raziskave Slovenian youth 2013, v kateri so ciljno populacijo predstavljeni prebivalci s stalnim prebivališčem v Republiki Sloveniji, stari od 16 let do 27 let ( $N = 608$ ,  $M_{starost} = 20,9$  leta). Zdravstvene izide smo preučili s petimi kazalniki subjektivnega zdravja (samoocenjeno zdravje, duševno zdravje, pogostost doživljanja stresa, samoocenjena depresivnost in zadovoljstvo z življenjem) in štirimi kazalniki uporabe substanc (pogostost uživanja alkohola, kajenja ter uporabe mehkih in trdih drog). Izobraževalni habitus smo merili s samoocenjeno težavnostjo šolanja, šolskim uspehom, povprečnim dnevnim številom ur učenja/študiranja, zadovoljstvom z izobraževalnim sistemom v Sloveniji, (ne) pripravljenostjo obiskovanja šole in pričakovanji mladostnika glede težavnosti pridobitve zaposlitve po koncu šolanja. Rezultati so pokazali, da: 1) je bila statistično značilna dobra tretjina bivariatnih korelacijskih koeficientov med kazalniki habitusa in zdravstvenimi kazalniki; 2) je bilo zadovoljstvo z izobraževalnim sistemom v Sloveniji v bivariatnih analizah najbolj konsistentno povezano s kazalniki subjektivnega zdravja, z uporabo drog pa šolska prilagojenost; 3) sta v multivariatnih analizah ob vključitvi vrste socioekonomskih in starševskih kontrolnih spremenljivk le v dveh primerih kazalnika habitusa izmed dvanajstih ostala statistično značilna napovedovalca (zgolj uporabe substanc); 4) je spol moderiral odnos dveh kazalnikov izobraževalnega habitusa z uporabo substanc, ne pa tudi s subjektivnim zdravjem. Prispevek sklenemo z implikacijami rezultatov.

**Ključne besede:** izobraževalni habitus, neenakosti v zdravju, zaznave šolskega okolja, spol, kulturni kapital

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## ITALIJANSKI IN SLOVENSKI JEZIK EKONOMIJE IN POSLOVANJA: ANGLICIZMI MED CITATNIMI ZAPISI IN POMENSKIMI KALKI

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### IZVLEČEK

*Anglicizmi nenehno vstopajo v italijanski in slovenski jezik ekonomije in poslovanja. Prispevek najprej raziskuje njihovo prisotnost v večjezičnem slovarju borznštva in ugotavlja, da se italijanski jezik pogosteje zateka k rabi angleških citatnih leksemov kot slovenski. Nato sledi razvrstitev anglicizmov v tri skupine glede na to, kako jih sprejemata oba prejemna jezika. Prva skupina zajema termine, ki so v italijanščini sprejeti kot citatno zapisani anglicizmi, v slovenskem jeziku pa na njihovem mestu najdemo citatni zapis ali funkcionalno ustrezničico. V drugo skupino so vključeni termini, ki se v italijanščini pojavljajo zlasti kot citatni zapisi, pogosto pa tudi kot pomenski kalki. Na istem mestu se v slovenščini uporablja pomenski kalk ali prevodni ustrezničnik. Zadnja skupina obsega termine, ki so včasih v obeh jezikih prejemnikih sprejeti kot citatni zapisi, najpogosteje pa kot pomenski kalki ali kot ustrezni prevedki. V zaključnem delu prispevek navaja mogočne razloge za pogosto pojavljanje anglicizmov v obeh jezikih prejemnikih.*

**Ključne besede:** anglicizem, citatni zapis, jezik stroke, pomenski kalk, spletni slovar

## ITALIAN AND SLOVENIAN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS VOCABULARY: ANGLICISMS AS CITATION LOANS AND SEMANTIC CALQUES

### ABSTRACT

*Anglicisms related to economics and business are constantly entering Italian and Slovenian. This article examines their presence in a multilingual glossary of stock exchange terms, showing that Italian makes use of citation loans more often than Slovenian. This is followed by a classification of the Anglicisms into three groups based on how the vocabulary is received by the two languages. The first group comprises English terms that are accepted in Italian as citation loans, whereas in Slovenian they appear as both loanwords and calques. The second group includes English terms that appear in Italian mainly as citation loans, but often also as semantic calques. In such cases, Slovenian uses a semantic calque of the term or its translation. The third group contains English terms that are sometimes accepted as loanwords in both languages, but for which both languages often make recourse to semantic calques or translations. The final part of the article outlines possible reasons for the frequent presence of Anglicisms in both recipient languages.*

**Keywords:** Anglicism, citation loan, LSP, semantic calque, online dictionary

## UVOD

Raba anglicizmov oz. anglo-ameriških terminov v različnih jezikih je že nekaj časa predmet lingvističnih in sociolinguističnih raziskav, ki se osredinjajo bodisi na splošni jezik (npr. Poplack & Dion, 2012; Gudurić & Drobniak, 2014; Clavería, 2015; Lino, 2015; Polok, 2017) bodisi na jezik stroke (Rosati, 2006; Dankić & Krstanović, 2011; Premrov, 2013; Kostelet Cvitković, 2014; Gilioli, 2014; Scarpa, 2014; Šabec, 2014; Petrov, 2015; Mackevic & Tcaciu, 2016; Čepon, 2017 idr.) in pri tem proučujejo jezikovne spremembe, ki potekajo v jeziku prejemniku ali, z drugimi besedami, v ciljnem jeziku oz. v prejemnem jeziku. Še pred desetletjem ali dvema je veljalo, da je strokovni jezik za pojav anglicizmov dovtrejšji kot splošni jezik (Bosnar-Valković, 2005, 170; Bombi, 2006, 615; D'Achille, 2006, 78), da se vpliv angleškega jezika prenaša preko pisnega prenosnika in da anglicizme uporablajo zlasti izobraženci, v zadnjih nekaj letih pa se je položaj povsem spremenil. Anglo-ameriški termini danes prodirajo v splošni jezik, uporablajo jih pripadniki različnih izobrazbenih skupin, pojavljajo se v govorjenem diskurzu (Fanfani, 2010) in v pisani besedi, pri kateri v zadnjem obdobju prednjači digitalni diskurz (Šabec, 2013, 300; Lubello, 2014, 72–73).

Ravno tako se je spremenil tudi časovni okvir sprejemanja anglicizmov: še v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja je veljalo, da neologizem iz angleškega jezika potrebuje več let za prilagoditev v jeziku prejemniku, kot povzema Petrov (2015, 5 po Galinsky, 1991, 195), in da gre skozi filter jezikovne presoje (Šabec, 2014, 168). Glede na splošno razširjenost interneta in hitrih povezav pa bi danes lahko rekli, da je za tak prenos potrebnih le nekaj minut (Petrov, 2015, 5) in da je jezikovna presoja pogosto povsem postranskega pomena. Anglicizmi torej prodirajo v vse pore življenja z veliko naglico, pri čemer gre pri nekaterih le za kratkotrajno rabo, drugi pa se ustalijo in postanejo del norme v ciljnem jeziku (Cerruti & Regis, 2015, 42) in s tem tudi del slovarjev (Pulcini & Scarpino, 2016, 504).

Kaj so pravzaprav anglicizmi? Kakor navaja Curk (2015, 63, ki povzema po Kalin Golob, 2001, 240), jih strokovna literatura opredeljuje kot leksikalne prvine, prevzete iz angleškega jezika (gl. tudi Stramlič Breznik, 2008, 150). Termin anglicizem je bil prvič uporabljen v 17. stoletju in se je nanašal na kateri koli izraz iz angleškega jezika, pa tudi na značilnost, modo ali jezikovni element, tipičen za Anglijo (Fischer, 2008, 8). Danes ga najpogosteje povezujemo z naraščajočim vplivom angleščine po drugi svetovni vojni, predvsem pa z mednarodno vlogo Združenih držav Amerike in t. i. mednarodne/spletne/globalne/internetne angleščine (gl. Šabec, 2014, 167) kot *lingue franca* – tj. s terminom, ki ga nasprotniki anglicizmov pogosto uporabljal kot slabšalnico. Sam termin je sicer etimološko povezan z Anglijo, vendar se uporablja tudi za vse izposojenke iz

različnih inačic angleškega jezika (gl. tudi Galinsky, 1991; Fischer, 2008, 8; Polok, 2017, 6), ki jih pogosto najdemo v italijanskem in slovenskem jeziku. Zato si v nadaljevanju najprej oglejmo, kako so angleške prvine obravnavane v literaturi obeh prejemnih jezikov, nato pa rezultate raziskave, ki se osredinjajo predvsem na citatno prevzete anglicizme v jeziku ekonomije in poslovanja, kot jih navaja eden od večjezičnih prostodostopnih slovarjev.

## ANGLICIZMI V ITALIJANSKI IN SLOVENSKI LITERATURI

V italijanskem jeziku se je širša raba anglicizmov začela predvsem po drugi svetovni vojni, ko so Apeninski polotok preplavili izdelki in moda iz ZDA. Tako kot prej v zgodovini, ko so v italijanščino prodirali hispanizmi in francizmi, se je tudi povočno obdobje prevzemanja tujejezikovnih prvin časovno ujemalo z nadvlado nekega naroda v Evropi (gl. Beccaria, 2004, 336; D'Achille, 2006, 75; Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 366). V omenjenem času je italijanska družba doživela globoko preobrazbo: kmetijsko gospodarstvo se je preoblikovalo v pretežno industrijsko, sledila je hitra urbanizacija, začeli so se gospodarski razcvet in spremembe na gospodarsko-političnem področju ter razvoj sredstev množičnega obveščanja. Tej preobrazbi je sledil tudi razvoj različnih področij besedišča: znanstveno-tehničnega jezika, jezika oglaševanja, pa tudi besedišča potrošniške družbe (gl. Dardano & Trifone, 1999, 645; Serianni & Antonelli, 2011, 189–191). S temi področji povezani anglicizmi niso prodirali v italijanski jezik le zaradi razvoja strok, ampak tudi zato, ker je v času predvojnega fašizma prevladoval purizem, ki je z različnimi vladnimi razglasili odklanjal sprejemanje tujih jezikovnih prvin (Beccaria, 2004, 624). Takratna vlada je vodila pravo kampanjo proti tujkam, a poznejši odziv nanjo je bil ravno nasproten od prvotno zastavljenih ciljev: zaradi omejevalne predvojne jezikovne politike je v povočnem obdobju italijanska družba začela še bolj odprt sprejemati neologizme iz tujih jezikovnih okolij (D'Achille, 2006, 75).

V današnjem italijanskem jeziku imajo anglicizmi pomembno vlogo zlasti v informatiki (Beccaria, 2004, 336), kjer bi jih le težko nadomestili z ustreznimi italijanskimi termini, saj bi tvegali izgubo jasnosti in nedvoumnosti diskurza (Tavosanis, 2012, 187). Podobno je v jeziku ekonomije, v kateri so v drugi polovici osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja tradicionalno varčevanje zamenjale bolj tvegane oblike naložb. Čedalje več ljudi se je odločalo za investiranje na borzah, v drugi polovici devetdesetih let pa se je uveljavila še »nova ekonomija« (*new economy*) z vsemi novimi jezikovnimi pojavi vred (Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 367). Povečanje števila anglicizmov v jeziku ekonomije in pri poslovanju se kaže tudi pri tvorjenju besedil italijanske poslovne korespondence (Lenassi, 2013, 230).

Eden redkih jezikov stroke v Italiji, ki uspešno zavirajo rabo anglicizmov, je uradniški jezik (Berruto,

2014, 188), vendar tudi v njem najdemo termine, kot so *planning, briefing, governance* itd. (Lubello, 2014, 70). Podobno težnjo po zaviranju rabe anglicizmov opazimo v jeziku prava, predvsem pri zakonodajnih aktih (zakoni, uredbe itd.). Pri pripravi teh aktov bi moral zakonodajalec uporabljati ali ustvariti termine v svojem jeziku in naj bi se torej za tukaj odločil le, ko posamezni izraz nima ustreznice v zakonodajalčevem pravnem sistemu (Alfieri et al., 2011, 27–28; Chiocchetti et al., 2013).<sup>1</sup>

Podobno velja za slovenski jezik prava. Služba Vlade RS za zakonodajo (2018, 70) v Nomotehničnih smernicah napiše, da je »raba tujke ali sposojenke dopustna (in celo potrebna), kadar v slovenščini ni ustreznega izraza, s katerim je mogoče dovolj natančno izraziti enako; iz tega pravila torej izhaja, da ima raba domačega izraza načeloma vedno prednost pred rabo tujke«. Nadalje beremo tudi, da je »raba tujk pogosteje in lažje sprejemljiva v zakonih in izvršilnih predpisih, ki so v praksi namenjeni ožemu krogu strokovnjakov oziroma specialistov, mnogo manj takih izrazov pa je priporočljivo uporabiti na področjih, na katerih so naslovniki predpisa zelo številni oziroma lahko npr. kar vse fizične in pravne osebe«.

K uspešnemu uveljavljanju anglicizmov v italijanščini so poleg širjenja družbenoekonomskega vpliva ZDA in razvoja posameznih strok pomembno pripomogli tudi nekateri jezikovni vidiki: nekatere strukturne značilnosti angleških besed, kot je kratkost (veliko je enozložnic, priljubljenih v jeziku sredstev množičnega obveščanja), ikoničnost (pogosto imajo onomatopejske značilnosti, ki priomorejo k priljubljenosti v stripih in v jeziku mladih), pogostost zloženk in z njimi povezana možnost »krajšanja«, čeprav včasih neustrezno izpeljana glede na jezik dajalec (*basket* namesto *basket-ball*), ter kratičnost (D'Achille, 2006, 75; Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 368).

Tako kot v italijanskem jeziku je tudi v slovenščini mogoče ugotoviti izrazitejši začetek pojavljanja anglicizmov v 20. stoletju, najprej v obdobju po drugi svetovni vojni, zelo opazno pa zlasti od devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja (Šabec, 2012, 275–275). Najprej je v slovenščino prehajalo predvsem izrazje s tehničnega področja in iz športa, nato pa čedalje bolj tudi z znanstvenoakademskega področja, s katerega se širijo termini na druge zvrsti, kot sta npr. časopisni in praktičnosporazumevalni jezik (Kalin Golob, 2009, 141). Tujejezikovni strokovni termini torej prehajajo v poljudni jezik, s čimer poteka »postrokovljenje« poljudnega jezika oz. terminologizacija (gl. Bokal, 2004, 49).

Prevzemanje tujejezikovnih prvin lahko poteka na različne načine. Vidovič Muha (2013, 24–25) ločuje postopek prevzemanja na izraženo in zakrito prevzemanje oz. kalkiranje. Kalke, nastale pri zakritem prevzemanju, avtorica deli na denotatne, kar pomeni, da so brez de-

notata v jeziku prejemniku (npr. izvorni pojmi iz računalništva), in na pomenske, pri katerih se ohrani izbira pomenskih sestavin jezika dajalca, npr. *server – strežnik; hard disc – trdi disk* (gl. tudi Šabec, 2009, 25; Šabec, 2011, 39–40; Vidovič Muha, 2012; Šabec, 2013, 295). Izraženo prevzemanje deli avtorica na citatnost (izraz se v ciljni jezik prevzame nespremenjen, npr. iz informatike *Shaker, Spy*), polcitatnost (ohranijo se črkovne, lahko tudi glasovne značilnosti jezika dajalca, oblikoslovni in besedotvorni morfemi pa so v jeziku prejemniku, npr. *megabit-ø, -a/-ni*) in sistemsko prevzetost (vključitev v formalni, tudi glasovno-črkovni sistem ciljnega jezika, npr. *animacija, ikona, klik*).<sup>2</sup>

Pri izraženem prevzemanju najdemo tudi ločevanje na citatne lekseme, polcitatne zapise in podomačene zapise (gl. Snoj, 2015, 283–284). Za citatne lekseme je značilno, da je stopnja poslovenjenosti ničta (npr. *wow*). Prva stopnja podomačitve je polcitatni zapis, pri katerem so korenski morfem leksema in njegove tvorjenke v slovenščini zapisani citatno, preostali morfemi ter kategorialne in skladenjske lastnosti pa so že slovenski (npr. *jazz-a, jazzovski*). V zadnji skupini, torej pri podomačenih zapisih, je tudi zapis korenskega morfema skladen z razmerjem črka – *glas* (npr. *tajkun-a*) (v zvezi s prevzemanjem gl. tudi Žele, 2009, 460–461). Norma v slovenskem jeziku spodbuja domačenje prevzetega besedišča: Bizjak Končar in Dobrovolt (2010, 104) ugotavlja, da je v Slovenskem pravopisu 2001, ki ima poudarjeno normativno funkcijo, slovarski prikaz podrejen jezikoslovni odločitvi. Večina izrazov v slovarju je podomačena, ne glede na to, ali je v gradivu tak zapis potren ali ne. O prevzemanju angleških izrazov v izvirni obliki ter o podomačitvi tujega zapisu gl. tudi Pogačnik (2003, 32–33) in Dobrovolt (2009, 6).

V italijanskem jeziku prevzemanje anglicizmov poteka v obliki citatnih leksikalnih enot (ital. *anglicismi integrali*) ali prevodnih in semantičnih kalkov (Cerruti & Regis, 2015, 37–38; Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 116–117), ki pa jih ni vedno lahko prepoznati (gl. Cortelazzo, 2000, 206). Semantični kalk je pojav, pri katerem beseda, ki je že v rabi, dobi nov pomen (npr. *label – etichetta, casa discografica – diskografska hiša*), prevodni kalk pa pomeni nastanek novega termina z italijanskimi leksemi, pri čemer so dobesedno prevedeni posamezni tujejezikovni elementi (npr. *case study – caso (di) studio – študija primera*). Primerjava poimenovanj kalkov v obeh jezikih torej pokaže, da slovenskega poimenovanja pomenski kalk ne moremo enačiti z italijanskim semantičnim oz. pomenskim kalkom, saj se slovenski pomenski kalk ujema z italijanskim prevodnim kalkom. V prispevku je termin pomenski kalk uporabljen tako, kot ga definira slovensko jezikoslovje.

1 V nekaterih pravnih aktih (sodni spisi, tožbe, sodbe itd.) nekateri avtorji zagovarjajo zmerno rabo angleških prvin (gl. Gilioli, 2014, 10–11).

2 V zvezi s prevzemanjem tujejezikovnih prvin gl. tudi Bokal (2009), ki ločuje tri tipe prevzemanja: citate, kalkirano prevzemanje in svobodno prevzemanje, in Skubic (2007), ki razlikuje med pomenskimi in sintaktičnimi kalki.

V italijanščini je skoraj povsem odsotna kategorija podomačene izposojenke oz. sistemski prevzetosti tujih jezikovnih elementov (ital. *prestito adattato*) (Cerruti & Regis, 2015, 37–38).<sup>3</sup> Težnjo k ohranjanju izvirnega zapisa je mogoče pripisati temu, da je večina prevzetih anglicizmov samostalniških besed in ne glagolov. Pri slednjih je fonomorfološko prilaganje nujno zaradi strukture italijanskega jezika (Tavosanis, 2012, 188; Cerruti & Regis, 2015, 37). Tako je mogoče v italijanskem jeziku zaznati veliko izvornih oz. citatno prevzetih anglicizmov: od šestdesetih do devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja so v političnoekonomske besedilih ti narasli kar za 75 % (Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 368). Podomačene zapise je mogoče najti npr. le v forumih, namenjenih manj strokovnim tematikam, vendar imajo takšni zapisi pogosto ironično vrednost, povezano tudi z izgovarjanovo. Zdi se, da jih tvorci besedil uporabljajo prav zaradi ekspresivnosti (Tavosanis, 2012, 188). Pri navajanju razlogov za nedomačenje anglicizmov v italijanskem jeziku pa je treba omeniti še en vidik: zaradi boljšega poznavanja tujega jezika je grafično in fonomorfološko prilaganje redko, kajti zdi se, kot bi šlo za popačene in provincialne reprodukcije tujega modela (Fanfani, 2010).

Kot je bilo že nakazano, je ekonomija eno izmed področij, na katerih so se anglicizmi v italijanskem jeziku široko razmahnili (D'Achille, 2006, 76). Tu je angleščina postala *lingua franca*, sporazumevalni jezik ekonomske globalizacije, ki je privedla do jezikovne internacionalizacije trga dobrin in storitev. Anglicizmi so najprej postali del strokovnega besedišča ljudi, ki se ukvarjajo s poslovanjem, nato pa so se razširili ob pomoči tradicionalnih in digitalnih množičnih medijev. V njih je mogoče najti komentarje o poslovanju na domaćem in mednarodnem trgu, za kar se zanimajo bralci, ki so sočasno kupci, prodajalci in borzni vlagatelji (Malinowska, 2010, 298–299). Značilno področje ekonomije, kjer pogosto naletimo na anglicizme, je trženje, s slabšalnico poimenovano tudi »marketese« (Tavosanis, 2012, 187).

Tudi v slovenskem jeziku ekonomije in poslovanja naletimo na rabo anglicizmov, vendar se, v nasprotju z italijanščino, pogosto uporabljajo podomačeni zapisi, čeprav sta v nekaterih primerih citatni zapis in podomačena inačica lahko skoraj izenačena glede na rabo in torej sobivata (Šabec, 2018, 72–73). Večinoma je mogoče najti ustrezničo v slovenskem jeziku, vendar zaradi veljave in z njim povezanega občutka izjemnosti, privilegiranosti in vključenosti v globalno mrežo poslovnežev tvorci besedil raje uporabljajo angleščino. Ne trudijo se, da bi v materinščini ubesedili zahtevnejše koncepte, kajti maternega jezika ne vidijo kot dovolj dobrega za strokovno izražanje (Šabec, 2014, 172–173).

<sup>3</sup> Vendar opažamo tudi spremembe, zlasti v jeziku informatike, ki se sicer povsem opira na angleščino. Na prehodu v novo tisočletje so bili anglicizmi le redkokdaj osnova za nastanek neologizmov, v zadnjem času pa se je kategorija prilagojenih izposojenk iz angleščine v računalniških krogih številčno precej okreplila (tako najdemo npr. *chat* (angl.) – *chattare* (ital.) – dopisovati si; *click* (angl.) – *cliccare* (ital.) – klikati, klikniti; *post* (angl.) – *postare* (ital.) – objaviti itd.), kot opaža Berruto (2014, 193).

Ta težnja se kaže tudi pri poimenovanju podjetij, čeprav Zakon o javni rabi slovenščine (Ur. I. RS, št. 86/2004 in št. 8/2010) in Zakon o gospodarskih družbah (Ur. I. RS, št. 42/2006), ki urejata področja javne rabe slovenskega jezika, prepoveduje tuja oz. neslovenska poimenovanja za podjetja, kot navaja Čepon (2017, 36).

Ob zaključku pregleda literature si oglejmo še, kakšen je odzivi na prevzemanje anglicizmov v drugih jezikih. Naraščajočemu mednarodnemu vplivu angleščine so nekateri naklonjeni, drugi ga kritizirajo. Na eni strani najdemo tiste, ki poudarjajo politične, gospodarske in kulturne prednosti rabe angleščine, na drugi tiste, ki v angleščini vidijo mogočo grožnjo drugim jezikom in kulturam. Kritike prevlade ali infiltracije ob pomoči tujega jezika so seveda znan pojav. Fischer (2008, 4) poudarja, da je bila do 19. stoletja tarča takšnega nedobravaranja predvsem francoščina, nato je osrednje mesto prevzela angleščina. Avtorica nadalje pojasni, da izposojenke iz drugih jezikov olajšujejo in bogatijo sporazumevanje, saj slej ko prej postanejo del ciljnega jezika in so tako vključene v jezikovno strukturo, da niso več prepoznane kot tujke. Toda anglicizmi niso kritizirani, ker je jezik sredstvo sporazumevanja, temveč zato, ker je jezik simbol nacionalne in kulturne identitete neke gorovne skupnosti. Anglicizmi posebljajo anglofonske ali ameriške strukture in vrednote, to pa je mogoče doživeti kot grožnjo lastnim nacionalnim vrednotam. Nekateri raziskovalci, da bi se izognili negativnim konotacijam angleških izposojenk, predlagajo ločevanje med jezikom komunikacije in jezikom identifikacije (House, 2005, 53–65). Anglicizmi naj bi bili torej sredstvo sporazumevanja in ne identificiranja (gl. Fischer, 2008, 5).

V italijanski literaturi prevladuje mnenje, da je treba do anglicizmov imeti objektiven odnos. Termini, ki jih je mogoče prevesti, so t. i. nepotrebne sposojenke, včasih pa imajo nekateri izrazi posebne pomenske odtenke, ki jih ni mogoče zaslediti v prevodnih ustreznikih. Če je tako, je raba tujk nedvomno upravičena. Anglo-ameriški termini se pogosto uporabljajo tudi zato, ker bi bile njihove ustreznice v jeziku prejemnika dolge besedne zvezze (gl. Rosati, 2006, 19) in bi torej zmanjšvale gospodarnost izražanja. Poleg različnih študij, namenjenih opazovanju in klasifikaciji anglicizmov, je pogosto zaslediti tudi kritičen odnos do tujk, ki gleda na prevzete tuje leksikalne enote kot na barbarizme, ki kvarijo nacionalni jezik (Beccaria, 2004, 335–336; gl. tudi Berruto, 2014, 121–122).

Glede anglicizmov v slovenskem prostoru Kalin Golob (2009, 144–145) ugotavlja, da velik priliv anglicizmov vpliva tudi na purizem: pogosteje ko se tujke pojavljajo, močnejši je odziv nanje. Med drugim ga je mogoče zaznati v nestrnjem odnosu do podjetij, ki se

odločajo za izbiro neslovenskih imen (gl. tudi Čepon, 2017). Kalin Golob (2009, 144–145) poudarja, da sta se skrb za jezik in trud za zaježitev tujk pojavila skupaj s standardnim jezikom in se nadaljujeta tudi v sedanjosti. Ko je v nekaterih obdobjih pritok tujk postal močnejši, se je odpor do njih povečal. Tako je purizem sicer pomagal ohranjati bistvene značilnosti slovenščine, sočasno pa pretirana skrb za jezik lahko ustavlja naravne razvojne trende in postane negativni poskus, ki vnaprej odklanja tuje elemente in ovira bogatenje jezika. Zmerni in pozitivni purizem je srednja pot med skrajnostma, ki skrbita za ohranjanje sistemskih značilnosti jezika in tudi za razvoj njegovih izraznih možnosti.

#### METODOLOGIJA

Raziskava je razdeljena na dva dela. V prvem smo opazovali rabo anglicizmov v spletnem prostodostopnem večjezičnem terminološkem slovarju *Delnice za začetnike* s 337 gesli, ki ga najdemo na portalu Evroterm. Vsaka slovarska iztočnica obsega angleški termin s prevodno ustreznico v slovenskem, nemškem, francoskem in italijanskem jeziku. Nato sledi kratka definicija v angleškem jeziku. Ta slovar je bil izbran za proučevanje, da bi ugotovili, kakšni so angleški termini, preneseni oz. sprejeti v italijanskem in slovenskem jeziku in koliko jih najdemo v obeh jezikih prejemnikih.

V drugem delu raziskave smo za opazovanje izbrali nekaj značilnih anglicizmov, ki jih skoraj vsakodnevno zasledimo v italijanskih publicističnih besedilih iz ekonomije in poslovanja. Da bi ugotovili njihovo razširjenost, smo dva tedna spremljali objave z gospodarskega področja na spletnih straneh dnevnika *La Repubblica*. Tako je nastal manjši korpus s 42705 besedami, v katerem smo našeli 112 različnih anglicizmov. Nekateri med njimi so uveljavljeni in tipični predstavniki italijanskega besedišča ekonomije in poslovanja, medtem ko so drugi prešli v opazovani jezik stroke šele v zadnjem času. Odločili smo se za podrobnejše opazovanje prvih, pri čemer smo se omejili na najbolj značilne termine, ki smo jih nato razvrstili glede na tendence pri prevzemanju v italijanskem in slovenskem jeziku. Izhajali smo torej iz rabe posameznih angleških leksikalnih enot v italijanskem okolju in zatem opazovali, kako so te enote slovarsko prevedene najprej v italijanskem, nato pa še v slovenskem jeziku. Pri razvrščanju anglicizmov glede na obnašanje v obeh opazovanih jezikih smo posamezne termine preverjali v spletnih slovarjih *Reverso Context* za prevod v italijanski jezik, za prevod v slovenski jezik pa smo uporabili slovarja *Euroterm* in *Glosbe*. Termine smo nato še dodatno preverili v *Slovarju slovenskega knjižnega jezika*, nekatere pa še v slovarjih *Corriere della Sera* in *Treccani* ter v besedilnem korpusu *Repubblica* za italijanski jezik in *Gigafida 2* za slovenski jezik.

Pri ugotavljanju slovarske ponujenih ustreznikov smo upoštevali le tiste, ki so relevantni za opazovani jezik stroke (slovarji seveda podajajo tudi prevodne

ustreznice, značilne za splošni jezik in za druge stroke). Tako smo npr. pri prevodu leksikalne enote *performance* opustili navedbo *predstava*, pri terminu *good will* pa prevodno rešitev *dobra volja* in tako naprej za druge ne-relevantne termine. Podobno smo ravnali pri navajanju italijanskih terminov, npr. *royalty*, kjer za opazovano stroko nista bistveni prevodni inačici *reali* (kraljevi par) in *nobile* (plemič/plemkinja).

Da bi zagotovili čim boljšo primerljivost obeh jezikov prejemnikov, pri analizi nismo obravnavali stvarnih lastnih imen (imen podjetij, združenj, bank, mednarodnih projektov, borznih indeksov). V nekaterih proučenih slovarjih so stvarna lastna imena le redko zastopana, zato obravnavata vseh v obeh jezikih ne bi dala primerljivih rezultatov.

#### VEČJEZIČNI SLOVAR DELNICE ZA ZAČETNIKE

Razlagalni spletni slovar *Delnice za začetnike* prinaša značilne borzne izraze v angleščini in nato njihove ustreznice v slovenščini, nemščini, francoščini in italijanščini. Kot je navedeno na vstopni strani slovarja, je razlaga posameznih terminov podana v poenostavljeni inačici angleščine (»simple English«), da sprejemanja novih vsebin ne bi dodatno oteževale morebitne jezikovne ovire.

Pri analizi smo se osredotočili na prevode terminov v slovenski in italijanski jezik, pri čemer smo opazovali, kako so posamezni angleški termini preneseni v oba ciljna jezika. Glede na skupne ugotovljene tendence so bili ti nato razvrščeni v skupine, prikazane v Preglednici 1, kjer v zadnji koloni kratko ponazorimo ugotovljene tendence z nekaterimi značilnimi primeri.

Preglednica 1 prikazuje, da je najpogostejši prenos tujega termina v oba prevzemna jezika s prevodom oz. kalkom (66,6 %). Takoj nato sledijo primeri, v katerih najdemo citatne zapise v italijanskem jeziku, v slovenščini pa je na istem mestu uporabljen prevodna ustreznica (21 %). V teh primerih je torej slovenščina ustvarila lastna izrazna sredstva, italijanščina pa se v celoti opira na izvorni jezik. Vrsto niže najdemo hibridne sintagme v italijanščini (5,3 %), ki besedotvorne sestave s tujezikovnimi prvinami sicer uporablja tudi v drugih jezikovnih zvrsteh (gl. Lopriore & Furiassi, 2015, 208; Lubello, 2014, 66). Kjer naletimo v italijanščini na jezikovno mešane sintagme, v slovenščini najdemo prevod oz. pomenski kalk.

Zatem sledi nekaj jezikovno povsem enakih geselskih enot (3 %) v obeh jezikih prejemnikih, torej angleški citatni leksemi. Za denotate, na katere se nanašajo omenjeni termini, nobeden od prevzemnih jezikov ni izobiloval lastnih izrazov. Nekoliko niže se pojavljajo hibridne sintagme v obeh ciljnih jezikih (1,6 %). Pri teh gre navadno za kombiniranje angleške leksikalizirane krajšave in občnoimenske sestavine jezika prevzemnika, kar kaže na dobro vpetost tujezikovnega okrajšanega termina v ciljnem jeziku. V razpredelnici nato zasledimo

**Preglednica 1: Prenos angleških terminov v slovenski in italijanski jezik na spletni strani <https://www.stocks-for-beginners.com/stock-market-terms.html>, ki je vključena v terminološko zbirkovo Evroterm.**

Prenos angleških terminov v slovenski in italijanski jezik	Število terminov	Termini v %	Primer
Prevod v obeh jezikih	200	66, 66 %	<b>Annual General Meeting</b> SI: Letna skupščina, IT: Assemblea generale
Prevod v SL, citatni AN zapis v IT	63	21 %	<b>Junk Bond</b> SI: Visoko tvegana obveznica, IT: Junk Bond
Prevod v SL, hibridna sintagma v IT	16	5,3 %	<b>Bull Market</b> SI: Bikovski trg, IT: Mercato Bull
Citatni AN zapis v SL in IT	9	3 %	<b>High Flyer</b> SI: High Flyer, IT: High Flyer
Hibridna sintagma v obeh jezikih	5	1,66 %	<b>Price-Earnings-Growth Ratio (PEG)</b> SI: PEG-kazalnik, IT: Coefficiente PEG
Manjkajoči prevodi v IT	4	1,33 %	<b>Micro-Cap Stock</b> SI: Mikropodjetje, IT: MISSING
Hibridna sintagma v SL, prevod v IT	3	1 %	<b>Price-Book Value (P/B)</b> SI: P/B-kazalnik, IT: Rapporto Prezzo-Valore Contabile
<b>Skupaj</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100 %</b>	

nekaj primerov z manjkajočimi prevodi v italijanščini, zadnja in najmanj pogosta možnost za prenos anglicizmov je sprejetje angleških terminov v slovenščino s hibridno sintagmo (gl. tudi prispevek o novotvorjenkah pri Sicherl & Žele, 2018, 53), italijanščina pa v takih primerih uporablja prevod.

Raziskava torej jasno kaže, da v italijanskem jeziku takoj za prevodi oz. pomenskimi kalki prevladujejo citatni zapisi in hibridne sintagme, slovenščina pa daje prednost prevajanju in manj pogosto uporablja izvorne citatne lekseme ter jezikovno mešane sintagme kot italijanščina.

#### TENDENCE PRI PREVZEMANJU ANGLICIZMOV V OBEH JEZIKIH PREJEMNIKIH

Kot smo videli, v obeh jezikih prejemnikih najdemo zanimivo število anglicizmov. Razlogi za njihovo pojavljanje so v italijanski in slovenski družbi podobni: gre za sprejemanje tujih modelov, zlasti ameriškega, v svetu ekonomije in financ, ki od začetka 20. stoletja čedalje bolj prodira v skoraj vse države sveta. Dejansko pa je bilo sprejemanje tujejezikovnih prvin vedno prisotno. V italijanskem govornem prostoru gre pri tem zlasti za

latinščino, ki je bila več stoletij prevladujoči jezik, in francoščino, predvsem v 19. stoletju (Seriani & Antonelli, 2011, 183–187; Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 362), v slovenski jezik pa so v preteklosti prodirali zlasti germanizmi in slavizmi (Kalin Golob, 2009, 138–140; Stramljič Breznik & Hameršak, 2010; Legan Ravnikar, 2017).

Iz raziskave je razvidno, da italijanščina uporablja več anglicizmov kot slovenščina (gl. tudi Lenassi, 2012), kar je nedvomno mogoče pripisati jezikovni politiki. Ta je v Italiji pomanjkljivo urejena v primerjavi z nekatrimi drugimi državami (D'Achille, 2006, 75), čeprav je v zadnjem času mogoče opaziti nekaj sprememb (De Mauro, 2016). V slovenskem prostoru ugotavljamo, da je maternemu jeziku namenjene več institucionalne pozornosti kot v italijanskem prostoru. Tako npr. v osnutku Resolucije o nacionalnem programu za jezikovno politiko 2019–2023 (2018, 21) beremo, da je eden od ciljev razumljiv uradovalni jezik, pri čemer je eden od ukrepov tudi »ozaveščanje o pomenu izbire slovenske ustreznice v primeru soobstoja sopomenskega slovenskega in prevzetega izraza oziroma jezikovne prvine za večjo razumljivost uradovalnega jezika ter ohranjanje slovenščine kot maternega, državnega in uradnega jezika«.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Jezikovna politika je seveda povezana tudi z normativnostjo: kot je bilo že prikazano v pregledu literature, norma v slovenskem jeziku spodbuja domačenje prevzetega besedišča (Bizjak Končar & Dobrovoljc, 2010, 104).

**Preglednica 2: Anglicizmi iz prve skupine. Krajšave: RC – Reverso Context; E – Evroterm; G – Glosbe; SSKJ – Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika.**

Angl.	It.	Slo.
<b>leader</b>	leader, capo (RC)	vodja (E); vodja (G); leader, tudi lider (SSKJ)
<b>rating</b>	rating, valutazione (RC)	rating (E); ocena (G); rating (šport) (SSKJ)
<b>know-how</b>	know-how, conoscenza (RC)	(strokovno) znanje in izkušnje (E); know-how, znanje in izkušnje (G); know-how (SSKJ)
<b>manager</b>	manager, direttore (RC)	vodstveni delavec, direktor (E); direktor, menedžer, (G); manager in menadžer (SSKJ)
<b>holding company</b>	holding, società finanziaria (RC)	holding, holdinška družba (E); holding (G); holding (SSKJ)

Naslednji razlog za razliko v odnosu do sprejemanja teujezikovnih prvin v obeh proučevanih jezikih gre iskat v težnjah po (ne)prilagajanju posameznih terminov zaradi sistemskih danosti jezika prejemnika: italijanski jezik lahko deloma podomači v največjem obsegu predvsem tuje glagole z dodajanjem italijanskih končnic prve spregative (gl. Rossi & Ruggiano, 2016, 317), slovenski jezik pa s svojimi morfološkimi značilnostmi omogoča (najmanj vsaj delno) podomačenje tujk, ki pripadajo tudi drugim besednim vrstam (najpogosteje samostalniškim in pridevniškim besedam).

In še navsezadnje: morda gre razliko med obema jezikoma na opazovanem področju pripisati težnjitve italijanske družbe, da z rabo nepodomačenih terminov prevzema tudi nekatere elemente oz. značilnosti anglo-ameriškega sistema brez prilagajanja, slovensko okolje pa bolj prilagaja termine in jih prevaja, ker poskuša s spremenjanjem terminov tudi deloma preoblikovati tuje modele glede na danosti v slovenski družbi. Raziskava o takšnih morebitnih razlikah med obema kulturama še ni bila opravljena, zato ostajamo na ravni hipoteze, ki jo bo nadaljnje zbiranje podatkov potrdilo ali ovrglo.

Danes je bolj kot kadar koli prej očitno, da se zaradi globalizacije, odpiranja in povezovanja ni mogoče izogniti vstopanju anglicizmov v druge jezike. Anglicizmi skoraj vedno označujejo novosti, razvoj in napredok: spregledati jih ali jih podcenjevati bi bilo kratkovidno. Rabo anglicizmov v drugih jezikih lahko dojemamo kot način odpiranja, obogatitve (gl. Rosati, 2006, 19), ne pa – kakor se morebiti zdi na prvi pogled – le kot odrekanje ciljnemu jeziku in siromašenje tega. Zagotovo pojavi novega termina namesto izposojenke nadalje bogati jezik; to še posebej velja, ko poleg novega termina uporabljamo sposojenko in ustvarimo prevodni ali semantični kalk (Serianni & Antonelli, 2011, 180). V takih primerih bo imel jezik na razpolago kar dva termina, npr. angleščina uporablja izraz *marketing*, italijanščina *marketing* in *commercializzazione*, slovenščina pa *trženje* in *marketing*. Vendar je odločitev o rabi citatnega zapisa ali domaćega termina odvisna od specifičnih pri-

merov. Npr. na rabo enega ali drugega izraza vpliva tudi struktura jezika prejemnika: za *dejavnost* marketinga, ki mu sledi v obeh jezikih desni prilastek, se uporablja domači termin, to je *commercializzazione di un prodotto* oz. *trženje izdelka* (in ne *marketing di un prodotto* oz. *marketing izdelka*). Vendar pa je termin *marketing* v obeh jezikih uporabljen tudi zato, da zajame širše področje: dejavnost tržnih raziskav, trženja, promocije oz. reklame in prodaje (gl. tudi Kotler & Armstrong, 2004, 9).

Da bi bolje prikazali tendence, ki jih je mogoče opaziti na podlagi opravljenih raziskav, smo izbrali nekaj terminov iz ekonomije in jih glede na sprejemanje anglicizmov razvrstili v tri skupine.

A. V prvi skupini so termini, ki so v italijanščini sprejeti kot citatno zapisani anglicizmi. V slovenskem jeziku na njihovem mestu ravno tako najdemo citatni zapis angleškega termina ali pa funkcionalno ustrezničo.

Kot je razvidno iz Preglednice 2, v italijanščini na prvem mestu vedno najdemo citatni leksem, v slovenščini pa je ta pojav nekoliko manj izrazit oz. manj stalen. Vse navedene angleške termine najdemo tudi v spletnem slovarju *Corriere della Sera* (v nadaljevanju CDS), kar pomeni, da so postali del norme in da so v jeziku sprejeti (gl. tudi Cerruti & Regis, 2015, 42). Ravno tako jih najdemo v spletnem slovarju SSKJ in v pomembnejših italijanskih slovarjih, kot sta *lo Zingarelli* (2019) in *Garzanti* (2017).

Značilni predstavnik odnosa do anglicizmov v obeh ciljnih jezikih je termin *manager*. Že Beccaria (1988, 424–423) je poudarjal, da angleška inačica ustvarja občutek učinkovitosti in ameriške veljave, drugače od italijanskega *dirigente* ali *responsabile*, pa tudi *jet set* je bolj *cool* kot *società*. Za isti leksem, rabljen v slovenščini, Šabec napiše (2009, 26; 2013, 293), da je neslovenska inačica povezana z občutkom modernosti. Pri tem velja omeniti, da je bil za slovenjenje termina *manager* predlagan tudi izraz *ravnatelj*, ki pa ga uporabljajo le nekateri avtorji znanstvenih in strokovnih besedil (gl. Celinšek, 2015, 70–73; Mihelič, 2017).

**Preglednica 3: Anglicizmi iz druge skupine.**

Angl.	It.	Slo.
<b>cash flow</b>	flusso di cassa, cash flow (RC)	denarni (pre)tok (E); denarni tok (G); ---- (SSKJ)
<b>performance</b>	prestazione, performance (RC)	rezultati, uspešnost (E); delovanje, dosežek (G); ---- (SSKJ)
<b>capital gain</b>	plusvalenza, capital gain (RC)	kapitalski dobiček (E); kapitalski dobiček (G); ---- (SSKJ)
<b>royalty</b>	royalty, canoni (RC)	licenčnina, tantiema (E); tantiema, denarno nadomestilo za odstopne pravice (G); ---- (SSKJ)

**B.** V drugo skupino uvrščamo termine, ki se v italijanski pojavljajo predvsem kot citatni zapisi, v številnih primerih pa tudi kot pomenski kalki. V slovenščini na njihovem mestu najdemo pomenske kalke ali prevodne ustreznike.

Kot opazimo v Preglednici 3, se prikazani termini sicer zelo pogosto pojavljajo v italijanskem jeziku, a kot prvo prevodno ustrezničko RC ne navaja angleškega izraza, temveč italijanski ekvivalent. Tudi v tej skupini zbrani termini so navedeni v spletnem slovarju CDS in torej povsem sprejeti v italijanskem standardnem jeziku. Glede na mesto v RC pa gre za nekoliko manjšo stopnjo sprejetosti v jeziku kot v prvi skupini (Preglednica 2). V SSKJ navedenih angleških jezikovnih enot ne najdemo. Namesto njih zasledimo kalke ali prevodne ustreznike, včasih izražene opisno oz. že kar z definicijo (npr. *denarno nadomestilo za odstopne pravice* namesto *royalty*).

**C.** Tretja skupina zajema termine, ki so le včasih v obeh jezikih sprejeti kot citatni zapisi, večinoma pa jih oba jezika prejemnika sprememata kot pomenske kalke ali ustrezne prevedke.

Preglednica 4 prikazuje, da navedene termine najdemo tudi kot citatne lekseme v obeh jezikih, v italijanski nekoliko pogosteje, v slovenščini redkeje. Tako jih najdemo tudi v konkordančnih nizih *Repubblica* za italijanščino in *Dnevnik* (v okviru *Gigafida 2*) za slovenščino, vendar v manjšem obsegu (npr. v slovenščini 2 primera za *head hunter* in 42 za *outsourcing*, v italijanski pa 13 nizov za prvi termin in 127 za drugega). Pri tem velja poudariti, da so ti termini lahko sestavnii del stvarnih lastnih imen, dodatno pojasnilo k terminu v angleškem jeziku kot npr. Če so še do nedavnega v večini primerov *veljale težnje po najemanju zunanjih izvajalcev* (po tako imenovanem *outsourcingu*) /.../ ali

pa samostojne leksikalne enote brez posebnih grafičnih oznak (ležeče pisave ali narekovajev), kar nakazuje njihovo sprejetost v jeziku prejemniku.

**RAZLOGI ZA RABO ANGLICIZMOV**

Glede na opravljene analize in ugotovitve drugih avtorjev, ki proučujejo jezikovne stike, bi razloge za rabo anglicizmov v obeh opazovanih jezikih prejemnikih lahko strnili v tri skupine. Anglicizmi se uporabljajo za:

**1.** zapolnjevanje leksikalnih vrzeli (Sicherl, 1999, 130; Šabec, 2008, 22) oz. za poimenovanje novih denotatorov, kar je značilno za oba proučevana prejemna jezika. To so t. i. poimenovalno potrebni anglicizmi (Muhvič Dimanovski, 2005).

Tujke torej vstopajo v ciljni jezik zaradi potrebe po poimenovanju novih predmetov, konceptov, idej,<sup>5</sup> kot so v našem primeru npr. *carry trade*, *high flyer*, *market maker*. To so termini, ki v nobenem od proučenih jezikov nimajo prevodnega ustreznika in jih je mogoče prevesti le s parafrazami oz. opisno.<sup>6</sup> Takšni dolgi prevodi pa niso jezikovno gospodarni, zato je krajša angleška različica v poslovnu svetu, kjer je hitra odzivnost izjemnega pomena, primernejša za hitro in učinkovito sporazumevanje. Značilen primer iz te skupine je *dumping*, v slovenščini podomačen tudi z zapisom *damping*, ki ustreza perifrazi *vendita sottocosto di beni all'estero* oz. *prodaja izdelkov v tujini pod tržno ceno* ali *offerta sottocosto di servizi all'estero* oz. *ponudba storitev v tujini pod tržno ceno* (gl. tudi Rosati, 2006, 19).

Pri zapolnjevanju leksikalnih vrzeli gre najpogosteje za prenos anglo-ameriških poslovno-ekonomskeh konceptov oz. modelov, npr. *governance*, *authority*, *board*, *management*, *marketing*. Če bi za navedene

<sup>5</sup> Pri tem jih navadno čaka enaka usoda kot njihov denotat: nekateri termini, ki se nanašajo na tehnološko napredne predmete, lahko kmalu izginejo iz rabe zaradi hitrega razvoja tehnologije, drugi pa se obdržijo, ker se je njihov pomen razširil (D'Achille, 2006, 78).

<sup>6</sup> *Carry trade* – investicijska metoda, pri kateri si investitor izposodi denar po nizki obrestni meri, da bi kupil naložbo, ki naj bi mu prinesla precej večji zasluzek; *high flyer* – delnica z visoko vrednostjo in večinoma nad povprečnim razmerjem med ceno in donosnostjo; *market maker* – trgovec z vrednostnimi papirji, ki prodaja in kupuje izbrane finančne instrumente in ustvarja dobiček z razliko v prodajni in nakupni ceni.

**Preglednica 4: Anglicizmi iz tretje skupine.**

Angl.	It.	Slo.
<b>head hunter</b>	cacciatore di teste, cacciatore di talenti (RC)	---- (E); lovec na glave, iskalec sposobnih kadrov (G); ---- (SSKJ)
<b>outsourcing</b>	esternalizzazione, outsourcing (RC)	oddajanje dela (zunanjam izvajalcem), zunanje izvajanje (E): zunanje izvajanje dejavnosti, oddajanje del zunanjim izvajalcem (G); ---- (SSKJ)
<b>shareholder</b>	azionista, socio, azionario, proprietario, shareholder (RC)	delničar (E); delničar, akcionar (G); ---- (SSKJ)
<b>sponsor</b>	sponsor, promotore, finanziatore (RC)	naročnik, sponzor (E); pokrovitelj, sponzor (G); sponzor, tudi sponsor (SSKJ)

primere uporabili ustrezni italijanski ekvivalent, kot so npr. *stile/modo di direzione aziendale, autorità, consiglio d'amministrazione, gestione aziendale, commercializzazione*, bi imeli v mislih evropski model. Prvih treh angleških terminov v slovenščini ne zasledimo (z nekaj redkimi izjemami le *board*, ki ga navaja tudi *Gigafida*), zadnja dva pa sta že povsem uveljavljena.

Prisotnost oz. odsotnost teh terminov v obeh ciljnih jezikih ponovno kaže na razlike med obema, povezane z zgodovino prevzemanja tujih ekonomskih modelov. Za nekatere od prej naštetih angleških terminov je v italijanskem jeziku obstajal primerljiv termin (in denotat) že pred prenosom in uveljavitvijo tukte. Vendar se je italijanski izraz nanašal na evropski oz. italijanski poslovni model, anglicizem pa je s seboj prinesel nov koncept oz. uvožen model poslovanja.

V slovenščini je položaj povsem drugačen: veliko dotedaj neznanih konceptov in z njimi povezanih terminov se je pojavilo (in nato uveljavilo) šele s prehodom na tržno gospodarstvo (za primere nekaterih drugih držav gl. tudi Mackevic & Tcaciu, 2016). Pri prevladujočem ameriškem poslovnom modelu je (bilo) novo terminologijo pogosto laže posvojiti kot podomačiti (gl. Šabec, 2014, 169).

Naj za prikaz omenjenih razlik navedemo dva značilna termina, in sicer *holding* in *manager* v slovarju *Treccani* in v SSKJ. Italijanski slovar ne opredeljuje, da sta slovarski iztočnici povezani s kapitalistično ekonomiko, v slovenskem pa je to jasno nakazano:

- *holding* -a m (ô) v kapitalistični ekonomiki družba, ki sama ne proizvaja, ampak si z nakupom delnic omogoča vpliv v določenih delniških družbah: kapital holdinga / državni holding; neskl.

- pril.: holding družba (<http://sskj.si/?s=holding>);
- *manager* in menedžer -ja [ménédžer] m (ê) 1. v kapitalistični ekonomiki vodilni uslužbenec podjetja; direktor, ravnatelj: družbo upravlja managerji; odločilna vloga managerjev (<http://sskj.si/?s=manager>).

Tako različen primer obravnave strokovnega termina dobro kaže na bistvene razlike med italijansko in slovensko družbo: italijanska je živila v tržnem gospodarstvu in bila s tem veliko bolj izpostavljena anglo-ameriškim modelom ter terminom, v slovenskem prostoru se je prehod iz planskega gospodarstva v tržno zgodil šele v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Časovne razlike pri sprejemanju oz. spremenjanju družbenoekonomskih ureditev se kažejo tudi v prevzemanju angleških terminov: v slovenskem ekonomsko-poslovnu jeziku jih je manj, veliko se jih pojavi v podomačeni obliki, lahko pa tudi kot kalk ali prevod.

**2. vzbujanje konotacije izbranosti**, čeprav je v ciljnem jeziku na voljo ustrezni ekvivalent.

Takšno težnjo je mogoče ugotoviti v obeh jezikih (cf. Šabec, 2008, 22; 2013, 296; Grochowska, 2010, 45)<sup>7</sup>; tovrstne anglicizme nekateri avtorji označujejo za poimenovalno nepotrebne (Muhvić Dimanovski, 2005; Gualdo & Telve, 2014, 316). Gualdo in Telve (2014, 316) nekoliko ironično ugotavlja, da ljudi, ki uporabljajo prefijene ali modne neologizme namesto ustreznih že uveljavljenih izrazov v lastnem jeziku, prežema nedoločljiva avra kompetence in splošnega poznavanja sveta, saj dokazujejo poznavanje drugačnega jezika in kulture. Z drugimi besedami: raba ali neraba prefijenih tujk ločuje ljudi, ki vedo, kako se streže stvarem, od tistih, ki tega ne znajo.

<sup>7</sup> Gl. tudi Stramlič Breznik (2008, 150), ki uvršča prevzemanje anglicizmov v proces nastajanja novih besed in pri tem povzema Muhvić Dimanovski (2005), ki opozarja na dva vidika neologizmov/neoanglizmov glede na poimenovalno potrebnost:

a. poimenovalno nepotrebni neologizmi so slogovni, ker so vzporednica že uveljavljenemu izrazu in imajo ekspresivno vrednost;  
b. poimenovalno potrebni neologizmi nastajajo zaradi nove predmetnosti, pojmovnosti, pojavnosti ali družbeno-zgodovinskih pojavov.

3. za ublažitev dojemanja nepriljubljenih, a dejanskih vsebin (evfemizmi).

Značilni primeri so v italijanskem jeziku *spending review* namesto *revisione/riduzione della spesa pubblica volta alla riduzione degli sprechi* oz. *pregled/revizija javne porabe* (zmanjšanje sredstev, namenjenih javni porabi); *flat tax* oz. *tassa<sup>8</sup>/imposta piatta/aliquota unica* oz. *enotna davčna stopnja*; *jobs act* namesto *riforma del mercato di lavoro/reforma trga delovne sile* (ki na neki način omejuje nekatere pravice zaposlenih), *bad bank* namesto *banca »cattiva«* oz. *slaba banka*; *fiscal drag* namesto *drenaggio fiscale* (*zaviralni fiskalni dejavniki/obdavčenje*) itd.

Včasih je opaziti pojav evfemizmov za prikrivanje nevšečnih vsebin, ki so lahko tudi v nasprotju z javnim redom in javno moralom. Npr.: *default* namesto *fallimento* oz. *stečaj* ali celo *bankrot*; *mobbing* namesto *persecuzione psicologica sul posto di lavoro* oz. *nasilje/trpinčenje na delovnem mestu*. V poslovнем svetu pa seveda najdemo tudi termine, kot sta *stalking occupazionale/sul posto si lavoro* namesto *pedinamento/persecuzione occupazionale/sul posto di lavoro* oz. *zalezovanje na delovnem mestu* (gl. tudi Antonelli, 2007, 17).<sup>9</sup>

Iz primerov je razvidno, da je pojav rabe angleških evfemizov značilen predvsem za italijanski jezik. Od naštetih izposojenk v tej skupini v slovenskem jeziku zasledimo le *mobbing* oz. podomačeno inačico *mobing*. Jezikovni uporabniki slovenščine se torej ne zatekajo pogosto k angleškim evfemizmom, kar bi lahko nakazovalo večjo neposrednost v sporazumevalni dejavnosti, italijanskim govorcem pa bi bilo mogoče pripisati več težnje k posrednosti.

Tako najdemo v italijanskem jeziku termine kot *default* ali *spending review* v izogib večji neposrednosti ali pa, kot se pogosto dogaja v političnem diskurzu, da si politiki ne bi zmanjšali priljubljenosti v očeh volivcev. Pri tem se postavlja vprašanje, kaj je razlog za takšno ravnanje. Eden od mogočih odgovorov bi bil, da se je dalo v preteklosti z anglicizmom nekoliko zakriti ostro realnost, saj angleški jezik ni bil zelo razširjen. Torej je bila *bad bank* v očeh marsikaterega Italijana manj slaba/nevarna/tvegana kot »banca cattiva« oz. »slaba banka«. Še danes, tako kot je bilo že večkrat ugotovljeno z javnomenjskimi raziskavami in intervjuvanjem prebivalcev, velik odstotek vprašanih ne pozna italijanske ustrezni-

ce, čeprav so v množičnih medijih večkrat zasledili angleški termin. Jezikoslovec Michele Cortelazzo meni, da ima raba tujke značilnosti »prave jezikovne dimne bombe« in da gre pri njej za »strategijo maskiranja, ki jo uporablja visoki državni funkcionarji« (Persotti, 2017).

## ZAKLJUČEK

Angleščina je močno prisotna v obeh, slovenskem in italijanskem prostoru, in njen vpliv se širi in narašča (gl. Šabec, 2012, 284; Scarpa, 2014, 226). Izbera citatnega zapisa, podomačenega leksema, kalka ali prevodne ustreznice ima v jeziku in družbenokulturnem kontekstu različne sporočilne vrednosti. Te lahko vidimo kot vrsto odpiranja, razvoja in bogatenja jezika prejemnika in družbe. Značilen primer za to je v italijanščini izraz *royalty*, ki se uporablja za posnemanje anglo-ameriškega modela poslovanja oz. za novo pojavnost. Podobno je v slovenskem jeziku s terminom *holding*.

Kot smo videli, se v italijanščini pogosto uporablja citatni zapis namesto kalka ali prevoda, kajti družbenoekonomska modela, pa tudi pravni sistem jezika dajalca (gl. Paolucci, 2017, 85–87) in jezika prejemnika sta različna. S prevodom se prevajalec sicer približa ciljnemu jeziku, s čimer pa mu nekemu terminu včasih ne uspe zagotoviti iste vsebine, istega namena in istega učinka v cilnjem modelu oz. sistemu (gl. Garzone, 2007, 201; Paolucci, 2011, 82). Citatno prevzeti leksemi v italijanskem jeziku lahko kažejo tudi na to, da se njihov uporabnik želi izogniti poimenovanju neprijetnih vsebin v maternem jeziku.

Prispevek ugotavlja, da slovensko jezikovno okolje bolj prilagaja tujejezikovne prvine kot italijansko; to bi bilo mogoče pripisati normativnosti slovenskega jezika oz. jezikovni politiki in sistemski danosti samega jezika. Seveda pa bi bilo treba za potrditev takšnih vzrokov za razlike opraviti nadaljnje raziskave, ki bi se sistematično in natančneje osredotočile na jezikoslovne in pragmatične vidike prevzemanja anglicizmov v obeh proučevanih jezikih prejemnikih. Pri tem bi bile opravljene ustreerne analize na izbranem korpusu besedil, ki bi upoštevale tudi zgodovinsko, ekonomsko in politično odprtost/zaprtost do sprejemanja tujejezikovnih elementov in z njimi povezanih širših družbenoekonomskih pojavov.

<sup>8</sup> V vsakdanjem italijanskem jeziku se termin *tax včasih* prevaja kot *tassa* (slov. *taksa*), to pa je primer lažnega jezikovnega prijatelja. Dejansko bi bilo treba v italijanski jezikovni praksi uporabljati termin *imposta* (slov. *davek*). Podobno velja za termin *tassazione* (slov. *obdavčenje*), ki se pogosto neustrezeno uporablja ne le pogovorno, ampak tudi v množičnih medijih namesto *imposizione fiscale*.

<sup>9</sup> Gl. npr. Antonelli (2007, 17), ki navaja primer *eros center*.

## L'ITALIANO E LO SLOVENO DELL'ECONOMIA E DEGLI AFFARI: ANGLICISMI TRA PRESTITI INTEGRALI E CALCHI SEMANTICI

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### RIASSUNTO

*Gli anglicismi penetrano costantemente nella maggior parte delle altre lingue, in particolare di quelle europee. Nel presente articolo, nella specie, si osserva ed analizza la presenza degli anglicismi nell'italiano e nello sloveno dell'economia e degli affari. In particolare, si intende rilevare la frequenza dei prestiti integrali inglesi e dei calchi semantici nelle due lingue. Nella nostra ricerca, all'inizio si osserva la presenza degli anglicismi nel vocabolario multilingue della borsa, da cui si rileva che nella lingua italiana si ricorre più spesso all'uso di prestiti integrali inglesi rispetto alla lingua slovena. Successivamente si procede a una classificazione degli anglicismi in tre gruppi, a seconda di come detti termini vengono recepiti dalle due lingue riceventi. Dagli studi compiuti nonché dall'analisi dei risultati del nostro studio è stato acclarato che l'inglese è marcatamente presente e in continuo aumento, sia nell'italiano che nello sloveno in generale e dell'economia in particolare. La scelta del prestito integrale, del prestito adattato, del calco semantico e dell'equivalente traduttivo genera nella lingua ricevente e nel suo contesto culturale e sociologico diversi valori comunicativi. Gli anglicismi possono essere considerati come una specie di apertura, di sviluppo e di arricchimento della lingua ricevente. In particolare, nell'italiano dell'economia si rileva una maggiore apertura ai prestiti integrali rispetto allo sloveno. Infatti, nello sloveno dell'economia si privilegiano i calchi semantici o la traduzione del termine, il che potrebbe essere ascritto alla normatività della lingua e al carattere del sistema linguistico sloveno. Per meglio individuare le differenze nella ricezione degli anglicismi in ambedue le lingue riceventi, nel presente contributo si sottolinea la necessità di effettuare ulteriori ricerche. Queste dovrebbero essere indirizzate in modo sistematico agli aspetti linguistici e pragmatici della ricezione degli anglicismi su un corpus di testi paragonabili, prendendo in considerazione la tendenza a ricevere o a rifiutare elementi esogeni dal punto di vista storico, economico e politico.*

**Parole chiave:** anglicismo, prestito integrale, linguaggio specialistico, calco semantico, dizionario online



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## WORDS OF ITALIAN ORIGIN IN THE WRITTEN LEGACY OF STEFAN MITROV LJUBIŠA

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### ABSTRACT

*This paper examines the presence of words originating from Italian and its dialects in the written legacy of Montenegrin writer and politician Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša. Taking into account the fact that this author advocated the use of the vernacular language in literary work, as well as the statements made by linguistic experts that words of Italian origin constituted an integral part of the vernacular speech patterns of his homeland, it seems reasonable to assume that the written legacy of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša ought to include elements of the Italian lexicon, despite him being a convinced opponent of the domination of foreign languages and cultures in his native land.*

**Keywords:** Italian words, Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša, vernaculars, literary work, official correspondence

## PAROLE DI ORIGINE ITALIANA NELL'EREDITÀ SCRITTA DI STEFAN MITROV LJUBIŠA

### SINTESI

*Il saggio tratta la presenza delle parole provenienti dall'italiano e dai suoi dialetti negli scritti dello scrittore e politico montenegrino Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša. Considerando che questo autore sosteneva l'uso della lingua nazionale nella letteratura, e tenendo conto del fatto che proveniva da aree in cui la componente lessicale italiana era presente in modo significativo, è ragionevole presumere che il suo linguaggio dovesse contenere elementi di lessico italiano, indipendentemente dal fatto che egli fosse, conformemente alle sue vedute politiche, contrario al dominio delle lingue e culture straniere nella sua terra natia.*

**Parole chiave:** italianismi, Ljubiša, parlate popolari, opere letterarie, corrispondenza ufficiale

## INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses the presence of words that originate from Italian and its dialects in the written legacy of the writer and politician Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša (1822–1878). In the introductory section, we examine the historical and political circumstances in Montenegro at the time of the public activity of this author. We also look at previous studies that deal with his work from various standpoints, and point out the somewhat contradictory conclusions reached by some experts analyzing the presence of foreign lexical components in his written legacy, primarily in his literary work. Although some sporadic reviews of Ljubiša's writings can be found in the last decades of the 19th as well as at the beginning of the 20th century (Nikčević, 2019, 44), the experts began to deal more seriously with the written legacy of this author from the 1970s (Tepavčević, 2017, 42). Among those who have so far discussed the work of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša, we can identify two groups of authors. The first group comprises those who believe that this writer drew inspiration from the local folk tradition and cultural heritage, including the vernaculars, whose significant part consists of borrowings. This viewpoint is represented by Nikola Popović (2014, 59), who claims that Ljubiša matured as an author in an area where local and foreign cultures (primarily Italian) were closely intertwined. According to Popović (2014, 60) the first reviews of Ljubiša's writings were negative precisely because of the regional constraints of his language. The fact that Ljubiša's literary work was based on local cultural tradition was also remarked by his first critic, Croatian philologist and literature historian Ivan Milčetić, whose views are conveyed by Milorad Nikčević (2019, 94–95). Milčetić came to the conclusion that Ljubiša's writing was devoid of originality and that he was a mere recorder of the local folktales. In more recently published studies the experts perceive Ljubiša's attachment to the cultural patterns of his homeland, but also recognize his originality. Miodarka Tepavčević (2017, 45) believes that Ljubiša's language content is rooted in folk history and tradition, while Branislav Ostojić (2012, 11) argues that this author's language is closer to the standard than to the everyday speech, but that it still contains vernacular components. The second group of authors is represented by Olga Trofimkina (1983, 38) who believes that Ljubiša consciously refined his language in order to remove all foreign elements, with the aim of expressing his political views – opposition to foreign influence in

his homeland – through his literature. None of these experts, however, offered a comprehensive analysis of the presence of foreign lexis in Ljubiša's work. Therefore, we have decided to deal with this hitherto unexplored segment of Ljubiša's written legacy in order to determine to what extent his political views influenced the choices in his literary work. Our main goal is to ascertain whether the author chose to deny the linguistic reality of his region, or he accepted Italian loanwords as an integral part of the national language and transferred them into his opus.

However, to begin with, we must consider the very phenomenon of lexical borrowing. In linguistics, «borrowing is the process of importing linguistic items from one linguistic system into another» (Hoffer, 2002, 1). This phenomenon can be considered one of the most obvious consequences of language contact (Haspelmath, 2009, 36; Jourdan, 2002, 79; Filipović, 1986).

Haspelmath (2009, 39) argues that the most commonly borrowed words are related to technology and new discoveries, while the elements of so-called basic vocabulary<sup>1</sup> are less susceptible to transfer from one language to another. The adoption process can affect stems and affixes, but also locutions and grammatical schemes (Haspelmath, 2009, 36). This means that borrowing can occur in relation to linguistic material as well as language structures, that is, it can refer to the introduction of lexemes, affixes or entire sentences, but also to the adoption of the syntactic, morphological and semantic schemes of the model language (Haspelmath, 2009, 37). A particular form of loanwords is represented by calques, be they structural or semantic, and by so-called hybrids – forms composed of elements from two different language systems.

A loanword can retain its original form and meaning, or it can undergo a process of adaptation to the phonological and morphological system of the recipient language. Adaptation can be either primary or secondary. Primary adaptation includes the changes a word undergoes from the moment it becomes part of a language until its complete integration. Secondary adaptation concerns those changes to which a particular word is subjected after its integration into the borrowing language.<sup>2</sup> In some cases, adaptation is necessary to make the word usable in the recipient language (Hoffer, 2002, 8). However, the degree of adaptation can vary, based on several factors. If a word has been recently introduced into the recipient language, it can stabilize in it without adaptation, and even retain its original pronunciation. The usual

1 Thomason uses the term *core vocabulary* (2001, 71).

2 Besides the terms *source/borrowing language*, the pairs *donor/recipient language* and *model/replica language* are also present in the relevant literature. Rudolf Filipović (1989) uses the term *lending language*.

terms for the non adapted words are foreignisms and – significantly rarer – xenisms. This category differs from that of words that have undergone the adaptation process and have become an integral part of the recipient language (Haspelmath, 2009, 42). For recent or unadapted loanwords, it is relatively easy to determine the donor language; however, the identification of older loanwords is much more complex, given that those words have «acclimatized» to the recipient language. One of the mechanisms used by linguists consists of the identification of all similarities in form and meaning that a given word from one language shares with another word from another language (Haspelmath, 2009, 45). In this procedure, it is important to rule out the possibility that the analyzed words have a common «ancestor» or a word that both derive from. Another problem faced by experts in this process consists of determining the direction of any borrowing. This involves identifying the model language on the one hand, and the recipient language on the other. One of the applicable criteria is establishing to what extent a certain word can be analyzed in both languages, starting from the assumption that there are greater opportunities for its decomposition into morphemes in the donor language. A further criterion for determining the source language is the degree of phonological integration,<sup>3</sup> as well as the presence of a certain word in languages similar to the model language, but not to the recipient language.

Words of foreign origin can also be classified according to the reasons for their entry into a specific language. This distinction comprises two broad groups: one is loanwords that have entered a language to designate new, previously non-existent terms or content, while the other is loanwords that have become part of a new language system, although a term of equal or similar meaning exists in the recipient language. The words borrowed to indicate new terms or concepts are usually called loanwords by necessity or cultural borrowings, while it could be said that the adoption of «unnecessary» words, or core borrowings, is conditioned by non-linguistic reasons – historical, geographical and political factors.<sup>4</sup> Haspelmath (2009, 46) considers the term «*loanword by necessity*» a little simplistic, since each language should have sufficient potential within it to create new lexemes. In his view, the degree of acceptance of a loanword in a particular language is directly influenced by the status of the donor language in the recipient language community (Haspelmath, 2009, 48). The status of the model language also affects the adoption of the lexical

material that replaces the existing elements of the lexicon of certain language. Considering the linguistic community as a whole, this type of loanword is influenced by many factors - historical ties, geographical proximity and political relations. On the other hand, from the individual's point of view, the process of adopting lexical elements of foreign origin is conditioned by the prestige of the model language. Some researchers believe that this type of loanwords originates from the need of a language to expand its lexical fund or to create synonyms (Weinreich, 1968). Weinreich (1968, 60) is of the opinion that adoption may also be conditioned by internal factors related to the recipient language, such as the necessity of eliminating low frequency words, as well as avoiding the accumulation of homonyms. The status of a loanword can also be influenced by a negative attitude towards a particular language. In this case, words coming from the model language have a negative connotation and their use is limited to informal language registers, mainly for the purpose of obtaining a comic effect. In addition to the two types of loanwords mentioned above, there is a third less common type, which Haspelmath (2009, 50) defines as a «*therapeutic loanword*», which takes place if a certain word becomes taboo in a language.

In the linguistic sphere, it is important to make a distinction between borrowing and imposition. Imposition occurs in linguistic relations where there is a substratum-superstratum relationship, which presupposes the existence of a subordinate and of a dominant language. In this situation, the adoption process mainly concerns phonology and syntax. On the other hand, the borrowing process between neighboring languages that develop in parallel mainly concerns vocabulary, although it can extend to other segments of the language structure (Haspelmath, 2009, 51). We should also mention intimate borrowing, which «refers to the situations in which two or more languages are used in a single geographical area by a single political community» (Hoffer, 1996, 543).

Lastly, the loanword adaptation process takes place within four subsystems, and therefore four types of adaptation can be distinguished:

1. Phonological adaptation;
2. Orthographical adaptation;
3. Morphological adaptation; and
4. Semantic adaptation (Sočanac, 2004, 2).

According to Filipović (1986, 68–70), phonological adaptation or transfonemizacija includes

3 More about phonological integration in Heath (1984) and Humbley (1974).

4 Myers-Scotton (2002, 239) defines cultural borrowings as "words for objects new to the culture [...], but also for new concepts", while core borrowings are "words that more or less duplicate already existing words in the L1".

replacing the phonological elements of the model language with the phonological elements of the recipient language. Transfonemization can be:

1. Complete – this presupposes a complete correspondence between the phonemes of the model and those of the replica;
2. Partial/compromise – this involves a partial correspondence between the phonemes of the model and the replica; or
3. Free – this implies significant differences between the individual phonemes of the model and the replica.

When analyzing the degree of phonological adaptation, it is necessary to compare the phonological systems of the model and the recipient language, their prosodic characteristics and the methods of distribution of the phonemes (Fon Coetsem, 1988). From a phonological point of view, the loanword can be modeled on the basis of orthography or pronunciation in the recipient language. If the adaptation is made according to orthography, it can be done in several ways:

1. The original orthography can be preserved;
2. The orthography can be adapted to the recipient language system, using different graphemes for the same phoneme in the two languages; or
3. The orthography can be conditioned by an intermediary language.

The morphological adaptation of the loanword may be primary or secondary. Primary adaptation implies changes that occur in the process of the assimilation of the loanword. In this process, three types of morphological substitutions or transmorphemizations can be distinguished:

1. Zero transmorphemization – this «is represented by the formula free morpheme and zero bound morpheme» (Filipović, 1989, 57);
2. Compromise transmorphemization – this implies the existence of a free morpheme and of the donor's language bound morpheme; or
3. Complete transmorphemization – implies the replacement of the donor's language bound morpheme with the corresponding bound morpheme of the recipient language (Filipović, 1986, 117–123).

Secondary adaptation may occur when the loanword is fully integrated into the recipient language and as such becomes a part of the morphological processes.

Semantic adaptation can also occur at the primary or the secondary level. At the primary level of semantic adaptation, the following changes occur:

1. Zero meaning extension – the meaning of the model remains unchanged; or
2. A narrowing of meaning – a word from a donor language can refer to a number of meanings or to a semantic field. Narrowing the number of meanings implies choosing one specific meaning of the loanword that is retained in the recipient language.

Secondary semantic adaptation also implies two types of changes:

1. Expanding the number of meanings; or
2. Expanding the semantic field.

The changes in meaning that occur in primary adaptation can be defined as the transfer of meaning, while those that take place during secondary adaptation and that are conditioned by the use of a loanword in the recipient language are defined as the adaptation of meaning (Filipović, 1986, 180).

Srdan Musić also dealt with the degree of adaptation of loanwords, offering a somewhat simpler classification than the one presented above (Musić, 1972, 74). Analyzing the level of the adaptation of loanwords, Musić starts from their classification based on the degree and manner of their assimilation. According to this classification, the categorization of loanwords is based on the degree of assimilation at the phonemic and morphemic levels. At the phonemic level, three categories of words can be distinguished – unassimilated, partially assimilated and completely assimilated words. Three groups of words can also be identified with regard to the degree of assimilation at the morphemic level. These are unadapted loanwords, semi-adapted loanwords and semantic translations (calques). Musić believes that Montenegrin vernaculars easily assimilate loanwords from Romance languages in general, and those from Italian language and the Venetian dialect in particular, primarily because of the similarity of the vocalic systems. He supports this claim with the results of his research, in which he recorded a very small number of phonetically unadapted or semi-adapted words (Musić, 1972, 76).

When discussing the categorisation of loanwords according to the degree of their assimilation at the morphemic level, Musić takes Klajn's definition of morphological assimilation, which consists of «adding cases or other suffixes from the recipient language (if the word passes from analytic to synthetic language) or keeping only one inflected form (in the opposite case)» (Klajn, 1967, 15–16).

Loanwords of Romance origin penetrated the language of the Montenegrin coast and hinterland in several phases. The oldest loanwords date back to the time of Balkan Vulgar Latin and cover almost the entire former Serbo-Croatian-speaking area. The second wave of penetration of Romanisms refers to the so-called Dalmatian period and affected the coastal areas, primarily the Croatian coast. The third, neo-Romance layer of loanwords, consists of words that originate from Tuscan, being literary Italian, and the Venetian dialect. In the 19th century, loanwords of Romance origin entered the vernaculars of Montenegro in two ways – directly, through direct contacts on the Adriatic coast, and indirectly, thanks to German influence (Musić, 1972, 35–40). In this paper, we mainly deal with the last two groups of loanwords.

### HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MONTENEGRIN AND ITALIAN TERRITORIES

Italy, and especially The Republic of Venice, has been present in different ways for centuries in the region of the eastern Adriatic and its presence has left traces in almost all spheres of society. The influence of Italy, and Venice in particular, was strongest on the Montenegrin coast, especially in the Bay of Kotor. Venice briefly ruled Kotor during the War of Chioggia against Genoa between 1378 and 1381 (Prokačić, 2010, 67). At that time, Venetian troops invaded the city, looted many private and public buildings, including churches, and then caused additional damage by starting fires (Božić, 1979, 28). In spite of these incidents, in an attempt to protect itself from Turkish invasion after the fall of the Serbian Empire, to which the city belonged, Kotor was placed under the protection of Venice in 1420 and remained under its rule until the fall of the Venetian Republic in 1797 (Andrijašević & Rastoder, 2006, 15). After Kotor, the territory of Paštrovići fell under Venetian control in 1423, and then the city of Budva in 1442. However, the Venetian estates on the Montenegrin coast did not all have the same status. For example, the Venetians managed the city of Kotor (It. Cattaro) with special care, given the strategic importance of its position, while Paštrovići managed to preserve its self-government based on tribal organization throughout Venetian rule, even at times fighting for a higher degree of autonomy. The city of Budva, although a border town, seemed to be pushed into the background (Stanojević, 1976, 180). The Venetian governor in this city bore the title of *podestà*, and for a short period of time he held the title of *provveditore* (Da Mosto, 1940, 19). The remaining parts of the Boka (Risan, Herceg Novi) changed their masters more often. With brief interruptions, these territories were under Ottoman

rule from 1483 until the 1680s, when, after the Ottoman-Venetian war, it became part of the Republic of Venice (Stanojević, 1976, 178). The towns of Bar, Ulcinj, and Sutorina in the Boka were exceptions to this, in that they belonged to the Ottoman Empire for centuries (Milošević, 1972, 18). After the fall of Venice and the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797), the Bay of Kotor was placed under the authority of the Habsburg dynasty (Andrijašević & Rastoder, 2006, 100). During Napoleon's conquest these territories were briefly annexed by Montenegro. This area was under the rule of France from 1807 to 1814, when it became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Andrijašević & Rastoder, 2006, 101). Taking into consideration the extensive presence of Italy in the political life of these territories that today form part of Montenegrin, we would expect traces of Italian influence not only in art and culture, but in the language structure as well, given the fact that, for centuries, Italian remained the official language of administration within all the Montenegrin territories under Venetian rule. The issue of the presence of Italian words in Montenegrin vernaculars has been addressed by several linguistic experts, such as Srđan Musić, who examined the distribution of expressions originating from Romance languages in the folk speech of the northwestern Boka, and Vesna Lipovac Radulović, who discussed the presence of words of Italian origin in the spoken language of the southeastern part of the Bay of Kotor as well as in Paštrovići and Budva, the hometown of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša.

### LJUBIŠA'S POLITICAL AND LITERARY ACTIVITY

The city of Budva, as already mentioned, was part of Austrian Dalmatia from 1815 to 1918, which encompassed several formerly Venetian possessions on part of the Croatian coast and in the Bay of Kotor. Dalmatia was one of the poorest and least developed provinces in the Austria territories, where the middle class was almost non-existent, and nationally conscious intellectuals were very rare (Petrović, 1976, 126). The government was based on a static and complicated administrative system with a huge number of staff. These officials, both foreigners and members of the local population, had to speak Italian, because it remained the official language of local administration, the judiciary and education in this region even after the fall of the Venetian Republic. This layer of society represented a stronghold of the Austrian authorities and was the main opponent of the creation of national Slavic states in this part of the Balkan Peninsula (Petrović, 1976, 126). As a reaction to this policy, nationally conscious intellectuals founded the Slavic Front that, from 1861, acted through the Popular Party, of which Stefan Mitrov

Ljubiša was an active member from its foundation. As one of the most prominent representatives of this party from the Bay of Kotor, he worked in the Dalmatian Parliament and as part of the Imperial Council in Vienna.

His political activity was focused primarily on the revival of the national consciousness of the local population and on the preservation of its national identity. Ljubiša considered language one of the essential elements of the identity of his people and therefore he dealt seriously with the role and position of language in society. He fought for his native language, not only as a politician, but also as a writer. His first work entitled *Објестео Паштровско у окружју Коморском* (*The tribe of Pastrovici in the region of Kotor*) was published in the journal «Srpsko-dalmatinski magazin» (*The Serbian-Dalmatian Magazine*) in 1845 (Tepavčević, 2010, 14). After that, he published a series of articles, polemics and discussions in various newspapers, connecting his political activity with his role as a journalist.

Ljubiša began publishing his literary works relatively late, initially as individual short stories in various magazines. He published the story *Šćepan Mali kako o njemu narod povijeda* (*Stephen the Little in the folktales*) in 1868. The narratives *Prodaja Patrijare Brkića* (*The selling of Patriarch Brkic*), *Kanjoš Maceđonović*, *Pop Andrović novi Obilić* (*Priest Androvic the new Obilic*), *Skočiđevojka* (*Maiden's Leap*) and others were issued over the following years. His collection *Pripovijesti crnogorske i primorske* (*The stories from Montenegro and the Coastland*) was printed in 1875 in Dubrovnik, while *Pričanja Vuka Dojčevića* (*The storytelling of Vuk Dojcevic*) was published in Vienna between 1877 and 1879. The only poetic work he published is the poem *Boj na Visu* (*The battle of Vis*), printed in 1866 (Tepavčević, 2010, 15). Besides his literary works, Ljubiša left a large number of letters which now have primarily cultural and historical value, as well as a number of speeches and interpellations which are also the subject of our interest. Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša is known as one of the most ardent supporters of the language reform promoted by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić. Some believe that by accepting Karadžić's principles, Ljubiša tried to make his language more similar to the vernacular of his region and, more generally, of Montenegro. However, there are differing views. Thus, Branislav Ostožić claims that «the linguistic structure in Ljubiša's works is closer to the standard language than to the vernacular» and that «the characteristics of the literary language are predominant in his writings» (Ostožić, 2012, 11). He adds, however, that Ljubiša's literary works «contain a number of relevant vernacular elements, so that his writings

[...] preserve enough information for dialectology and folklore studies» (Ostožić, 2012, 11).

At the same time, according to Olga Trofimkina (1983, 38) Ljubiša aspired to eliminate the influence of foreign languages in his literary works, as far as was possible. This author says that Ljubiša was a national language expert, «but at the same time an outstanding master of literary expression», who «did not simply transmit everyday spoken language in literature, but worked actively on improving his expression», so that «the reader gets the impression of the complete authenticity of the vernacular used in his writings» (Trofimkina, 1983, 39). Analyzing only one part of Ljubiša's lexis – borrowed words – she came to the conclusion that the writer tried to make his linguistic expression to the greatest possible extent free of loanwords, including lexis of Italian origin, despite its prevalence in the vernaculars of the coastal areas (Trofimkina, 1983, 39). According to her, this can be explained by the writer's attitude towards his own language, but also by his political convictions which were discussed earlier. Trofimkina further claims that in the corpus she processed, she registered only 8 out of 400 Italian loanwords that Vaso Tomanovic gathered in his article on foreign words in the speech of the Bay of Kotor, and 7 more examples that Tomanovic did not mention in his research. She believes that these are mainly words that became part of the spoken language in the coastal areas together with the objects they refer to, since these objects were not denoted in the vernacular (Trofimkina, 1983, 40). Taking into account all of the above, it could be concluded that Olga Trofimkina believes that Ljubiša the politician, a self-confessed «anti-Italian»,<sup>5</sup> transmitted his political views into his literary works.

The Italian author Luka Vaglio has a different viewpoint. He points out that Ljubiša admired Italy and Italians in general, who in his day were fighting for the unification of Italy and thus aimed to accomplish what the writer wanted his own people to achieve (Vaglio, 2009, XXVI). He indicates the special respect Ljubiša had for the work of the Italian Romantic writer Alessandro Manzoni (1785–1873). It is believed that this Italian author had an impact on Ljubiša's work and that Ljubiša borrowed certain narrative techniques and secrets of the craft of literature from him. In addition to this, according to Vaglio, Manzoni may have served as a source of inspiration for the themes and motifs which Ljubiša elaborated in his stories. Vaglio does not negate the widely accepted view that Ljubiša was one of the staunchest advocates of the equality of languages and nations in Austria; he does, however, believe that Ljubiša still recognized the importance of

<sup>5</sup> This term is used by Rade Petrović (1976).

the Italian linguistic and cultural influence on the Montenegrin coast. Vaglio claims that the presence of Italian loanwords and words originating from the Venetian dialect represent the most interesting aspect of Ljubiša's writings. These loanwords, in his opinion, reflect the real vernacular and represent an integral part of the everyday lexis. In our analysis, we aim to ascertain whether, as Trofimkina claims, Ljubiša the politician affected some of the choices made by Ljubiša the writer and forced him to deny the linguistic reality of his region in which Italian loanwords undoubtedly existed, or if, in fact, the writer, as stated by Luca Vaglio, accepted words of Italian origin as an integral part of the national language and transferred them into his opus.

### CORPUS ANALYSIS

Our corpus consists of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša's collected works published in 1988 in the critical edition prepared by Đ. Radović, N. Vuković, R. Rotković and M. Luketić. This edition includes Ljubiša's literary works, his translations, articles, speeches and interpellations, private and official letters and its bio-bibliography with attachments. In the analyzed corpus, we determined the presence of 251 words of Italian origin, of which there were 211 nouns, 25 verbs, 14 adjectives and one adverb. The collected material was compared with the Italian words recorded in the works of Srđan Music (1972) and Vesna Lipovac Radulović (1997, 2004, 2009). Their works were selected for comparison in order to determine the extent to which Ljubiša's Italian lexicon coincides with the loanwords present in folk speech, despite the fact that the presence of Italian words in these vernaculars was examined approximately a hundred years after the author's death. The original meaning of the registered terms was verified using two monolingual dictionaries of Italian, Zingarelli's and De Mauro's, as well as Boerio's dictionary of the Venetian dialect. Of the total number of Italian loanwords registered in the corpus, 139 examples (55.37%) were registered in the vernaculars we used for comparison, while the remaining 112 (44.63%) were not present in the works by Srđan Music and Vesna Lipovac Radulović. When analyzing the corpus, it can be seen that those words originating from Italian present in Ljubiša's literary works almost always occur in the vernaculars. For example, in his *Pričanja Vuka Dojčevića* 32 Italian loanwords were recorded, of which 25 (78.12%) occur in the spoken language of the text. *Pripovijesti crnogorske i primorske* contains 29 words of Italian origin, of which 25 lexemes, or 86.2% of the total, are present in a vernacular context. In most cases, these terms refer to certain spheres of everyday life and represent an integral part of the language of Ljubiša's homeland,

whose use, as previously stated, the writer strongly promoted. This can be seen from the following examples:

- lopiža** – lat. *lapidea* – a crock;
- škrabijica** – ven. *scarabatolo* (*shelf*) – a drawer;
- korec** – it. *corpetto* – a vest, women's blouse;
- krap** – it. *carpa* – a carp;
- ločika** – it. *lattuga* – a lettuce;
- cukar** – it. *zucchero* ven. *zucaro* – sugar;
- leća** – it. *lenticchia* - lentils;
- širun** – ven. *suro* - a kind of sea fish;
- palomnič** – it. *palamita*, ven. *palamida* – Atlantic bonito, a type of fish;
- sapa** – it. *salpa* – a type of mollusc;
- galija** – it. *galea*, ven. *galia* – a ship with oars, which often uses prisoners to man those oars;
- rinčak** – it. *rezzaglio*, *rizzaglio* - a kind of fishing net;
- tuna** – ven. *togna* – a fishing line with a hook;
- noštromo** – it. *nostromo* – the commander of the deck of a ship;
- palj** – it. *pala* (*shovel*) – a shovel which removes water from the boat.

The remaining written legacy of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša also contains words of Italian origin, but to a lesser degree than his literary works. It should also be noted that the Italian loanwords in this segment of our corpus are present to a much lesser degree in the lists of vernaculars that we used for comparison. In the 48 examples of Ljubiša's speeches and interpellations that we reviewed, we registered 36 words originating from Italian. 14 of these terms (38.88%) occur in the vernaculars of the Boka, Budva and Paštrovići. Ten of these terms were recorded by both Vesna Radulović Lipovac and Srđan Music, while two words were registered only in the north-west part of the Bay of Kotor, and two expressions were found only in the vernacular of Budva and Paštrovići. Most of them refer to various spheres of everyday life:

- dimmazija** – it. *ginnasio* – a gymnasium;
- škatula** – it. *scatola* – a box;
- očale** – it. *occhiali* – glasses;
- ćokolata** – it. *cioccolata* – chocolate;
- dacija** – it. *dazio* – duties, taxes.

Some of these terms have a different or narrower meaning in the vernaculars. For example, the term *financa* (it. *finanza*) in Ljubiša's writings means «finance», while in the vernacular it used to mean «tax collector». The original meaning of the term is «finance; financial police». The noun *štatut* (it. *statuto*) in the vernacular means «regulation, law» while in Ljubiša's language it means «rules». In Ljubiša's language, the term *matrikulja* (it. *matricola*) means «a memorial book, register», while in the vernaculars

of the coast the same noun is used with the sense of a «seaman's book, sailors' document.» In Italian, the term has the first indicated meaning. From the part of the corpus concerning Ljubiša's speeches and interpellations, we also extracted a certain number of words that are not present in the vernacular. The most common in this group are examples belonging to administrative and political terminology:

- burokrata** – it. *burocrate* – a bureaucrat;
- eksekutivni** – it. *esecutivo* – executive;
- burokracija** – it. *burocrazia* – bureaucracy;
- Gibelin** – it. *Ghibellino* – a Ghibelline;
- ministerijalni** – it. *ministeriale* – ministerial;
- korolar** – it. *corollario* – a necessary consequence, a conclusion;
- Đunta** – it. *Giunta* (Committee, Council) – here: the National Committee.

The corpus dedicated to the written legacy of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša also includes his letters. In the critical edition of the entire preserved writings of this author, 125 of these were published. Twenty-three letters were written in a foreign language (either German or Italian), and the remaining 102, which are the object of our interest, were written in his native language. In Ljubiša's letters, we registered 118 words that originate from Italian and its dialects. Of that number, 56 words (47.45%) are registered in the vernaculars. Eight terms (6.77%) appear only in Srđan Mušić's dictionary, while 14 words (11.86%) are present exclusively in Vesna Lipovac Radulović's vocabulary list. Both authors recorded 34 of the terms (28.81%). We also note that Italian loanwords appear more frequently in informal letters, especially in correspondence with family members or close friends, while in official correspondence words of Italian origin are considerably less frequent. For example, in a very short letter addressed to his cousin Visarion (Vasilije) Ljubiša in Constantinople in 1849, 7 words of Italian origin occur:

- Salonić** – it. *Salonicco* – Thessaloniki;
- butiga** – it. *bottega* – a shop;
- komeštibil** – it. *commestibili* – food products;
- frankati** – it. *affrancare* – pay postage;
- konat** – it. *conto* – account;
- skužati** – it. *escutere* – to hunt down your debt, charge;
- preša** – it. *pressa* – haste.

From the above examples, the vernaculars do not register the proper noun *Salonić* and the verb *frankati*. In contrast to this example, in letters intended for officials of the Austrian Empire, political opponents or the editors to whom he send his works, words of Italian origin occur only sporadically, and these are usually technical terms from the spheres of the law and politics:

- ezekucija** – it. *esecuzione* – execution;
- Dieta** – it. *Dieta* – Parliament;
- tribunal** – it. *tribunale* – the court;
- pericija** – it. *perizia* – expertise;
- apelati se** – it. *appellarsi* – to complain;
- gabinet** – it. *gabinetto* – cabinet, the Ministry;
- senjatura** – it. *segnatura* – a signature;
- šuplika** – it. *supplica* – a petition;
- rikurs** – it. *ricorso* – an appeal;
- seduta** – it. *seduta* – a session.

From the above mentioned examples, the vernacular registers the expressions *tribunal* and *apelat se*, while some economic terms that Ljubiša used in his letters are not present:

- asenjirati** – it. *assegnare* – to assign, allot;
- recevitur** – it. *ricevitore* – a tax collector, collector;
- kaša** – it. *cassa* – a fund;
- dita** – it. *ditta* – a firm, company;
- direcion** – it. *direzione* – management;
- reversal** – it. *reversal* – a receipt;
- oferta** – it. *offerta* – an offer;
- kontabilitad** – it. *contabilità* – accounting;
- pjedario** – it. *pieggio* (surety, guarantor) – here: the guarantee, surety;
- konvencion** – it. *convenzione* – a contract agreement.

Words that are present both in Ljubiša's letters and in the vernaculars are mainly deal with different spheres of everyday life, such as the household, types of food or maritime terminology:

- ura** – it. *ora* (time) – a clock;
- tinel** – it. *tinello* – a dining room;
- skala** – it. *scala* – stairs;
- dardin** – it. *giardino* – a garden;
- rožalija** – it. *rosolio* – a type of liquor;
- biž** – ven. *biso* – peas;
- gof** – ven. *gofo* – a kind of marine fish;
- kaštiga** – it. *castigo* – a penalty;
- indenjer** – it. *ingegnere* – an engineer;
- banda** – it. *banda* – a side;
- familja** – it. *famiglia* – a family;
- kolpo** – it. *colpo* – stroke;
- riceta** – it. *ricetta* – a prescription;
- rest** – it. *resto* – the amount of something that remains;
- manin** – ven. *manin* – a bracelet;
- cerot** – it. *cerotto* – a patch, lining;
- vapor** – it. *vapore* – a steamer;
- fortunal** – it. *fortunale* – a storm, a storm at sea;
- kalafit** – it. *calafato* – the repairman on ships;
- porat** – it. *porto* – a port.

Some of the terms that occur in Ljubiša's legacy show minor or major differences in meaning when compared to the same words used in the vernaculars.

lars of the Boka, Budva and Paštrovići. The Italian loanwords recorded in Ljubiša's letters do not have a more generic meaning than those that occur in the local languages. The most important difference between the two groups of terms is the number of meanings. The expressions registered in the vernaculars often have multiple meanings, while Ljubiša uses only one of those. The noun *kaštiga* (*it. castigo*) in Ljubiša's writings means «punishment», while in the local languages, in addition to that meaning, the same word can also mean «evil, misfortune or miracle». In Italian, this noun can mean «a very boring person», while it also signifies «accident, evil» in the expression *castigo di Dio*. The noun *banda* (*it. banda*) in Ljubiša's language is used in the sense of «side», while in the vernaculars it can also mean «a brass band; a group of bandits». In the original language, this noun can offer all of meanings. Ljubiša uses the noun *kolpo* (*it. colpo*) in the sense of «shock», while in the local languages it can mean «heart attack, stroke; a gust of wind, waves and rain». This term has each of the above meanings in Italian. The term *cerot* (*it. cerotto*) in Ljubiša's usage means «patch, ointment, compress», while in the vernacular it may be used in the sense of «boring person». In Italian, the noun has all of these meanings, depending on context. Ljubiša uses the noun *resto* (*it. resto*) to refer to «rest», while in the vernaculars of the coast it can also mean «residue».

In the examined corpus, we noted a certain number of words that are recorded both in Ljubiša's writings and in the vernaculars, but which have completely different meanings. The noun *riganj* (*ven. rigano – cord*) in Ljubiša's use indicates the type of instrument of torture, while in the vernacular this term means «a rope used to bind fishing nets». In the dictionary of the Venetian dialect which we consulted, only the latter meaning is registered. The verb *surgati* (*it. sorgere – to pick up, rise up, go out*) in Ljubiša's language means «to break», while in the vernacular it appears to mean «to throw (anchor) into the sea; push down». Furthermore, in Italian there is an obsolete form of the same verb that can mean «to anchor». The term *dispensa* (*it. dispensa*) in Ljubiša's writing means «freedom from any obligation or regulations», while in the vernacular it is used to mean «a (boat) storage». In Italian, this noun has both of these meanings. The term *ura* (*it. ora*) in Ljubiša's language means «watch», while in the local languages it is used exclusively in the sense of «hour». In Italian, this noun has only the second of these meanings. In the vernaculars of the Montenegrin coastal area the noun *impreza* (*it. impresa*) means «company», while in Ljubiša's usage it means «enterprise». Both meanings are present in the original language. The noun *kartela* (*it. cartella*) means «policy» in Ljubiša's language, while the same

noun in the vernaculars means «lottery ticket; folder, binder». All of these meanings are present in Italian. In vernaculars term *konsulta* (*it. consulta*) occurs with meaning «medical consulting team», while in Ljubiša's language it means «consultation». It should be noted that the meaning of this word present in the vernaculars is referred to as obsolete in dictionaries of Italian.

Discussing the process of the adaptation of the loanwords, the authors that have dealt with this issue so far believe that Montenegrin vernaculars easily assimilate words from Romance languages in general, in particular those that originate from the Italian language or the Venetian dialect, mainly due to the similarity of the vocalic systems. This claim is corroborated by the research results of Srdan Mušić (1972) who dealt with the presence of Romanisms in the vernacular of the Bay of Kotor, in which he recorded a very small number of words that were phonologically not assimilated or partially assimilated. However, in the loan adoption process, some forms undergo changes which are not conditioned by the need for adaptation, but by certain other factors, such as dialectal influences, analogies, assimilations and dissimilations (Sočanac, 2004, 118). We came to the same conclusions when analyzing our corpus – the words of Italian origin registered in the written legacy of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša are adapted according to the same rules that apply to the lexis that entered the Montenegrin vernaculars. This conclusion is valid when discussing the process of adaptation at the phonological or morphological, as well as the semantic level. The vocal changes are mainly conditioned by assimilation or dissimilation, while, generally speaking, morphological changes are related to gender change, which is conditioned by the fact that in Italian, unlike in Montenegrin, there is no category of neuter gender. Of the semantic changes, as mentioned previously, the most common is the narrowing of the number of meanings, which is primarily reflected in the choice of one of all the possible meanings that a particular word may have in the source language. In doing so, as we have shown, the selected meaning of the loanword used by Ljubiša in certain cases differs from the meaning that is most frequent in the vernaculars.

## CONCLUSIONS

Our study was conducted in order to determine the extent to which the political attitudes of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša motivated him to exclude Italian loanwords from his written language, in spite of the fact that those terms were an integral part of the spoken language of his homeland. It has been already pointed out that some experts who have studied Ljubiša's writings state that the words of Italian origin in his

written legacy are present in negligible percentages, and that they believe this to be a consequence of his conscious decision to convey his political views through the language choices he made. There are those who hold the opposite view and believe that Italian loanwords, as an integral part of lexis of Ljubiša's homeland, entered into his language. Based on our research we may present a few conclusions. Firstly, the Italian lexical component in Ljubiša's written legacy is much more prevalent than some authors believe. Secondly, the frequency of Italian loanwords in Ljubiša's writings is conditioned by the kind of text he was writing and by the intended audience. In his literary works, Italian loanwords are present, but the interesting fact is that these words of Italian origin largely coincide with those that are present in the vernaculars of the coastal regions. As to the representation of Italian lexis in Ljubiša's letters, it is necessary to make a distinction between his official correspondence with various government

representative or officials, and his letters to friends and family members. In the second group, Italian loanwords are much more frequent, while their number in official letters, as well as in speeches and interpellations, is negligible. From the above, it could be concluded that in official correspondence, Ljubiša the politician emphasized, through his linguistic choices, his opposition to Italian as an alien language, but in his literary creations as well as in private correspondence, he did not manage to completely exclude the Italian loanwords, since they were an integral part of his national language, whose use he strongly advocated. Finally, all the loanwords of Italian origin registered in the presented corpus have been adapted according to the same rules and models that follow the Italian loanwords in the Montenegrin vernaculars, and changes occur in them according to the same principles – these are mainly caused by dialectal influences, analogies, assimilation or dissimilation.

## BESEDE ITALIJANSKEGA IZVORA V PISNI ZAPUŠČINI STEFANA MITROVA LJUBIŠE

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## POVZETEK

Namen pričajočega prispevka je bil ugotoviti, v kolikšni meri je politična naravnost črnogorskega pisatelja in politika Stefana Mitrova Ljubiše vplivala na to, da je iz svojega jezika izključil italijanske izposojenke, kljub temu, da so bili ti izrazi prisotni v govorjenem jeziku tedanje Črne gore. Na podlagi raziskave smo prišli do več zaključkov; italijanska leksikalna komponenta v Ljubišini pisni zapuščini je veliko bolj prisotna, kot so do sedaj menili nekateri avtorji, pogostnost italijanskih izposojenk v njegovih besedilih pa je pogojena z vrsto besedila in ciljno publiko. Ugotovimo lahko, da je Ljubiša kot politik v uradni korespondenci s svojimi jezikovnimi odločitvami poudarjal svoje nasprotovanje italijanščini kot tujemu jeziku. Po drugi strani pa v svojih literarnih delih in zasebnih korespondencijih ni uspel popolnoma izključiti italijanske leksikalne komponente, saj je bila ta integralni del narodnega jezika, katerega uporabo je močno zagovarjal.

**Ključne besede:** italijanske besede, Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša, ljudski jezik, literarno delo, uradna korespondenca

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**OCENE**

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
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 Apes academicae 2. Ljubljana, založba ZRC, 2018,  
 441 strani

Ob izteku leta 2018<sup>1</sup> je Inštitut za slovensko literaturo in literarne vede ZRC SAZU v zbirki *Apes academicae*, ki jo ureja Luka Vidmar, izdal prevod znanstvene monografije Gerharda Giesemanna, nemškega slavista in dolgoletnega dopisnega člana SAZU, o teologiji Primoža Trubarja (*Die Theologie des Slowenischen Reformators Primož Trubar*. Köln, Bohlau Verlag, 2017). Prevod je delo Fanike Krajnc-Vrečko in njenega vmes preminulega moža Edvarda Vrečka. Osrednji del knjige je razdeljen na devet poglavij, ki jim sledijo sklepne ugotovitve, seznam virov in literature, kazalo osebnih imen (delo Nine Ditmajer) ter povzetka v angleškem in nemškem jeziku.

Nemški izvirnik monografije je v Sloveniji doživel odziv sociologa Marka Kerševana,<sup>2</sup> enega vodilnih strokovnjakov za slovensko protestantiko. Za razliko od njega ima avtor teh vrstic pre malo znanja, da bi lahko kritično presojal problematiko Giesemannove monografije, zato pričajoči zapis ni ocena knjige, temveč njena predstavitev, ki naj spodbudi k branju. K temu napeljuje že, da si Giesemann s knjigo prizadeva zapolnitvi »edino večjo vrzel« na področju študij o Trubarju, kot je zapisal recenzent Kozma Ahačič (drugi je Jože Krašovec), čeprav se je s problematiko Trubarjeve teologije, resda večidel v posameznih razpravah, doslej ukvarjala že plejada raziskovalcev in raziskovalk njegovega opusa, na čelu z Jožetom Rajhmanom.

Giesemann se s knjigo kritično opredeli do njihovih doganj, ki jih vidi kot obremenjene s Trubarjevim kulturnim<sup>3</sup> oziroma nacionalnim svetništvo, in v pretres vzame vprašanje o izvirnosti njegove teologije. Vendar ko ostro zavrne pripisovanje nacionalno-emancipatornih ali kar državotvornih namenov Trubarju, saj je bilo njegovo delo verskega oziroma misjonarskega značaja, je Giesemannova kritika pretežno uperjena proti slavnemu možu. Kaže, da je vzrok temu njegovo slabše poznavanje najnovejših raziskav in premočno zanašanje na starejša dela, saj v znanstveni literaturi o reformaciji na Slovenskem že dlje časa obstaja osnovni interdisciplinarni konsenz, ki kot vodilo literarnega ustvarjanja



slovenskih protestantskih piscev razume njihovo prizadavanje za zveličanje svojih rojakov, in ne t. i. narodnega buditeljstva, ki ji ga očita Giesemann. Kajti, čeprav drži, da slovenistika in zgodovinopisje kot osrednji t. i. nacionalni vedi pri »romantiziranju«<sup>4</sup> Trubarja in reformacije na Slovenskem nista povsem »nedolžni«, je Giesemann nacionalno pozlato, ki naj bi še vedno močno oviral kritično obravnavo Trubarjevega dela in časa, mestoma le predimenzioniral. Drugo vprašanje so, seveda, obeležitve raznih obletnic in proslave ob Dnevu reformacije, ko kdaj zanese tudi znanstveno srenjo, kaj šele tiste, katerih vedenje o Trubarju črpa skoraj izključno iz nacionalnega imaginarija. Kljub temu oziroma prav zato gre pričakovati, da bo delo ob znanstvenih odzivih spodbudilo tudi reakcije iz kulture spomina. Giesemann sicer priznava, da je danes v slovenski znanosti nacionalistična politura s Trubarja večinoma odstranjena, le pri vrednotenju Trubarjeve teologije naj bi še kar »zapeljevala v prece-

1 Pričajoča predstavitev knjige je bila sprva predvidena za objavo v medtem (zaenkrat) ugasli reviji Tretji dan.

2 Marko Kerševan: »Problem s Trubarjem«. O(b) knjigi Gerharda Giesemanna Teologija slovenskega reformatorja Primoža Trubarja. Stati inu obstati: revija za vprašanja protestantizma, 14, 2018, 27, 161–187.

3 O pojmu glej npr. Marijan Dovič (ur.): *Kulturni svetniki in kanonizacija*. Ljubljana, Založba ZRC, 2016.

4 Sašo Jerše: *Die Slowenische Reformation zwischen dem Amboss Christi und dem Hammer der Romantik – Zur Hagiographie der Moderne und deren Vormodernen Grenzen*. Jahrbuch für die Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich 129, 2013, 142 sl.; prim. Sašo Jerše: »Apoteoza Primoža Trubarja« – romantični pogled na slovensko reformacijo in njegove meje. Stati inu obstati: revija za vprašanja protestantizma, 15/16, 2012, 208–228, 390–391.

njevanje«. Pričakovati, da bo enako v nacionalnem (!) imaginariju, vsaj v kratkem, bi bilo seveda protislovno in deplasirano, čeprav kaže, da (ne le) Giesemannu to ni povsem jasno.

Izvzemši slednje, je Giesemannov polemični ton prvenstveno usmerjen zoper dojemanje Trubarjevih teoloških zapisov kot njemu lastne, sistematične in izvirne teologije, izše iz spoznanj, do katerih naj bi se dokopal sam. Giesemann svojo zavnitev tovrstne percepcije utemelji na natančni analizi Trubarjevih del (oba katekizma, predgovor k prevodu Nove zaveze, Cerkveni red itd.), v kateri upošteva zlasti besedilne strukture, razvrščanje teoloških spoznanj, način argumentacije na podlagi svetopisemskih citatov ter način obravnavanja ključnih pojmov, kot so opravičenje, postava in milost, izvirni greh, dvojna človekovna narava, kristologija itd. Pri tem opozori, da je treba Trubarjeva učena opozorila, citate ipd., ki doslej naj ne bi bili kritično ovrednoteni, razumeti kot običajni in nujni instrumentarij, ki naj bi avtorju dal potrebnou kredibilnost, denimo pred württemberškimi teologi, ne pa kot iskanje samostojne teološke poti. Na podlagi podrobne in primerjalne analize Giesemann sklepa, da je Trubar po odhodu iz Notranje Avstrije leta 1548 prišel povsem pod vpliv luteranske teologije, pri tem pa je zajemal tako iz Luthrovega opusa kot iz del njegovih naslednikov, zlasti Melanchthona, Brenza in Veita Dietricha. Tudi tam, kjer naj bi ali je Trubar prevzemal od Bullingerja ali Vlačića, Giesemann ne vidi odklona od luteranske pravovernosti, saj naj bi šlo zgolj za takšna besedila in tolmačenja, ki so bila v njenem okviru nesporna.

V nasprotju z nekaterimi slovenskimi raziskovalci Giesemann zato pod vprašaj postavi domnevni vpliv cvingljanstva in humanizma (vključno z njegovimi ideali individualizma) na Trubarja, vsaj po letu 1548. Kar je bilo pred tem, pa se mu za razumevanje Trubarjevega dela ne zdi potrebno »natančneje raziskovati«. Čeprav gre morda za sporno ali tendenciozno mnenje, drži, da je rekonstrukcija Trubarjevih teoloških pogledov pred letom 1550 zaradi po-manjanja ustreznih virov onemogočena, saj zgolj njegovi spomini ne zadoščajo. Giesemann zavrne tudi tendenze, ki skušajo Trubarju pripisati teološko enakovrednost osrednjim osebnostim reformacije ali posredništvo v konfesionalnih sporih med cvinglijanci in luterani. Teološko Trubarja pojmuje kot lokalnega reproducenta pravoverne luteranske teologije, vendar mu pri tem ne zmanjšuje po-mena, ki ga je imel za vzpostavitev in razvoj slovenskega knjižnega jezika.

Giesemann izvirnosti in pomena Trubarjevega opusa torej ne vidi v domnevno svojski in medkonfesionalno posredniški teologiji, temveč v njegovi sposobnosti, da je kompleksna teološka vprašanja, kot pronicljiv misijonar in pedagog, zmogel posredovati na nedogmatičen način. Pri tem v luteransko teologijo ni posegal vsebinsko in se je tudi vselej izrecno izogibal vsakršnemu dispuetu. Njegovo poslanstvo je bilo drugje: svojim rojakom s »pravo

vero« omogočiti zveličanje. Vendar je »preprostim Slovencem« odrešenjsko oznanilo lahko posredoval le v njihovem jeziku in primerno njihovemu mišljenju, zato je moral najprej »posloveniti« luteransko teologijo. Ker naloga ni bila zgolj jezikovna, je Trubarju pomagala tudi sposobnost, da se je znal vživeti v »vsakdanje skušnjave, stiske, oporekanja in strahove« svojih bralk oziroma poslušalcev, pri čemer je nanje deloval tudi tolažilno, kot vsak dober dušni pastir.

Zgolj kratka predstavitev Giesemannove knjige oziroma jedra njegovih tez je za razumevanje teh seveda nujno pomanjkljiva, vendar se glede na polemičnost monografije o kronološko prvem slovenskem kulturnem svetniku ni batiti, da bi umanjkale tudi (nove) vsebinske, v protestantskih teologijah ustrezno podkovane ocene dela. Paziti bo treba le, da ne bo zaradi kulture spomina ost kritike namesto v bistvu zabadala v slamo.

**Žiga Oman**

Roland Kaltenegger:  
DIE OPERATIONSZONE 'ADRIATISCHES KÜSTENLAND'. DER KAMPF UM TRIEST, ISTRIEN UND FIUME 1944–1945.  
Würzburg, Flechsig Verlag, 2018,  
444 strani

Nemška založniška hiša Flechsig je leta 2018 izdala novo monografijo Rolanda Kalteneggerja, nemškega vojaškega zgodovinarja, ki se ukvarja predvsem s pre-čevanjem zgodovine gorskih enot (primarno Tretjega rajha). Njegovo najnovejše delo je posvečeno zgodovini Operacijske cone Jadransko primorje (Operationszone Adriatisches Küstenland; OZAK), ki se je raztezala na območju severne Italije, zahodne Slovenije in severozahodne Hrvaške v času nemške okupacije med letoma 1943 in 1945.

Avtor se, kljub naslovu, ne posveti sami ustanovitvi OZAK septembra 1943, ampak prične *in media res*, pri čemer se osredotoča na zgodovino 188. (rezervne) gorske divizije, ki je delovala na tem področju. V prvem poglavju dodatno predstavi ustanovitev 392. (hrvaške) pehotne divizije (znana tudi kot Vražja divizija), ki se je na tem območju znašla ob koncu vojne. Na kratko omeni še 237. in 278. pehotno divizijo, ter zgodovino kraških lovcev. Medtem ko je bila dotična divizija garnizirana v italijanskem delu OZAK, je vseeno delovala tudi na današnjem slovenskem in hrvaškem ozemlju.

V drugem poglavju se bralec seznanji z zasedbo severnoitalijanskega ozemlja po kapitulaciji Kraljevine Italije v septembru 1943. Pri zasedbi je sodelovala tudi 188. rezervna gorska divizija, ki je imela v OZAK naloge, da nadaljuje z usposabljanjem pripadnikov gorskih enot ter preprečuje partizanske sabotaže na komunikacije. Objavljeni so še izvirni nemški dokumenti o

napadu bataljona Heine na partizansko zasedeno Cerkno januarja 1944,<sup>1</sup> ter o drugih akcijah tega bataljona (operacija Renate aprila 1944 in operaciji v začetku junija t. l.). Avtor se v tem poglavju dotakne še nemške gradnje fortifikacijskih linij na severu Italije (vključno s t. i. »Karststellung« med Polo, Reko in Trstom).

Tretje poglavje je namenjeno predstavitevi nemškega varnostnega sistema v OZAK, natančneje varnostnih območij ter poveljnikov teh območij, kot tudi nemškega pogleda na (slovensko) partizansko politično in vojaško organizacijo (Avnoj, OF, NOV in POS). V četrtem poglavju avtor analizira operacijo Weldenstein (*Unternehmen Weldenstein*), ki je aprila 1944 potekala v čepovanski dolini proti partizanskemu 9. korpusu.


Avtor se v petem poglavju razpiše o nemških pripravah na morebitno zavezniško izkrcanje v severnem delu Jadranskega morja, kot tudi pripravam na obrambo Trsta, glavnega mesta OZAK, za kar je bila marca 1944 ustanovljena »Bojna skupina Trst« (*Kampfgruppe Triest*). Pri tem je objavljeno izvirno nemško povelje o sestavi bojne skupine, njeni aktivaciji ter nalogah podrejenih enot ob zavezniški invaziji.

Šesto poglavje je namenjeno trem protipartizanskim operacijam (*Prien*, *Zugspitz-Höllental* in *Dachstein*), v katerih so v avgustu in septembru 1944 sodelovali deli 188. divizije. Avtor tudi tu v glavnem le povzame poročila vpletenih nemških enot oz. vodilne enote. Celotno sedmo poglavje govori o obalnem obrambnem podobmočju Trst-Jug (*Küstenverteidigungsunterabschnitt Triest-Süd*), ki ga je pokrival 137. rezervni gorski polk in je zajemal območje med Miljami in Trstom. Dotični polk je bil odgovoren tudi za pokrivanje Sermina in Izole.

V osmem poglavju je predstavljen 47. gorski korpus, ki je združeval večino nemških enot na območju OZAK, vključno s 188. divizijo. Dalje avtor predstavi tudi odnose med nadrejenim poveljstvom (*Oberbefehlshaber Südost*). Deveto poglavje je kronološko zamenjeno na začetek leta 1945. Temu sledi poglavje o bojih 47. korpusa na področju med Reko in Trstom, poglavje o nemški kapitulaciji na italijanskem bojišču (april-maj 1945), ter o zadnjih bojih za Trst. Trinajsto poglavje se posebej dotakne zadnjih bojev za Istro in Reko, kjer je delovala 392. (hrvaška) pehotna divizija in je preprečevala napredovanje jugoslovanske 4. armade.

Na koncu knjige avtor sledi zadnjim bojnim dnem štirih gorskih polkov (901., 902., 903. in 904.). 18. poglavje je dejansko kratka predstavitev kraških lovcev (*Karstjäger*). Temu sledi še poglavje o kapitulaciji armadne skupine E na jugoslovanskem ozemlju, ter o povojnih dogodkih (ujetništvo, poboji).

Avtor je pri izdelavi knjige uporabil tako arhivsko gradivo (iz državnih arhivov ter lastnega arhiva) kot tudi širok nabor literature. Pri tem je potrebno izpostaviti, da v dotičnem gradivu ni virov s področja nekda-



nje Jugoslavije (Slovenija, Hrvaška) in Italije, kot tudi ne literature avtorjev, ki se ukvarjajo s preučevanjem zgodovine tega območja. Posledično je vsebina knjige napisana zelo enostransko, le na podlagi nemških virov, kar okrni pregled medvojnega dogajanja. To se najbolj vidi pri neidentifikaciji partizanskih enot, ki so se borile proti 188. diviziji in drugim nemškim enotam na območju OZAK.

V knjigi se nahajajo tudi številne fotografije, zemljevidi, medvojni dokumenti, plakati, itd., ki popestrijo branje, pri čemer so nekatere fotografije manj pozname oz. celo objavljene prvič. Knjiga bi bila boljša tudi z vključitvijo (stvarnega) kazala, ki bi olajšalo iskanje po samem besedilu. Kot že rečeno, knjiga primarno temelji na delovanju 188. (rezervne) gorske divizije in ne prinaša popolnega pregleda zgodovine OZAK (npr. popolnoma zanemari delovanje policjskih sil, Rijarno, itd.). Vseeno je knjiga lahko uporabna za preučevalce druge svetovne vojne na tem območju, predvsem za tiste, ki se zanimajo za delovanje nemške 188. divizije.

**Klemen Kocjančič**

1 Prim. Boris Mlakar, *Tragedija v Cerknem pozimi 1944* (Gorica, Goriška Mohorjeva družba, 2000).

## KAZALO K SLIKAM NA OVITKU

SLIKA NA NASLOVNICI: *Hidžab kot simbol naj bi posredoval negativne interpretacije islama in muslimanov v svetovnem pogledu islamofobije, kar služi legitimnosti njihove zavrnitve* (Wikimedia Commons).

Slika 1: *Ker med splošno stavko v Londonu leta 1926 ni bilo na voljo javnega prevoza, so se te dame na delo peljale s kotalkami* (Pinterest).

Slika 2: *Reklamna razglednica – ženska na kotalkah* (Pinterest).

Slika 3: *Slika, na kateri sta dva otroka – Frances in Eddie Walker, je bila poslana kot božična voščilnica gospe Irene Lane* (Pinterest).

Slika 4: *Mlad francoski delavec* (Foto: Raymond Voinquel, 1946; Pinterest).

Slika 5: *Protestnik, ki nasprotuje projektu Park51, nosi transparent proti šeriatu. Park51 je bil prvotno zamišljen kot center islamske skupnosti in mošeja na Spodnjem Manhattanu v New Yorku. Razvijalci so upali, da bodo s tem spodbudili medverski dialog v širši skupnosti* (Wikimedia Commons).

Slika 6: *Člani kotalkarskega kluba Great Yarmouth na Wellington Pier, c. 1950* (Pinterest).

Slika 7: *Edvardska dekleta na kotalkah* (Pinterest).

Slika 8: *Disko oblačila* (Izgled: Leonard McGill, 1980; Pinterest).

Slika 9: *Kotalkanje na ulicah Berlina, 1910* (Pinterest).

Slika 10: *Covornik na demonstraciji pobude »Ne želimo islama na Českem« 14. marca 2015 v Čeških Budjeovicah, Republika Češka* (Wikimedia Commons).

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FRONT COVER: *The hijab as a symbol is supposed to convey negative interpretations of Islam and Muslims in the world view of Islamophobia, which serves to legitimize their rejection* (Wikimedia Commons).

Figure 1: *With no public transport on offer, these ladies take to roller skating to work during the 1926 general strike in London* (Pinterest).

Figure 2: *Advertising postcard – woman in rollerskates* (Pinterest).

Figure 3: *Sent as a Christmas greeting to Miss Irene Lane, the two children are Frances and Eddie Walker* (Pinterest)

Figure 4: *Young French worker* (Photo: Raymond Voinquel, 1946; Pinterest).

Figure 5: *A protester opposing the Park51 project, carries an anti-sharia sign. Park51 was originally envisioned as an Islamic community center and mosque in Lower Manhattan, New York City. The developers hoped to promote an interfaith dialogue within the greater community* (Wikimedia Commons).

Figure 6: *Members of the Great Yarmouth roller skating club at Wellington Pier, c. 1950* (Pinterest).

Figure 7: *Roller-skating Edwardian ladies* (Pinterest).

Figure 8: *Disco Dressing* (Looks by Leonard McGill, 1980; Pintrerest).

Figure 9: *Roller skating on the streets of Berlin, 1910* (Pinterest).

Figure 10: *Speaker at demonstration of initiative »We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic« on 14 March 2015 in České Budějovice, Czech Republic* (Wikimedia Commons).



